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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the way that a change management entity facilitated a deep and lasting 
business transformation, undertaken as a major program of projects that were engaged in business 
process re-engineering, logistics supply change management and formation of joint ventures and 
forms of alliance.  It takes a project management perspective of this change agent with a strong 
focus on how it achieved change through leadership, co-learning strategies and collaboration. 
This study takes place within the context of a unique historical period of economic transition for 
Latin America. 
 
By the time the globalization wave started to hit South America in the late 80s, both its national 
economies and various logistic segments were used to operating within a protective and 
restrictive business context. Regional companies enjoyed operating within bilateral treaties and 
under the scope of a wide array of subsidies and protective regulations that let them grow without 
having to face the complexities of a truly competitive free market. On the contrary, foreign 
companies either found regional entry barriers simply too high or that these barriers deterred 
them from expanding across a new potential market. 
 
During the early 90s, when the globalization phenomena combined with an economic opening 
process across the region, South America faced a deep business transformation process 
expanding along its coasts. The great South American common market known as Mercosur, 
began to experience a potential threat on the part of the global (and therefore more resourceful) 
world-class shipping companies, port and logistic operators who considered this region of the 
world as their next necessary step toward achieving larger economies of scale to help them 
remain globally competitive. South America in general, and the Mercosur market in particular, 
became strategic markets that these global firms could not overlook without running the risk of  
losing their global competitive advantage.   
 
The globalization wave brought about two trends that forms a critical context to the essence of 
this research into the Mercosur Atlantic Corridor Project (the Corridor). These were:  
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1. The opening process of the Mercosur economies toward a less regulated and a more 
liberal concept of trade which originated within a window of opportunity for the global 
operators to target the region; and  
2. The national and regional operators’ relative competitive weakness and their firm 
perception on the way the globalization wave might impact their business. This led to a 
remarkable regional business transformation process.  
 
The Corridor was established as a regional reaction to the global threat by an increasing number 
of national and regional companies (both logistic and logistic-related firms) that decided to join 
forces to face (by then) an uncertain and threatening business environment. These operators came 
from a wide array of sectors within the shipping and logistic world: ocean and river transportation 
companies; marine and river port operators; air-station operators; trucking and railway 
companies; warehousing and distribution operators; freight-forwarding firms; air-cargo freighting 
operators; consultancy and surveying services; law and insurance services; exporting and 
importing companies; ship-building and naval repair firms; traders and brokers; etc.      
 
The Corridor provides an example of a business transformation project involving extensive 
knowledge transfer and trust building as core elements and that identifying this through the 
research was a key outcome. The research examines the Corridor’s ability to generate trust first 
and then to facilitate knowledge transfer among stakeholders. Not less relevant is the 
identification of leadership, collaboration, culture, and corporate strategy as vital conductors for 
stakeholders to share critical internal information and join forces to face extra-regional threats.   
 
The research focuses on the Corridor as a single entity using five case studies of different 
complexity by exposing distinct angles of business transformation through the participation of a 
rather wide sample of companies and segments.    
 
The case studies provide readers with the necessary elements to clearly visualize the extent 
reached by the globalization process across the region as well as help them identifying the views, 
opinions, and insights of all those who participated in a series of interviews and provided useful 
feedback to the research aims. A cross case-study analysis also helps to not only better 
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understand the “whys” and “hows” of the various alliances, partnerships, and joint ventures but 
also the project management approach taken by these organizations in facing the new business 
environment. Different business realities under a common business environment help us 
understand the way trust, knowledge, and leadership played among stakeholders as well as the 
way culture played its role along the process and how the Corridor project facilitated this. This 
process provided fertile ground to examine the way the Corridor became a valid community of 
practice from where other communities of practice originated and developed by combining 
different aspects of knowledge, strategy, collaboration, cooperation, leadership, trust, and culture 
– all under a project management perspective. 
 
A qualitative research methodology has been chosen in view of the specificity of the data 
gathered and the subjective nature of the information surveyed along with the author’s direct 
participation and observation. This dual role has made possible the gathering of data from the 
inside of the Corridor Project as well as the identification of critical information arising out of a 
number of interviews and informal conversations. 
 
The Corridor Project developed as a dynamic community of practice with project management 
office characteristics where a number of projects were born and evolved through their different 
life cycles to later turn into different business transformation outcomes. The research suggests 
that the Corridor could become a model to put into practice in other regions of the world where 
production and consumption asymmetries are found or where infrastructural asymmetries could 
call for a Corridor-like project to overcome trade imbalances or increase regional trade – all this 
leading to a series of business transformation opportunities to let corporations become more 
competitive by making a strategic use of knowledge sharing and transfer.     
 
 Keywords: Globalization; Knowledge Management; Community of Practice; Leadership; 
Collaboration; Trust. 
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1. Thesis Introduction 
 
1.1 - CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter commences with a brief description of the Doctor of Project Management 
(DPM). It then explains how the author used the core coursework phase of the DPM 
(exposure to the literature through the combination of reflective learning, action and field 
practice relating to the DPM’s four areas of knowledge) to explore an innovative linkage 
between theory and practice that framed the choice of research topic—resulting in this 
thesis. An explanation on how the research idea evolved then follows, allowing the present 
research topic to develop, which was influenced by the coursework and by peers views and 
opinions together with field practice that facilitated interaction and experimentation that 
made this dissertation possible. An outline of the aims and objectives of this thesis is then 
provided, along with the research proposition and research questions. The next section 
concentrates on the overall research strategy and how it fits into a project setting. This is 
then followed by a description of the dissertation’s scope and limitations, literature review 
within the defined fields of knowledge, and its expected contribution to better PM practice.  
The chapter concludes with a brief outline of the coming chapters and a final summary of 
the present chapter. 
 
1.2 - RESEARCH STUDY BACKGROUND 
The Doctor of Project Management (DPM) is a mixture of coursework (33%) and research (67%) 
where coursework is delivered on-line or in executive mode and research is undertaken in the 
candidate’s workplace focused on a project management context (Graduate School of Business 
2002, p2). The DPM program relies to a great extent on the research capabilities of the candidate 
and a great degree of commitment taken by the candidate to combine coursework, workload, and 
reflection on practice. All this will eventually lead the candidate to naturally link the research 
papers he/she has been working on throughout the years with aim of improving project work and 
project management practice. The program is intended to take project managers from their 
existing high levels of project management mastery to new dimensions of reflection on practice; 
through introducing academic rigour to the candidate’s reflective learning process and linking 
his/her project management case study projects and individual knowledge and perspectives.  
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The DPM program introduces the candidate to four new areas of knowledge that are at the cutting 
edge of project management practice and uses this new knowledge as a vehicle to develop project 
management wisdom (Graduate Business School 2002, p3). These are: Knowledge Management 
(KM) and innovation (Area 1); project management leadership topics such as stakeholder 
engagement, leading versus managing, cross cultural and team culture and strategy in a PM 
context (Area 2); Project procurement and Ethics (Area 3); and a further elective course, often 
tailored to the DPM candidate’s research interest (Area 4).  
 
The DPM combines reflective learning action on these four new areas of knowledge with work 
practice experiences focused on fieldwork and research on projects (in this case from all over 
South America), to bring about a genuine and useful linkage between theory and practice. This 
has resulted in the DPM experience being a difficult exercise to complete in view of the South 
American region’s own cultural particulars and managerial characteristics, as discussed in the 
later chapters. On-site project management constraints, far from constituting obstacles for 
research, often provided fertile ground to experiment on and continuously exercise reflective 
learning while gathering rich feedback aiming at improving project management practice.  
 
The author’s experience of conducting the research study as described in this dissertation 
illustrates an interesting interaction between coursework, reflective learning action, and work 
practice that fits consistently into RMIT’s professional doctorate aims and objectives for 
candidates to prepare a dissertation that is primarily based on the understanding of the overlap 
and interaction of action and its consequences leading to a consistent piece of research. The 
author’s contribution is mainly based on considerable field experience and a permanent search of 
those linkages between theory and practice that result in worthwhile consideration of the 
betterment of project management practice in complex situations. Views and opinions of project 
management peers at RMIT along with the coursework outcomes have exerted a clear influence 
upon the author with respect to taking into account not only different perspectives or professional 
opinions, but also to include the cultural factor and the extent to which knowledge management is 
valued and put into practice.  
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Core courses
Reflection on core course ideas and its application to projects
Feedback from colleagues, peers mentors,
and academic supervisors
Further action, reflection, feedback
External environment:
• The workplace
• The projects
• Pressures and demands
• Learning opportunities
Context:
• National culture
• Projects culture
• Feedback capacity
• Feedback willingness
Improved PM Practices
 
Figure 1.1:  DPM Learning Model and Outcome 
 
Figure 1.1 illustrates the learning model undertaken using the DPM in this thesis and its 
outcome. The author brings experience and insights from various large industrial projects in 
South America centered on hydrocarbons, mining, and international transportation industry 
segments where both his direct observation and direct participation resulted in the pyramidal 
model illustrated in Figure 1.1. Coursework provided a foundation upon which subsequent 
interactions of reflection and feedback provided a  fruitful outcome between coursework, peers 
views and impressions, reflective learning using an action research approach. Action research is 
described by McNiff and Whitehead (2000, p203) as starting with the question “How do I 
improve my work? It requires the researcher to be central to the research process, to embody self-
learning and self-transformation through that learning, not aiming for closure but ongoing 
development, participating in the research rather than being an independent observer and 
focusing on the process being educational. There are a number of forms of action research that 
will be discussed later in Chapter 5. This work uses a case study in which the author was a 
participant. The most important aspect of the dissertation however, is possibly represented by 
what Kurt Lewin, in his classic formulation of field theory (Lewin,1951) defined in the sense that 
behavior is influenced by its environment and the context within which it occurs (Reason & 
Bradbury 2001, p38) – a topic of utmost importance in project management. Coursework at 
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RMIT provided the foundation of the pyramid upon which, the workplace largely served as the 
site for undertaking research (Malfroy 2004, pp68-70). The results are improved project 
management practice employed by the candidate and disseminated more widely to colleagues and 
the PM profession.  
 
As CEO of a consulting organization that had, through reputation and role in the Corridor 
project, enabled me to influence colleagues and peers within the Corridor entity. 
 
1.3 - RESEARCH IDEA 
The research idea arrived at for this thesis was chosen from one of several projects that I have 
been involved with that were of interest in terms of my DPM journey of reflection. 
 
The basic idea of the present dissertation originated through combining my experience in 
one of the major projects he participated in with the ideas generated from the Project 
Procurement and Ethics course. During this coursework I had the opportunity to investigate 
two key management fields: sustainable development (that is, considering not only the 
financial, but also the social and environmental impact to ensure long term viability) with 
all its ethics components, and alliances and partnerships as a way to focus on value-
enhancement and resource use effectiveness through genuine corporate collaboration. By 
then, I was immersed in South America’s largest gas fields project in Peru (the Camisea 
project) and in two gas plant expansions project in south eastern Bolivia (San Alberto I & 
II). The coursework exerted a definite influence on the way I started to look at the mode the 
coursework subjects were dealt with at the respective job-sites. Thus, gradually I took 
advantage of my direct participation in both projects to observe relevant events in detail, 
gather related data, and talk to people on-site with appropriate knowledge and insights to 
help make sense of what was taking place there. These insights included the way that 
leadership was exercised; the way indigenous communities were hired and treated; the way 
project activities impacted on the environment and the way the contingency planning 
worked or did not work; the feelings and attitudes of people; cultural insights and personal 
perceptions hidden behind people’s way of looking and behaving before unfriendly 
contexts etc. By then, I mentally constructed ideas for a potential contribution for better 
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project management practice in terms of ethics and sustainable development, while 
carefully looking into the extent to which project partnerships and alliances might result in 
better site management practice. I scrutinized real events and situations, observed at the 
various job-sites, and contrasted these with coursework learning materials along with RMIT 
peers’ views and opinions, always with the purpose of bringing to light a different 
perspective to confront these rather unique situations. 
 
The knowledge management (KM) coursework was of paramount importance to me as it gave me 
the opportunity to relate knowledge transfer and sharing concepts within the MERCOSUR 
Atlantic Corridor project (henceforth referred to as ‘the Corridor’)- a project where corporate 
interactions within various dimensions led to alliances, partnerships, economies, and change. 
Further, this project was significantly complex and unique enough to incorporate ideas and from 
coursework topics the author had completed within the field of Project Procurement and Ethics. 
Finally, the “leadership” coursework constituted one of the pillars of the dissertation in view of 
its intrinsic importance as regards to transactional and transformational dimensions together with 
the leader-follower interrelationship in a project that involved large multinational players in the 
mining and steel industry segments – always in South America. Finally, it was the combination 
of the above mentioned coursework topics which fitted consistently into a regional project that 
embodied a large number of players (participant individual people and firms) and therefore 
diverse scenarios. In this way, I naturally found a dissertation topic that allows the inclusion and 
interaction of coursework subjects and a real connection with a project which is characterized by 
diversity, complexity, and uniqueness - all within a region where normally project management 
practice experience recurrent barriers to good practice. 
 
1.4- CORRIDOR AIMS AND OBJECTIVES THAT FRAMED THE RESEARCH 
PROBLEM 
The aim of this study is to establish how a huge geographical region along with a growing 
number of players can re-engineer its business methods to encourage intra-regional cooperation 
by focusing on an efficient knowledge management while exercising a different leadership style 
to that normally adopted in the region. Improving the culture of cooperation of the Corridor 
partners turns out of paramount importance encouraging further effective medium and long-term 
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collaboration to improve the MERCOSUR economies and competitiveness as well as value-
generation of its participating organizations. This aim entails gradual acceptance and putting into 
practice a deep regional business transformation by increasing the number and quality of 
participants who – to a greater or lesser extent – saw themselves compelled to overcome a 
number of barriers that were imposed by contextual circumstances (to be more fully discussed in 
Chapter 2). 
 
Therefore this thesis focuses on, and seeks to understand, the following Corridor project 
objectives that led to conceptualizing it as a strategic community of practice1 (CoP) and 
therefore helped shape the research questions: 
1. Improving cooperation between Corridor participants to enable the creation of a 
knowledge marketplace aiming at gaining competitive advantage for individual 
organizations and Corridor participants; 
2. Defending participants’ market share and further improving it by developing a timely 
reaction capacity to global business trends impacting on the region; 
3. Fostering collaboration to overcome regional infrastructure deficiencies and further 
achieve both regional and global-oriented economies of scale;  
4. Facilitating the identification of business opportunities at the regional level and promoting 
the access of both service and infrastructure-related foreign direct investment; and 
5. Strengthening intra-regional trade by linking remote locations with consumption poles 
within the region while increasing overall regional economies of scale. 
 
The first objective has to do with knowledge sharing and transfer as a vehicle towards reducing 
negative impacts to business cooperation and enhancing trust and cooperation between the 
Corridor participants through the so called “integration round-tables”. These periodical 
gatherings served as fertile ground to encourage corporations get in touch with one another and 
share knowledge in search of achieving a common competitive advantage under some sort of 
win-win scenario. The second objective is directly related to the effects globalization trends had 
on the region where the Corridor, along with its communities of practice (CoP) —see Section 2.5 
for support of this assertion, induced participants to face business transformation successfully and 
                                                 
1 See Section 2.5 for a full explanation of this term 
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coordinate their regional responses by learning how to cope with change, while making good use 
of innovation strategies. The third objective raises once more, the importance of regional 
cooperation and value enhancement through CoP, by not only focusing on achieving regional 
economies of scale but also enlarging these and expanding their global reach. The fourth 
objective aims at promoting better project management practice upon identifying niche markets 
where direct investment helps improving and expanding the existing level of infrastructure as a 
way to become the whole system more viable, sustainable and competitive at the regional level to 
be able to face the global trends. The last objective brings to the discussion table what probably 
was the very first target of the Corridor, which was always aimed at bringing remotely located 
organizations and resources closer to consumption centers by making use of innovative 
procurement, leadership, change, and cross-cultural management techniques and practices.  
 
1.5-   INITIAL RESEARCH PROPOSITION AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Based on the Corridor’s aims and objectives that framed the research idea, the research 
proposition is that the MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor Project becomes an instrumental entity 
where regional stakeholders find a useful system and the adequate tools to formulate and 
implement a business reengineering strategy towards achieving larger economies of scale. As 
such, the system entails stakeholders to engage in a cultural transformation journey, aiming at 
overcoming trans-national operational deficiencies and gaining regional competitive advantage.  
Consequently, a number of research questions naturally present themselves in connection with 
the proposition and the embodied aims and objectives of the dissertation: 
• Research Question 1: 
What are the variables granting the Corridor project the ability to generate trust first and facilitate 
knowledge transfer among stakeholders? 
• Research Question 2: 
How do Corridor stakeholders share vital internal information and join forces to face extra-
regional threats? 
• Research Question 3: 
Why do Corridor stakeholders show their current attitudes and motivations toward committing 
themselves with partnerships, alliances, and joint-ventures? 
• Research Question 4: 
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How does culture play a role in easing or impeding the development of the Corridor vision 
throughout the region? 
• Research Question 5: 
What factors hold a more relative influence on stakeholders to allow vertical or horizontal 
integration to occur? 
• Research Question 6: 
What is the actual awareness degree among stakeholders with respect to sustainable development 
and its future relevance over the region? 
 
1.6 - RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
The selected research approach is that of a single case study in view of its uniqueness and great 
number of variables that are embodied in the project. As such, this case study is both descriptive 
and explanatory. It contains an exploratory phase as there is no similar project in the world with 
the exception of the North Atlantic Maritime Corridor, which is more recent, more modest in its 
objectives, and more limited in its scope of action. Case studies may be exploratory, descriptive, 
or explanatory (Yin 1994, p4). Even though each case study strategy has its distinctive 
characteristics, there are large areas of overlap among them (Sieber 1973). The type of research 
questions posed in the dissertation makes it necessary to deepen the explanatory and exploratory 
dimensions, though without excluding the descriptive stage in view of the project rareness or 
uniqueness. A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon 
within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are 
not clearly evident (Yin 1994, p13).  
 
The MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor project is developed as a single case study though it 
embodies various units of analysis, which, owing to their magnitude and extent, are presented as 
sub-case studies or sub-units of analysis. These subunits of analysis are not intended to serve as 
literal or theoretical replication, but to help demonstrate the propositions by addressing the 
research questions within a pattern-matching dimension, and by incorporating different angles 
and conclusions arising out of the subunits. This situation leads the dissertation to look more like 
a multiple-case design despite containing the three basic elements of a single-case design: critical 
test ; unique case ; revelatory case (Yin 1994, p45). The evidence of multiple cases is often 
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considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust 
(Herriot & Firestone,1983). It is also a case that because of its uniqueness or rareness perhaps, 
this can be considered to be also revelatory as it allows knowledge, culture, procurement, ethics, 
and leadership to interact and innovate within a transnational environment. Yin (1994 p40) 
argues that the revelatory condition exists when an investigator has the opportunity to observe 
and analyze a phenomenon previously inaccessible to scientific information.   
 
Multiple data collection methods are utilized including literature review in three languages, 
individual interviewing of key players at regional level in an open-ended fashion, desk-based 
investigation of monthly minutes, and archival records analysis – further to what the author 
regards as of paramount importance: direct observation and direct participation. These are the 
main sources of evidence, though a more detailed explanation will be made available in Chapter 
5 of this dissertation - as well as of the research strategy which is been chosen to be of a 
qualitative nature. A qualitative research strategy requires your direct, personal engagement with 
the field, its actors and the archives, and one that challenges you to grapple with “real world” 
complexity, interaction and change (Burton & Steane 2004, p161). A grounded theory approach 
was selected as the most convenient way to analyze the data. This is because of its strength of 
inductive generation and discovery of theory from collected and analyzed field data that leads to 
interpretation of a phenomenon in its contextual surroundings (Burton & Steane 2004, p170).  
 
The research findings of this dissertation are designed to avoid any kind of harm for the 
participants. While some of participants agreed to be named others did not, so respect for the 
integrity of those participants was maintained with both confidentiality and anonymity. The 
research is conducted by the full observance of the principles of informed consent, honesty, 
conflict of interest and privacy (Burton & Steane 2004, pp63-70). Ethics approval was sought and 
obtained through the normal RMIT procedures.  
 
The research approach can be summarized in Figure 1.2 as follows. 
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Figure 1-2 Summary of the Research Approach 
 
The principal focus for the research was how the Atlantic Corridor project functions as an entity 
and a means to develop business transformations of it members. This was best conducted by 
viewing the Corridor as a single case study entity investigated through a series of sub-case 
studies of joint ventures (JVs) that were facilitated through the Corridor.  
 
The explication of the research questions came after much reflection during exposure to theory 
while undertaking the DPM core courses. They were distilled from further review of literature 
already accessed during the coursework stage and this combined with preliminary data gathered 
over a number of years allowed me to crystallize the research questions so that the research 
proposition that is linked to the nature of the Corridor as an entity and how it was shaped by 
global and local events to provide a vehicle for business transformation that provided participant 
firms with a competitive advantage to sustain their business interests. The proposition led to a 
series of aims identified in Section 1.4. These in turn presented an opportunity, given access to 
data illustrated in Figure 1-2 above, to scope the research into a manageable scale that could be 
undertaken by a single researcher within the expectations of the DPM thesis requirements.  
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Various research approach options have been described and illustrated in Figure 1-2 above. The 
case study approach was selected with some reflection in action as a participant that allowed me 
access to data as well as main players involved to verify and validate opinion expressed, data 
gathered, conclusions drawn and implications implied from analysis of the case studies. 
Interpretation of data to draw conclusions from the data was based on use of some grounded 
theory approaches to highlight themes and meanings and I used a sense-making approach to 
develop conclusions. These approaches are explained in more detail in Chapter 5. 
 
1.7 - SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
I believe in capitalizing on the distinctive opportunity to perceive reality from the viewpoint of 
someone inside the case study rather than taking the role of a typically passive external observer. 
However, I am also well aware of problems the condition of participant-observer may bring with 
respect to potential biases, and therefore I intend creating transparency of the findings and 
conclusions by adding multiple sources of evidence. I also recognize and acknowledge that being 
familiar with the subject of the dissertation (and in the struggle to introduce only relevant 
valuable material and discard what I deem too elementary or basic) I might have left out some 
crucial background or contextual information at any given stage.  
 
Evans (1995) describes this tendency as the so-called “95 per cent syndrome” where a critical 5 
per cent may be left out because it seems obvious. Even though my direct participation and 
observation of many of the crucial events that have shaped this project (and despite the potential 
emotional ties I might have held throughout its development) this did not hinder me from 
utilizing multiple sources of evidence as a practical way to offset such a potential threat and bring 
balance to the research study.  
 
The research methodology is of a qualitative nature, where a limited number of open-ended 
interviews were conducted. However, my direct participation and observation introduced a 
number of inferences which were duly recorded and later validated by multiple-source evidence. 
Even though the Corridor members developed into a growing number of stakeholders, meaning 
that a quantitative approach would have been possible to combine with a qualitative research, this 
would have turned out impractical and too time-consuming for collecting quantitative data.  
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1.8 - LITERATURE REVIEW 
I chose English language literature sources as the most appropriate, with some references found 
from Portuguese and Spanish language literature. The research study embodies a number of 
leading subjects that help shape the research idea, its aims and objectives. These include: 
- Theory of the firm and competitive advantage; 
- Leadership: transformational and transactional; leader-follower. 
- Change and Innovation management, procurement. 
- Knowledge management: knowledge sharing and transfer. 
- Cross-cultural management: transnational impact.       
The literature review helps substantiate the case study data along with the subunits of analysis 
with respect to the above main segments of study. This adds value to understanding the 
Corridor’s search for enhanced competitive advantage and enlarged regional economies of scale. 
 
1.9- THE EXPECTED CONTRIBUTION 
 
This thesis contributes useful PM research that Winter, Smith, Morris and Cicmil (2006, p642) 
highlights the need for. More specifically, they stress the need for theory for PM practice 
directions 2, (projects as social processes), 3 (value creation as the primary focus) and 4 (broader 
conceptualizations of projects) as well as research direction 5 (towards practitioners as reflective 
practitioners). This thesis addresses those research directions. 
 
Their aim was to encourage PM researchers to focus on projects as part of a lived 
experience with human factors significantly affecting project outcomes (direction 2)—this 
thesis is focused very much on participant experiences and perceptions. They also highlight 
direction 3 as a way for PM researchers to think beyond project success in terms of time, 
cost and quality but as a means of creating benefits and value—business transformation and 
value chain improvement is also highlighted in this thesis. Direction 4 relates to broader 
conceptualization of projects and this thesis looks at the Corridor as a program of projects. 
Finally their direction 5 calls for reflective practitioners and I this helped me to become one 
through this research study.  
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Therefore, following the approach suggested by Winter et al. (2006) explained above, this 
research into the Corridor provides a number of expected contributions to facilitate 
improved PM practice that can be identified as follows: 
• Providing an opportunity to explore and better understand how leadership, culture, and 
knowledge sharing and transfer interacted and produced both tangible and intangible regional 
benefits.  
• Providing a useful mechanism that challenges the typical leader-follower relationship and 
brings about a new approach for the betterment of the primary stakeholders strategic position 
within the region. 
• Establishing a new organizational model at regional level that facilitates understanding 
and, better confronting, the often unstoppable global business trends for the benefit of both 
primary and secondary stakeholders.  
• Showing the way regional physical and psychological constraints or limitations can be 
overcome and implemented in other geographies under similar parameters to produce both 
tangible benefits and intangible improvements.  
 
1.10- THESIS OUTLINE 
Chapter one sets the context of the research by focusing on the role played by the interaction of 
coursework and on-field practice, the development of the research idea, and the formulation of 
the thesis’ aims and objectives. It further refers to and briefly explains the initial research 
proposition and research questions to later provide the framework of the chosen research 
methodology along with the author’s view of what the scope of the work is and the existing 
potential limitations.  
 
Chapter two discusses the MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor from an historical perspective by 
briefly describing its evolution, and the context into which it is immersed to let the reader 
understand its magnitude and potential. It explains how it works in practice and identifies various 
linkages with leadership and social network theory that result valuable to adequately address the 
research questions. Chapter 2 forms a contextual basis from which the research data can be made 
better sense of. 
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Chapter three reviews the existing literature concerning knowledge management, leadership, 
cross-cultural and change management, and procurement, all with respect to a large and unique 
regional or trans-national project of this type. Gaps in the literature are identified and 
subsequently utilized to address every research question. 
 
Chapter four describes the Corridor in terms of its role as a program/portfolio tool that enables 
projects to be realized through facilitating collaboration, cooperation, and knowledge sharing. It 
also establishes the importance of the Corridor as a value chain promoter.  
 
Chapter five addresses and analyses the various research methodologies available and proceeds to 
justify the chosen methodology in view of its suitability with respect to the research questions, 
always within the framework of the thesis aims and objectives. It provides a comprehensive 
approach to data collection; it explains how the process leads to classify and sort out the findings; 
and it further provides an explanation on how bias is overcome and how accuracy issues are dealt 
with. 
 
Chapter six refers to a number of sub-cases that form part of a selected cluster, where specific 
short-term barriers or constraints were cooperatively overcome, leading stakeholders to gain 
competitive advantage and enlarge economies of scale. The findings arising out of the data 
collection process are contrasted with theory and pertinent conclusion are assessed and presented. 
The chapter also presents alternative world scenarios where the Corridor concept might be put 
into practice elsewhere under similar parameters.   
 
Chapter seven focuses on a complex long term case study where the existing constraints entail 
stakeholders carefully evaluate not only the way to gain competitive advantage and enlarge 
economies of scale, but also how to cope with their long term strategic positioning problem and 
intangible resource management threat. As with the previous chapter, findings and theory are 
contrasted and discussed while an outline of lessons learned are provided.  
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Chapter eight develops a cross-case study analysis by considering Porter’s (1985) three main 
strategies and value chain model as a way to identify the actual contribution of the Corridor to the 
different roles played by both the primary and support activities.  
 
Chapter nine addresses the Corridor’s needs of improvement from a project management 
perspective and with a particular emphasis on the role played by the public sector, along with its 
potential impact on the regional development.   
 
Chapter ten summarizes the research findings, highlights a number of insights, and provides a 
number of suggestions in the form of final conclusions. A series of appendices display samples of 
supporting evidence associated with this research study. 
 
1. 11- CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter has provided all the necessary elements to inform the reader of the content and 
structure of the following chapters. It presented the research initial idea, followed by the thesis 
aims and objectives, and followed this with the detail about the research proposition and research 
questions. The proposed methodology is identified with guidance about how bias will be 
overcome and the scope of the work was also described. Finally, a thesis outline is provided 
along with a brief description of what each chapter contains as a way to facilitate the reader to 
comprehend the sequence of the work.    
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 2.  MERCOSUR ATLANTIC CORRIDOR 
 
2.1 - CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 
This chapter commences with an introduction to the main facts that gave birth to the 
MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor by describing and discussing first the nature of the MERCOSUR 
common market itself, and to later briefly describe two different perspectives on the Atlantic 
Corridor Project: a macro-approach and a micro-approach. These different views help the reader 
more fully understand the potentialities of the project which will be more fully explored and 
analyzed in the upcoming chapters. The chapter concludes with a summary of this chapter’s main 
points.      
 
2.2 – THE MERCOSUR COMMON MARKET 
South America’s salient feature, besides its vast continental mass, is the existence of a very large 
central region scarcely inhabited and loosely associated to the continent’s own economy and that 
of the world at large. The center of the continent encompasses several important ecosystems 
sequentially succeeding each other from the equator up north to the deep polar south— 
composing a remarkable inland mass encompassing the Amazon Basin, the Cerrados, the 
Pantanal, Chaco, Pampas, and Patagonia. It is very well endowed with good agricultural soils, 
mineral reserves, forests, oil, gas, and large rivers meaning water, waterways, and hydropower 
potential in the range of hundreds of thousands megawatts.  
 
South America’s major economic and population centers and areas are concentrated in its coastal 
areas, facing outwardly from the continent. As a consequence, the intra-continental connections 
between its oceanic borders are both limited and inadequate in most cases. However, the trade 
between its Atlantic and Pacific economies are modest when compared to its actual potential. 
This situation developed from historical, cultural, and geographical factors—for example the 
natural barriers represented by the Andes cordillera and the Amazon rainforest, or the various 
existing languages and dialects across bordering nations and even within the same country. 
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The advent of the MERCOSUR common market, the Andean Pact, and other important 
integrative initiatives have been gradually changing the traditional mindset and has led toward a 
program of projects that contribute to a shared destiny for the many countries of South America. 
This brings to light an urgent need for better communications and transportation systems. The 
MERCOSUR common market had a promising genesis in 1986 when four of its original 
members decided to join efforts to enhance overall intra-regional economies of scale and increase 
their joint negotiating power as a bloc. Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay were the 
founding partners whereas Bolivia and Chile joined later under a differentiated status. Currently 
Venezuela, Mexico, and Peru are considering in joining the bloc, subject to political 
consideration – and later South Africa as the first outer regional member.  
 
MERCOSUR, the “Common Market of the Southern Cone,” was created in March 1990 by the 
Asuncion Treaty and was meant to create a common market among its four signatories 
(Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay) by December 31st 1994 (Appendix A). This common 
market would include a gradual elimination of all custom duties among its signatories, the 
creation of a common external tariff along with the adoption of a common trade policy, and the 
harmonization of economic policies.  
 
The Treaty of Asuncion and its supplementary Protocol of Ouro Preto brought about the creation 
of a number of institutions to assist in the process of attaining these goals (Appendix B). Since its 
beginnings, MERCOSUR has achieved more than any of the previously existing economic bloc 
organizations (e.g. Latin American Free Trade Association ; Andean Pact ; Caribbean 
Community) as it has formalized and expanded cooperation and trading relationships to become a 
vibrant and viable economic integration organization. For a substantial period of time, its 
members enjoyed unprecedented expanded trade and great prosperity (Cohen & McClusky 
1996). Indeed, according to the International Trade Reporter intra-MERCOSUR trade increased 
314%, to $17.1 billion, during 1990-1996 and reached a peak of $20.5 billion in 1997-1998.  
 
Institutionally, the MERCOSUR has agreed on a common external tariff covering 85% of 
imports currently being traded by its members and reached agreement on a substantial number of 
trade matters. Thus, it can be argued that it has generated a significant amount of excitement 
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among the elites of its member states, who step-by-step leant toward the idea of economic 
integration as both feasible and desirable. The bloc managed to recruit two new regional 
members (Chile and Bolivia) and later entered into a substantial cooperative relationship with 
both the European Union and a number of different organizations and individual extra-regional 
countries. Even Argentine ex-President Carlos Menem – as explained frequently in the 
International Trade Reporter2 – urged MERCOSUR to adopt both macroeconomic common 
patterns and a single regional currency.  
 
This optimistic environment has changed somewhat since 1999 as severe economic difficulties 
became apparent first in Brazil, then in Argentina and the other member states. This had a 
tremendous impact on the MERCOSUR and its development. A clear assessment made at the 
time by the Brazilian ex-President Fernando Henrique Cardoso who stated that while there was a 
lot to be sorry about, there was one issue that trumped all others—inflation. Prices in Brazil in 
1993 rose an astonishing 2,500% . This kind of hyperinflation is difficult to imagine for someone 
who has never lived through it. It dominates business and daily life. On pay day, people lined up 
outside supermarkets, desperate to spend their money before it lost its value. Prices on basic 
goods such as rice (the Brazilian staple) could double in just a day. All contracts, bank accounts, 
tax bills and salaries had to be adjusted for inflation. This was an imprecise process encouraging 
tremendous corruption and, as described by Cardoso (2006 ; 173-7), was economic hell. 
 
Further, the regional economy seemed also to be trapped in a stop-go policy cycle that imposed a 
detrimental impact on regional trade. Also at that time the MERCOSUR faced a hemispheric 
competitor – USA – that was actively sponsoring the Free Trade Association of the Americas, 
better known as FTAA or ALCA for all Latin America. However as de Jonquiers (2001) argued,  
“… regardless of the region’s economic difficulties and potential competition from another 
organization, MERCOSUR members apparently remain committed to the concept of regional 
economic integration in general and to the maintenance and development of MERCOSUR in 
particular. Indeed, regional trade organizations like MERCOSUR have emerged as a driving 
force in the global economy.” 
 
                                                 
2 Comments held on various occasions during Carlos Menem,s first term from December 1989 to December 1994. 
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 An introduction to the MERCOSUR Common Market would not be complete without at least 
mentioning the importance of key factors that actually shaped this organization. In this regard, it 
may be argued that many Latin American countries that have attempted economic or political 
integration have had little in common with each other. Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Uruguay, on 
the other hand, seem unusually complementary to each other, politically, economically and 
historically. They have many things in common, starting with geography: three out of the four 
(Paraguay / Argentina / Brazil) share extensive common borders, as do Brazil and Uruguay. 
Uruguay and Argentina were once even politically united as they were part of the United 
Provinces of the River plate from 1810 through to 18803. The political systems of all four 
countries had undergone recent substantial democratization and had taken part – as argued by 
Coffey (1998 pp257-9) – in the process of economic liberalization that took place in the region in 
the 1970’s and 1980’s. All four countries actually traded with each other, and had a history of 
economic cooperation, including joint administration of transnational infrastructure projects.  
 
In spite of prior cooperation between them in the construction of Corpus and Ytaipu dams in the 
late 1970’s, relations in the early 1980’s between Argentina and Brazil turned out difficult. 
Argentine military governments tended to foster rivalry with Brazil and their foreign policy 
towards that country leant toward stressing competition rather than supporting cooperation. 
Brazilian governments, on the other side, responded with strong protectionist measures aimed at 
Argentine exports, whose quantity and value had fallen greatly since 1980 (Alterini & Boldorini, 
1995). This situation changed after the military regimes of Argentina and Brazil were replaced by 
democratic governments by the mid 1980’s.  
 
Both the Brazilian and Argentine governments began to see the advantages of further cooperation 
and integration which led to the signing of a number of agreements in quick succession. Coffey 
(1998) further argues that this turn of events was in fact unavoidable and that the relationship 
between Argentina and Brazil could be described as similar to that of France and Germany at the 
time of the creation of the European Economic Community: both countries had a long history of 
inter-relationships, sometimes hostile, and the exports of one (France, or in this case Argentina) 
                                                 
3 See – information available at http://www.wtove2003/com/ing_argentina.shtml 
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tended to be mostly agricultural, while those of the other (Germany, or in this case, Brazil) tended 
to be primarily industrial. 
 
 Economic data extracted from the CIA Factbook (2002) suggests that this degree of economic 
complement seems to validate the existence of the common market. Brazil and Argentina are 
South America’s largest countries, both in territory and population, each having large and 
developed consumer markets. Argentina is rich in natural resources, and counts on a highly 
developed export-oriented agricultural sector – while its industrial sector is regarded to be weaker 
than other sectors, despite depending upon a strong and competitive export-oriented automobile 
industry. Its service sector is considered large, accounting for 66% of the country’s GDP in 2001. 
Its exports – estimated in USD 26.5 billion in 2000 – included edible oils, fuels and energy, 
grains, foodstuff, vehicles, and mining concentrates more recently. Its imports – which totaled 
USD 23.8 billion in 2000 – chiefly included machinery and equipment, motor vehicles, 
chemicals, metal manufactures, and plastics. Argentina’s main foreign partner was Brazil, 
followed by the United States, Chile, Spain, China, and Germany. 
 
Brazil, on the other hand is a much larger economy than Argentina, has well developed 
agricultural, mining, manufacturing and service sectors. Its main manufacture exports are textiles, 
footwear, chemicals, cement, lumber, iron ore, steel, aircraft, motor vehicles and machinery. Its 
export value in 2001 was USD 57.8 billions and it imported USD 57.7 billion. Argentina was 
Brazil’s second most important trading partner in 2001, directly after the USA and ahead of 
Germany, Japan, Italy and the Netherlands.  
 
Other MERCOSUR members, Uruguay and Paraguay, have different strengths that the bigger 
members do not, namely a very well developed financial and service sector in the case of 
Uruguay, and an export-oriented energy producer in the case of Paraguay. Even though there are 
a number of segments where all countries overlap and compete with one another, it becomes 
apparent that complementation works as a uniting factor and pushes the system toward further 
integration. Thus, Brazil’s extensive manufacturing sector has a natural market among 
Argentina’s, Uruguay’s and Paraguay’s populations.  
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Argentina’s extensive natural resources and agricultural sectors also have ready made markets in 
Brazil. Uruguay has had extensive economic connections with Argentina with particular 
emphasis on the financial sector, while Paraguay’s electrical generation industry very profitably 
supplements Argentina’s and Brazil’s massive energy needs. It can be argued that these economic 
connections and long history of interaction prepared the ground for better understanding and 
communication among the members. This, at a later stage, would bring about the creation of the 
MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor Project as a way to face the ever-changing economic trends that 
the globalization process operates throughout the region. It is difficult to imagine a Corridor 
Project prospering without having its members, institutions, companies, and people go through 
some sort of economic and historical evolution where both historical and emotional ties 
influenced practical issues that needed to be resolved for the block to trade and prosper in a 
cooperative venture that influenced the ever-deepening relationships. Some analysis of logistic-
related economic information has to be first and briefly introduced before proceeding to the main 
concept of this thesis. 
 
The MERCOSUR common market was established to accomplish the following goals: 
? Elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers;  
? Adoption of a policy for a common external tariff (CET);  
? Coordination of macroeconomic and sector trading policies; and 
? Member-country commitment to the free movement of services, labor, and capital. 
 
The MERCOSUR functions within the greater frameworks of the Latin American Integration 
Association (ALADI) and GATT (General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs), which permit 
members to provide preferential treatment within customs unions, while prohibiting additional 
tariffs to be levied on outside countries. The trade opening-up program focused on eliminating 
customs rights on foreign trade and prohibit member countries from unilaterally impeding mutual 
trade by targeting an end of duty requirements and non-tariff restrictions.  
 
MERCOSUR’s Atlantic coast stretches 3,500 miles along eastern South America, and the 
combined geographic area of more than 4.5 million square miles is considerably larger than that 
of the United States. It is the fourth largest integrated market in the world after NAFTA (North-
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American Free Trade Agreement), the European Union, and Japan. The distribution of population 
throughout South America’s territory is not homogeneous. A large portion of it is concentrated 
over the coastal zones, while its central part exhibits a low demographic density below one 
inhabitant/square kilometer. The total population is approximately 350 millions, about 60% 
belonging to the MERCOSUR countries and predominantly located along its Atlantic seaboard 
over 5,000 kilometers. Vivacqua & Stehling (1997) state that the MERCOSUR economy is large, 
with a GNP close to one trillion USD, while its output concentration is a factor that should also 
be considered.  
 
In the case of Brazil, its major industrial and urban centers are located within a coastal stretch 
roughly 600 kilometers wide. In the case of Argentina, its major industrial output and urban 
settlements are located within the Buenos Aires province with the port of Buenos Aires as its 
main gateway to the world. To conclude, three sub-regions can be identified along the Atlantic 
seaboard, which contains the bulk of the MERCOSUR economy: 
• The north-northeast of Brazil with a population close to 50 millions and a GNP over 
USD 100 billions/year; 
• The south-southeast of Brazil, containing a population of more than 80 million 
generating over USD 700 billions per year; and  
• The River Plate region comprising the great Buenos Aires, Montevideo and Asuncion 
areas, generating a GNP over USD 200 billions/year. 
 
It becomes apparent that there are great concentrations of both supply and demand levels in these 
areas that are well identified and geographically isolated but they show little physical connection 
such as being linked by road, rail etc. Given the long distances between these concentrated areas 
of potential inter-area trade, one would expect the opposite—higher physical links. The 
MERCOSUR’s size along with the existing long distances between its various industrial and 
urban poles generates sizable transportation flows over long distances. Additionally, the need for 
the region to accomplish larger transportation economies of scale to therefore increase its 
negotiating power with other world blocs makes logistical integration a key tool toward fulfilling 
this need. Building a suitable logistic system seems to be a key enabler towards meeting the 
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needs and goals of the MERCOSUR. The next section will introduce the reader to the main 
concepts of the Corridor as an intent to explicit the macro-ideology upon which same is based.        
 
In this way the MERCOSUR concept can be seen not merely as a political and economic 
initiative, but rather as a radical change vision being translated into a mission and goals to be 
realized through a comprehensive and lengthy program of change and logistics projects. 
 
2.3 - MERCOSUR ATLANTIC CORRIDOR: A MACRO APPROACH 
On September 1st, 2000, the Summit of the Presidents of South America released a communiqué 
emphasizing the importance of counting on an integrated infrastructure (transportation / energy / 
telecommunications). The communiqué directly addressed the continent’s transportation 
infrastructure envisaging the optimum use of different modes (land / air / maritime / inland 
waterways) in order to facilitate the border traffic of people, vehicles, and cargo. The presidents 
called for an infrastructure integration plan to be developed by the Working Group on Bi-oceanic 
Land Corridors. In essence, this demonstrated a significant emphasis of the first South American 
summit placing on trade and development of transportation infrastructure along the region’s 
prevailing corridors (Agencia Brasil 2000). Appendix “C” displays the Protocol of Intentions for 
the Corridor and gives the reader a good general idea of its aims. 
 
The trade corridor in South America emerged as an important agent of economic development 
with transportation being its fundamental subsidiary component. Despite the tendency to 
restructure the state to become more normative and assume a regulatory posture, it may be stated 
that Latin American governments in general, are still pressing forward to invest in transportation 
infrastructure. Though the Summit did address and identify strategic infrastructure needs, in 
reality the investment capacity keeps being heavily targeted toward highway construction and not 
toward more integrative and cost-reducing maritime, inland waterway, and intermodal 
transportation. In this regard Vivacqua and Stehling (1997 pp4-6) stated that trade among 
MERCOSUR partners had been increasing rapidly—from USD 5 billions a year from 1995 to a 
projected 15 billions in 2000. Land transportation generally prevails despite the very long 
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distances between countries4. In the case of Brazil, the largest economy in the region, land 
transportation accounts for more than 70% of the total transported volume within Brazil.  
 
Vivacqua and Stehling (1997) further contend that Brazil’s internal transportation costs rank 
among the highest in the world—60% above the USA, twice that of Canada. Furthermore, most 
cargoes in and out the northeastern region in Brazil, are carried by truck to and from the River 
Plate which lies 5,000 kilometers away. At this point an obvious question can be posed reflecting 
on one of the many challenges the Corridor has to face. Why is coastal navigation, an 
intrinsically more economical mode of transportation, not utilized in large scale alongside the 
Atlantic coast of South America? This question is especially relevant when all the physical and 
geographical elements for such development seem to be in place—a large expanding economy, 
an ever-growing population distributed along the coast, and large volumes of cargo to be carried..  
 
The answer could be that since the 1950s the two larger economies of the region – Brazil and 
Argentina – favored highway transportation to consolidate their respective development of a 
strong automotive industry. Notwithstanding the above, the consortium of the MERCOSUR 
Atlantic Corridor resumed the strategic vision of making the existing coastal and inland waterway 
transport systems more competitive and integrating them with other transportation modes and 
infrastructural nodes. 
 
Panama is one hypothetical hub that might well replicate the Corridor’s main integrative 
function. This initiative aimed to expedite and facilitate logistics integration among the 
MERCOSUR countries while taking advantage of the privatization program of port facilities, and 
the ever-expanding investment in terminals and transfer equipment and facilities. The master 
goal, without prejudice to a number of other goals that emerged through the process, has been the 
transfer of some tens of million tons of cargo from the intra-coastal highway network to a coastal 
navigation system capable of connecting to an inland waterway sub-system. Consequently, 
regional level decision-makers at the intervening ports decided that they should jointly develop a 
variety of process and change management initiatives to: 
                                                 
4 With poorly paved and maintained road systems, land transport continues to be less efficient and effective than 
fluvial transport along the vast inland waterways 
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• Lower operational costs, rationalizing the ship-to-shore interface, and contributing to 
enlarge regional economies of scale; 
• Act locally as coordination centers between the local inland transportation network and 
coastal navigation through the organization of a local, integrated, multimodal 
transportation sub-system monitored by the port; 
• Organize an operational association among the several ports along the coast to promote 
integrated door-to-door operations via coastal navigation and by linking their 
respective inland transportation suppliers; 
• Act locally as a trade and investment promotion center; and 
• Promote the creation of potential land-bridges linking the Atlantic with the Pacific 
across the member countries by optimizing all the available logistic means at regional 
level. 
 
 South America has been developing a unique style of overcoming the obstacles to trade 
presented by the existing imbalances of its transportation systems as a result of facing a legacy of 
un-integrated and non-standardized highway, railway, river, ocean, and coastal transport 
networks. It can be acknowledged that in the absence of a top-down comprehensive intermodal 
approach to regional transportation, public and private interests have coalesced in the form of 
integration roundtables to make transportation more efficient, respond to globalization trends, 
help enlarge economies of scale, enable alliances, partnerships and joint-ventures, and gain 
overall competitive advantage. The above mentioned integration roundtables are centered on a 
regional port and indicate an evolving conception on integrated port networks in Latin America 
analogous to the port networks in ascendancy in Europe (van Klink 1997).  
    
It becomes apparent that through its integration roundtable5 model, the MERCOSUR Atlantic 
Corridor approach has emerged as a regionally endogenous form of problem solving currently 
spanning several South American countries. Moreover, this model seems easily transferable to 
other regions in the world where considerable imbalances between production and consumption 
poles or between efficient and inefficient transportation systems and infrastructural nodes exist. If 
these imbalances are translated into large cargo flows that can be rationalized and optimized (by 
                                                 
5 A form of community of practice (CoP) that will be explained in more detail in Chapter 3 
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cooperating, exchanging knowledge, becoming regionally organized, and/or facilitating trade and 
investment through enlarging economies of scale and gaining competitive advantage) then the 
model may become a very powerful tool. Replication of this model might then be useful to 
stimulate trade growth and development, overcoming structural obstacles to enlarged economies 
of scale and gaining competitive advantage by narrowing existing technological, operational, and 
managerial gaps between countries and regions.  
 
This model may possibly be applied to the following regions and countries where there are a 
number of imbalances in available facilities, technology and management: 
• South-central USA and the region comprised between Central America and the 
Caribbean where two common markets work independently and remarkable gaps are 
evident (CAFTA: Central America Free Trade Agreement; CARICOM: Caribbean 
Community). A difficult geography, lack of infrastructure, high level of obsolescence, 
and great cultural diversity are just a few aspects that can be overcome to achieve 
greater economies of scale and competitive advantage. 
• Australia-New Zealand and the region made up of Indonesia, Philippines, and 
Southeast Asia. This is a vast and densely populated area where technological, 
managerial, and cultural gaps become apparent, whereas it holds a tremendous growth 
potential. Like the previous example, geography is extremely complex, there is ground 
for a considerable upgrade in terms of logistics infra and supra-structure, distances are 
even more important, and culture plays even a more important role if well understood 
and managed toward accomplishing trade enlargement and generating efficiencies. 
• Western Mediterranean countries and the northern Africa region - where not only 
ocean shipping and ports turn out to be pivotal for trade development, but also the 
design and setting of land-bridges that might help reaching the heart of both continents 
by making a strategic use of ground logistics and air logistics. Here, similar to the 
previous example, effective transfer of successful models and managerial experiences 
across Europe, might result in enlarged economies of scale and betterment of overall 
competitiveness of the entire trading bloc. 
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There are many regions and sub-regions across the globe where structural gaps and considerable 
growth potential may be identified. The above – as well as many other possible examples – 
presupposes that the intervening parties have a strategic interest along with their understanding of 
the long term implications arising out of the decision-making process. Geopolitical interests may 
also play a key role here too but this aspect is not the focus of this thesis.       
 
2.4 - MERCOSUR ATLANTIC CORRIDOR: A MICRO APPROACH 
The MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor comprises an organization that gathers a significant number 
of companies which hold regular meetings where their respective problems are made public 
before the participating members. These problems and issues are discussed, assessed, while 
potential solutions are proposed, examined, and tested in the respective field. 
 
The scope of the organization spans across the MERCOSUR and participants come from a wide 
range of activities—such as logistic operators, ocean and river port operators, railway companies 
and operators, barge and tugboat operators, trucking companies, port services firms, warehousing 
and distribution companies, air-cargo operators and airport terminals, customs brokers and 
national customs authorities, shipyards, banking, insurers, exporters, importers, traders, 
shipbrokers, government, education, legal firms, environmental consultancy companies, etc .  
 
Meetings are held once a fortnight. Information sharing amongst participants is conducted 
through an on-line intranet system that is accessed through what is called integration roundtables 
to become explicit, whereas knowledge relating to comments and conclusions are later distributed 
in a face-to-face mode. These on-line forums link a growing number of cities and ports 
throughout the MERCOSUR countries. They integrate them into a node where regional 
discussion on operational and commercial issues affecting the growth of business takes place, in 
tone with the on-going globalization process. The main goal of these meetings is to find solutions 
or alternative ways to address the many problems encountered in the MERCOSUR region as a 
way to increase trade by sharing and transferring knowledge, and making regional supply and 
demand centers getting closer and meet their needs and potential in a more efficient manner. 
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A major advance in the consortium concept emerged with the creation of cross-national 
roundtables established in Argentina, Uruguay, and Brazil, to later expand into Paraguay, Bolivia 
and Peru while discussions continue to be held to let other countries join the system – either 
regional or extra-regional ones. Thus a truly continental organizational economic development 
model is expanding based on the assembly of key actors involved in the logistic process with the 
goal of reducing operational bottlenecks and costs while increasing trade opportunities and 
fostering strategic alliances at the same time.  
 
The integration roundtables are normally established at a port community and fall under the 
responsibility of a “regional coordinator”, who carries out the following functions: 
• Continuously expanding the Corridor’s membership and the regional network of 
affiliated roundtables; 
• Calling the roundtable meetings and acting as a motivator so that the expected results 
are accomplished; 
• Continuously stimulating the exchange with other roundtables in their multiple 
forms— teleconferences; business road shows, reciprocal consulting; intranet;   
• Continuously stimulating the affiliation of companies to the data bank, with special 
concern with its updating, as well as its use by third parties; and 
• Developing proposals and contracts offering services on regional and business 
promotion and consultancy on matters of commerce and logistics.  
 
Meetings can often promptly resolve a given problem just by assembling the necessary actors. In 
the case of larger, more fundamental or complex economic development issues involving larger 
regional areas or economic interests, the roundtables can initiate the process of dialogue and, with 
staff resources, mediate and facilitate data and information exchange in search for potential 
alternative solutions.  
 
An illustration that can be provided is that of the meeting originating in Vitória, the leading port 
and capital of the Brazilian state of Espírito Santo, where the MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor’s 
focus lies on generating regional development. To do so, it was necessary to convene integration 
roundtable meetings that included leading players in the region’s basic industries, warehousing 
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companies, transportation services, governments, custom houses, labor, media, shippers and 
many others. The purpose was to resolve a wide array of issues. Examples of these issues include 
port congestion, ship-to-shore transfer imbalances, interruptions in the cold-chain for reefer 
containers, or an increasing rate of transportation-related claims. This illustrates how the 
roundtable meeting can help create the conditions for companies to interact, exchange data, 
produce information and knowledge and therefore help solve problems affecting key players 
through promoting this form of corporate socialization. This process was expected to generate 
added value and perhaps most importantly, a point of cooperative behavior could be reached, to 
result in potential strategic alliances, partnerships, alliances, mergers or even acquisition among 
firms in gaining competitive advantage and facing whatever peril or change that the globalization 
wave may bring in terms of technology, innovation, competitiveness, and scale of business. 
 
The specific micro-objectives of the Corridor can be summarized as follows to: 
• Create a favorable space for the development of integrated logistic systems under 
the concept of door-to-door logistics; 
• Stimulate the participation on the basis of a win-to-win system, where all the 
participants have something to win from their presence; 
• Attract a growing number of ground transportation companies, railway companies 
and operators, ocean shipping firms, ocean and river port terminal operators, 
shipping agencies, warehousing and distribution companies, exporters and 
importers, unions, universities, authorities, etc.; 
• Create innovative logistic systems leading to achieve greater productivity and larger 
trade economies of scale; 
• Solve explicit problems and remove obstacles through formulating and 
implementing solutions to those specific problems, and fostering partnerships and 
alliances among participants; and 
• Transforming ports and its associated communities into logistic integration nodes – 
between its natural hinterland and the members of the Corridor. 
 
The MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor has currently only one similar organizational entity, that is 
similar in being a geographic extension of a region but with a limited or modest objective. The 
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Northern Maritime Corridor (NMC) takes place in the north Atlantic by gathering eight maritime 
nations together aiming to improve a number of issues that they commonly face. The NMC is the 
chosen term for a sea based transportation corridor that stretches from Northern Norway and 
North West Russia to the Continent, connecting the coastal areas of the North Sea and the 
Northern Periphery; 20 regions in eight countries (Germany, The Netherlands, Flanders, 
Scotland, The Faeroe Islands, Iceland, Greenland, Sweden and Norway). The vision of the NMC 
as stated on its web site6 is to provide: “A means of efficient, safe and sustainable transportation, 
connecting coastal areas and enhancing regional development in the North Sea Region and the 
Northern Periphery Area”. The vision suggests a more focused objective which becomes 
apparent when coming to examine what its goals are: 
? Promote the short-sea-shipping links; 
? Improve seafood transport and logistics; 
? Enhance the maritime transport in the petroleum sector; and 
? Betterment of maritime safety. 
 
These goals suggest a much more concentrated list of objectives with a much smaller scope of 
action; however, it also highlights the importance of two aspects this thesis will focus on:  
networking as a fertile ground to enhance knowledge sharing and transfer through the 
participation of both public and private actors. The main difference between the NMC and the 
MERCOSUR Corridor is perhaps given by the stress the NMC places on the region to region 
cooperation concept, vis-à-vis a supra-regional and almost continental approach on the 
MERCOSUR.  
 
Figure 2.1 shows the large geographical scope of action of the NMC which despite involving 
eight nations, only concentrates on functional targets whereas conducting a regional approach, 
these being the main differences with the MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor. Such a limited 
functional scope of action suggests that being maritime nations and counting on a higher relative 
operational and technological development than the existing in the MERCOSUR Corridor, their 
needs differ from the latter while a region-to-region approach makes more sense on a given 
                                                 
6 See URL http://www.irogaland.no/ir/public/openIndex/view/list_nmc2006.html?ARTICLE_ID=1140187268312 
accessed April 5th 2009. 
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number of segments – and not a supra-national treatment where major imbalances are non-
existing. 
 
Figure 2.1 : NMC’s geographical scope 
 
This example turns out useful to determine one, and possibly the most important, pre-condition 
that justifies a more ambitious corridor such as the MERCOSUR addressing development 
imbalances between sectors, regions, and countries. 
 
2.5 – INTEGRATING ROUNDTABLE CONFIGURATION EXAMPLE 
This section is presented in two subsections. Sub-section 2.5.1 relates to a justification of 
supporting the view taken of the roundtable discussion infrastructure as one, supported by 
the Corridor’s IT and organizational infrastructure, can be viewed as a form of strategic 
community of practice CoP followed by sub-section 2.5.2 which explains how the Corridor 
performs as a kind of strategic CoP. Wenger McDermott and Snyder (2002) describe a CoP 
as an organizational form where a group of people join together to pursue a common 
interest. 
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2.5.1 – Justification for the Corridor as an Entity Facilitating Strategic CoPs. 
By definition, a community of practice (CoP) is a natural part of organizational life and they are 
expected to develop through their own initiative, whether the organization recognizes them or 
not. Even though it is not the intention to develop the discussion of this type of entity much 
further at this point, it is important to highlight that a CoP’s sustainability depends, to a great 
extent, on the voluntary engagement of their members and on the emergence of internal 
leadership - informality and autonomy being fundamental components of the system. 
 
However, and as it will be exposed throughout this dissertation, this has a direct link with both 
the context these CoP were intended to established and consolidated and the cultural dimension 
of the various participating regions and countries. It has been the author’s experience as a direct 
participant that even though there is a voluntary component in any CoP, there is also a driving 
element that is determined by the particulars of the business environment it operates. 
Geographical differences and sector particulars by industry became apparent, as well as 
idiosyncrasy and business contextual gaps. 
 
My role during the early years of the Corridor project was to recruit new members around South 
America’s south cone countries, as well as identify potentially new places to establish additional 
roundtables that help link production and consumption poles in a more efficient way. Identifying 
vulnerable sectors as well as targeting realistic reengineering possibilities across the region, was 
only part of the task. Making these regional players aware of the upcoming globalization impact, 
especially those far located from the main industrial poles, turned out to be perhaps the most 
difficult part in that old regional rivalries and on-going distrust had to be somehow overcome. 
 
 Such a role was carried out by fulfilling certain parameters in terms of budgeting priorities and a 
very specific time framework – both variables being traditional PM processes. This role allowed 
me to appreciate a number of different PM related realities that introduced complexity of 
undertaking PM processes across a vast geography, as well as to conceptualize the nature of the 
existing priorities as well as to identify potential intra-sector synergistic opportunities.  
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Wenger et al. (2002, pp6-7) argue that success in global markets depends on communities 
sharing knowledge across the globe. Naturally, in order to maintain its global character a varied 
array of features such as culture, leadership, geography, and religion - among many others and 
further to knowledge sharing and transfer itself – had to be considered by those corporations that 
decided to join the Corridor as an alternative to face the future. The Corridor did not look for 
global success but that it was set up as a reaction to the global threat of world scale newcomers 
holding much larger economies of scale and an almost endless resource base. 
 
Pettigrew (1997) suggests that when comparing organizations from different sectors, issues of 
industry context must not be overlooked. Firstly, any investigation or comparison between 
managerial processes in different sectors must consider the political, economic, social, 
technological, legal, environmental and structural factors inherent to each sector. Secondly, an 
organization itself is historically the product of its own politics, economics and social factors that 
contribute to the use of processes, practices and philosophies. It is precisely this understanding 
that leads Pettigrew to suggest an outer and inner context that collectively helps to determine the 
feature of a practice. These features adopt very different and dynamic forms when both a regional 
context and an ever-fluctuating business environment is considered from a knowledge sharing-
transfer and CoP perspectives with respect to Latin American countries. 
 
Wenger et al (2002, pp12-14) further argue that some CoPs grow spontaneously whereas others 
may require careful seeding and further pushing and close follow-up. In this regard it is an 
accepted opinion that organizations can do a lot to create an environment into which they can 
prosper by encouraging participation, removing barriers, assigning resources, and giving them a 
say in the decision-making process (Storck and Hill, 2000 pp63-74).  
 
Walker and Christenson (2005, pp287) provide a useful comparison of the features a 
community of interest, CoP, project Team, Project management Office (PMO), Project 
support office (PSO), Corporate management office (CPO), and Centre of Excellence 
(CoE).  These terms used are mainly defined and discussed later—readers may refer to 
Section 3.9 for project office forms. They use the three dimensions of social capital offered 
by Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) of structural, relationship and cognitive dimensions. The 
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structural dimension refers to the strength, configuration and nature of ties between 
individuals and groups.  The Relationship dimension refers to trust, norms and cultural 
aspects later elaborated upon in Section 3.8. The cognitive dimension relates to shared 
understandings, through shared codes and language (technical or national) also discussed 
further in Section 3.7 and Section 3.8. 
  
Figure 2-2: Forms of Knowledge Networks  
 
Figure 2.2 can be viewed in light of the Corridor. It has some features that suggest that the 
Corridor could be considered a form of PMO as is later argued in Section 3.9. However, Figure 
2.2 illustrates, supported by the context descriptions of the Corridor and further discussion on the 
literature of CoPs offered in Section 3.7, that the roundtable discussions facilitated by the 
Corridor can be primarily seen as a CoP. Structural, relational and cognitive dimensions clearly 
support this being in agreement with Figure 2.2.There was evidence found in this thesis of both 
individual and group learning as members brought back knowledge acquired into their 
organizations. Organizational learning within the Corridor itself as well as participant 
organizations may be described as high because of the continued refinement and improvement 
gained through experience. In terms of wisdom, which Walker and Christensson (2005, pp276) 
refer to as ‘the judicious choice of alternatives’, there is plenty of evidence that will be presented 
in the analysis of Corridor initiative case studies presented in Chapter 8 that supports the Corridor 
is a form of CoP. The last column of Figure 2.2 shows corporate support resources required and 
in this case the Corridor required active participation and people contact so it could be seen to be 
medium to high. Nevertheless, this provides adequate justification to view the Corridor 
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roundtable discussions as being a form of CoP and that the Corridor itself holds many attributes 
shared by various forms of PMOs facilitating CoPs.  
 
Probably one of the tallest barriers to overcome, not only in South America but in the entire Latin 
America region, turns out to be of cultural nature and is linked to an existing and growing degree 
of skepticism. This is due to formulas or techniques that have been successfully applied in distant 
environments being promoted but where both macro and micro variables (the context) show very 
little similarities with those at regional level. Added to this was the existing historical mistrust 
and rivalry between nations in the region. 
 
This has been my experience when attending the integration roundtables, where speakers have 
proposed foreign examples as potential models to be implemented or adapted to the regional 
reality, when these proposals have been categorically rejected due to existing practicality gaps in 
terms of business environments, cultural aspects, and the general perception that the upcoming 
economies of scales and technology of the global firms were potential threats. This can be 
contrasted with the opportunities to grow, adapt, and even expand by reengineering structures, 
rationalizing their operating assets, or engaging in some type of vertical integration process. 
 
In general, it may be affirmed that the urgency of short run results within the MERCOSUR 
region attracted a great part, if not all, the attention of the corporations at the expense of longer 
term issues of possibly much more strategic value. From this viewpoint, and according to the 
author’s experience, these CoPs had to go through difficult times and often needed permanent 
back-up and follow-up support to divert their members’ attention from the burning daily 
problems of keeping their attention focused on the subject matter a given CoP was working with. 
 
The CoP concept in not new, neither is the need for organizations to become more intentional and 
systematic about managing knowledge in an ever-changing business environment. However, it 
becomes apparent that companies operating in world markets need to make good use of people 
who stand out in their CoP, no matter where they come from, meaning that corporations no 
longer struggle for market share only, but that they also compete for talent. 
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Cappelli (2000, p103) argues that in terms of talent and from a retaining talent perspective, 
professional relationships and social ties are important reasons why people stay with a company. 
Cohen and Prusak (2001, p19) argue that companies can win the war for talent by offering 
employees the opportunity to build a sense of community with workplace colleagues. One of the 
Corridor’s objectives relates to talent creation as a way to let innovation and change emerge in a 
number of industry segments that made their living in a highly restrictive market context. 
 
Hamel and Prahalad (1994, pp56-58) discuss genetic reengineering as another way to introduce 
more genetic variety into a population from a talent recruitment viewpoint, aiming at bringing in 
new members who cross-breed with the old and alter the existing genetic pool. Also relevant 
here, Dixon (2000, p11) states that “The common knowledge that is generated internally, by 
talented employees in the act of accomplishing the organization’s task in new and innovative 
ways, is where knowledge sharing can really pay off”.  
 
It is often argued that the knowledge of experts is an accumulation of experience, (a kind of 
“residue” of their actions, thinking, and conversations) that remains a dynamic part of their 
ongoing experience (McDermott 1999, pp103-117). Therefore this type of knowledge, which is 
much more a living process than a static body of information, forms an integral part of a CoP’s 
activities and interactions further to serving as a living repository for that knowledge.  
 
Talent seems to be a fundamental component and CoPs turn out being useful tools to retain 
talented employees for the benefit of the organization. However, it also poses a strategic 
obligation on the part of the corporation to regularly supply challenging targets to keep talent 
busy while intending gain competitive advantage. This is a topic where this dissertation intends to 
deepen the existing literature, with particular emphasis on the way CoPs contributed to sharing, 
creating, and transferring different knowledge. The development of these CoPs became, step by 
step, challenging projects for both the companies and their talented employees to address. 
 
A CoP should not only be a helpful tool to generate new ideas and drive innovation but also 
create an alerting system with respect to the probably various defective genes an organization 
should get rid of before launching into new challenging strategic paths. This transformational 
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perspective of the Corridor proved useful as the new business context approached the region. 
Such an alerting mechanism tended to identify where talent was missing or had deteriorated.  
 
Fernie, Green, Weller and Newcombe (2003, p180) are of the opinion that strong ties, identified 
by high-trust is of paramount importance in project management alliances and joint-ventures. 
Lengthy timeframes and close relationships are ideal for the sharing complex tacit knowledge. 
Weak ties, however, limit the exchange of knowledge and even information, as is clearly exposed 
within the Corridor project. However, it is also conceded that the knowledge created by highly 
socialized or strongly tied groups is unlikely to be innovative or supportive of talent emergeing 
this suggests that CoPs are likely to produce better results if they find themselves somewhere in 
the middle and far from the extremes poles of being high trust / no trust, or strong ties / no ties. 
 
2.5.2 - The Corridor Performing as a Strategic CoP 
Given the special characteristics of the Corridor and the heterogeneous membership of the 
roundtables, it turns out interesting to highlight that even though trust and socialization were 
variables in permanent evolution, their members rarely forgot that they were actually competitors 
and therefore tended to keep a certain strategic reserve of information in a defensive fashion– 
though probably they were compelled by the uncertainty generated at the outset of the project by 
the business environment. Further to the founding firms (PETROBRAS / CVRD / BND), the 
Corridor embraces a growing number of members comprising a wide spectrum of activities and 
regions:  
? LIBRA DO NAVEGACAO, Santos……………..……..Shipping company. 
? SADIA, Sao Paulo………………………………….. .... Foodstuff industry. 
? VOLKSWAGEN, Buenos Aires………………………..Automotive industry. 
? PORTO DE SAO SEBASTIAO, Sao Sebastiao………..Container Terminal. 
? INFRAERO, Sao Paulo…………………………………Airport Authority. 
? DOCENAVE, Rio do Janeiro…………………………...Shipping company. 
? C.P. DE BAHIA BLANCA, Bahia Blanca…………......Ocean bulk Terminal 
? PUERTO MADRYN, Port Madryn…………………….Ocean mutipurrpose. 
? FIESP, Sao Paulo………………………………………..SME Chamber. 
? ABIA, Sao Paulo………………………………………...Food Chamber. 
 38
? MERCOSUR TRADE CENTER, Buenos Aires……..…Trading company. 
? IMPSA, Mendoza……………………………………….Industrial firm. 
? Maruba, Buenos Aires……………………………….Shipping company. 
? TRANSROLL NAVEGACAO, Santos…………………Coastal Feeding co. 
? CSAV, Santiago…………………………………………Shipping company. 
? ALL, Sao Paulo………………………………………….Railway company. 
? NUEVO CENTRAL ARGENTINO, Cordoba…….……Railway company. 
? BELGRANO CARGAS, Buenos Aires…………….…...Railway company. 
? FERROSUR ROCA, Olavarria…………………….……Railway company. 
? SIDERAR, Campana……………………………………Steel company. 
? URUCUM MINERACAO, Ladario…………………….Mining company. 
? INTERSINDICAL PORTUARIA, Santos……………...Port union. 
? TECON SALVADOR, Salvador………………………..Container Terminal. 
? TRP, Buenos Aires………………………………………Container Terminal. 
? ROSARIO PORT TERMINAL…………………………River bulk termnal. 
? NUEVA PALMIRA PORT, Nueva Palmira…………….River bula Terminal 
? TANGO LOGISTICS, Curitiba……………………...….Ground transportation 
? TERMINAL 7, Buenos Aires……………..…………….Empty container yard 
? ATZ, Zarate…………………………………..…………River auto Terminal. 
? PUERTO DESEADO, Patagonia…….……..…………..Seafood Terminal. 
? COMODORO RIVAVADIA, Patagonia……..………...Ocean oil terminal. 
 
The integration roundtables were born in Brazil. Two pioneering engineers had foreseen that the 
upcoming global trends required extreme changes to allow the region’s businesses to preserve 
their businesses within national and regional owners instead of selling off assets with no effective 
reaction on their part to counter that threat. The project was born in the Brazilian city of Vitoria, 
to later expand into the costal ports of Brazil, and inland cities of strategic importance within that 
country, in terms of output and consumption scales. Later, numerous other locations with a 
relative higher degree of logistic complexity proved to be of interest and these were embraced 
within the Corridor.  
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A second stage emerged with the regionalization of the roundtables and the Corridor concept 
itself, by expanding the idea into Argentina and the other southern cone countries—Uruguay, 
Paraguay, Bolivia, and Chile. Later, Peru was added to the list of participating countries as its 
importance was recognized in terms of being a land-bridge to the Asia-Pacific Rim of high 
strategic profile for a number of massive cargo segments.     
 
 
Figure 2.3:  MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor Consortium network; 2004. 
Figure 2.3 illustrates the wide geographical area as well as the scale of the Corridor roundtable 
groups. These are represented by star symbols on the map.  
 
Meetings are held regularly, are directed by a sort of manager or broker and its outcomes are 
made available via an intranet throughout the regional network as shown on Figure 2.3. These 
encounters can often resolve a given problem just by assembling the necessary actors in a single 
journey.  
In the case of greater, more fundamental or complex economic or operational development 
issues, the roundtables can initiate the process of dialogue and, with staff resources, mediate and 
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facilitate data and information exchange in search for potential alternative solutions by bringing 
together actors from both the public and private sectors. 
 
Probably one of the roundtable’s top priorities lies on adding value through the development of 
information databases capable in itself to generate trade leads and business development further 
to generating a fertile ground for potential investment currents. In this regard it is important to 
highlight that even though the roundtables have experienced a rapid expansion process leading to 
sustained value adding, it is precisely the high rate of growth that presents a possible weakness in 
terms of available technology to back up such an expansion.  
 
Even though the Corridor rests on an intranet system which is regularly up-graded to cope with 
an ever-increasing demand, the spirit of this dissertation lies more on the concepts of knowledge 
sharing and transfer, leadership, strategy and CoPs, and not on the technology or information 
systems utilized to let knowledge sharing and transfer occur. No matter how well developed an 
intranet system may be as a device aimed to transfer knowledge; strategic or critical issues may 
turn state-of-the-art technological devices into a relatively valueless proposition should priorities 
not be well defined within the organization. The research in this dissertation finds that face-to-
face interaction among the Corridor’s members was critical in making transformations happen, 
whereas technology seems to be restricted to an enabler or enhancer for this to happen. 
 
Examples of knowledge management activities include the search of solutions to better handling 
hazardous chemicals or perishable goods in Brazilian terminals; harmonizing procedures for a 
smooth railways interconnection between Argentina and Brazil; upgrading aids to river 
navigation as to make night operations safe to reach Bolivian terminals; standardizing air-cargo 
terminal handling fares across the region; adopting similar regional criteria towards controlling 
and surveying ships flying flags of convenience; easing customs clearance procedures in 
Argentina to allow transit cargoes to Chile to proceed faster. 
 
Information technology (IT) plays an important role within the Corridor and its upgrade can be 
regarded as an on-going challenge to better capture the generated knowledge across the regional 
roundtable forums. However, a bigger challenge to the development of the roundtables remains in 
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that a given number of issues were and are yet deemed to be strategic and therefore not subject to 
disclosure, sharing, or transfer. Competitive advantage is often regarded to be at stake if a given 
piece of information was made available for others to assess and make use of it for their own 
advantage (e.g. terminal handling charges for a given shipping  joint-venture; bunker prices or 
place of supply for a given air-cargo freighting company; operational advantages given by a 
railway firm to a major global shipping company to distribute containers across the region; fixed 
ocean freight rate levels for major volume customers; reliable new-tonnage supplier; shipbuilding 
contract particulars; achieved load/unload rates at a given hub terminal; etc).  
 
Section 2.5.1 provided a justification for viewing the Corridor’s Roundtable discussion 
groups as CoPs that were supported by both IT, and more importantly leadership, within a 
project management environment or context for facilitating and participating in a major 
transformational change by supporting and helping the development of these CoPs. 
 
2.6 – CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the constituting elements of the MERCOSUR common market by 
referring to the Asuncion and Ouro Preto Treaties that gave birth to this organization. It followed 
by giving an historical perspective and a brief picture of its potentiality of development by 
highlighting the existing relatively high degree of complementation of the member economies as 
well as the apparent political willingness to pursue the previously set objectives.  
 
The chapter continued by addressing the Corridor from a macro-perspective, through underlying 
its role as agent for economic development. It also stresses its importance as an active tool to 
overcome the existing imbalances between production and consumption poles within the 
MERCOSUR, further to proposing other possible scope of its application in the world. The 
chapter concluded with a section that also deals with the Corridor from a micro-perspective and 
addressed both the role and the way the integration roundtables work, and it explained its 
objectives and the way they interact with its potential outcomes.           
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 - INTRODUCTION 
This chapter begins by setting the study’s context with organizational competition strategy 
providing one of several relevant theoretical frameworks that help to make sense of and to 
be used to analyze data used in this research study. Figure 1-2 illustrated the logic behind 
the thesis in terms of research question and methods and the need for literatures accessed 
and discussed. The cluster of theoretical areas also was shown. Business transformation 
evolves from business strategy that responds to competitive forces and the role provided by 
the Corridor. Action that translates strategy into the realized result also involves leadership 
to create value and effect change and PM skills. Further, it requires knowledge exchange 
and so the theoretical areas of culture and knowledge management are relevant to enact 
change. This context affects corporate strategy adopted by Corridor participant firms and so 
a brief explanation of the various strategy schools as well as the way that Porter’s (1985, 
2001) five competitive forces and the way they have influenced the various logistic 
industry segments across the studied region is provided. 
 
The chapter continuous by assessing the theory of the firm while trying to ascertain what is 
behind the apparent and ever-existing need global companies display for market expansion, and 
how that process impacts on the regional companies and national economies. The resource based 
view of the firm informs a dominant assumption behind this thesis. It also helps us better 
understand the impact of structural variables as well as the role that individual expectations play 
with respect to the limits to the growth of the firm.    
 
The chapter then establishes differences between a transactional and transformational leadership 
style, as well as clearly establishing the main particulars and characteristics of leadership and 
management in a Corridor-like business environment. It introduces the reader to the concept of 
uncertainty by highlighting its importance in this project, and develops a discussion on strategy 
and its various implications within the Corridor project and its players. It also addresses theory 
relating to how organizations cooperate as a way for companies to gain control over and 
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establishe a given market. This highlights the importance of both uncertainty and market inter-
dependence from a cooperation perspective and within a South American context. 
 
The chapter then continues with a section that addresses the role to be played by the knowledge 
management (KM) and how it links with the Corridor project. In doing so, it both describes the 
project and relates to different types of knowledge creation and knowledge transfer. It also 
highlights the concept and utilization of a CoP within the integration roundtables across the 
region.  
 
Figure 1-2 in Section 1.6 illustrates the research approach and how the combination of 
reflection on practice, reflection in practice, and reflection on DPM courses led me to the 
theories presented in this chapter. Therefore, it makes sense to not only present a traditional 
literature review that stands apart from theory but to also indicate where reflection on the 
experience of being an active participant has relevance to theory presented. It is anticipated 
that this will help the reader to appreciate how theory and reflection shaped hypotheses or 
propositions that were later tested. 
 
Finally, as PM is argued to play an important part in effecting transformational change, 
there is a section that identifies recognized project management tools and techniques. The 
chapter is then concluded with a chapter summary. 
 
3.2 - COMPETITIVE FORCES AND INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 
Courtney, Kirkland and Viguerie (1997) argue that in turbulent and rapidly changing 
circumstances, traditional strategic planning horizons are dangerously constricting and confining. 
They categorize four levels of uncertainty with corresponding strategic responses:  
• Level 1, with a clear enough future can be planned for using the traditional strategic 
toolkit as described by the positioning school of thought (Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and 
Lampel, 1998, Chapter 4);  
• Level 2, with alternative futures lends itself to concentrating on a few discrete outcomes 
that define the future using analytical tools game theory etc;  
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• Level 3, comprises a range of possible outcomes but no natural scenarios where scenario 
planning can be use; and.  
• Level 4 is in the realm of true ambiguity with no basis to forecast the future so the main 
tools used for planning would be emergent by drawing analogies, recognizing patterns and 
using non-linear dynamic models. Transformational organizational change will respond to 
the perceived uncertainties and dynamic capabilities being developed by firms. 
 
The Corridor context, as described in detail in Chapter 2, involved massive uncertainty and high 
levels of turbulence so Level 1 above was certainly not the case facing Corridor participants with 
Level 3 highly likely and Level 4 in extreme cases with Level 2 being the case for several 
Corridor participants. This appreciation of uncertainty and required response influenced the 
strategy adopted in individual cases and by individual players. The case studies chosen help to 
how illustrate this occurred (see Section 8.2 for analysis and Figure 8.1 as an illustration). 
 
Globalization: 
Need for 
geographical cover
- scale 
Geo-political factors: 
MERCOSUR
Emerging economies  
Severe resource constraints
talent, fuel, other inputs  
Shock to existing
paradigm 
Supply chain 
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demand/supply
cycles 
Impetus for change
balanced response
Avoiding missed 
opportunities Fear of trend
implications
Change
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Emergent, 
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Reflexive   
Deployment   
A program of project initiatives
The Corridor as a 
collaborative learning
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Initial Corridor 
members, re-align with
global players
through sell-outs
mergers, JVs
alliances 
 
 
Figure 3.1:  Understanding Corridor Development 
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Figure 3.1 helps explain how the corridor evolved. This chapter will discuss the nature of 
globalization, geo-political factor and the way that the emerging economy has placed pressure 
upon the prevailing business paradigm in the MERCOSUR. This provided the kind shock often 
that triggers change and innovation (Kotter, 1995). This shock provided the impetus for change 
that Kotter (1995) refers to. The reaction can be explained by what Schein (1993) refers to as two 
types of anxiety. Anxiety 1 is the fear associated with an inability or unwillingness to learn 
something new because it appears too difficult or disruptive while anxiety 2 is the fear, shame or 
guilt associated with not learning something new - generally due to an explicit statement about 
the need for survival to learn the new things. Corridor participants related to type 1 anxiety as the 
fear of not being able to cope with the implications of the perceived emerging trend of 
globalization and the other drivers indicated as priming the ‘shock’ treatment feelings. Anxiety 2 
was for them about the fear of missing opportunities that forming alliances and cooperative 
initiatives may present. Original Corridor members engage with global players in a number of 
ways that leads to collaboration and cross-business learning as well as joint venturing, alliances 
and even mergers and acquisitions. Both Regional and global players influence each other 
through the Corridor experience.  
 
This chapter outlines the strategic response that became the Corridor initiative. The strategy was 
(in part at least) what Mintzberg,  Ahlstrand and Lampel (1998) call emergent and configuration 
strategy. This provided a reflexive strategy in coping with the evolving situation facing them. 
Mintzberg et al (1998) describe and discuss 10 schools of strategy that fall into three groups—
prescriptive, descriptive and configurative.  
 
The prescriptive set of three strategic schools (the design school, the planning school and 
positioning school) is more concerned with how strategy should take place than with how it 
actually does take place. This view is very much about a deliberate top down, somewhat 
command and control, approach. This was popular in the 1980s and 1990s where those 
supporting these strategy schools believed that they could, and should, shape their preferred 
future. In part we see some evidence of this with corridor participants but generally strategy is 
used in the sense of designing the Corridor concept as a strategic response to the forces illustrated 
in Figure 3.1.  The descriptive school sees strategy as an analytical process.  
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The next descriptive set of six strategic schools is more concerned with describing how strategy 
does in fact take place and this help us understand how the Corridor functions with a diverse 
group of participants that individually often adopt varying strategic approaches. The 
Entrepreneurial School responds to market chaos and extreme turbulence and it focuses 
exclusively and extremely on a top-management perspective. This school sees strategy as being 
centred upon vision through the innate intuition, judgement, wisdom, experience and insight of 
the entrepreneur who formulates the strategy to meet the envisioned challenge. The fundamental 
basis of this school is rooted in innovation. The cognitive strategy school sees strategy as a 
mental process and take an interest in the way that a strategist’s mind works by using cognitive 
psychology to do this—how they make decisions, how they judge evidence and how they 
communicate what they believe to be sound strategic decisions.  
 
The learning school believe that strategy is an emergent process. This view of strategy presents a 
departure from the CEO (or highest echelon of management) being the strategy formulator, as is 
the view with the prescriptive strategy school, rather it implies a flow of influence stemming 
from across the organization from top to bottom. Strategy and changes emerge from the 
organization as a whole through its evolved culture and how the interplay and actions between 
leaders and followers affects procedures and governance. This chapter will later focus on more of 
this aspect. 
 
The power school sees strategy as a process of negotiation linked to influence and politics. There 
was much evidence of power and its deployment being a key shaper of the Corridor concept as 
well as explaining observed behaviors. The politics school also believes that ability to influence 
and negotiate is also reflected by the sense of commitment or compliance experienced by those 
taking part in negotiations.  
 
A related school to this is the cultural school that sees strategy as a collective process. Culture 
can be studied from either the outside in, or inside out. It can also be understood from the 
national/regional as well as organizational point of view to help explain what is observed. The 
environmental school sees strategy as a reactive process. This school sees the environment as the 
 47
defining actor, together with leadership and the organization, shaping strategy through the 
organization’s reaction to forces external to it. Mintzberg et al. (1998, p288) argue that this 
school evolved out of contingency theory with ideas such as ‘the more stable the environment, 
the more formalized the organization’s internal structure’. 
 
This last strategic group, comprising the configuration strategic school, is concerned with 
strategy as a process of configuration and transformation. Mintzberg et al. (1998, p305-306) 
states that Configuration School proponents believe that most of the time an organization can be 
described in terms of a kind of stable configuration of its characteristics for a distinguishable 
period of time adopting a particular structured by adopting its strategies to meet the challenges it 
faces from its external environment.  
 
There are periods of stability and periods of extreme turbulence when disruptive change requires 
a quantum leap to another organizational form. These successive states of configuration and 
transformation occur over time similar to the stages of organizational transformation triggered by 
turbulent shocks described by Greiner in (Greiner and Schein, 1988; Greiner, 1998).  
 
The key to strategic management therefore is to sustain stability most of the time when that 
maintains competitive advantage and to be able to shift gear to being transformational to 
CoPe with disruptive change to position the organization ready for the next fairly stable 
period. This is where the other strategy schools have their usefulness because the process of 
strategy making can be seen as Mintzberg et al. (1998, p305-306) argue as “one of 
conceptual designing or formal planning, systematic analyzing or leadership visioning, 
cooperative learning or competitive politicking, focusing on individual cognition, collective 
socialization, or simple response to the environmental forces: but each must be found at its 
own time and in its own context” - “the resulting strategies take the form of plans or 
patterns, positions or perspectives, or else ploys, but again for its own time and matched to 
its own situation”. Given the predominance of turbulence and uncertainty, and the need to 
step in and try to shape the future from this discussion of Courtney et al, (1997), an 
emergent strategy combined with a strong focus on the configuration strategic school 
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approach was generally adopted to help shape the future and respond to events illustrated in 
Figure 3.1.  
 
Understanding the various strategic schools of thought is useful for helping us understand how 
the Corridor concept evolved and the behaviors of those that participated in it in the program of 
many project initiatives. The dominant and prevailing view of the dynamics of competition is that 
any industry, whether it is domestic or international or produces a product or a service, the rules 
of competition are embodied in five competitive forces: the entry of new competitors, the threat 
of substitutes, the bargaining power of buyers, the bargaining power of suppliers, and the rivalry 
among existing competitors (Porter 1998, pp4-11). Porter argues that the collective strength of 
these five competitive forces determines the ability of firms in an industry to earn, on average, 
rates of return on investment in excess of the cost of capital plus the value of the managerial 
input. Naturally, the strength of the five forces may vary from industry to industry and may 
evolve as a given industry changes. 
 
Put in logistic terms and referring this to the MERCOSUR region, each of the five forces may be 
clearly represented in the following manner: 
1. Entry of new competitors: global shipping companies; global port operators; world-
scale freight forwarding companies and logistics operators; global air cargo carriers; 
global coastal feeding and barging operators; extra-regional railway and trucking 
conglomerates;  
2. Threat of substitutes: innovative distribution channels; new technology making all 
previous approaches obsolete; new type of containers; new stowage or transfer 
technology; better pricing or faster timing in ground transportation vis-à-vis barging 
operations; efficient railing vis-à-vis congested air stations; global accounts with extra-
regional headquarters; concentration of shipbrokers beyond the region; 
3. Bargaining power of buyers: large global multinationals on the export or import 
process representing enormous volumes in the container trade; large brokers or non-
vessel operator common carriers7 gathering great volumes of cargo; mineral and grain 
                                                 
7 NVOCC: non-vessel operating common carrier are normally independent logistic operators gathering a number of 
shipper and exerting pressure on the carriers to obtain lower freight rates. Their bargaining power may naturally vary 
according to what their volume may be at a given point as well as the intended time-period. 
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global dealers taking advantage from a raising cycle in the value of their commodities 
and exerting great pressure on services; global ocean carriers holding large economies 
of scale and better port pricing; shippers associations; 
4. Bargaining power of suppliers: large oil companies exerting pressure on a strategic 
input for almost all the transportation chain; large international port terminal consortia 
concentrating global interests; large steel manufacturing firms choosing priorities 
between supplying oil and gas customers or the ship-building industry on regional 
basis; limited number of barges leading to a general rate increase on the waterways and 
costal system; and 
5. Rivalry among existing competitors: national, regional, and global ocean shipping 
companies struggling for a market share by reengineering their services and 
organizational structures; ocean and river container terminals striving to prevail and 
control trades by lowering fares and upgrading technology; port hinterland competition 
among regional ports by creating rail access or expanding into distributing-related 
services; trucking, railway, or barging operations struggling for controlling a market 
segment ; global air-cargo carriers and regionally-based companies; provinces and 
departments disputing the control and operation of strategic corridors linking 
consumption and production poles, regions and countries. 
 
The five forces may determine industry profitability because they influence the prices, costs, and 
required investment for a firm to remain competitive. Large exporting or importing 
multinationals may influence the freight rate levels an ocean shipping company may charge, as 
does the threat of substitution. Similarly, buyers’ power may have an impact on the level of 
investment a given carrier must deploy in order to match their customer expectations on service 
level, quality, and delivery times. 
 
The bargaining power of suppliers may become critical for most transportation operators, 
especially during times where the oil market shows instability and uncertainty for an input of a 
high strategic value such as fuel oil. The intensity of rivalry has a direct connection with the 
available supply or the number of companies present in a given market, and with the freight level 
logistic companies may charge their customers at a given moment. These factors are crucial 
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elements for the Corridor. As well as the threat of entry they place a rather clear limit to freight 
rate levels and extensively shapes the degree of investment needed on technology, structure, and 
management to deter entrants. A commonly held view about industry profitability is that profits 
are a function of the balance between supply and demand, where the profitability emerges as a 
consequence of the demand being greater than the supply.  
 
Although true and as argued by Porter (1998, pp8-11), this focuses only on short-term 
fluctuations in supply and demand, whereas long-term profit projections are somehow dictated by 
the industry structure. Industry structure may determine how quickly competitors add supply as 
well as it may trigger a price war and reduce profitability every time there is an excess of 
capacity - a phenomena that take place too often in the container trade for instance. However, this 
varies from industry to industry.  
 
Durell (2005) argues that in the shipping industry for example, the industry structure plays a key 
role as regards to what is known as the shipping cycle. When the balance of supply and demand 
is more or less in equilibrium, ocean freight rates are reasonably stable. In this state, the main 
incentive to build new ships is to replace aging tonnage with newer vessels that are more 
economic and efficient to operate. With an average vessel life of 20 years, about 5% of the 
world's fleet is either scrapped each year or sent off to what is know the laid-up market – some 
remote sheltered locations that have safe anchoring in the Norwegian fiords or in Greek waters.  
 
If the global demand for shipping starts to exceed its long-term average growth rate, then tonnage 
capacity becomes constrained. The first thing that happens is that the scrap rate drops to about 
1%. Then if demand really ramps up, as happened in 2003 and 2004, supply just can't keep up. 
New ships must therefore be ordered, and that creates backlogs for shipbuilders, which will 
generally require a couple of years to catch up with demand, creating logical market disruptions 
and impacting on their entire value chain. Problems then begin to surface as ship-owners seem to 
mimic the actions of momentum investors8 piling into the latest hot stock as their new-building 
frenzy leads to an oversupply of expensive new shipping tonnage in the market.  
                                                 
8 These are stock market investors who follow a herd instinct by piling their money into the latest ‘hot’ stock 
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The problems of oversupply are exacerbated by governments giving massive grants to 
shipbuilders to secure jobs and tax breaks to ship-owners, such as 100% depreciation in the first 
year of operations as well as operational subsidies as is the case for the American merchant 
marine9. In a normal cycle, ocean freight rates plummet, not only because of the oversupply of 
tonnage but also because demand eventually slackens and this leads us into the "bust" part of the 
classic boom-bust cycle.  
 
An explanation for the apparent indefinite continuation of a “boom” in shipping is that the 
enormous growth in demand from China and India for energy and raw materials will be sustained 
for many years if not decades, thus sustaining the demand for ships through flooding the world 
markets with products which eventually triggers demand for bigger vessels capable of reaching 
distant markets. Such a cycle brings about (in response to an extraordinary excess of demand 
arising out of China and India’s constant growth) a sort of markets interdependency. This cycle 
has evolved to such a degree that even the far away South American (east and west) coasts have 
witnessed the arrival of global shipping companies that saw an opportunity to expand their 
services beyond the east-west-east traditional shipping routes. 
  
The “laid-up market”, where older and lesser economic and efficient ships are anchored, is often 
slow to react before a market boom situation because vessels have to be put into seaworthy 
conditions first, minimally crewed, and repositioned in the trades of interests. This is similar to 
other large capital provision industries such as the building development industry where 
developing new-buildings takes some time to realize and often trigger a real estate oversupply 
impact on the market. Along with the shipping expansion, global port operators also saw an 
opportunity to accompany this expansion and also explore distant markets. In fact most logistic 
segments of the supply chain attempted to gain global reach in the same way. The industry 
structure seems therefore, to play an important role in the interaction of Porter’s five competitive 
forces and especially when those industries are of global nature or global reach (e.g. ocean 
shipping; ports; ship-building). 
                                                 
9 The American merchant marine runs an annual program of subsidies aimed at helping its merchant marine remain 
competitive on its operations around the world, and foster shipowners place their construction orders on American 
shipyards.  
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Probably the three most widely cited books on competitive analysis from the 1980s were Michael 
Porter’s “Competitive Strategy” (1980), “Competitive Advantage” (1985), and “Competitive 
Advantage of Nations” (1989). According to Porter, strategies allow organizations to gain 
competitive advantage from three different bases: cost leadership, differentiation, and focus. 
Porter calls these bases generic strategies. Cost leadership emphasizes producing standardized 
products at a very low per-unit cost for consumers or segments that are price-sensitive.  
 
Differentiation is a strategy aimed at producing products and services considered unique 
industry-wise and directed at consumers who are relatively price-insensitive. Focus means 
producing products and services that fulfill the needs of small groups of consumers. Porter’s 
strategies imply different organizational arrangements, control procedures, and incentive systems. 
Larger firms with greater access to resources typically compete on a cost leadership and/or 
differentiation basis, whereas smaller firms often compete on a focus basis. This is where the 
issue of achieving larger economies of scale within the Corridor proves to be of paramount 
importance for all those companies concerned about being relegated to perform secondary 
services as a minor industry player or being outsourced by the global and more resourceful firms. 
Achieving project management efficiencies and developing skills and competencies to compete 
with global players becomes essential in order to honor the often urgent deadlines set by a 
volatile business environment. It also became a strategic reality for all these companies, who 
needed to compete on a cost leadership basis, to start searching for potential allies interested in 
entering in some sort of alliance, partnership, or joint-venture. 
 
Porter (1985) stresses the need to achieve larger economies of scale, accomplish a higher level in 
technology, having preferential access to raw materials – among other factors – to carry out a 
successful cost leadership strategy. In this regard it is important to point out that most if not all of 
the players within South America (no matter what type of logistic segment in the supply chain) 
had to face the arrival of global players showing strong cost leadership strategy attributes. As 
such, the newcomers’ economies of scale turned out to be substantially bigger. Consequently 
their bargaining power was much stronger for gaining access to strategic raw material and 
resources (e.g. fuel oil ; building and operation subsidies). This resulted in these global players 
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being more accessible in the region, therefore far more efficient, and their technology also made a 
distinguishing difference due to the daily running costs of their more modern ships, better 
equipped terminals, faster transfer equipment, etc.  
 
Porter (1985) also highlights that a firm that can achieve and sustain differentiation will be an 
above-average performer in its industry if its price premium exceeds the extra costs incurred in 
being unique. As such, the differentiation strategy logic lies in the attributes chosen by a firm to 
differentiate it from its rivals. Naturally, such a choice entails being able to afford the required 
additional investment. For those (by then totally isolated) companies operating in South America 
this investment could be seen as unrealistic. They stood on the verge of facing truly global, 
aggressive, and resourceful firms capable of successfully adopting both a cost leadership and 
differentiation strategy in their intent to capture most of the main existing market segments while 
outsourcing those of minor potential. 
 
The last generic strategy is focus, the choice of a narrow competitive scope within an industry. 
This presented a potential and threatening scenario that served as a triggering element to 
constitute the Atlantic Corridor of the MERCOSUR for their members to expose their views, 
combine their resources, enter into restructuring alliances, leading all to face the new era of 
market globalization in the logistic industry.  
 
Finally, Porter (1985) also refers to a last option defined as “stuck in the middle” or the 
manifestation of a firm’s unwillingness to make choices about how to compete. Such a scheme 
turns out nowadays simply unthinkable since a firm that chooses to adopt this strategy, would 
compete at a disadvantage because the cost leaders, differentiators, or focusers will be better 
positioned to compete in any segment. 
 
However and surprisingly, this has been the case for various large regional shipping companies 
and port terminals operating under the flag protection scheme10. Restrictive laws had let them 
grow large and remain “stuck in the middle”, facing no threats, and within a market environment 
                                                 
10 Flag protection schemes were implemented by most countries in South America during the 70s and 80s to enforce 
a share of their imports and exports be carried by vessels flying their national flags. 
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that lacked of competition and discourage the utilization of any of Porter’s generic strategies for a 
long period of time (e.g. Lloyd Brasileiro; Empresa de Lineas Maritimas del Estado – ELMA; 
Flota Fluvial del Estado; Libra Navegacao)11. Interestingly, the same concept of market 
protection leading to a stuck in the middle corporate attitude is still established in developed 
countries such as Canada or the USA, where the lack of competition brings about the utilization 
of older tonnage and obsolete technology – contrary to on-going world trends (e.g. coastal trade 
in the USA; barge trade within Canada’s Great Lakes). 
 
Naturally and with the advent of both the globalization process and the creation of the 
MERCOSUR market, flag protection schemes and bilateral treaties drew to a close and new 
market rules emerged to make room for new players to enter and lead the way to both  market 
and industry changes. These new trends impacting on regional shipping and port business is well 
developed and explained in a policy research project report undertaken by the Lyndon Johnson 
School of Public Affairs of the University of Texas at Austin (Boske, pp35-60).   
 
Thus the Porter forces model that he still felt applicable and appropriate for the e-economy as for 
example (Porter, 2001), can be used to help explain the shipping cycle as it occurs in the Latin 
American context, which is the context of this dissertation. Further, the formation of alliances and 
pseudo and real joint ventures has been offered by a range of strategy thinkers and academics 
such as (Doz and Hamel, 1998) as a strategic response. 
 
This entails cooperating with competitors, co-opting them and learning how to internalize 
knowledge from them. Doz and Hamel (1998) document cases study examples from a range of 
industries. Walker and Hampson (2003) show how building construction organizations can form 
strategic alliances. Oum, Park and Zhang (2000) provide extensive examples from the air 
transport industry and Ferdows (1997) illustrated how foreign factories can be strategically linked 
in a value chain that fits very well with the way that Corridor participants arranged themselves in 
their value chain.  
 
                                                 
11  State-owned and private shipping companies in Brazil and  Argentina that got bankrupt or sold out.  
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All these examples support the earlier part of this section that the resource based view of the firm 
helps explain behaviors such as those that led to the development of the Corridor. We see that 
these alliance-type relationships not only allow more effective sharing of risk through superior 
application of scale and depth of resources but also application and transfer of knowledge to help 
dynamic competencies develop and be engaged so that these Corridor organizations have better 
reflexivity and adaptation capacity to rapidly changing global competition forces. Many of these 
aspects will shortly be discussed in more depth.  
 
3.3 - COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE AND THE VALUE CHAIN 
This thesis’ context resides in a transformation of logistics companies that sought 
competitive advantage. Logistics and supply chain management (SCM) is generally linked 
in the mind of practitioners and academics (Sadler, 2007). Further, following the research 
direction 3 of Winter et al. (2006) in which value is privileged over focus on techniques 
and tools, SCM as a technique is re-framed in terms of value chain management. This view 
is supported by the leading literature for example Sherer (2005, pp77) states that “A 
broader concept, value network advocacy, better describes the needs of business today.” 
Later she states “Today we should be focusing on networks, not linear chains or flows. This 
applies to the physical process and even more so, the movement and sharing of information. 
Information has become the key driver of advantage. Information hubs should be the basis 
of communication Information technology today can support this move.” (Sherer, 2005, 
pp81). This provides one of but many examples from the literature on how SCM has been 
evolving towards a value focus as is the focus of this thesis. Readers wishing to find a 
current literature review and extensive discussion on the trends should refer to Sadler 
(2007).  
 
It is useful to apply Porter’s model of the value chain to better understand the process through 
which the various regional logistic segments proceed when facing new global trends. Porter 
(1985, pp36-61) argues that the value chain is made up of value activities (the distinct activities a 
firm performs) and margin (the difference between total value and total cost arising out of 
performing the value activities). 
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Value activities can be classified in to two broad types, primary and support activities. Typically, 
primary activities are defined by the creation of a product or service (inbound logistics / 
operations / outbound logistics / marketing and sales / service), whereas support activities (human 
resources / technology / procurement etc) functionally support the primary activities. This leads 
to the creation of margin.  
 
An important aspect that forms part of the support activities is the firm’s infrastructure which is 
precisely one of the issues that renders value to the Corridor. The infrastructure created through 
the Corridor is useful in providing and making available tools for companies with smaller relative 
infrastructure resources. Those regional companies facing difficulties in tackling new global 
market trends and experiencing their respective infrastructure levels as a burden rather than as an 
advantage, found in the Corridor roundtables both competitors and complementary firms 
experiencing the same problems.  
 
The Corridor gave them the opportunity to search for new ideas, new resources, and new 
concepts which in general contributed to enrich and strengthen their own value chains in a wide 
array of forms. These forms often entailed restructuring and adapting companies to face new 
scenarios by implementing project management processes and techniques. These new 
organizational forms manifested themselves as strategic alliances, joint-ventures, and different 
degrees of partnerships. It even brought about a number of mergers and acquisitions among 
members, as a way to enlarge economies of scale for them to remain competitive with larger 
global infrastructure resources. 
 
Both primary and support activities of the participating members tended to improve by exposing 
what their limitations and problems were, and (most of the times), finding alternative action to 
take by combining efforts and gaining one another’s experiences.  
 
For the purpose of letting the reader better comprehend the extent of the role played by each of 
the primary and support activities among the Corridor participants, it is useful to follow Porter’s 
value chain classification as a way to clearly conceptualize the “why”, “what”, and “how” of the 
Corridor along with the roundtables.  
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Porter refers to five generic categories associated with the primary activities:  
1. Inbound logistics: all those functions connected with receiving, storing, and 
disseminating inputs to the product, such as material handling, warehousing, inventory 
control, vehicle scheduling, and returns to suppliers. However for companies involved 
in rendering logistic services, there is no product to be manufactured, but that just a 
pure service is to be delivered. This presents a different perspective. For an ocean 
shipping company, inbound logistics is represented by the handling of their entire fleet 
of containers spread all over the world. This involves activities associated with 
trucking operations, customs operations, warehousing and distribution operations, 
stuffing and un-stuffing12 of containers allowing a good turn-around-time (TAT) of the 
container itself13, and naturally the positioning and repositioning concept which comes 
associated with the concept of balance costs. Having a low TAT along with a large 
fleet of containers disseminated over a rather large geography, is considered within the 
industry as a very dangerous situation – both operationally and financially. An efficient 
bunkering operation at strategic world locations is also regarded as a key value chain 
variable, with fuel oil being the most expensive input for running a shipping fleet. 
Smooth handling of spare parts and accessories reaching navigating convoys at remote 
locations along with an efficient bunkering operation at the right time and location, 
turn out simply essential for a waterways operator. For an air-cargo company, 
bunkering is also of paramount importance, as well as reliance on efficient ramp 
services for a smooth operation. For a port terminal, inbound logistics is very much 
related to its infrastructure in terms of transfer facilities, cold-storage supplies, fluids 
and tools for maintenance, spare parts logistics, automation and satellite 
communication equipment. Further examples can be presented but what is important at 
this point is to highlight the distinction for a logistic company between Porter’s first 
generic category of the primary activities and the operation itself, and to understand the 
role that economies of scale may play in this context. Global firms relying on global 
purchasing power and global distribution will easily be differentiated with those 
                                                 
12 In shipping the term ‘stuffing’ is used for filling literally with stuff of all kinds 
 
13 Time a container takes to complete a round-trip from port to door delivery and back to port. 
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nationally or regionally-oriented companies showing much less versatility and 
maneuvering capacity. This illustrates the need for firms to be reflexive towards the 
context in which they operate; 
2. Operations: capital concentration here is a destabilizing factor for regional shipping 
companies. This is because economies of scale displayed by the global carriers are far 
larger than those achievable at regional level. According to the Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (Hoffmann 1988), concentration itself has 
affected everything including ship size, the number of port calls, and changes in 
shipping services offered. Haralambides (2000) stated at a conference that “The overall 
degree of containerization, currently about 60% of general-cargo traffic, is expected to 
reach 70% or higher by the year 2010. Total container traffic now exceeds 200 million 
TEUs (twenty equivalent units) per year”. He also stated that between 1991 and 2000, 
container shipping capacity increased at an average annual rate of 10.5%, compared to 
2.5% in worldwide GDP, 6.5% in international trade, and 2.1% in world merchant 
fleet. This suggests that an expansion of the global carriers toward achieving larger 
economies of scale reinforced by a globalization of world trade is lowering the entry 
barriers for global carriers to many world markets. Therefore, the Corridor concept 
appears to be a strategic project arising out of a defensive reaction to the expansionist 
process of global corporations. Whether this results in more competitive operations or 
not is a subject to be dealt with in the coming chapters;  
3. Outbound logistics:  this is normally associated with collecting, storing, and physically 
distributing the product to buyers – a typical logistic function. This is the very nature 
of a logistic operator’s business comprising: distributing products to the end buyers, 
conducting efficient warehousing operations, and designing a precise scheduling for 
air-traffic or marine-traffic services, etc. ECLAC14 argues that changes in shipping 
services have come about as shippers have begun to expect higher quality services, 
including shorter transit times, more direct services, guaranteed delivery times, door-
to-door15 services, low incidence of damage, and the use of electronic communications 
                                                 
14 Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). Concentration in Liner Shipping :its 
causes and impacts for ports and shipping services in developing regions by Jan Hoffmann (Santiago, Chile; 
August 17th 1998). P32 
15 Definition given to a container service going from the supplier’s premises up to the end receiver’s plant.   
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and systems that have received ISO 9000 certification. Naturally, outbound logistics 
again has a direct link with infrastructure and therefore with economies of scale. 
Larger and more resourceful firms are in a better position to achieve larger economies 
of scale that lowers their base-cost, and through this, attain competitive advantage;   
4. Marketing and Sales: activities such as pricing, channel selection, channel relations, 
advertising, promotions, and sales force deployment are of strategic importance to 
induce a customer to favor a given service at the expense of a less resourceful one. 
Typically, global companies that gained larger economies of scale based on the east-
west-east trades (eastbound and westbound services), found themselves in a much 
better position to expand their services to cover the north-south-north trades 
(northbound and southbound services) to national or regional companies going global. 
Global companies do this by making use of their already existing marketing and sales 
services. ECLAC argues that globalization has affected both trade direction and 
volume, blurring the distinction between north-south-north and east-west-trades. 
Reliance on transshipment means that a portion of the north-south trade is transported 
by east-west carriers for part of the journey. In addition, seasonal cycles, trade 
imbalances, and route differences add to the difficulty in defining trade directions; and  
5. Service: activities associated with providing service to enhance or maintain the value 
of the product, such as installation, repair, training, parts supply, and service 
adjustment. Again at this point, relying on larger economies of scale allowed the 
operator to become more competitive based on lower running costs and repositioning 
costs worldwide for an entire fleet – either for ships, aircraft carriers, trucks, or 
railways.   
 
Porter (1985, pp40-45) also refers to support activities. These played a fundamental role for the 
MERCOSUR operating companies at the time of facing the arrival of those global players who 
held greater economies of scale, as well as an immediate apparent greater capacity to achieve a 
differentiated competitive advantage form in procurement; technology development; human 
resources; and firm’s infrastructure. 
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Being global and having access to the key locations for acquiring fuel oil (FO)16, or having a 
world coverage for rapid deployment of flying in spare parts, as well as obtaining both available 
space and competitive pricing for ships’ dry-docking17 on regular basis, are variables that define a 
differentiation competitive advantage for the global and more powerful firms, at the expense of 
those showing lesser volumes and number of assets to negotiate with. In the case of truly 
international industries such as ocean and air transportation, global mobilization of assets to the 
key supplying locations delivers a strategic difference and helps improve profit margin within the 
value chain model.  
 
Technology development can be represented by a number of factors. These include the higher-
relative speed of vessels, a faster loading/unloading capacity of gantry cranes18, a well developed 
on-line cargo tracking on the part of the NVOCCs19, GPS-based satellite system to track down 
containers over a certain hinterland, etc. The combination of technology and a large client-base of 
global reach, provides a differentiation competitive advantage that is very difficult to offset for a 
national or regional firm whose market boundaries were so far well defined and not subject to 
expand and therefore forced somehow to innovate. 
 
Human resource management affects competitive advantage in any type of logistic company, 
through its role in determining the skills and motivation of employees and the cost of hiring and 
training. Large and global shipping companies recruited their future executives from within the 
MERCOSUR region and sent them over to their corporate universities located across the USA, 
Europe, and Asia, not only for professional training purposes but also to be indoctrinated in the 
firms’ corporate culture and to become familiar with the company’s operating systems and ways 
that ‘things are done’. This is directly connected with knowledge management (KM) and where 
                                                 
15 Fuel oil can be supplied in different parts of the world at different prices for which it turns out crucial for the ocean 
carriers to access to those spots first, and count on enough volume to obtain price differentials enabling them gain 
competitive advantage on the north-south routes. 
 
17 Vessels normally go dry dock once a year for a period of 30 days for operational maintenance, further to a 
compulsory inspection every 4 years.  
 
18 Specialized port cranes utilized to load and discharge full-container ships worldwide. 
 
19 Non-Vessel Operating Common Carriers: definition utilized within the USA for those companies that count on a 
large number of clients whose cargoes get shipped worldwide on third party vessels.    
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perhaps the Corridor’s participants knew how to better respond to the globalization trends. This 
will be dealt with later, both in this chapter (see Section 3.7) and throughout the dissertation.  
 
Finally, the firm’s infrastructure turns out to be of paramount importance when assessing the real 
threat that globalization has posed to the regional Corridor firms. The threat to Corridor 
participants lay in the capacity of global companies to deploy a tremendous amount of assets and 
resources of all kinds including: 
• number of trades operated by a single shipping firm;  
• global sales and operational offices; 
• number of trucks and trailers operated by a small number of ocean carriers; 
• integration between railways and shipping lines; 
• expansion of global port terminals and deployment of innovative and capital-intensive 
transfer equipment20; and 
• highly specialized ships deploying state-of-the art navigation and operation technology. 
 
It becomes apparent that both the primary and support activities played a fundamental role in 
reshaping the region’s value chain – as defined by Porter – in that every single operator within 
the MERCOSUR has witnessed changes in its business environment in a quiet but dramatic 
fashion. In that process, many companies have vanished whereas others have been sold out to the 
foreign and global operators. However, there were a significant number of firms that found in the 
Corridor an opportunity to face a threatening scenario. Porter’s theory helps in analyzing the way 
that forces act and interact and they make value chain analysis, along with implications that may 
be experienced so that discrete threats and opportunities can be better identified by the value 
chain segments.  
 
This section drew to particular attention in context-specific terms, how viewing logistics from a 
value chain as opposed to simply a supply chain, has relevance to this thesis. As stated in Section 
1.8 with reference to the Winter et al. (2006) research direction 3, research is needed into how 
value is created and delivered in projects 
                                                 
20 Rubber-typed cranes, fork-lifts, straddle carriers and further handling equipment that is utilized to transfer cargoes 
from port sheds to trucks.  
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3.4 - THE THEORY OF THE FIRM AS IT APPLIES TO THE MERCOSUR REGION          
The nature of the firm can be viewed from a number of perspectives. The resource based view 
(RBV) sees organizations as a set of competencies and resources providing competitive 
advantage that can be successfully used (Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Competencies have been 
argued as being a vital resource (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990) including knowledge (Conner and 
Prahalad, 1996). Organizations, such as those in the Corridor, needed to respond to turbulence 
and market uncertainty through developing a set of dynamic capabilities that allow them to be 
flexible, lean, responsive to disruptive change and become learning organizations so that they can 
interact more effectively with both upstream and downstream supply chain members (Spender, 
1996; Teece, Pisano and Shuen, 1997; Eisenhardt and Brown, 1999; Eisenhardt and Martin, 
2000). 
 
The theory of the firm aims at assisting in the theoretical investigation of one of the central 
problems of economic analysis – the way in which prices and the allocation of resources among 
different uses are determined. These probably are the main triggering variables to constitute the 
Corridor project. The conditions of equilibrium analysis require that there be some force that 
prevents the indefinite expansion of output of any firm. If a situation of pure competition is 
assumed, the limit to output is found only in the assumption that the unit cost of a product or 
service must rise at some point when even additional quantities of it are produced or services are 
rendered —putting more resources in lower unit cost ceases to generate additional revenue to 
cover that investment and indeed revenues may actually decrease with additional input of 
resources to effect efficiencies that are aimed at lowering unit costs.  
 
 Typically, this theoretical limit seems to be evident when analyzing the case of all those global 
ocean carriers that commit themselves to building larger and larger vessels in pursuit of achieving 
greater economies of scales to reduce their slot cost21. Many if not all of them are probably well 
aware that when shipping supply exceeds demand only a few ports worldwide can be relied upon 
to accommodate the needed facilities to provide a berth for these ships that seem to be built larger 
                                                 
21 The cost assigned to carry one TEU or twenty equivalent unit on board a ship. e.g. a 20 footer container on board a 
ship. 
 63
and larger as the pressures for globalization intensify. However, Penrose (1995, pp13) argues that 
“When appropriate resources are available, a firm can produce anything for which a demand 
can be found or created, and it becomes a matter of taste and convenience whether one speaks of 
the market or of the resources of the firm itself as the consideration limiting its expansion”.  
 
It appears that perhaps the global shipping firms believe that they can create their own niche 
demand and dominate the logistics industry by using their economies of scale for cost advantage 
and their sophisticated skills for differentiation and position competitive advantage that is 
provided by their application of vast resources available to them. These global companies have a 
good understanding of the time lag between a market signaling the enormous recent increased 
demand for shipping services and constrains and barriers that inhibit rapid responses to these 
signals by all players. 
 
The MERCOSUR market has witnessed global logistic and transportation firms engaged in a 
race: 
• to build larger and larger ships in an intend to achieve larger economies of scale scales 
and lower per-unit costs;  
• for firms acquiring national and regional assets to become global players or simply 
enlarge their scope of operations, and gain wider and more extensive market coverage 
(e.g. railways in Argentina and Brazil ; port terminals all over South America ; huge 
distribution hubs spread all over   the region); and 
• foreign firms acquiring assets on the waterways to intend playing a dominant role in 
the rivers linking five countries in the region.  
 
All this contradicts the firm’s limits to growth theory, but that seems to find a certain logic with 
Penrose’s concept of what firms usually do. Cyert & March (2006, p179) argue that prices and 
outputs change primarily in response to short-run feedback on performance and the extent to 
which solutions to organizational problems are sought in price and output changes, and that this 
depends on past learning about the consequences of that changes. They further contend that firms 
do not resolve potential conflict between market share, profits, and output stability goals 
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primarily by a procedure of explicit mediation. Rather, they ameliorate conflict by accumulating 
excess resources, by decentralizing information, and by attending sequentially to crises.  
 
It has been the author’s experience after attending a number of roundtable sessions and 
witnessing the globalization wave approach the MERCOSUR coast, that the way the Corridor 
members regarded the global operators did not consciously reflect upon and appraise prices, their 
past experiences, their past learning, or any relationship between organizational structures and 
price/output variables. On the contrary, the apparent unstoppable race of the global companies for 
becoming even more global by absorbing distant markets that they had been absent from for so 
long, seems to have no direct connection with any theory of the firm’s limit to growth or price 
and output determination per se. 
 
This suggests that the globalization process is first of all, interpreted and then put into practice as 
an expansionist strategy by a number of large-scaled leading global firms that intend to exert 
dominance upon their followers. This interpretation of the global threat that loomed large was 
likewise understood by the regional operators who eventually gave birth to the Corridor as a 
defensive reaction by a number of organizations.  
 
Put perhaps in simple terms, the risk of not creating or generating global reach for those ever-
expanding international firms seemed to indicate firms being more relevant than the increasing 
costs that the strategy to form part of the Corridor might imply. Not being part of this Corridor 
entity could mean leaving room for others to emerge as Corridor members and gain dominance 
and an opportunity for Corridor members to be better positioned in the long-run to be ahead of 
the competitors. 
 
Penrose further argues that contrary to a popular belief, large firms appear extremely successful 
when competing against smaller companies despite smaller firms having more simple 
administrative and operational structures. Furthermore, there appears to be little evidence that 
larger firms are managed inefficiently when there is enough time for them to make the 
adjustments and adaptations to their administrative framework appropriate to their increasing 
size. 
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This is precisely what apparently happens, as explained earlier, with the shipping cycle in that the 
world maritime markets do no change overnight but that it takes months and even years to 
foresee a new trend developing. This new mother trend seems having been represented by the 
globalization process. What perhaps has not been well assessed on the part of the larger 
companies, is the uncontrollable long-run race for world market cover and the strategic 
positioning that may enable them hold a dominant position and diversify both horizontally in 
other logistic segments, as well as vertically along the supply chain.  
 
Typically, there are a number of subsidies that are granted by some countries which tend to ease 
the expansionist process of some fleets in a sort of permanent pursuit of greater economies of 
scales and lower unit costs. These distortions tend to impact on the firm’s practical application of 
lessons offered by free market and competitive advantage theories of the firm. An example of 
distorting influences that limit the application of pure theories of the firm is the Operating 
Differential Subsidies (ODS) and the Construction Differential Subsidies (CDS) granted by the 
American government aiming at maintaining a US-built and crewed merchant marine22. Another 
fundamental difference of perceptions and behaviors between global corporations and those of 
MERCOSUR-based firms with a lesser-relative market coverage that becomes apparent is 
suggested by their executives’ attitudes towards their firms’ expansion.  
 
Penrose (1995) contends that the managers of global firms have much more to gain if profits can 
be retained and invested in the firm – contrary to the popular belief of making short run profits 
only at the expense of what the long-run might bring. Individuals thereby gain prestige, personal 
satisfaction in the successful growth of the firm they are connected with, more responsible and 
better paid positions, and wider scope for their ambitions and abilities. This does not mean that 
executives will limit their own salaries in order to leave more for profits. On the contrary, the 
salaries of top executives can get as high as the community will condone or as the conscience of 
the executives themselves will permit – stock purchase options and other bonuses being the main 
mechanism (O'Neill and Berry, 2002; O'Neill, 2006). 
 
                                                 
22 See Regulation and Policies of American Shipping by MIT’s Ernst Frankel, Auburn House, Boston 
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Buchanan (1940, p209) states that: “It has been argued, for example, that an enterprise attempts 
to maximize net income to its owners, but that this is equivalent to maximizing the present worth 
of its assets – for the significance of the assets to the firm is their ability to contribute to the 
realization of the desire stream of dividends to shareholders having the greatest present worth”. 
 
Both operational and building subsidies granted by many of the maritime nations whose 
companies are engaged in the global race for greater economies of scales and lower operational 
costs, act as a permanent driving force toward the logic of accomplishing the greatest present 
worth. Increasing present worth means gaining access to new markets and becoming more and 
more global, achieving greater economies of scales and consequently gaining more negotiating 
power, as well as displaying merits to qualify for geopolitical-oriented subsidies backing up the 
expansion strategy of many firms in the ocean shipping and port business. 
 
On the other hand, small businessmen frequently tend to identify themselves with their firm and 
to view it as their life’s work, as a constructive creation to which they can point with pride and 
which they can pass on in full measure to their children. To this end, it may be asserted that they 
often prefer to reinvest their profits in the firm rather than outside and to draw only moderately 
on profits for their personal consumption. 
 
This assertion is supported by a study of over 500 small and medium sized businesses in New 
Zealand where eight factors of motivation for starting a business were identified. Tax reduction 
was only rated at 1.7 out of 5, approval of others was rated 2.2 and following a role model was 
rated 2.6. Personal development was rated 3.8, instrumentality of wealth 4.2, family and 
community welfare and need for independence 4.3 and employment being rated more highly at 
4.4. (Pinfold, 2001).  
 
This study, though not intended to be representative of Corridor participants, nevertheless is 
indicative of the small family-type business sector and supports behaviors observed and 
sentiments expressed in many discussions with Atlantic Corridor participant senior managers. 
Business sustainability and growth appears to be a common goal for both large global companies 
as well as smaller regional operators. 
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It seems reasonable, therefore, to assume that in general the financial and investment decisions of 
firms are controlled by a desire to increase total long-run profits. However, here again both 
economies of scale and competitive advantage are being of crucial relevance to dominate a region 
or market that was previously conceptualized or understood by its operators  in a totally different 
manner. In many industries and areas within the Corridor scope of action, there were a 
considerable number of firms that have been operating successfully for several decades under 
competent and imaginative management, but have refrained from taking full advantage of 
opportunities for expansion.  
 
Many of these were family firms whose owners were content with making a comfortable profit 
and have been unwilling and unmotivated to make more money or to raise capital through 
procedures that would have reduced their control over their firms. This process has also helped 
global companies gain a foothold into the region by acquiring such firms and aligning into their 
global operating scheme. Thus strengthening or driving even further the Corridor’s very essence 
seems a useful mechanism for holding off total domination of the MERCOSUR by global 
companies at the expense of regional companies in a way that the local firms could not 
participate in and shape. 
 
It is accepted that there are three types of explanations of why there may be a limit to the growth 
of the firm, regardless of whether it is a large, small, global, or regional firm. These are 
managerial ability, product or factor markets, and uncertainty and risk. The first refers to 
conditions within the firm, the second to conditions outside the firm, and the third is a 
combination of internal attitudes and external conditions. Regional management was to a great 
extent first captured by the global companies in their intent on recruiting regional talent and 
making their inducement periods shorter.23 Consequently, this process weakened many of the 
MERCOSUR-based firms whereas it tended to shape what was later regarded as a global threat to 
the region. Managerial recruitment was also connected with these companies’ ability to tackle 
                                                 
23 Global shipping companies such as MAERSK, EVERGREEN, MSC, or P&O, tended first to recruit local or 
regional talent to later formulate and implement their market enlargement strategies. 
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ongoing levels of uncertainty. This later proved being less relevant when compared to these 
firms’ need or most highly rated strategy to expand and go global before others did. 
 
Regarding the external barriers to expansion, it is reasonable to assume that there is not an 
effective limit to the amount of any kind of productive resource that a firm can obtain at a given 
price, and that there are opportunities of profitable investment open at existing prices and interest 
rates – regardless of what the situation of a given economy may turn out to be. MERCOSUR’s 
barriers of entry can be considered as low. This, together with the global firm’s threat of looming 
large to gain economies of scales, provided the kind of shock illustrated in Figure 3.1 because 
these global firms turned what theory defined as possible limits to the growth of the firm, into 
their favor. These limits were in fact evident as the currently operating national and regional 
companies saw themselves gradually constrained with respect to:  
1. keeping their managerial ability to expanding and gain economies of scales in view of 
their relatively smaller operated volumes and limited financial opportunities (a 
resources limitation); and 
2. face a new phenomena that shaped a totally new business environment that none was 
prepared to predict and overcome (a strategic limitation). 
 
While regional managers started giving up their regional positions to go global and pass their 
knowledge on to the newcomers, the latter brought the strength of their economies of scale and 
lower relative costs to set a remarkable competitive difference that would help them gain market 
share while either displacing existing players toward a secondary role of feeding operations24 or 
simply displacing them from the market - forcing them to sell, enter in some sort of alliance, or 
simply give up and disappear. 
 
The theory of the firm argues that the expansion of firms is largely based on opportunities to use 
their existing productive resources more efficiently that they are being used – provided that there 
is not a monopoly condition but that of a free market. Firms become larger and larger, and the 
                                                 
24 Feeding companies are those being outsourced to carry out operations of minor scales or volumes between coastal 
ports or non-distant geographical locations (e.g. 500 TEU vessels linking a hub port terminal and a non-regular port 
of call ; trucking companies being outsourced by major railways to render door delivery services as from the railhead 
; outer port empty container terminals outsourced by main port terminal operators) 
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question arises whether the large firms are more efficient than smaller firms would be because 
they are larger with more resources. This raises interesting questions. Does this justify the 
assumption that they will become more efficient as they grow? or that each of their segments of 
activity will become cheaper, of better quality, or more adapted to what exporters and importers 
want?  
 
While growth is a process, size is a state – which means that the Corridor is either a result of, or a 
reaction to, both growth and size variables. Both can be regarded as a direct threat to the smaller 
regional firms’ very regional existence.  
 
In this regard, Penrose (1995, p131) highlights the point that the profitability and even survival of 
a firm depends entirely on the ability of its entrepreneurs to make shrewd financial deals, to judge 
correctly market changes, and to move rapidly from one type of activity to another. Firms fail to 
be economically sustainable when they do not adequately concentrate on the intensive 
development of any of their existing segments of activity, but instead jump haphazardly from one 
type of service to another in response to often short term changes in external conditions. Put in 
logistic terms and emphasizing the purpose and goals of the Corridor, Hoffmann (1998, p12) 
highlights that there has been a substantial move toward stronger alliances and mergers – perhaps 
an inevitable stage the Corridor members had to face at a given point.  
 
Unlike Conferences25, a major goal of transport logistics alliance is to reduce the cost of 
transport. While keeping their individual corporate identities, alliances allow liner shipping 
companies to combine cargo volumes, increase service frequencies, and increase vessel use 
through vessel sharing agreements (VSA)26. Similarly, terminals, equipment, and containers are 
shared, and companies are able to use their collective financial strength in order to procure and 
replace long-term assets. These examples can easily find similar processes across the region 
when assessing the transformation that both Argentina’s and Brazil’s railways have gone through, 
or the reshaping of the entire existing assets operating on the Parana-Paraguay waterways along 
                                                 
25 Cartelized ocean carriers adopting a common pricing policy for a given market anywhere in the world. 
26 A mechanism by which shipowners could flag off some vessels from their fleets while improving the utilization or 
load factors on the remaining ships on service by sharing their use with former competitors. Thus, both capital costs 
and operating costs tended to lower while performance indicators tended to raise. 
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2,400 km of navigable waters and river terminals, or the changing trends in terms of air-cargo 
station hubs across the region, as well as the various land-bridges that evolved as a response to 
create high specialization as a strategy to counteract the offensive represented by the 
globalization players.  
 
The theory of the firm provides a useful tool to lead the reader to gradually understand the 
existing motivations behind the Corridor’s creation, and the way organizations find their ways to 
capitalize their experiences and project new possible scenarios to face the upcoming globalization 
and other economic and political trends indicated in Figure 3.1. The processes adopted by the 
Corridor in how it operates – further to including aspects that will be developed throughout other 
chapters such as economies of size, technological economies, managerial economies, operation 
and expansion economies, and diversification economics – triggered a number of alliances and 
partnerships of different degrees. These combined with a series of vertical and horizontal 
integrations and linkages within their respective supply chains, leads us to a fuller understanding 
of the Corridor as an innovative entity full of potential to be implemented under project 
management parameters in many parts of the world, as a way to generate larger economies of 
scale and getting corporations more competitive.  
 
3.5 - LEADERSHIP AND STRATEGY THEORY TO MEET STAKEHOLDER NEEDS   
 
Before discussing leadership in this section starts it is important to link to the purpose of business 
transformations explored in this thesis. In section 4.4 the concept of the corridor as a value chain 
is discussed. In that section and in previous and subsequent sections I talk about ‘value’ and 
‘benefits’ to ‘stakeholders’. This then, is an appropriate place to explain who I am referring to as 
‘stakeholder’ and what I see as ‘benefits’ and ‘value’ that the Corridor project facilitates. 
 
The literature has more recently expanded the range of stakeholders, and the stakeholder concept 
in terms of PM. Turner (1999) and Cleland and Ireland (2002) provide PM perceptions of 
stakeholders drawing upon earlier management literature. A chapter devoted in a recent PM book 
(Walker, Bourne and Rowlinson, 2008), provides a convenient summary of the term stakeholder 
as it has been developed from its roots in general management theory. They claim that “social 
science stakeholder theory tends to focus around concepts of justice, equity and social rights 
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having a major impact on the way that stakeholder’s exert moral suasion over project 
development or change initiatives” (Walker et al., 2008, pp71-72) and they cite the works of 
(Gibson, 2000) to support their view. They then discuss the instrumental stakeholder theory view 
as put forward by Donaldson and Preston (1995) where stakeholders are pragmatic demanders of 
some needs or wants that they are willing to negotiate about with the providers of those benefits. 
This can be complimented by the convergent stakeholder view (Jones and Wicks, 1999) in which 
sees stakeholders as those with legitimate moral needs to be considered as well as those who have 
the power and influence to instrumentally affect a project. Thus my perspective of stakeholders in 
this thesis is more in line with the convergent view even though many of the Corridor players 
tended to take a more instrumental view of who were legitimate stakeholders.  
 
For the purposes of this thesis, a stakeholder is considered to have a legitimate stake in a project 
(in this case the business transformation) both from an ethical or business sustainability point of 
view as well as from a pragmatic view point in surviving the globalization wave that triggered the 
Corridor’s birth as well as those conditions that persuaded players to join and participate in JVs 
such as that illustrated by case study examples. The stake is an interest representing investment in 
money, time, management and leadership energy as well as knowledge that is co-generated, 
transferred and used to create value and benefits. Value will be discussed in more detail in 
Section 4.4 but it can be seen here in shorthand as creating effectiveness (cost reductions) and 
efficiency (doing things smarter to gain more with less) as outlined in section 3.2 to 3.4. A 
benefit is described by Cooke-Davies (2002, p187) as the outcome from a project that fulfills the 
need and objects for initiating the project. Anderson, Narus and van Rossum (2006) use the term 
value proposition to describe how various stakeholders may have a need or value they wish to 
obtain by be answered the question why should a customer bother with our offering as opposed to 
our competitors. They argue that this requires a deep and detailed understanding of the customer's 
requirements and preferences. Suppliers can stress points of difference that they can deliver but 
still offer relatively little value to the target customer without ensuring that these customers 
actually place sufficient value on that offering to make differentiation worthwhile. 
 
Leadership, and particularly leadership within the Corridor projects where JVs and other forms of 
collaboration feature, requires understanding both existing realities and potential futures. This 
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will be discussed later in this section in terms of the Courtney, Kirkland and Viguerie (1997) 
preferred futures strategic thinking. The concept of benefits and being customer focussed with 
‘value’ in mind turned out useful for the cases discussed in this thesis. This is because Corridor 
players who participated in JVs were concerned to meet the needs of their clients, customers and 
staff so that they could offer a value proposition that met (often as a JV in a form of business 
cooperation as discussed in Section 4.3) or exceeded their rivals outside the Corridor. Also, the 
focus on benefit turns out to be relevant to the creation and development of trust and commitment 
in the collaborations that the Corridor facilitated. A brief paragraph on this is salient here. 
 
Trust is a concept that Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (1995, p715) explain as having four 
antecedents. One is the propensity of a party to trust. This means that for trust to exist, one party 
must be open to trusting the other and willing to test that trust. The three main factors affecting 
trust that they identify is benevolence (that is providing benefits and good will towards the other 
parties), having integrity (that is being consistent in the way that they do what they commit to 
honestly and openly) and having the ability to do what they say (as individuals as well as being 
able to deliver within the systems that they operate). These three factors are continually tested by 
a party that is willing to trust and positive results reinforces and builds trust while negative 
experiences detracts from the ‘bank’ of trust. The Corridor’s role as mediator and facilitator 
helped this trust to be established which, as discussed in Section 3.7, also affects the effectiveness 
of knowledge development and use. Further, trust has an impact on commitment. 
 
Meyer and Allen (1991) define commitment at three levels each with different implications. 
People may be compliant which really expresses little if any commitment other than do what the 
law or contract requires, this may be considered as not being committed but compliant. The 
lowest level of commitment relates to what Meyer and Allen (1991) call continuance 
commitment where there is a willingness to do something because not doing will result in harm 
to that person, often financial harm or some form of lower level of benefit received. The next 
level is called normative commitment where the person feels obliged to do what was promised or 
committed to. This could be seen as begrudging commitment or simply doing the minimum that 
norms require. The most powerful form of commitment is affective commitment where goals, 
objectives, vision and desire are matched so that the person wants to do what they committed to.  
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So we can see from the above that if stakeholders (be they players, employees, clients or 
customers) who have an interest in a business cooperation of the kind investigated in this thesis, 
have high levels of trust and high levels of effective commitment, then the outcome is likely to be 
favourable. The aim of leadership, from this stakeholder perspective, is therefore to ensure that 
barriers to this state are reduced and that drivers are designed to be put in place to enhance and 
enable this kind of trust and commitment to flourish. This leads to a discussion about leadership 
style and approaches that favors or hinders the working environment that affects trust and 
commitment.  
 
The concept of situational leadership has been with us for a long time (Tannenbaum and Schmidt, 
1958; Hersey and Blanchard, 1982; Hersey, Blanchard and Johnson, 1996). It is generally 
accepted that leadership may be a waste of resources and definitely counterproductive in certain 
situations in which the environment does not call for a forceful leader but where sound and good 
management maybe through shared understanding and agreement on action to be undertaken is 
the minimum needed to face the kind of situation where contextual volatility and uncertainty 
prevail.  
 
So
ur
ce
 o
f A
ut
ho
rit
y
(Democratic)
Relationship Oriented
(Authoritarian)
Task Oriented
Leader 
permits 
followers to 
function 
within limits 
defined by 
leader
Leader 
defines 
limits; asks 
group to 
make 
decision
Leader 
presents 
problem. gets 
suggestions 
and makes 
decision
Leader 
presents 
tentative 
decision 
subject to 
change
Leader 
presents 
ideas and 
invites 
questions
Leader 
“sells”
decision
Leader 
makes 
decision and 
announces it
Area of Freedom
for Followers
Use of Authority
by the Leader
 
Figure 3.2 Authority Sources and Leadership Style – Adapted from Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1958, p96) 
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While the leadership literature has progressed a long way over the past 50 or 60 years it is worth 
reviewing some of the formative ideas about leadership because a leadership mentality has a 
strong impact on the way in which any organization, including the Corridor, functions. Figure 3.2 
illustrates the range of leadership styles observed in practice that spans a highly authoritarian 
approach to a pure collaborative and democratic approach.  The background logic behind these 
styles was explored, researched and results described by Hersey and Blanchard (1982; Hersey et 
al., 1996) and this model is presented in Figure 3.3.  
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Figure 3.3 Leadership Styles and Follower Maturity: Adapted from (Hersey et al., 1996, p208) 
Figure 3.3 introduces follower maturity or the ability of them two participate in the decision 
making process based on their willingness and ability to contribute. The four styles and 
represented along the continuum in Figure 3.3 and explain the styles in terms of four styles S1 to 
S4. Style S1 and S2 are directive relying on more transactional motivation whereas style S3 and 
S4 have opportunities for transactional motivation, they rely on the follower’s intrinsic 
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motivation to act as is necessary. Transactional refers to there being an exchange of some sort of 
either tangible rewards such as pay and remuneration or perhaps more intangible rewards such 
praise and encourage a sense of self-worth.  
 
Transactional leaders motivate subordinates to perform as expected. They do this by helping 
them recognize task responsibilities, identify goals, acquire confidence about desired 
performance levels, and understand that their needs and the rewards desired are linked to goal 
achievement (Bass & Avolio 1994, pp13-19). Transformational leaders motivate individuals to 
perform beyond expectations by inspiring them to: focus on broader missions transcending their 
own immediate self-interest; concentrate on intrinsic higher-level goals (achievement and self-
actualization) and not lower-level goals (safety and security) and be confident in their abilities to 
achieve the missions given by the leader.  
 
Probably, a truly transformational leader is that one that becomes transactional for a while. In this 
connection Bryan and Hulme (2003) – directors in McKinsey’s New York and Houston offices 
respectively – argue that companies can find additional earnings in two ways: they can try to 
improve operating performance by squeezing more profit out of existing capabilities, or they can 
improve corporate performance by organizing in new ways to develop initiatives that could 
generate new earnings. By pursuing both of these approaches simultaneously, companies can take 
a powerful organizational step toward meeting the challenges of today’s hypercompetitive global 
economy. Consequently, the border between transactional and transformational leadership seems 
to be extremely thin or at least overlapping in the best of cases, the context being the main 
driving element to blend these two leadership styles.   
 
Some writers (e.g., Bennis & Nanus 1985 ; Zaleznik 1998, pp62-70) contend that leadership and 
management are qualitatively different and mutually exclusive, or put in other words, that 
management and leadership cannot occur in the same person . In other words, some people are 
managers and other people are leaders. Yukl (2002 pp5-6) sustains that managers value stability, 
order, and efficiency, whereas leaders value flexibility, innovation, and adaptation. Managers are 
concerned about how things get done, and they try to get people to perform better. Leaders are 
concerned with what things mean to people, and they try to get people to agree about the most 
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important things to be done. Bass & Stogdill (1990 pp383-86) are of the opinion that 
transformational leadership does not substitute for transactional leadership. It supplements for it 
with an add-on effect, performance above expectations. The logic is that the most successful 
transformational leaders need transactional skills to manage effectively the day-to-day events. 
 
Authors cited above, who refer to transformational and transactional leadership style dimensions 
seem to hold varying views on how intensely the context applies to these two leader-follower 
style relationships. However, these two leadership style dimensions mutate and gradually shift in 
intensity between these two poles on the dimension in accordance with the various roles 
companies had to play within the Corridor. All of these companies found themselves subjected to 
volatile regional circumstances as global trends exerted significant pressure on them to adopt 
their leadership styles. 
 
Another vision of leadership is provided by David (2003 pp157-185) who argues that a cost 
leadership strategy will rarely call for a leader but a skilled manager capable to trace the slightest 
cost deviation and act accordingly. Leadership, by contrast, is about coping with change (Kotter 
1998, p40) – this possibly being the main constituting driver of the Corridor project itself. David 
(2003) further argues that a differentiation strategy, for example, is more likely to demand a 
leader whereas a divestiture – purely transactional – may better require a manager.  
 
Both mean change though each encompasses a different leadership dimension: clearly the former 
calls for a transformational style while the latter results more transactional - though probably not 
entirely transactional. However, the size of the firm and its global positioning also play a role in 
turning a transactional leader into transformational, or a transformational attitude into a much 
more cautious and conservative transactional leadership style. This is been precisely the changing 
and volatile nature of the South American market where the ever mutating business environment 
seemed having empowered some players while limiting others, rather than having created the 
conditions for leaders to turn up and develop naturally while formulating and implementing their 
previously elaborated strategies.  
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Economies of scale, global positioning, financial back-up, and knowledge capturing seem having 
all played a key role in making the regional players react and set up the Corridor organization as 
a way to offset the globalization impact on their businesses. Courtney, Kirkland and Viguerie 
(1999 pp5-30) who are consultants at McKinsey & Company argue that uncertainty, a concept 
which turns out abundant in the region, requires a new way of thinking about strategy. They say 
executives take a binary view: either they underestimate uncertainty to come up with the 
forecasts required by the firm’s planning, or they overestimate it, abandon all analysis and go 
with their gut instinct. This “just do it” approach to strategy can make executives face 
extraordinary surprises for which were not trained to overcome or even think about it. The 
environment into which leaders and followers have to act can never be changed but that at best 
they can intend adapting to it and try to make the best within the given constraints and limitations 
– either operational, financial or human (Cleland & Ireland 2002, pp455-64). 
  
Further to Porter’s (1985) generic strategies, there are a number of strategies that were adopted 
by a great number of players within the Corridor structure. The global newcomers also adopt 
similar strategies to the regional firms (though using a different leadership positioning 
perspective) in their pursuit of enlarging economies of scale and expanding markets, though this 
was contrary to what happened within the Corridor, as it entailed a rather transactional leadership 
style that tended to be facilitated by the plentiful resources available for these firms to deploy.  
 
Typically, vertical integration strategies were common on both sides – those who were reacting 
defensively before the globalization process, as well as those who were protagonist of such an 
expansionist trend. Vertical integration strategies allow a firm to gain control over distributors, 
suppliers, and/or competitors. Forward integration within the value/supply chain turned out to be 
common as it proved useful in gaining ownership or increased control over distributors. Ocean 
shipping companies as well as railway companies tended to integrate trucking operators and off-
dock stations27 all over the region aiming at limiting customers on their choice to pick up an 
independent service. Port terminals all over the Atlantic coast not only acquired entire trucking 
companies, but also integrated cargo surveying firms and shipping agencies as a way to have a 
                                                 
27 Warehouses located outside the port terminal area where a number of exporting support activities are carried out 
(e.g. stuffing of containers ; stacking of containers ; cargo surveys ; customs clearance ; cargo storage; cargo lashing 
; lumber fumigation; etc) and whose control may help improving a given market share.  
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direct influence on both shippers and ocean transportation companies. Shippers would rather 
prefer contracting a single party with whom the whole circuit could be set forth, whereas 
shipping companies would see the opportunity to offer more services and therefore inducing 
shippers to utilize their services without incurring in heavy investments. Backward integration 
played an important role in that a great number of suppliers were practically swallowed by both 
global and regional operators who aim to hold better and tighter control over the destiny of the 
cargo flows all across the region.  
 
Vertical integration strategy was a very common result with respect to shipping companies: 
acquiring those firms that used to render shipping agency services as well as tug-boat operators; 
empty container yards 28; ship chandlers; and logistic operators controlling a given market 
segment or number of customers, and even port terminal services. Air-cargo firms also tended to 
rapidly acquire their contracted air-station depots instead of outsourcing them, feeding trucking 
services29, and third-party sales agencies as a way to hold better control on the market. River 
barging companies and coastal feeding operators were either absorbed by larger and global 
operators in their condition of potential suppliers, or went for shopping themselves by integrating 
their own suppliers such as river terminals, naval repair facilities, inland distribution centers, etc.  
 
Horizontal integration strategies also played a fundamental role in the form of mergers, 
acquisitions, and takeovers among competitors, and as a way to conduct a growth strategy 
leading to achieving larger economies of scale and enhancing the transfer of resources and 
competencies. Davidson (1987) argues that mergers between direct competitors are more likely to 
create efficiencies than mergers between unrelated businesses, both because there is a greater 
potential for eliminating duplicate facilities and because the management of the acquiring firm is 
more likely to understand the business of the target. Typically, this is been the situation with a 
number of global shipping companies taking over the regional ones, as well as global port 
terminal operators who acquired a number of both ocean and river terminals.  
 
                                                 
28 Yards where entire fleets of empty containers are stored, maintained, repaired, and made good for the exporter to 
pick up and deliver alongside ship to initiate the ocean transportation leg.  
29 Van and truck services linking inland origins with air-stations. 
 79
Krass (2001) contends that a reason why companies still merge, even in the face of odds against 
success, is the fact that investors and shareholders greatly reward increased market share and 
geographic expansion. Krass (2001) further highlights the fact that future growth expectations 
account for more than 60 percent of an average company’s market value today, up from about 
40% a decade ago. David (2003, p37) helps explain this business expansion in terms of market 
penetration, market development, and product development—sometimes referred to as 
competitive intensive strategies because they require intensive efforts if a firm’s competitive 
position where existing products or services are improved.   
 
Market penetration strategies were adopted by most of the global operators in almost every single 
segment of activity within the logistic field in view that markets were not saturated at the outset 
of the globalization process, enlarged economies of scale were regarded as a key variable towards 
achieving major competitive advantage, and the sense that loading factors could be increased 
significantly.30 A market development strategy was perhaps the main driving strategy behind 
global shipping companies and port operators, as well as global logistic firms and railway 
operators – among many others – towards enlarging economies of scale and gaining competitive 
advantage. Naturally, to do so demanded a successful organizational structure, new untapped or 
unsaturated markets, plenty of capital and human resources availability, an existing excess of 
supply or sub-utilized operational capacity, and the very perception that the company’s core 
business was becoming rapidly global in scope. This action on the part of the global firms made 
room to a reaction on the part of the regional companies that regardless of their activity segments, 
their market share, geographical scope, and available assets, tended to get together in a defensive 
fashion leading to the creation of the MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor.31 The only exception to this 
rule is given by the barging business all along the 2,400 km Parana-Paraguay waterways and the 
Amazon River in Brazil, in view of the existing traditional knowledge which proved being an 
                                                 
30 Loading factor is the rate of utilization of a vessel’s carrying capacity. The available space on the main liners 
sailing east-west-east were aimed at being reduced or its effective utilization increased, in view of the geographical 
expansion toward north-south-north trades where they were absent before the expansion process begun. The main 
liners tended to reach better results by capturing more cargoes destined to remote location by transshipping same on 
to feeding vessels southbound and northbound.  
 
31 Most of the global carriers regularly extended their services to south America (Maersk/P&O/Sea-Land/CP 
Ships/Hapag-Lloyd/Evergreen/Cosco/MSC) as well as a great number of port terminal operators (P&O 
Ports/ICTSI/Maersk/Hutchinson).  
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unsurpassable barrier to the global newcomers – as it will be dealt with in chapter 7 where a case 
study on this topic will be presented and analyzed. 
 
Product (or service) development strategies were mostly undertaken by the port terminal 
operators by making available to customers new technological devices for on-line cargo tracking, 
and by installing efficiency enhancers GPS32 devices – further to the general betterment of the 
existing operational facilities leading to service improvement and cost lowering. 
  
David (1985, pp14-17) defines five guidelines when a service development strategy may be an 
especially effective strategy to pursue:  
1. When an organization has successful services that are in the maturity stage of its life 
cycle; the idea here is to attract satisfied customers to try new and improved services as 
a results of their positive experience with the firm’s present services; 
2. When an organization competes in an industry that is characterized by rapid 
technological developments; 
3. When major competitors offer better-quality products at comparable prices; 
4. When an organization competes in a high-growth industry; and 
5. When an organization has especially strong research and development capabilities. 
 
National owners of port terminals had to either quickly reengineer their businesses or give up and 
sell out. This becomes apparent in view of several changing trends that had remained entrenched 
right up to the point that the globalization wave arrived to the region that. These changes that 
operators were confronted with entailed moving from an environment where the economy was on 
the verge of market protectionism; the existence of a rather paternalist leadership style across the 
region and the presence of flag-protection schemes33. 
 
                                                 
 
32 Global Positioning System displays the exact physical location or geographical coordinates a given container has 
at a given moment. It renders both the customer and the port operator a permanent follow-up of a container routing 
and therefore facilitates both to estimate timing of cargo delivery and container drop-off. 
 
33 Cargo restriction laws that were applied for Argentine flag ships carrying imports into the country, or for Brazilian 
flag ships trading in and out of Brazil – further to numerous bilateral treaties which tended to support the utilization 
of their respective fleets. 
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A similar process did happen in the railroad sector which unlike the port business, was acquired 
first by strong national firms who at a later stage saw themselves in the position of having to sell 
out to even stronger and more capable regional groups. These groups were precisely in search of 
enlarging their economies of scale to accompany the process or face the impact of the upcoming 
globalization while achieving lower relative operational costs. Diversification strategies did not 
play here a fundamental role as most global players kept their focus on what they did best as 
defined by their respective core businesses. 
 
Concentric diversification strategies were, however, actively adopted through the Corridor 
networking as a defensive reaction to face what Muto (2001) refers to as six useful guidelines to 
seriously consider concentric diversification strategies: 
1. When a firm competes in a no-growth or slow-growth industry; 
2. When new, but related, services could be offered at highly competitive rates; 
3. When adding new, but related services, would significantly enhance the sales of 
current services; 
4. When new, but related, services have seasonal sales levels that counterbalance an 
organization’s existing peaks and valleys;   
5. When services have entered into the declining stage of its life cycle; 
6. When an organization has a strong management team. 
 
These types of strategies were often adopted by those national and regional logistic operators that 
saw their income sources or customer-base threatened by the arrival of global newcomers. They 
went to the crating, fumigation, lashing, and packaging business in an attempt to offset their 
decline in sales. Other example is given by those independent trucking firms who appointed 
regional and even overseas representatives in their intent on controlling import cargo flows which 
otherwise would have been easily routed through someone else’s organization. 
 
River terminals also diversified by providing cargo surveying and customs clearance services at 
the shippers’ premises, further to supplying lashing/packing material and hiring lifting equipment 
by request. National custom brokerage firms went regional and even overseas by offering their 
professional services and by expanding into logistics too, as a way to ensure demand for their 
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core activities. Ship-brokers opened up their often small and local organizations and also went 
regional by offering ancillary services such as warehousing, trucking, surveying, security, and 
even claim management. National shipyards also went regional further to diversifying into new 
lines of production (barge shipyards expanded into rail wagons; fishing vessels shipyards also 
started building barges and tugboats; ocean-going full-container shipyards tended to build smaller 
coastal feeders and also ocean tankers). Classification societies34 tended to open branches on 
global logistics, not as a defensive reaction but as a way to take advantage of their already global 
structure in the classification business for the ship-building, oil and gas, mining, and construction 
industries.   
               
It becomes apparent that in view of the uncertainty factor that is yet present in South America and 
which arises out of an ever-dynamic and volatile business environment, it seems very unlikely to 
typify a single or unique leadership style that matches a Corridor-like entity – along with a single 
associated strategy type. Leadership and strategy seem to take many different forms within the 
Corridor in view of its members’ diversity and their different business realities and potentialities 
they have been obliged to face.  
 
Naturally, other variables within the human resources, knowledge, and operations dimension, 
also play a role when trying to identify the dominant leadership and strategy styles. Some 
examples may help the reader visualize some of the variables that will guide us through the 
dissertation towards better comprehend why leadership and strategy find so many different forms. 
Markides (1998 p88) contends that too many companies mistakenly assume that they can break 
up clusters of competencies or skill that, in fact, work only because they are together, reinforcing 
one another in a particular competitive context.  
 
Hamel and Prahalad (1994 pp49-54) refer to the importance for corporations to develop and 
strengthen their organizational culture through engendering a rich genetic coding policy where 
beliefs, values, and norms, support different views or contrasting perspectives and facilitate 
companies therefore to be better placed to face a troublesome or changing business environment. 
                                                 
34 Global organizations such as SGS, BUREAU VERITAS, DET NORSKE VERITAS, AMERICAN BUREAU OF 
SHIPING, GERMANISCHER LLOYD, NKK, who provide surveying and classification services to a wide array of 
industries.  
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Considering adopting an appropriate leadership style became essential when, for example, 
outsourcing policies were formulated and implemented as a result of the need for the Corridor 
companies, to catch up with the global trends and remain competitive. Auguste Hao, Singer and 
Wiegand (2002) argue that outsourcing often results in being hostage to providers who could be 
tempted to raise prices and reduce services. 
 
The concept of transaction cost economics is useful for us to understand what was happening and 
triggering the activities within the Corridor. Oliver Williamson (1985) is one of the most widely 
cited authorities on transaction cost economics (TCE) which essentially means the cost of 
transacting business. This includes the cost of tendering, the cost of administering contracts and 
the cost of maintaining relationship to mention just a few of the ‘hidden costs’ involved in doing 
business. Often an apparent saving in one area merely adds to costs in another for example 
outsourcing to save direct costs can incur contract administration costs and strategically loose an 
organization a strategic advantage to expand their business in a particular way.   
 
Ghoshal (1996) argues that  TCE  helps explain why customers and providers alike often find 
themselves saddled with increasing transaction costs (such as managing the relationship; 
monitoring the delivery of services; and coordinating the exchange of information between 
customer and provider) that had not been anticipated and sometimes exceeded whatever value 
one or the other party had hoped to gain. We see various examples of this concept across the 
global players that imposed their services without sometimes having measured the actual extent. 
 
Auguste, et al. (2002, p55)  argues that “in the long run, the providers must realize not only 
economies of scale but also economies of skill – by codifying the process innovations developed 
while serving one customer so that they can be used in work for other customers”. This suggests 
that outsourcing within the Corridor provides a fertile ground to study the type of leadership 
arising out of an ever changing business context. Furthermore, strategic alliances, partnerships, 
joint-ventures, mergers and acquisitions will be further explored within a knowledge 
management (KM) and leadership perspective.      
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3.6 - BUSINESS COOPERATION THEORY 
An element that was present by the time the Corridor project tended to materialize that is 
currently present is the uncertainty factor. In the face of increased uncertainty, a company can 
choose between spinning off or internalizing activities. Typically, entering a new geographic 
market as a spin-off company is a decision involving a high degree of uncertainty caused by a 
number of factors: difficulty in quickly identifying customers’ preferences; lack of knowledge 
about competitors; market response to the service; potential cultural barriers and so on. In this 
situation, the establishment of agreements such as joint ventures or a range of alliances enables 
participants being able to rely on more information and reducing the existing uncertainty levels to 
a more manageable dimension. This is been an option that not only outsiders to the MERCOSUR 
Atlantic Corridor have taken in order to enlarge economies of scale and gain competitive 
advantage, but also the regional firms by adopting some sort of defensive reaction within a 
market that they have been active in for a long time and under moderate competition.  
 
Internalizing – the other option – means the acquisition by fusion or takeovers of local firms as a 
means of entering these markets. In these markets, where volume is a critical variable, greater 
presence or concentration is a fundamental competitive factor. Larger size and therefore greater 
economies of scale can be achieved by internal or external growth based on acquiring more 
control over a given market. Internal growth implies increased administration and management 
costs, whereas external growth, management and organizational costs may tend to increase owing 
to the uncertainty generated by the acquisition process itself. 
 
Cooperation between companies represents a third option to achieve larger size – though it also 
involves certain costs derived from organizing and put into practice the cooperation agreement. 
Arranz Pena and Fernandez (2002 p21) argue that the reason for company cooperation can be 
summed up as follows: 
• Reducing transaction costs that arise when uncertainty increases; 
• Obtaining a greater volume and presence in the market by reaching agreements with 
competitors, suppliers, or customers; 
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• Seeking efficiency in certain activities carried out by the company by means of 
spinning off, when the internal costs of carrying out the activity are greater than if this 
activity is carried out in the market with logical competition; and 
• Using specific assets which the firm does not possess, but which complement its 
activities. According to the specificity of assets, cooperation may prove more efficient 
than acquisition in the market, since uncertainty is reduced on obtaining them without 
incurring any internalization costs.   
          
James (1985), on pointing out that the fundamental aim of a military – or economic – alliance is 
either to combine participants’ potential or effective forces so as to increase the latter with respect 
to adversaries, or to dissuade potential opponents from committing themselves to a future 
conflict, states intuitively the main aims that might be pursued in cooperation: by pooling, 
combining or exchanging resources it attempts to enable partners to gain access to advantages 
they could not achieve individually.  
 
A business cooperation phenomena generally includes different forms of association 
concentrating on internationalization strategies, technological innovation or market expansion, 
for example. The two most common explanations for cooperation are: the search for growth or 
the power of the market; and the search for synergies or complementariness. The first of these 
and according to Kogut (1988 pp319-32), rests on the competitive positioning and industrial 
economy theories. If maximizing an activity’s profits depends on improving the company’s 
competitive position with respect to rivals, therefore, and if the necessary resources or risk 
acquired exceed its resources, cooperative association would enable economies of scale, 
experience and risk diversification to be obtained, while at the same time increasing the power of 
associated companies within the sector. This type of cooperation associates firms that might be 
comparable within a connected field and with identical problems, representing the common link 
for resources of the same type.  
 
The second case is based on the synergies obtained by grouping or combining qualitatively 
complementary assets and this also fits in well with the RBV of the firm. Adler (1979 pp58-98) 
defines it as symbiotic or differentiated cooperation where complementary companies get 
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associated aiming at pooling or exchanging resources – each contributing different qualities. 
Naturally, this combination of forces enables a more complete or intense use of the different 
types of assets possessed by each firm in unequal proportions. 
 
Collins and Doorley (1992) contend that a series of advantages can generally be identified for 
companies, both with respect to similarity cooperation (comparable organizations with identical 
problems that seek greater size), as well as in the case of complementary or synergic company 
associations (combining resources to use different types of asset more completely).  These 
advantages include: 
• increased capacity and competence without needing to acquire and develop new 
resources and abilities; 
• time gained with respect to competitors; and 
• company flexibility is maintained, which is very necessary for adapting to the 
changing environment in which their activities generally take place. 
 
Naturally, cooperation agreements often are associated with a number of disadvantages  
(Collins and Doorley1992): 
• A reduction in the associated company’s strategic autonomy that must accept a 
redistribution of order and control in exchange for the advantages sought – which often 
creates mistrust on the part of the executives and directors;  
• The need to harmonize and coordinate the decisions and actions of two or more 
independent organizations, often with different structures, systems and even cultures, 
which can lead to conflicts between associated firms or to a possible obstruction to the 
activity that is object of the cooperation (this can lead to a conflicts between associated 
firms or to a possible obstruction to the activity that is object of the cooperation – 
which would lead to a gradual deterioration in each partner’s overall performance); and  
• It can dissipate the strategic advantages of a company by means of the learning of its 
technology by a third party, creating a new competitor or fortifying an existing one, 
when sharing technology and knowledge with the partners.  
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There are three environmental factors that can be regarded as having an impact on company 
structure and which inevitably led many regional companies to getting together and undertake a 
number of sub-projects within the Corridor – a master project in itself. The first factor is given by 
economic globalization and along with it the liberalization of capital movements in international 
financial markets, all representing a new reality that even exceeds the capacity to react before 
potential financial problems (e.g. financial crisis in Mexico, Brazil, Russia, Japan, and 
Argentina). 
 
In this increasingly inter-dependent world, companies have to face new competitive challenges – 
such as the appearance and entry of international-scaled competitors, the international expansion 
of markets, and greater innovation capacity. Davidow and Malone (1992) argue that in being 
faced with this great inter-dependence between economies – economic globalization – companies 
are responding with a less localized view and tend to adopt and adapt both a more global 
perspective and more versatile organizational structures.  
 
The second factor is given by the increase in business uncertainty that arises out of – to a great 
extent – the mentioned inter-dependence concept. The speed with which changes are occurring 
on global basis in the economic world and get transmitted across regions and countries, 
introduces great uncertainty. This is especially true for those activities that demand constant 
technological transformations and market follow-up to keep pace of the new surrounding 
conditions – established by both companies struggling for market expansion and customers 
demanding better or more integral services. The uncertainty of the environment also places 
greater demands on firms’ speed of reaction to adjust to transformations (their reflexivity), or 
even their intention to predict them, something that derives from the need to design a flexible and 
adaptable organization. 
 
The third feature characterizing the business environment is the high level of competitive rivalry. 
Increasing customer requirements and market saturation are variables that oblige companies to 
constantly dig deeper in their search for competitive advantage and market positioning. As a 
result of this, there is a tendency for companies to concentrate on know-how, or on those aspects 
of their added value chain they really dominate. This greater level of competitive rivalry is, in 
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turn, producing a regrouping or concentration in those activities where competitive advantage 
exists and therefore typically leading to adopting a downsizing, rightsizing, leaning, or 
reengineering strategy.  
 
Handy (1992) contends that organizations seeking greater flexibility are eliminating internal 
barriers and hierarchies, reducing their size and forming a complex of autonomous business units 
that are aimed at the market and linked horizontally. These structures are setting up new forms of 
organization by means of internal cooperation, constituting the so-called internal cooperation or 
intra-company network. On the one hand, companies are introducing greater flexibility by 
creating autonomous units and, on the other hand, they are increasing their presence in other 
markets – globalization – by concluding cooperation agreements with other firms. Greater 
cooperation between companies is also driven by the advances of information technology. In this 
regard, Davenport (1993) argues that technology is not only introducing substantial advantages, 
but also enables geographically remote locations to be connected, communications to be 
established practically in real time and therefore, it eases decentralization of information and 
transmission via communication networks – all concepts that turn out key in international 
logistics. Technological leadership can be considered as probably the most important factor 
making regional firms approaching each other and global firms getting together to set a 
cooperation path that might eventually lead them to enlarge their economies of scale and step into 
new markets. 
 
The Corridor project in itself can be regarded as a cooperation agreement which was born as a 
consequence of two other elements that often cause cooperation to work: market interdependence 
and uncertainty. These two variables when working together seem to have brought about the 
necessary environment for companies to get together, exchange their experiences by articulating 
and socializing knowledge, and give birth to a number of sub-projects that may well find 
correlation with one of the various types of cooperation agreements. 
 
Porter et al. (1987, pp437-51) define cooperation as verbal or written agreements concluded 
between various companies in order to carry out an activity jointly, with certain definite 
objectives and a certain degree of coordination and structure in which to carry them out – with 
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their duration depending on the aims being pursued. This definition opens a number of possible 
strategic TCE variants as per Williamson (1975): 
• Independence and redirection strategies, where the aim is to reduce uncertainty and 
dependence on the surrounding environment, by exploiting the associated firms’ own 
resources and competitive advantages; 
• Cooperation strategies, which involves agreements between competitors, either on a 
general scale or in specific activities, the aim being to reduce temporarily the existing 
competition between them; 
• Linked relations or delegated link strategies, which are the result of one company’s 
agreement with another – the delegated or subcontracted one- in order to have a task, 
activity, or function carried out on their behalf instead of assuming it themselves; and 
• Alliance strategies, which are agreements that attempt to modify the competitive 
environment, to eliminate or moderate competition between a number of players for a 
given period of time. From the various kinds of alliance, a cooperation agreement 
might not be explicit – contrary to the more formal alliance-type agreements such as 
joint-ventures and partnerships which should be explicit.  
 
Even though the Corridor project witnessed a great variety of sub-projects developed and 
completed under its auspices, a great majority of the interactions first went through a 
collaborative dimension to later engage in some sort of explicit commitment under an alliance 
type of cooperation. The above suggests that regardless of how uncertain or intertwined markets 
may look, some sort of collaborative stage needs first to be overcome in order to let the way open 
for companies to achieve more formal and wider agreements. This dissertation will focus more on 
those sub-projects that based their agreements straight on a formal basis, though which 
experienced a great deal of cooperation during the formation phase – without which these 
undertakings would not have been feasible in the first place.    
       
3.7 - KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT AND SITUATED LEARNING THEORY   
When markets shift, technologies proliferate, competitors multiply, and products become 
obsolete almost overnight, successful companies are those that consistently create new 
knowledge, disseminate it widely throughout the organization, and quickly embody it in new 
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technologies and products. These activities make up the “knowledge-creating” company where 
its sole business is continuous innovation (Nonaka, 1991; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Nonaka 
and Teece, 2001). According to Nonaka (1991) successful Japanese competitors like Honda, 
Canon, Matsushita, NEC, Sharp have become famous for their ability to respond quickly to 
customers, create new markets, rapidly develop new products, and dominate emergent 
technologies - the secret of their success being the way knowledge creation was managed. Even 
though it seems quite unlikely that innovation may occur almost overnight in terms of logistic 
services, the above description looks very appropriate to underline the importance of knowledge 
in a competitive environment.  
 
Much of the analysis of this thesis and its premise as based upon research question 2, relates to 
knowledge creation, sharing/transfer and use by Corridor participants. Therefore associated 
literature is highly relevant that helps explain how and why individuals and organizations create 
and share knowledge to co-create value and competitive advantage 
 
Davenport and Prusak (2000) argue that the KM concept holds links with a number of various 
aspects of the business organization. Zack (1999) shows us how KM links with business strategy 
in that knowledge is an asset that may become represented by pricing knowledge, research and 
development, promotion knowledge, customer knowledge, or market knowledge. These authors 
found that it is not actually very difficult to envision ways of using knowledge more effectively 
in business strategy, but that the difficulty lies in actually making the changes to strategic 
programs and adopting the necessary behaviors throughout the organization.  
 
KM has to do with work processes in that how market researchers, scientists, consultants, 
engineers, and executives create, gather, store, share, and apply knowledge on their daily tasks. 
While knowledge workers may view their work in unstructured terms, it is possible to view 
knowledge work as a somewhat structured process that can be designed and improved. Markus 
(2001) argues that knowledge processes are often categorized by whether they involve 
knowledge creation (as in research or new product development) or knowledge reuse (as in 
sharing best practices or helping others solve common technical problems). It has to do also with 
culture and behavior in that how an organization can best create a culture and set of behaviors 
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that value the creation, sharing, and use of knowledge, and consider said concepts as long-term 
achievable goals. The central problem here is probably given by the management of attention or 
the proper understanding of the way it is allocated by individuals and organizations, knowing 
how to capture it more effectively, and using the technology both to acquire and protect it. 
Finally, it also has to do with the physical business environment, an issue one might suspect 
being of minor importance but that can be a pivotal factor to ease or foster knowledge creation 
and sharing. 
 
Nonaka (1991) distinguishes between two types of knowledge: explicit and tacit. The former is 
formal and systematic, easy to communicate and share in the form of a product specification, 
scientific formula, or computer program. The latter turns out highly personal and therefore hard 
to formalize and communicate to others – further to containing the very personal skills that a 
determined job, profession or technology may demand. This author highlights four basic patterns 
that bring about knowledge creation, known as the SECI cycle: 
1. Socialization -Tacit to tacit occurs when an individual shares tacit knowledge directly 
with another and therefore creates knowledge under a sort of “socialization” process. 
This may result in a very powerful way to create knowledge provided that a sharing 
system is in place too. The simple attendance of the Corridor members to the 
roundtable discussions and presentations, do not guarantee nor represent a fertile 
ground in itself for companies to spontaneously share their tacit knowledge – unless a 
well design sharing mechanism deploying business safeguards is in place, along with a 
“strong motivation driven by the business context – as argued by (Sense, 2007)”.  
2. Externalization – Explicit to explicit: occurs when an already existing knowledge 
transforms itself in a new piece of knowledge giving a better or deeper insight on a 
determined issue. This is not necessarily regarded as one of the most powerful means 
to create knowledge, though it may prove necessary for decision-making in business 
(access to a number of market ratios, financial or accounting information, or variables 
that may result useful for benchmarking purposes). 
3. Combination – Tacit to explicit: occurs when articulating tacit knowledge into explicit 
knowledge that may bring about innovative ideas of cooperation. This was experienced 
within the Corridor among firms that were in search of not only achieving larger 
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economies of scale, but also trying to capture a different view of the existing business 
reality that might help them survive and even grow while facing the globalization 
impact all over the region.   
4. Internalization – Explicit to tacit: occurs when explicit data information and 
knowledge is reframed and made sense of and so becomes personalized and 
internalized. It was hypothesized as essential for knowledge creation provided that a 
sharing mechanism is also in place - this is what Nonaka and Konno (1998) refer to as 
ba being translated from the Japanese word for ‘place’. In this regard, the Corridor 
proved being an efficient forum through its roundtable events to let internalization of 
documents, reports, statistics and other pieces of information facilitate change and 
innovation.  
 
Garvin (1998 pp48-78) contends that an organization cannot improve without first learning 
something new and that solving a problem, launching a service, or reengineering a process all 
require adopting a learning attitude on the part of both companies and individuals. He argues that 
organizations that systematically approach the management of institutional, organizational and 
personal knowledge in a way exemplified by the SECI process are acting as learning 
organization. Otherwise change remains cosmetic, and improvements are either fortuitous or 
short-lived.  
 
A forum such as the Corridor was hypothesised as a good example of a knowledge organization 
in that it contains, from my observations, a number of knowledge-hungry organizations and 
individuals who for different reasons joined the Corridor entity in search of knowledge-based 
solutions that might help them face a changing business environment. Senge (1990, p1) describes 
learning organizations as places “where people continually expand their capacity to create the 
results they truly desire, where new and expansive patterns of thinking are nurtured, where 
collective aspiration is set free, and where people are continually learning how to learn together”.  
However, in South America and particularly, from my observations as a facilitator within the 
Corridor, this sort of learning attitude was not born “per se” or because of a sudden upsurge of a 
self-improvement feeling or vision on the part of the members; but that on the contrary, it was 
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probably due to having to face the unknown that manifested itself in the form of global 
companies arriving in that part of the world. 
 
I provide below, my observations and reflections upon evidence subsequently used as case study 
data that are useful for better understanding the relevance of many KM issues that I felt were 
salient to this study. The following reinforces the important of knowledge as a strategic 
competitive advantage asset that is often tacitly held by key individuals and in unstructured or 
implicit forms within organizations. 
 
Such a sudden and perhaps violent chain of events that was hypothesized to be in all and every 
logistic segment along the MERCOSUR coasts and territories, was driven by a marked market 
saturation on the east-west-east trades on the part of the global ocean shipping companies, and 
the overwhelming excess of carrying capacity that the main ship-owners had to face in their 
permanent search of larger economies of scale. 
 
 The evolution of the economies of scale (as discussed earlier in the chapter from a strategy and 
competition theory perspective) drove a number of knowledge-based issues that are the focus of 
this section of the chapter. Sailing ships involves a great deal of both highly explicit knowledge 
(charts, weather reports, news reports about safety and risk conditions, stowage plans, loading 
and discharging computer-based modeling planning etc) as well highly tacit knowledge (likely 
impact of localized weather patterns, cultural knowledge applied to crew management, 
navigational decisions on speed, course deviations, ports or other facilities are more reliable as 
others in response to conditions of trade at any given time or ‘rumors’ of those who linked into 
informal social networks about a range of political and economic issues that have risk and 
uncertainly impacts). 
 
The range of tacit knowledge in particular varies over time and by region because events are very 
fluid and knowledge about their causation and impact is often highly opaque. Thus the size of 
ships and their ability to travel along a particular route is closely linked to local knowledge. Also, 
much of so-called market intelligence is about gossip and as such is common knowledge and 
dyadic knowledge that is at the same time both explicit and tacit (through interpretation).   
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 Until 1988, the biggest container ships carried 5,000 TEUs. This meant that they were small 
enough to fit through the Panama Canal. Ships must be no wider than 32.3 meters, no longer than 
294.1 meters, and have a draught no greater than 12 meters to cope with the locks along the 80 
kilometer journey between the Atlantic and Pacific. Ships that fit he Panama Canal are known as 
Panamx class, whereas today’s full-container ships are known as POST-Panamx class and have a 
capacity of up to 11,000 TEUs. According to Containerization International35, if the pursuit of 
economies of scale drives ship sizes beyond 18,000 TEUs, then nature presents another 
formidable obstacle. Vessels of this size are already known as MALACCAMAX class, meaning 
they would be the largest able to sail through the Strait of Malacca between the Malaysian 
Peninsula and the Indonesian island of Sumatra. This 805 km stretch is a shipping lane of equal 
importance to the Panama and Suez Canals though it presents a shallow point of 25 meters deep, 
limiting passing ship’s draught to 20 meters. 
 
Barges transportation and shipping along the fluvial system of rivers and waterways between the 
borders of Brazil and Argentina for example (Parana-Paraguay waterways), presents similar 
knowledge management issues. Currents and rapid changes in water flow affects the capacity of 
goods to be transported as there may be severe hold ups due to insufficient draft depth or barge 
pilots needing to devise alternative routes to compensate for such problems. Planning and 
coordination of this kind of logistic exercise become highly knowledge intensive and so KM 
becomes a crucial issue.  
 
The trade amongst China, India, America, and Europe account for 65% of the 250M plus 
containers moves around the world each year. According to The Economist36, with world 
merchandise trade growing by around 15% a year and China’s exports at nearly twice that rate, 
the boom in container shipping is set to continue well into the foreseeable future. However, such 
an apparent constant expansion on the east-west-east trades or better called “round-a-world 
services, mean that bigger ships are being replaced by even bigger and newer vessels for the 
above trade lanes, leaving the former vessels to sail northbound and southbound. This is 
                                                 
35 Containerisation International is a well known maritime trade journal. 
 
36 The Ecnomist ; Conainer Shps: Maxing out.; Vol.382, Nbr.8518; (March 2007); p71.  
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primarily what led to a serious saturation in of smaller vessels seeking markets in South America 
as a whole arising of a search of larger economies of scale on the round-a-world services.  
 
There may be little doubt of the role to be played by knowledge creation and sharing on the part 
of the Corridor members when facing such a challenging scenario. This naturally leads to taking 
leading steps towards fostering change and innovation based on a rather positive attitude and 
comprehension of both knowledge generation and sharing as useful corporate mechanisms to face 
the unpredictable and a definitely mutating business environment. 
     
Global port terminal operators saw a market expansion opportunity in South America in view of 
the on-going trade liberalization, which later turned into an imperative if they wanted to keep 
their global standard. Naturally, the mentioned enlargement of vessels’ economies of scale 
becomes associated with a critical need for adequate port handling facilities and by significantly 
updating existing facilities or purchasing updating on state-of-the art container cranes, transfer 
and handling equipment, and further facilities. The magnitude of this investment often fell 
outside the financial capabilities of the regional companies in that market space. A this point, 
once again, the knowledge creation and sharing became of high relevance at the Corridor 
roundtables in that those who felt threatened – either directly or not – became aware of their 
rather fragile condition before the upcoming global trends facing them at that time. 
 
 Similarly, global ship-owning companies, global air-cargo companies started to expand their 
operations too into South America and leading to a reengineering process of the air infrastructure 
business too. A similar situation happened with other sectors such as barging, trucking, 
warehousing, freight-forwarding, underwriting, and brokerage. Mapping ‘who knows what’ in an 
organization leads to the creation of a knowledge inventory – but does nothing to guarantee the 
on-going availability of knowledge, and what is even more delicate, nothing guarantees either 
that when an individual leaves the company, he or she does not take the acquired knowledge 
quota with him or her. The Corridor has tried to create the necessary forum for helping 
companies not only create knowledge they would later use, but also sharing same and 
diversifying its utilization within both the company and the Corridor – as a way to preserve what 
they have achieved and would potentially accomplish as they develop these knowledge strategies.   
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Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) contend that creating new knowledge is the product of a dynamic 
interaction among a number of roles. Front line employees deal with the day-to-day issues within 
the company and therefore find themselves in the best position to experiment what the realities of 
their business turns out to be – in terms of product or service acceptance, technology, quality, 
responsiveness etc. These individuals are referred to by Dixon (2000, p11) as those who learn 
from doing the organization’s tasks and who therefore possess a kind of knowledge defined as 
“common knowledge”.  
 
She further argues that the specificity of their knowledge is precisely what gives the knowledge 
gained from experience its potential to provide an organization with a competitive edge. 
However, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) contend that despite these individuals possessing a 
considerable amount of highly specific information, they often find it extremely difficult to turn 
that information into useful knowledge – which seems to lead to both a knowledge creation and 
sharing problem. This author argues that sometimes the market signals can become so ambiguous 
and vague that hinders employees from effectively socializing (tacit to tacit) or articulating (tacit-
to-explicit) knowledge. Other individuals within the front line can become so concentrated or 
identified on their specific task, that they loose a broader vision of the business environment their 
firm is engaged in.  
 
Other situation that may occur lies in those who manage to acquire, firm up, or even socialize 
knowledge, find it difficult to get it accepted in its real dimension or importance on the part of the 
receiver – who often interprets that knowledge to fit more his/her particular perspective of a 
given situation with respect to a specific context, instead of adopting a broader view of the 
situation. Therefore, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) argue that there is a continual shift in meaning 
as new knowledge turns out rather diffuse in an organization. Further, the above illustrates a 
problem known as the ‘stickiness of knowledge’ its difficulty in getting transferred. The concept 
of ‘sticky knowledge’ has been discussed for a long time and was rigorously studied by Szulanski 
(1996; 2003). He identified seven sources of knowledge stickiness:  
1. Source Lacks Motivation (unwillingness to share knowledge);  
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2. Source lacks credibility (the source lacks authority, expertise or is perceived as 
unreliable or untrustworthy);  
3. Recipient lacks motivation (doesn’t care); 
4. Recipient lacks absorptive capacity (has not the background to perceive cause and 
effect links, lacks underpinning knowledge or experience in experimentation to know 
how to use the knowledge); 
5. Recipient lacks retentive capacity (forgets vital details);  
6. Barren organizational context (the culture or governance structure inhibits knowledge 
sharing); and  
7. Arduous relationship between source and recipient (lack of empathy, trust or 
commitment to collaborate in the task of sharing knowledge).  
 
He concluded from testing his model (based upon canonical correlation analysis of a data set 
consisting of 271 observations of 122 best-practice transfers in 8 companies) that contrary to 
conventional wisdom that blames primarily motivational factors, major barriers to internal 
knowledge transfer are:  
- knowledge-related factors such as the recipient's lack of absorptive capacity;  
- causal ambiguity; and  
- an arduous relationship between the source and the recipient (Szulanski, 1996).  
 
Despite the above, this may be so, the experience of knowledge creation and its communication 
or dissemination throughout the network within the Corridor worked in a different way. In this 
case ambiguity or diffuse knowledge was observed as negligible, possibly based on organizations 
and people participating in Corridor activities being encouraged and motivated by the seriousness 
that the threat of globalization posed on almost all players in the region. Therefore, knowledge 
creation seems to be of paramount importance in the MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor project as 
well as knowledge sharing, without which and in spite of accomplishing a remarkable level of 
knowledge creation, little would have been successfully transmitted to other member companies. 
This seemed to minimize what Nonaka (1991) and Szulanski  (1996) had defined as knowledge 
ambiguity and vagueness.  
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Knowledge has first to be generated to later be transferred to others for which a number of 
elements have to be considered. When knowledge is intended to be transferred from company to 
company, or from a team-to-team basis, much depends on the receiving team’s absorptive 
capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990 p128-152). The idea behind this concept is that to learn 
something new, a company or a team needs already having enough related knowledge to be able 
to absorb the new knowledge. Research evidence shows that lack of absorptive capacity on the 
part of the receiving team may represent a significant barrier to knowledge transfer (Szulanski, 
1996 pp437-441). Jewell and Walker (2004) argue that a consequence of poor absorptive 
capacity is often an inability to understand cause and effect loops leading to what Szulanski 
(2003) defines as causal ambiguity or the condition where people are not able to confidently 
make a cause an effect link. 
 
 Dixon (2000) explains that the similarity of task and context between the source group and the 
receiving group and the absorptive capacity of the receiving group are deciding factors in 
determining what kind of transfer method will be most effective. She distinguishes five 
categories of knowledge transfer: 
 
Serial Transfer: a team that does a task to later repeat it exactly the same way though in a 
different context. The source team and the receiving team are one and the same. This type of 
knowledge transfer might be related to the support activities to the various logistic segments 
where no market variables are assessed nor play a decisive influence, but that form part of the 
technological back-up that becomes necessary to run operations worldwide (e.g. extranet systems 
for port terminal operators; global communications for air-cargo freighters; ship-shore interface 
communication systems for ocean-going vessels and its on-shore facilities; GPS cargo tracking 
systems for railing, trucking, or distributing companies). 
 
Near Transfer: it involves a source team that transfers knowledge to a receiving team for a 
similar task and context – though in a different location. It involves the put into practice of 
explicit knowledge and it therefore aims at generating cost and time savings throughout a period 
of time. This type of knowledge results easy to transmit as long as it keeps within the very same 
logistic segment, as technology and operations tend to differ greatly between the different sectors. 
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Far Transfer: it involves the transfer of non-routine tacit knowledge between two teams, meaning 
that the knowledge to be transferred lies primarily in the heads of those who possess it. This is 
perhaps the most typical knowledge interaction within the Corridor members and the one that 
brought about a wide spectrum of converging opinions, views, and perspectives - which later on 
proved useful in triggering the very concept of knowledge socialization on a wide array of issues 
that were impacting on their business. 
 
Strategic Transfer: this type of knowledge involves a mix of tacit and explicit knowledge that 
combine with each other to give birth to a new organization in the form of a joint-venture, 
acquisition, alliance, or the launching of a new service. This type of transfer also played a key 
role when companies started their search of a strategic partner to face a business environment 
they have never experienced nor anticipated. 
 
Expert Transfer: it aims at transferring explicit knowledge about very infrequent tasks. This is not 
a very relevant category as it can be interpreted and put into practice in the form of a procedure or 
formula. At some point within a VSA37 platform it is likely this type of knowledge had played its 
role in view of the VSA’s own specificity and uniqueness in the logistics field. 
 
It became apparent from the author’s reflection upon his own experience about the roundtables, 
discussion with others, and recorded evidence  that both explicit and tacit knowledge play an 
important role at the Corridor roundtables discussions, the latter perhaps being the most critical to 
both transfer and retain. As difficult as it is to codify tacit knowledge, its substantial value makes 
it worth the effort.  
 
Davenport and Prusak (2000 p81) argue that mapping ‘who knows what’ in an organization 
creates an essential knowledge inventory, but does nothing to guarantee the on-going availability 
of knowledge. These factors are now illustrated, from my reflection, as being relevant to the 
                                                 
37 VSA means Vessel Sharing Agreement and it refers to the typical association ocean transportation companies got 
involved with in order to lower their operational costs, increase their load factors, expand market cover, improve 
their IT systems, and gain overall competitive advantage. Typically a VSA entails a formula that gets adapted to the 
number of members joining a VSA. 
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Corridor. Having access to knowledge only when its owner has time to share it or losing it 
entirely if the “knowledge worker” (Drucker, 1999) leaves the company, is a significant problem 
that threatens the value of the organization’s knowledge capital. This has been a rather new 
problem members to the Corridor have experienced as they found themselves practically obliged 
to share their knowledge capital with one another in order to ultimately defend themselves from a 
threatening business scenario. Furthermore, a much of that tacit knowledge was also vulnerable 
to be exploited by foreign companies in their search for regional expertise. Consequently, what 
before was seen with indifference by the regional players in view of a rather indulgent business 
environment, all of a sudden became a critical factor to manage within their own organizations as 
well as at the Corridor forums when looking for allies, strategies, and alternative ways to keep in 
business.  
 
A practice that probably proved to be of paramount importance was the formation of 
communities of practice (CoPs). Wenger and Snyder (2000) describe a CoP as a group of people 
who share a concern, a set of problems, or a passion about a topic, and who deepen their 
knowledge and expertise in this area by interacting on a regular basis. Both companies and 
individuals get together in CoPs to create tools, standards, generic designs, manuals, potential 
strategies, and other documents – or they may simply develop a tacit understanding that they 
share. By doing so, they accumulate knowledge, become informally bound – at least in 
principle38- by the value they find in learning together. 
 
Wenger et al. (2002 pp6-10) argue that in their view knowledge has become a strategic resource, 
companies need to keep it on the cutting edge, deploy it, leverage it in operations, and spread it 
across the organizations by cultivating CoPs in strategic areas. Skyrme (1999 p170) contends that 
while some communities focus on a particular profession or discipline, the most powerful 
communities turn out to be customer or problem focused by transcending disciplines and bringing 
in different perspectives. Naturally, just as a knowledge team is more cohesive than a simple 
work group, a knowledge CoP results in a more cohesive cluster within a diffuse knowledge 
                                                 
 
38 The idea behind the Corridor roundtables is to let companies and individuals interact with one another by exposing 
their problems and exploring alternative potential solutions. A second stage of development means that these players 
give up their informal bounding condition and enter into joint-ventures, partnerships, alliances, or any sort of 
association that enable them better cope with the market trends.  
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network. Skyrme (1999) further agues that the main difference with a work team is that a CoP is 
self-selecting and cannot be strongly directed but that on the contrary, the best management style 
for a CoP would be a hands-off approach, whilst providing a climate in which they thrive – an 
issue that will be extensively dealt with in the coming chapters.  
 
Wenger and Snyder (1998) list the following stages of community development which provides a 
good match of part for the Corridor development: 
 
1. Latent: there is potential for a CoP within the organization. 
2. Coalescent: members come together and recognize their collective potential. 
3. Active: engaged in developing a practice. 
4. Legitimized: recognized as a valuable entity. 
5. Strategic: central to the success of an organization.  
6. Transformational: capable of redefining its environment. 
7. In Diaspora: dispersed but still alive as a force. 
8. Memorable: no longer very relevant, but still remembered as part of member’s identities. 
 
The Corridor project appears to have successfully gone through all the stages and finds itself now 
active with respect to the sixth stage while in permanent search of reinforcing all and every of the 
precedent stages in a sort of knowledge-based recycling system. Good communication and shared 
sense of purpose, intensive external networking, effective knowledge management and trust make 
up the guiding principles of the Corridor and proved useful in setting up a knowledge market39.  
 
Davenport and Prusak (2000) contend that their studies show that three factors in particular often 
cause knowledge markets to operate inefficiently in organizations: the incompleteness of 
information about the knowledge market; the asymmetry of knowledge; and the localness of 
knowledge. These factors are now illustrated, from my reflection, as being relevant to the 
Corridor. 
 
                                                 
39 A knowledge market is a place where knowledge buyers (those in search of knowledge) and knowledge sellers 
(those who possess knowledge) get together to exchange knowledge and firm-up interactions and relationships.  
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If the MERCOSUR Corridor is to be considered as an organization made up of a great number of 
sub-organizations, it can then be argued that the incompleteness of information occurs when 
firms do not know where to find their own existing knowledge. The lack of knowledge maps and 
“yellow pages”40 that link buyers and sellers is a typical problem for which the formation of CoPs 
turn out to be useful. Typically, a common lack of knowledge that was found to exists was the 
absence of thorough explicit knowledge on both how to assess and what is the operating costs 
and competitive margins for medium-sized ocean and river transportation companies is, whereas 
this knowledge turned out to be possibly one of the strongest knowledge assets that global 
companies brought into the region.  
 
Asymmetry of knowledge occurs when there is abundant knowledge on a subject in one location 
and a shortage of it somewhere else within the same organization or group. This situation brought 
about a fertile ground to formulate and put into practice a solution to this problem through the 
creation of a Corridor-like forum where knowledge asymmetries found the ideal forum to help 
knowledge sellers and buyers meet and offset these asymmetries. These asymmetries became 
apparent not only between complementary segments within the logistic field, but also within the 
same area of activity (e.g. railways; coastal feeding services; inland depots; ground transportation 
firms; freight-forwarding companies; etc). 
 
Localness of knowledge also represents one of the pillars upon which the Corridor concept along 
with its many CoPs seems to work well in the direction of knowledge enhancement. The 
knowledge market generally depends on trust and as such, people and organizations tend to trust 
those who they know. Face-to-face meetings – a subject to be dealt with in a later chapter – are 
often regarded as the best way to let tacit knowledge flow and disseminate through an 
organization or a CoP. CoPs are not only competing for market share, but provide a fundamental 
tool to find, nurture, and retain talent – all those concepts being of paramount importance for the 
great majority of the Corridor members to face uncertainty within a rapid and ever evolving 
business scenario.   
 
                                                 
40 Often called as on-line directory of expertise in an organization where knowledge comes structured by skill and 
discipline and not so much by department. It often entails best practices databases and expert profiling.   
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Following from the ‘localness of knowledge’ referred to above, it is useful to briefly discuss how 
the concept and theory of situated learning (SLT) comes into play with the development of CoPs. 
Lave and Wenger (1991) in their book discuss how learning in communities has evolved from a 
kind of apprenticeship model. Wenger then as noted earlier advanced the theory to explore the 
realities and characteristics of CoPs. Sense (2008, p37) states that “learning is always considered 
a practical accomplishment that takes place amongst and through other people (where learners 
construct their meanings and understandings and learn through their social interactions within a 
context) and is not simply and only, an individual cognitive activity (where learners as individual 
actors possess and process information and modify their mental models)”. He argues that SLT is 
a highly social process where the context and situation resides within the practice being 
undertaken, where there is an exchange of knowledge that frames and re-frames meaning, and it 
becomes a natural part of working action as learning. Also he argues that SLT supports the notion 
that learning is more that cerebral activity but is commonplace and practical but does require 
reflection, discussion and collaborative sensemaking. This can be contrasted to formal 
‘classroom’ learning or other forms of knowledge transfer where the context is not heavily 
embedded. SLT also requires institutional support, such as that of the Corridor and participant 
organizations that actively engage in co-learning between members through round table 
discussions and joint venture business formations. The key aspect of SLT that relates specifically 
to the Corridor is that the context must be favorable to participants working out the best way they 
can learn from each other. This requires an intervening entity that helps participants match their 
learning and cognitive styles (such as the Corridor) or that participants self-organize to ensure 
that their interactions provide meaningful learning through work interactions. In this way SLT 
supports the idea that the Corridor could be viewed as a form of CoP.  
 
3.8 - CULTURE RELATED TO THE CORRIDOR PROJECT 
Culture has been described by Schein (1993) as displaying itself at three levels. Artifacts are 
observable at a surface level through such things as flags and historical accounts. At a deeper 
level we may perceive espoused values through acceptable ways of doing things in that certain 
actions and approaches are approved of and openly encouraged while others are frowned upon or 
receive explicit criticism. At the deepest level lie basic assumptions that are inferred and 
understood by those sharing that culture—these are the ways of doing things that are implicitly 
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followed. This view of culture helps explain how we can understand surface artifacts and actions 
in terms of deeper cultural drivers. 
 
The Corridor project embodies a number of neighboring South American countries whose 
cultural roots might well be regarded as of similar nature. However, there is sufficient evidence 
behavior, observed and encountered, that suggests cultural gaps existing not only between the 
MERCOSUR countries but even within single nations such as Brazil. Thus even within some of 
these countries, culturally they may be considered as various countries inside a single country.  
 
Without aiming at breaking down the social components roots of each of the MERCOSUR 
members, it is useful to assess and compare the national cultures of the two largest economies – 
Brazil and Argentina – by following the pioneering working model of Hofstede (1980) with 
respect to the four dimensions of culture-related values. This comparison is of general value in 
understanding cultural impact upon Corridor member interactions. While the Atlantic Corridor’s 
aims are focused upon joining countries both of somewhat similar cultures such as Brazil and 
Argentina it also has longer term goals to include in the MERCOSUR, distant cultures such as 
South Africa. An additional cultural influence is that countries that belong to the region are also 
greatly influenced by their indigenous communities such as is the case in Venezuela and Peru and 
further to Mexico. The following findings on cultural characteristics reported by Hofstede (1980) 
illustrates some of the influences at play. Caution is needed when trying to interpret Hofstede’s 
findings because his data was based upon a study within IBM several decades ago and both times 
and globalization forces over past several decades have probably changed some cultural 
characteristics.  This section in the thesis is meant to support understanding, in general terms, the 
cultural environment present in the Corridor project. 
 
Power distance (PD) : is the extent to which inequality is seen as an irreducible fact of life or the 
extent to which employees accept that their boss has more power than they have and that their 
boss’s opinions and decisions are right because he or she is the boss (Hoecklin, 1995: Chapter 2).  
While Brazil ranks 14th (PD score 69), Argentina is 35th (PD score 49). Brazilians share their PD 
area with West Africa, Singapore, Hong Kong and Colombia, whereas Argentines do so with 
Italy, South Africa, Jamaica. Even though this information is insufficient to draw any firm 
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conclusions, it suggests that while Brazilians are more inclined to obey and honor what the boss 
has to say – probably influenced by a more authoritarian immigration flow from Portugal and 
West Africa, Argentines look not so much aligned with the boss’ directives but a bit more open to 
challenge and discuss – probably because of the country’s European immigration flows. In other 
words (and this is reflected in my own experience) Brazilian managers can be seen as making 
decisions autocratically and paternalistically; exerting close supervision positively evaluated by 
subordinates; centralizing decision-making; supporting top-down pyramidal organizations; and 
accepting autocracy at whatever level within the organization. Argentine managers, however, 
appear more identified with less centralization; flatter organization pyramids; sharing decision-
making to a certain extent; close supervision negatively evaluated by subordinates; and autocracy 
is better valued at lower organizational layers. These differences loom large in the northern and 
less industrialized part of Brazil whose culture has not been yet influenced by the on-going 
globalization trends and where tradition plays a fundamental role. Understanding and evaluating 
these issues appropriately turns out of immense value at the time of negotiating a joint-venture, 
alliance or whatever commercial and industrial undertaking at regional basis as well as when 
exchanging and sharing knowledge and business intelligence. 
 
? Uncertainty avoidance (UA): is the lack of tolerance for ambiguity and the need for 
formal rules or the extent to which a people feel threatened and try to avoid ambiguous 
situations. While Argentina ranks 15th (UA score 86) – together with Chile / Spain / 
Costa Rica / Panama – Brazil ranks 22nd (UA score 76) – together with Venezuela and 
Italy. High UA means more worry about the future; more emotional resistance to change; 
tendency to stay with same employer; loyalty to employer is seen as a virtue; less risk-
taking; conflict in organizations is undesirable; initiative of subordinates should be kept 
under control; rules should not be broken. Both countries show very high UA ratios 
though they do not match Hofstede’s definitions - which if strictly applied to and 
considered with respect to the Corridor cannot find much correlation with the exception 
of more worry about the future and more resistance to change. At this point it turns out 
interesting to highlight that Argentina shows a higher UA ratio than Brazil which can be 
explained by the fact that the former nation has shown throughout its history more 
political and economic crises than Brazil leading to a general feeling of more fear and 
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resistance to change. However, and taking into account both countries as a whole within 
the context of the Corridor project, the above suggests that despite holding a very high 
UA level, it was the ever-evolving business and political environment that made the 
whole system work through combining efforts, innovating and eventually gaining 
competitive advantage. No joint-venture, alliance, partnership or cooperation agreement 
of any sort would have been otherwise feasible without having both managers and 
employees overcoming their fears and differences while participating in the roundtable 
forums across the region. 
 
? Individualism (IDV): is a concern for oneself as an individual as opposed to concern for 
the priorities and rules of the group to which one belongs. Argentina ranks 23rd (IDV 
score 46) along with India and Japan, whereas Brazil ranks 27th (IDV score 38) together 
with Arab countries, Uruguay and Greece . A low IDV score – as shown by both 
countries – suggests that: employees expect organizations to look after them like family 
and also to defend their interests; employees believe in group decisions and hold a solid 
belongingness perception; less concern in fashion with management ideas; involvement 
of individuals with organizations primary moral; and that promotion is based on seniority 
rather than on merit. Conversely, a high IDV score suggests a much higher degree of 
individual decisions and initiative or achievement, further to giving much more value to 
modern management concepts and promotion based on merit. The Corridor, however, is 
not an individual but an organization that embodies a growing number of different firms 
and corporations and as such seems to gather some characteristics of a low IDV score 
and some of a higher IDV score. Again, suggests that it is the business environment into 
which an organization is immersed that dictates any necessity to shed old paradigms and 
quickly adjust to new realities in order to survive. Seniority is no longer a factor in South 
America but merit is all; belongingness is nowadays in decay and individual initiative 
and even entrepreneurship is more and more valued and respected by both society and 
peers; paternalistic leadership is no longer sought or expected in the way it probably was 
in the past; modern management techniques are often assessed and adjusted to the 
regional needs. All these elements that in fact constitute a strong managerial trend, 
suggest once more it is the business context the one making culture subordinate to 
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achieving goals and objectives, and not the opposite. When survival is at stake, all the 
cultural variables seem become adapted to accomplishing the desired objectives.  
 
• Masculinity (MAS): masculine societies define gender roles more rigidly than 
feminine societies. Argentina ranks 21st (MAS score 56) along with India, Hong Kong 
and Greece, whereas Brazil ranks 27th (MAS 49) together with Pakistan, Singapore and 
Israel. A high MAS level (Argentina) presupposes that some occupations are restricted 
to male; that organizational interests are a legitimate reason for interfering with 
people’s private lives; that fewer women are available in more qualified and better-
paid jobs; that male are better qualified to deal with stressing jobs and industrial 
conflict. A lower MAS level (Brazil) means practically the opposite. The Corridor is 
mostly integrated by male managers and employees. However and according to the 
author’s personal experience at the forums, this is due more to the fact that logistics in 
whatever segment is considered a male activity, with little or no room for females. 
Appointing a woman as a port director, a railway manager, an air-station operations 
manager, a shipping manager, or a warehouse sales executive does not have anything 
to do with her real possibilities of succeeding at the job, but with the way she will be 
perceived by others in a typically male environment. In this case, productivity is to 
suffer as well as the whole system. Needless to say that both Argentina and Brazil rely 
upon females in their respective armed forces where cultural barriers seem to have 
adapted or been subordinated to the political will. With the exception of the armed 
forces – which is a top-down decision and therefore assimilated as such – the above 
suggests being a matter of how societies perceive the working roles according to their 
cultural roots. In this regard Lucey (1997, p22) argues that the process of perception is 
individual and varies from time to time and that people attach meaning to messages 
and situations in accordance with their attitudes, experiences and value systems. In 
other words, people tend to see and understand what they want and expect to see and 
understand, which is undoubtedly influenced by culture and pre-concepts.    
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A more recent and more extensive international cultural study was undertaken in at the end of 
the 1990’s and was reported upon in 2002 (House, Javidan, Hanges and Dorfman, 2002) and is 
referred to as the Global Leadership and Organizational Effectiveness (GLOBE) study. This 
study supported some of Hofstede’s previous seminal work (Hofstede, 1980) but identified 9 
dimensions. The above were included and others offered. The dimensions are (House et al., 
2002, p5-6): 
1. Uncertainty avoidance (as described above); 
2. Power distance (the degree to which members of an organization or society 
expect and agree  that power should be equally shared); 
3. Collectivism I - Societal collectivism (that reflects the degree to which 
organizational and societal institutional practices encourage and reward collective 
distribution of resources and collective action); 
4. Collectivism II – In-Group Collectivism (that reflects the degree to which 
individuals express pride, loyalty and cohesiveness in their organizations or 
families); 
5. Gender Egalitarianism (similar to the masculinity dimension); 
6. Assertiveness (the degree to which individuals in organizations or societies are 
assertive, confrontational, and aggressive in social relationships); 
7. Future orientation (the degree to which individuals in organizations or society 
engage in future-oriented behaviors such as planning, investing in the future, and 
delaying gratification); 
8. Performance orientation (the extent to which individuals in organizations or 
society encourages and rewards group members for performance improvement 
and excellence); and 
9. Humane orientation (the degree to which individuals in organizations or society 
encourages and rewards individuals for being fair, altruistic, friendly, generous, 
caring and kind to others. 
 
The GLOBE study did not have any data from Latin America but included the Latin Europe 
cluster that includes Spain and Portugal as well as Italy. These three cultures, through mass 
immigration, influenced Latin American culture. The GLOBE study measures not only 
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perceptions from a well designed survey instrument, for details refer to (House et al., 2002), of 
how things are but also perceptions of how things should be. This gives a richer and fuller picture 
of the cultural norms. The Latin Europe cluster results are presented in Figure 3-4 (Jesuino, 2002, 
p85). 
 
 
Figure 3-4: Cultural Map of Latin Europe Cluster of Countries   
  
Again this provides supporting evidence that helps us better understand the cultural drivers of 
behaviors in general terms. The implications of this relates to the way that Corridor members 
interact in sharing knowledge, in negotiating agreements and in the way that ‘chemistry’ of 
attraction or lack thereof may be explained and understood in cultural terms.  
 
 
3.9 - PROJECT MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS APPLIED TO THE CORRIDOR 
PROJECT 
As stated earlier, the Corridor can be seen as not just a very large project but rather a program of 
projects. Moreover, it has been proposed earlier that the Corridor may be seen as both a form of 
CoP as well as having some attributes shared by a project management office. Therefore a 
discussion on the nature of a project, PM and PM maturity helps to provide a framework for 
testing how the Corridor functions. 
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The PMBOK41 guideTM defines a project as a temporary endeavor undertaken to create a unique 
product, service, or result, whereas it refers to project management as the tasks that are carried  
out in an environment that often influences the organization more broadly than the project itself. 
Project management is also described as “the application of knowledge, skills, tools, and 
techniques to project activities to meet project requirements” (PMBOK, 2004).   
 
From a process point of view, the PMBOK defines project management as the application of 
knowledge, skills, tools and techniques that receive inputs and generate outputs. The KM 
perspective of project management processes is further deepened by addressing the project 
integration management knowledge area that includes the processes and activities needed to 
coordinate the various existing processes within a project. The PMBOK also refers to project 
scope management as the processes required to ensure that all the work related to the project 
completion is included by both identifying and controlling what effectively is needed within the 
project. Along with it, project risk management concepts get naturally linked to project 
completion in the form of increasing the probability and impact of positive events, as well as 
decreasing the probability and impact of events that turn out adverse to the project. 
 
A further PM concept that is needed to be explained in this thesis that helps explain the nature of 
the Corridor is the viewing the Corridor as a form of project management office. The project 
management office (PMO) concept has been with us for a long time. Walker, Arlt, and Norrie 
(2008a) state that most construction projects tend to be managed on site through a project office. 
This office is where specialists and much of the project team congregate in physical proximity to 
work together, to share ideas and to facilitate communication through rich personal contact. More 
recently however, the PMO concept has been evolving as a way to move beyond just gathering 
people together and better coordinating their actions and resources towards sharing standards 
(Rad, 2001; Ingebretsen, 2003; Blomquist and Müller, 2006; Crawford, 2006). This facilitates 
program or portfolio management (Turner, 1999: chapter 14; Artto, 2001) in a way that adds 
coherence. Program and portfolio management bears distinct similarities with the way that the 
Corridor operated.  
 
                                                 
41 PMBOK: Project Management Body of Knowledge 
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Walker, et al (2008a) also state that a PMO at its lowest level provides a location where project 
team members gather to do their PM work and this is often restricted to those involved in the 
‘iron triangle’ processes of time, cost and quality control. This level of PMO supports decision 
making, coordination and control and is a way of ‘housing’ project managers. The number of 
functions performed are quite varied but generally with governance and training functions and as 
Hobbs and Aubry (2007) report, most have been formed in the last 2 years and about 80% being 
formed within the last 5 years. Hobbs and Aubry (2007, p82) also report that the functions of a 
PMO tends to be to: 
1. Develop and implement a standard methodology; 
2. Promote project management within the organization; 
3. Develop competency of personnel including training; 
4. Provide mentoring for project managers; 
5. Provide a set of tools without an effort to standardize. 
 
They found, however, that for 58% of the sample of 500 usable survey responses, the relevance 
or even the existence of the PMO had been seriously questioned (Hobbs and Aubry, 2007, p83). 
Handler and Magee (1999, p2) through the Gartner group suggest three classifications of PMOs 
in terms of information systems implementation for health care organizations (HCOs). These are:  
1. “The Repository Model: The project office serves as a source of information on project 
methodology and standards; 
2. The Repository-Coach Model: An extension of the repository, this organizational 
structure assumes a willingness to share some project management practices across 
business functions and uses the project office to coordinate communication. Best practices 
are documented and shared, and project performance is actively monitored. Results are 
used as an opportunity to raise HCO performance and to train inefficient or new project 
managers. In some organizations, mentoring relationships have been established across 
business boundaries between high performing project managers and those who are less 
able. The project office in this model is a permanent structure with staff and has some 
supervisory responsibility for all projects; and 
3. The Repository-Coach-Manager Model: The most permanent, consolidated organizational 
model, this concentrates project management within the project office. This implies direct 
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management or oversight, depending on scope and duration, of projects wherever they 
occur within the HCO. In some cases, all project managers are actually staffed within the 
shared service and consigned to projects as needed. This model assumes a governance 
process that involves the project office in all projects regardless of size, allowing it to 
assess scope, allocate resources and verify time, budget, risk and impact assumptions 
before the project is undertaken. Funding is generally a combination of direct, budgeted 
allocation for baseline services and a fee-for-service charge for others.” 
 
Another example of a PMO that won internal awards within the communications organisation 
Ericsson P/L that was based in Melbourne, Australia is described and analysed by Cartwright 
(2006; Cartwright and Walker, 2008). This PMO started life, as does many others, as an attempt 
to raise PM skills and capabilities. Its original focus was concerned with creating standards, 
promoting learning exchange and sharing experience and gathering data on success or otherwise 
of their projects. This evolved to being involved in strategic decision making about which 
projects to focus on but also it was involved in helping groups within the organisation develop 
business cases. In addition it acted as a coach for PM staff as well as advised sponsors and 
champions. The PMO in its latest evolution is proactive and has been made more accountable 
(Cartwright and Walker, 2008). 
 
Once PMOs provide a physical or communities of practice (CoP) link to project management 
teams then knowledge sharing takes place and this allows standards to be set that make 
established PM processes more repeatable for that organization. This level of PMO moves to a 
higher order PMO that is described by Christenson (2007) as a centre of excellence and this 
appears to be a very effective way of transferring knowledge (Walker and Christenson, 2005). 
Thus the PMO facilitates organization-wide impact of an incremental improvement and increased 
PM maturity.  
 
The PMI standard OPM3 (PMI, 2003) specifies a 5 level maturity model:  
1. Initial, where ad hoc PM approaches are deployed and the project is characterized by 
chaos and confusion with the same mistakes being repeated for each project;  
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2. Repeatable, where basic PM tools, techniques and processes are deployed and formalized 
often with a start in developing a procedures manual or system that allows success to be 
repeatable or failures not repeated;  
3. Defined, the procedures manual or system is formalized and tested to a point where it is 
accepted as a policy and guides PM activities;  
4. Managed; at this stage performance is recorded and data collected to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the systems in place in the PMO and it is possible to justify resources and 
initiatives and gauge the value of the PMO and the systems are well understood and 
accepted; and finally the  
5. Optimizing level may be reached, where it is continuously improved and is embedded in 
the organizational culture (Crawford, 2002; Rad and Levin, 2002, p282).  
 
The proposition that arises to be later tested from this discussion of PMOs, COEs and CoPs is 
that the Corridor has functioned in part as a high level transnational cross-organizational 
repository-coach type COE through its CoP activities in addition to its mentoring, supporting 
standards and knowledge transfer. Its maturity level could be said to be at level 4 and possibly, at 
least in part, at level 5.  
All these PM concepts find a number of links within the Corridor project that turn out essential to 
consider it from a project management perspective and can be summarized as follows: 
I. The concept of temporariness means that every project or program of projects has a 
definite beginning and a definite end – at least in principle. Normally, the end of a project 
comes when its objectives have been accomplished or when it becomes apparent that the 
objectives cannot be achieved or for whatever reason the project is abandoned. The 
MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor project is a sort of master project that serves as a 
framework and strategic guidance for a growing number of sub-projects that constitute 
and give strength to the Corridor. These subprojects are the ones showing a definite 
beginning and a concrete end with respect to their temporariness, whereas the master 
project or Corridor project has been undertaken to create a lasting end – to be a permanent 
forum of knowledge interaction aiming at creating the necessary tools for regional 
companies to face the impact of globalization. These tools become associated with a 
number of possibilities that range from a simple reengineering strategy after having 
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acquired the needed expertise, to joint-ventures, mergers and acquisitions. While each 
sub-project usually has a limited time-frame associated with its own particular 
opportunity or market window, the Corridor project pursues economic, social, and 
operational impacts that far outlast the sub-projects themselves. The very dynamic and 
long-lasting nature of the globalization process makes the Corridor project’s goals42 lie 
distant over the horizon, while it brings about a growing number of business situations 
that turn into sub-projects with definite start-ups and ends.  
II. The concept of uniqueness is an important characteristic of project deliverables. Contrary 
to what happens in many industrial projects around the world, the Corridor project 
appears to be truly unique and not likely to be imitated anywhere at present as it is based 
on both a world trend – globalization impact – and a regional phenomenon – end of 
protectionism. The Corridor project was born as a consequence of a very unique world 
trend that produced a defensive reaction amongst a number of regional companies that 
were operating in a rather protected and bilateral economic system, and thus gave birth to 
a number of sub-projects that proved to be unique too. Such a unique characteristic 
becomes apparent in the way regional firms accepted to get together and naturally 
exchange what before was probably regarded as strategic information. The way 
knowledge is generated and transferred makes the Corridor project and its sub-project of 
very unique nature. 
III. Progressive elaboration: from the view that the globalization phenomenon is an ever-
mutating process showing many different and ever-evolving faces and impacts on the 
region. The Corridor both adapts itself to face the new realities and constantly expands its 
functions into new roles to better cover the knowledge interaction. The Corridor as a 
framework or forum provides a number of sub-projects to grow and be shaped, it has its 
own organizational structure that counts on a progressive description of tasks and duties 
which starts with the project scope and it develops progressively in a much more explicit 
detail as the many sub-projects demand it. A significant number of companies formed part 
of the Corridor project and therefore attend the integration roundtable. These are the 
                                                 
42 The Corridor’s main goals can be identified as creating the necessary conditions for companies to let them achieve 
larger economies of scale and gain competitive advantage. The economies of scale are associated with lowering their 
operational costs that would ultimately let them gain competitive advantage as to face the global firms. The concept 
of competitive advantage though depending on a number of variables, is to a great extent linked to the enlargement 
of economies of scale.  
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places where the concept of progressive elaboration varies as it is required by a specific 
sub-project in any of its possible segments. 
IV. Project Management Office (PMO): it is the Corridor itself that acts as an organizational 
unit or PMO that centralizes and facilitates the initiation of projects under its domain. 
Unlike many organizations where projects are grouped and conducted by a given PMO 
which is in charge of managing and controlling them, the Corridor recruits, informs, 
trains, and take all the necessary steps to facilitate companies and individuals generate 
and transfer knowledge that may help them overcome their ongoing problems. It does not 
manage or monitor any sub-project but that facilitates the sub-projects to accomplish their 
goals while adopting the structure of a project itself – which reinforces its uniqueness and 
temporariness characteristics. 
V. Project life cycle: the Corridor project does not match the traditional concept of life cycle 
in that it is the phases linking the beginning of a project to its end. The typical transition 
from one phase to another within a project’s life cycle in the form of deliverables, does 
not really happen at the Corridor, but in the sub-projects the Corridor embraces. The 
Corridor project finds itself in some sort of ever-evolving intermediate phase that creates 
new deliverables by means of facilitating a constant and growing explicit and tacit 
knowledge interaction amongst its members. Such an interaction produces a continuous 
flow of knowledge that keeps the Corridor’s life cycle at an intermediate level of 
development, whereas it makes many sub-projects overlap their stages and adopt a fast 
tracking schedule as they witness others’ successful experiences to put them into practice 
at once, always under the Corridor umbrella.  
VI. Stakeholder Management: Naturally the Corridor project, like any project, engages a great 
number of stakeholders who directly or indirectly, may have an impact on the project’s 
life cycle and therefore its effectiveness and maturation stage (Walker et al., 2008b). As a 
transnational project, the Corridor involves very large and influential corporations and 
entire governmental interests that may play as either positive or negative stakeholders. 
Large global corporations encountering resistance to their market expansion strategies on 
the part of the regional firms may be regarded as negative stakeholders by the Corridor 
members. On the contrary, state and federal governments that try to maintain and expand 
their local businesses and stopping the migration of assets towards extra-regional 
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interests, will probably be regarded as positive stakeholders by the Corridor members. 
Typically, the Corridor counts on a great and growing number of primary and secondary 
stakeholders who can make a sub-project slow down or achieve its objectives faster.  
VII .Project Management Processes: the Corridor project can be defined as a long-    
 run process that integrates a number of sub-projects displaying well defined sub-     
processes during their life cycles. The purpose of a project is to initiate, plan, execute, 
monitor, control, and close a project. This is the way the Corridor’s sub-projects have 
been managed throughout the years. However, the Corridor gets differentiated from its 
sub-projects in that the processes it utilizes are in permanent evolution and put into 
practice at the integration roundtables across the region. Both explicit and tacit knowledge 
creation and transfer need a permanent refinement of processes as new situations arise, 
more innovative solutions are sought, and more sophisticated stakeholders participate. 
VIII. Project Integration Management: integration includes aspects such as  
 unification, consolidation, articulation, and integrative actions that turn out     crucial to 
stakeholder or member requirements, to managing uncertainty and expectations, to 
fostering innovation and knowledge sharing, and to sub-project completion. The 
integration forums or roundtables represent the physical settings where the processes 
related to the ongoing sub-projects merge into the Corridor’s processes and lead to a flow 
of knowledge creation and transfer.   
IX. Project Scope Management: the Corridor project relies upon a well defined  
scope of action where a number of functions are defined, are verified and effectively 
controlled over a specified period of time aiming at creating the necessary conditions for 
the members to interact and bring about a number of sub-projects. The Corridor’s scope 
defines the way an integration roundtable should work, whether its location is more 
strategic than tactic, the necessary number and right location, the number of commissions 
each roundtable should incorporate, and the way they should be moderated and monitored 
to let knowledge emerge and spread all over the system. The Corridor project scope 
management therefore includes a number of processes that prove essential for the system 
to allow sub-projects proliferate across the region and produce more innovative and solid 
deliverables for their members and itself.  
 117
X. Project management tools and techniques find fertile ground and a significant variety of 
situations where these can be utilized and tested. Both within the Corridor project master 
project and the existing and ever-evolving sub-projects, it becomes apparent that from a 
project management perspective, the Corridor and the sub-projects it embraces seem to be 
making full use of a number of variables that turn out to be key for the project 
management practice: time; budget; processes; knowledge; temporality; uniqueness; and 
possibly a number of other factors this dissertation does not intend to focus on. 
Consequently, this project seems to be an adequate forum where project management 
tools and techniques can be tested, as well as this project seems to find in them a set of 
solid tools enabling it conduct its functions in a solid and proactive manner. 
 
3.10- CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter illustrated how both reflection upon practice as illustrated in Chapter 1 Figure 1-2 
together with literature used in the DPM coursework component influenced the choice of theory 
that was then presented to underpin the empirical stage of this thesis 
 
Project management is about implementing a strategy. Therefore, a theoretical exploration of 
various schools of strategy was introduced in this chapter because of it relevance to 
understanding the nature of the corridor and how that was shaped by the industrial structure. The 
Corridor is presented as a response to the contextual forces that Corridor members faced and help 
explain its reason for being as well as the way it operates. Competitive advantage and the value 
chain and its relevance to the Corridor expand this discussion. The theory of the firm theory 
grounded in a resource based view helped to frame a competencies and dynamic capability 
perspective on how the Corridor evolved and how it operates so that the motivations of the 
Corridor’s participants and its formation can be more clearly understood.  
 
An important part of understanding the Corridor is how it is led and how leadership directs the 
Corridor’s strategies and activities and so a section on relevant leadership theory was included in 
this chapter. This naturally led to a discussion of business cooperation theory as this lies at the 
core of the Corridor’s reason for being.  
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One of the stated prime motivations of Corridor participants and lies at the heart of its existence 
is knowledge sharing and so it was necessary to review KM in this chapter and to discuss in 
particular issues related to knowledge transfer and the formation of CoPs. More critically, as this 
is a dissertation based on a PM perspective it was necessary to provide a section in this chapter to 
justify how the PM view can be substantiated as being valid. 
 
In summary, the MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor can be regarded as a master project with an 
indefinite scope of time that gives birth and nurtures an apparently ever growing number of sub-
projects. These subprojects and opposite their master project – the Corridor – show a dynamic 
life-cycle whose maturation levels depend on the business environment they have to face. 
 
As such, the Corridor project along with its sub-project, all reflect a number of theories which, 
either directly or indirectly, take part at different levels of the master project while holding a 
direct influence on the sub-projects. The Corridor project, being of a transnational nature and 
mostly focused on a knowledge theory dimension, gathers in itself and its sub-projects a rich 
variety of situations which makes it unique, multiple-theory oriented, and of a rather high 
complexity in view of its great number of links and interactions. As such, it involves aspects 
related to competitive strategy where Porter’s five competitive forces, industry structure, and 
generic strategies have first to be looked into and broken down, to later understand how the 
mentioned subprojects emerged and developed.  
 
Understanding the way the value chain works to actually add value in a business transformation 
to integrate very different sub-projects by combining their primary and support activities with one 
another has also been argued to be a significant way to add value to the organization. Further, the 
theory of the firm helps understanding the motivation behind the creation of the Corridor project, 
by both companies and individuals before a hostile business environment.  
 
The leadership and strategy theories turn out useful to visualize how the different strategies and 
leadership styles can best match the distinct situation that evolve as the globalization moves 
forward. The business cooperation theory helps understanding the steps that many firms take 
prior committing to more formal types of alliance, further to what their motivations or reasons 
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may turn out to be. Finally, both the knowledge theory and the project management tools and 
techniques applied to the Corridor project result of paramount importance to visualize the 
direction of this dissertation. 
 
This dissertation aims at contributing to deepen different aspects of the above theories by 
addressing a project which, in view of its uniqueness and complexity, embraces a great number of 
variables which far from remaining stagnant, evolve or mutate as the globalization trend expands 
all over the region. Special emphasis is set on the knowledge dimension and its practical 
application in full accordance to the generally accepted project management best practices, tools 
and techniques.           
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4.  THE CORRIDOR PROJECT: WORKING THROUGH 
COLLABORATION AND KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER 
 
4.1 - INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this chapter is to expand upon the broad context of the Corridor described in 
Chapter 2 and the literature review presented in Chapter 3 to now describe the Corridor in terms 
of its role as a program/portfolio tool that enables projects to be realized through facilitating 
collaboration and knowledge sharing.  
 
This chapter commences exploring how knowledge exchange occurred with the Corridor and the 
relationship between the face-to-face interaction concept and the utilization of technology to 
ensure a better knowledge sharing and transfer in the roundtable forums. The size of the firm 
along with some culture-related aspects are also dealt with in an attempt to establish the real 
influence a technological platform may have on an organization’s capacity to transfer knowledge 
effectively. The emotional filters that may act as barriers in the transfer of both explicit and tacit 
knowledge between individuals and companies are also linked with the freedom to interact and 
the face-to-face concept.  
 
The section continues by explaining the existing relationship between a firm’s absorptive 
capacity and the business context it operates through a given CoP. Section 3 follows, providing 
different examples of knowledge transfer through strategy formulation as a way to establish its 
real importance as far as vertical integration processes are concerned. Section 4 then explores 
how the role of a company’s home base, in achieving global goals and gaining competitive 
advantage, also acts as a potential triggering factor for regional cooperation and collaboration. 
 
The chapter ends with the conclusions and recommendations.     
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Figure 4-1:  The Corridor as a tool for collaborative sustainability 
 
Figure 4.1 illustrates the Corridor and its associated roundtables as tool to facilitate collaboration 
and through that, global competitiveness and a sustainable business future. The metaphor used is 
a machine tool that uses synergies of benchmarking, process improvement, forming collaborative 
groups, enacting strategies that may lead to mergers and acquisitions between members in 
forwards, backwards and vertical integration of value chains to turn the screw cranking up 
sustainable competitiveness. This is achieved and through the Corridor facilitation of trust-
building and knowledge creation, sharing and use. The identified inhibitors are stickiness of 
knowledge in being effectively transferred and the wedge of mistrust where this occurs to 
undermine the ‘machine tool’ working effectively.  
 
4.2 - THE CORRIDOR AS A KNOWLEDGE TRANSFER DEVICE 
It can be argued that knowledge sharing entails making the existing knowledge of a company 
more generally accessible as a way to face upcoming challenges and thus gain competitive 
advantage. The knowledge advantage (K-Adv) concept as proposed by Walker, Wilson and 
Srikanathan (2004) and set out in more detail by Walker (2004, p6) states that the K-Adv is “the 
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capacity to liberate latent creativity and innovation potential through effective management of 
knowledge both from within its organizational boundaries and its external environment”.  
 
Walker (2004) argues that the K-Adv concept entails a connection between knowledge use and 
sense-making to build the necessary social capital in the form of creative chaos and ambiguity; 
redundancy of resources to allow people to think and reflect; variety of stimuli and channels of 
communication and capacity for reflection and curiosity. This is supported and enabled by a 
technology infrastructure, a human capital infrastructure, and a leadership infrastructure that 
together in unison provide the necessary conditions for effective knowledge creation, sharing and 
transfer. The leadership element needs to be transformational as discussed in Chapter 3 Section 
3.5 and it also needs to be strategic in envisioning how a K-Adv environment can be created and 
maintained. 
 
The human capital element relates to reducing knowledge stickiness, building and maintaining 
trust that enables and facilitates knowledge creation and transfer. This is also linked to raising the 
organization’s absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990) and reducing causal ambiguity 
described in Chapter 3  Section 3.7 as being key elements of knowledge stickiness (Szulanski, 
1996). The third element is information communication technology (ICT) and its effective 
diffusion and adaptation. The way that the Corridor addressed each of these K-Adv enablers will 
be now be discussed in more detail. 
 
4.2.1   Emphasis on the ICT Infrastructures 
The Corridor used its own intranet as part of its facilitating infrastructure to link participants. 
While this facilitates linking people to knowledge sources it does not necessarily realize the 
intended effect of establishing these linkages. Mullin (1996, p56) states that “The challenge lies 
in being able to train people to share and then to reuse knowledge within the organization”.  
 
Many companies worldwide have relied almost exclusively on big investments in document-
management systems, shared servers, intranets of different magnitude, and other technology 
solutions, believing this approach to be enough to let employees unlock knowledge (McDermott, 
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1999). The result too often seems to be an overwhelming volume of outdated and poorly written 
documents leading knowledge buyers or seekers to sail in a sea of confusion and ambiguity. 
  
Bryan argues that the real value of knowledge transfer at transnational level comes less from 
managing knowledge and a lot more from creating and exchanging it. He further argues that 
effectively exchanging knowledge on a company-wide basis is much less a technological 
problem than an organizational one: encouraging people who do not know each other to work 
together for their mutual self-interest (Bryan, 2004).  
 
However, technological devices may also trigger the creation and exchange of knowledge on a 
face-to-face mode, provided that its platform facilitates a direct contact between the participants. 
Even though ever increasing technological dependence is evident in the logistics business, as well 
as in any other kind of large-scale PM operations, the Corridor’s forums role has been to provide 
an exchange mechanism so that both authors and seekers of knowledge could find their way to a 
knowledge market. This forum which later became a knowledge market would have been much 
slower (or proved much less efficient in terms of knowledge sharing) without a minimum 
technology platform. This suggests that both a direct contact among team members and 
independent participants may be necessary initiating conditions to build trust and permit a 
knowledge market to emerge. 
 
However, a key element to jointly trigger knowledge sharing and make it sustainable over time to 
allow this knowledge market to mature is provision for a common technological platform for 
participants to use. Technological sophistication, size, and structure of a company may indicate 
how ready it could be to utilize technology to facilitate creating and exchanging knowledge. 
However at the same time, these characteristics may conspire against and confound effective 
face-to-face exchange that might eventually lead to a more effective flow of knowledge. 
 
 A typical example of this is the giant American engineering company Fluor Daniel that develops 
projects across the Americas and all over the world. Even though the same team may be 
simultaneously carrying out a functional activity such as logistics on a number of different 
projects in distant locations, it is common for their members to not know each other despite 
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having exchanged thousand of emails and have engaged in long hours discussing operations on 
the phone or in front of teleconferencing devices.  
 
Dixon (2000) argues that technology used for knowledge work has to be married with face-to-
face interaction to create the most effective systems, and that even though one does not replace 
the other, one clearly enhances the other. Another problem that a technology-based knowledge 
transfer system often presents is given by the lack of willingness of some people in effectively 
transferring such a body of knowledge. Dixon (2000) further argues that when organizations find 
that their members show little interest in the knowledge or information repositories, they often 
have to expend considerable resources to provide (often by reinventing the wheel) the same 
common knowledge that could and should have been shared in an attempt to overcome the lack 
of contributions. Worse still, common mistakes may be constantly repeated. Thus, an incentive 
system is often designed and put into practice aiming at rewarding people for contributing and 
retrieving knowledge. Large and global firms such as KPMG, Chevron, Bechtel, Ernst & Young, 
as well as other large consulting firms of global reach, have tried to address this issue through 
innovative incentive mechanisms, though mainly technologically-based KM solutions (Hansen, 
Nohria and Tierney, 1999). 
 
Technology is no doubt a key element to efficiently manage knowledge as it allows people to 
share knowledge without having to be in the same place at the same time. However, this seems 
not to be the most efficient knowledge transfer method but that some sort of combination 
between technology and direct individual contact as experienced by Ford Motor Company 
through their “Best Practice Replication”. Here, the engineers from two different countries got to 
know each other to exchange views on how to improve their respective production lines; after 
face-to-face exchanges and discussions they came to respect each other, and to recognize that the 
other had some very useful ideas that they had not thought of themselves (Dixon 2000). 
 
4.2.2. Emphasis on the Human Infrastructure 
 
Experience with the Corridor indicates that face-to-face communications is the most efficient tool 
used by medium or small-sized companies to communicate to front-line employees while 
exchanging views and experiences in the MERSOSUR Corridor forums or integration 
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roundtables. Face-to-face communication allows richer communication that includes senses of 
smell and touch that humans perceptively use when interacting. Larkin and Larkin (1999, p152) 
argue that “the best way to communicate a major change to the frontline workforce is face-to-
face”. This seems to indicate that technology can be best utilized by larger or more technology-
use mature organizations and when involving more analytical employees often localized at higher 
managerial echelons of the organization rather than at frontline workers who may not have the 
ICT skills to use high technology KM approaches. 
 
The knowledge sharing and transfer literature discussed in Chapter 3, generally cites examples 
drawn from single large corporations that encompass a great number of worldwide divisions and 
does not often cite examples from regionally-focused smaller organizations embodying a great 
diversity of functional activities such as that often seen within the logistics world. This research 
thesis focuses upon how KM operates between both competing and complementary firms that are 
grouped under a common entity (the Corridor). This offers a fertile ground to further develop the 
existing knowledge management experience into a new situation that is poorly addressed by the 
current literature. 
 
 Most of the Corridor members and participants fall into the category of either small to medium-
size companies with a regional focus or larger and global companies whose regional branches 
operating as independent entities adapted their KM style to the KM advantages offered by the 
Atlantic Corridor. 
  
It is been the author’s experience that direct face-to-face dialogue was the preferred method for 
sharing valuable proprietary knowledge inside the Corridor forums, between knowledge 
providers and buyers, and this provided a pillar upon which tacit knowledge to explicit 
knowledge conversion was initiated. If knowledge seekers find a willing expert, they can quickly 
pinpoint and acquire the knowledge they need. Whether meeting with them one-on-one or in a 
group, the knowledge provider is likely to gain recognition and esteem from peers and superiors.  
 
This introduces a culture matching dimension that is not further explored in this thesis. Detailed 
analysis from a culture perspective is not pursued due to limiting the scope of this work and 
because the context of the Corridor is within a Latin America with members of a similar cultural. 
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The MERCOSUR countries fall within a similar band as reported by (Hofstede, 1991; Gupta, 
Hanges and Dorfman, 2002). I have briefly discussed various aspects of organizational culture in 
Chapter 3 Section 3.8. This cultural dimension from a national and organizational cultural aspect 
does, however, lead to recognizing that culture has an influencing role in knowledge sharing 
facilitation. Even more so if applicable to a Corridor-like organization which turns out to be 
different than a cooperative, consortium, joint-venture, or alliance of any sort while tending to be 
a spontaneous gathering of both complementary and competing organizations – where culture-
matching is restricted to facilitating knowledge to flow and transfer. 
 
Further to exploring extensively beyond the literature discussed in Chapter 3 relating to 
organizational and national culture, it is important to define culture as a set of refined behaviors 
that people have and strive toward in their society. Culture, according to anthropologist Taylor, 
includes the totality of knowledge, belief, arts, morals, law, customs, and other capabilities and 
habits acquired by individuals as members of a society (Cleland & Ireland 2002, p559). Put in 
other words and from an organizational viewpoint, organizational culture may be defined as the 
environment of beliefs, customs, knowledge, practices, and conventionalized behavior of a 
particular social group (Cleland & Ireland 2002, p559; Schein, 1993).  
 
Elashmawi & Harris (1998, p87) provide a definition of culture that seems to be very appropriate 
to describe the nature of the Corridor. They refer to culture as the behavioral norms that a group 
of people, at a certain time and place, have agreed upon to survive/coexist. Despite the countries 
in the region shared rather homogeneous cultural patterns, it becomes necessary to deepen into 
certain cultural insights to better comprehend the different cultural environments these countries 
belong to. The principal cultural influences are manifested in the dimensions described by 
Hofstede (1991) and in the GLOBE study (House, Javidan, Hanges and Dorfman, 2002; Jesuino, 
2002) that are outlined in Chapter 3. While there may be significantly shared assumptions 
indicated across the MERCOSUR nations by virtue of these cultural dimensions they can not be 
used as a tool for predicting behaviors. The cultural dimensions and their clustering, however, 
can be used to better understand how various individuals from cultural clusters may share a world 
view that helps them to readily relate to each other.  
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People make organizations work, and the culture of the form of PMO ties people together, giving 
them meaning and a set of principles and standards to live and work by – a concept that is of 
paramount importance in the knowledge transfer process. From this perspective, the Corridor – as 
a corporation - may be imagined as a larger entity or master project made up of a number of 
project teams or groups holding different life cycles in their particular sub-projects, and where 
every group develops its distinct sub-culture – one where members are influenced by the culture 
of the organization to which the group belongs as well as separate project cultures. Corporate 
culture is usually explained in terms of organizational values and beliefs and the behavior of 
members of the corporation (Schein, 1993). 
 
Cleland & Ireland (2002 p560) argue that the culture of an enterprise and the culture of a project 
within an enterprise are mutually interdependent, influencing each other as the two organizations 
work together. A reengineering project which results in organization-wide downsizing, 
restructuring, and realignment of the way in which project processes are managed is also likely to 
have an impact on the local culture. Firms may also need to adapt the organization to fit cultural 
differences within a cross-company project meaning that both an institutional and individual 
adjustment is very likely to be needed at an early stage. The meaning and real extent of these 
concepts loom large if a trans-national characteristic is considered and embodied within a 
knowledge dimension - a topic this dissertation will intend to cover by assessing the roots and 
impacts with respect to this unique organization.   
   
Davenport and Prusak (2000, p93) give various examples of various companies organizing 
workshops, fairs, and conferences under different degrees of freedom or flexibility for the 
executives to wander and interact in a more or less natural way, aiming at holding informal 
conversations or exchanging tacit knowledge. They argue that large firms that organize events in 
a rigid or too highly structured way hinder informal interaction and therefore limit the exchange 
of tacit knowledge. On the other hand, firms allowing executives free time to get in touch with 
each other turn out being much more effective from a knowledge sharing perspective. They 
advocate knowledge transfer through face-to-face meetings and through narratives in addition to 
more structured forms. Wandering and interacting are two essential constituting elements of the 
Corridor’s flow of tacit knowledge. Naturally, giving people the opportunity to talk to one 
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another does not by itself solve the problem of sharing and transferring knowledge. However, it is 
interesting to highlight the system adopted by a number of Japanese companies to let and foster 
knowledge transfer among their employees as a way to create value for the firm. They have set 
up “talk rooms” where informal and unscheduled meetings are held in order to encourage some 
kind of creative blending and exchange that eventually may bring about value creation. The 
Japanese corporate culture also encourages group dinners and after-work gatherings as a way to 
facilitate communications to spread out and to establish trust among the participants, without 
which knowledge transfer would not be feasible.  
 
Nonaka and Konno (1998) introduced the Japanese concept of ba or a space that has been 
especially created where learning can take place. The following actual examples from my 
personal experience illustrate how informal gatherings and fluid conversations are highly unlikely 
to contribute “per se” in finding an adequate response. These include conversations around: 
details of the design of a state-of-the-art Roll-on/Roll-off43 (RO/RO) vessel to carry automobiles 
within the MERCOSUR market; the optimal length and draft for a convoy of barges to carry iron 
ore ex central Brazil to a Buenos Aires up-river terminal throughout 2,400 kilometers of a tricky 
fluvial system; the best consumption/output ratio for a river tugboat to operate in the Parana-
Paraguay waterways; the most suitable management information system for integrating the 
regional railways by linking five countries; the optimal air-cargo freighter to operate 
economically under strong winds and long distance conditions across the Patagonian territories; 
the optimal lifting equipment for Manaos up-river port terminal in the Brazilian rainforest; the 
most suitable deck design for a project ocean-going vessel to call south American east cost ports; 
or the optimal emergency airplane capable to land and take off at 4,500 meters of altitude in a 
mining project’s runaway of only 1,300 meters in length, turn out to be only some.  
 
 However, this informal gathering process is efficient in placing the early germ of ideas where 
these initial interactions may bring about promising outcomes at a later stage. Such outcomes - as 
will be described in more detail in the next chapters – may range from a simple cooperation 
agreement to a formal joint-venture agreement or even mergers and acquisitions between regional 
                                                 
43 RO/RO is the technical term for those ships capable of loading, transporting, and discharging rolling cargoes such 
as pipe-lyers, side-booms, road-making machinery, mobile cranes, trucks and automobiles. 
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corporations in pursuit of achieving a better corporate positioning that help them cope with the 
global trends more efficiently. 
 
My experience and observations of the way that regional shipping companies reacted to the 
global trends represented by ever-growing economies of scale in the east-west-east trade lanes 
sheds some light on the way that face to face knowledge transfer occurred. Far from making 
contacts at corporate level, flying first class, or holding pre-announced overseas meetings, all 
contacts among the Corridor members were initiated in an informal fashion. Examples of two 
joint-ventures presented in Chapter 6 that later proved to be successful (and became a model to 
follow in lowering operational costs while rationalizing their respective fleets in operations), 
illustrate saw how “trust shaping” first steps in going forward in two different but both equally 
informal ways. The first example was during a friendly lunch between two shipping firms, and 
the second at conducting an informal meeting at the commencement of an owners meeting that 
proved to be totally fortuitous. 
 
 The first example was an ad-hoc lunch where key representatives of the parties got to know each 
other and explore the possibility of helping one another in coping with an upcoming threatening 
scenario dominated by lower-cost and larger-scale operators (Zim Lines and Maruba). The 
second example had the same purpose though an informal encounter that turned out to be crucial, 
triggered the face-to-face meeting that in turn helped cement a business relationship (Zim Lines 
and Pan American Shipping).  
 
Little explicit data was exchanged thereafter, but that form of mostly tacit knowledge and face-to-
face dialogue and exchange of information became a feature of regular and frequent interactions 
between the executives and owners themselves. With the passing of time information and 
knowledge of the operational variables of each company was transferred to the other for their 
comparison and assessment (such as load factors / operational draft / consumption / load - unload 
speed / sales force / organizational structure / IT systems). Additionally, information and 
knowledge that not long before had been considered highly strategic information (port rates / 
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market freight rates / service contract rates44 / bunkering strategy / time-charter rates45 / 
operational costs) was also freely exchanged. Thus the special characteristic of the Corridor’s 
own developing ethos and culture of facilitating knowledge transfer and developing cooperative 
ventures was achieved through the Corridor’s ability to enhance informal interactions where 
significant tacit knowledge could be exchanged and re-framed in the above example from ‘highly 
confidential’ to ‘sharable and tradable’ in this evolving knowledge market.   
 
Face-to-face interaction also resulted in building trust and therefore better cooperation and 
cohesiveness among teams spread all over the world, when corporate sales meeting were held 
once a year. All those people with whom one had been in contact with on the company’s intranet, 
finally got together, shook hands, started exchanging views and opinions on a number of 
common marketing topics, and most importantly, built a solid trust base. Knowledge transfer and 
cooperation tended to become increasingly easier after every meeting took place. 
Communications were more fluid, understanding resulted more readily, tolerance for bad moods 
was higher, and overall cooperation became evident. This illustrated how the Corridor through 
these meetings, where people interacted face to face, were able to build trust and affective 
commitment as discussed in models and theory presented in Chapter 3 section 3.8.   
  
Another aspect that is worth-considering in terms of knowledge sharing and transfer is the role 
that the emotional dimension plays in a typical interaction of parties within a very particular 
context into which business develops in South America. Nichols and Stevens (1999, pp8-14) 
argues that in different degrees and in many different ways, listening ability is affected by our 
emotions. When someone says what we especially want to hear, we open our ears and may accept 
everything – truths, half-truths, or fiction. On the other hand, if we hear something that opposes 
our most deeply rooted prejudices, notions, convictions, our brains may become over-stimulated 
and tend to reject that piece of information by creating emotional filters.  
 
When the business environment mutates and shows little or no chance of being effectively 
anticipated, emotional filters seem to play its role in that Corridor member companies tend to 
                                                 
44 Rates that are assigned to a given contract to carry a specific number of containers during a certain period of time 
from the port/s of loading to the ports/s of discharge.  
45 Rates that have to be paid for running a ship on daily basis and for a specific period of time. 
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exchange both explicit and tacit knowledge in an almost desperate need to find an alternative 
action to consider countering any upcoming perceived business threats posed by the global 
economy. In order to avoid the growth of such emotional filters and to better deal with them, a 
proper understanding of the contextual culture and habits becomes essential. In this regard, it 
seems one may conclude that for letting tacit knowledge emerge and be exchanged in a Latin 
American environment, it may be necessary  not only to allocate more free time and to support 
occasional gatherings, lunches and dinners, but to also implement informal brokerage events to 
actively encourage people towards interacting and sharing knowledge . 
 
 This is where a sound understanding of the regional culture particulars becomes essential, as it 
often plays a key role in easing or impeding knowledge sharing and transfer. Furthermore, 
existing emotional filters as referred to by Nichols and Stevens (1999), tend to be neutralized by 
the ever-fluctuating South American business context which makes knowledge sharing and 
transfer flow easily and be regarded as a matter of survival when facing the effects of 
globalization.  In this sense we can see examples of continuance commitment driving affective 
commitment (Meyer and Allen, 1991) discussed earlier in Chapter 3 section 3.8.   
 
An element that turns out important to knowledge transfer and is directly related to the Corridor’s 
CoPs is what Burton-Jones (1999) describes as “sticky” knowledge and what Szulanski 2003) 
defines as its three constituting elements: absorptive capacity, causal ambiguity and the quality of 
relationship between providers and seekers of knowledge. Further to what was already described 
in the Chapter 3 section 3.7 about knowledge stickiness, it is useful to link this theoretical 
concept with some Corridor-related events that the author had the opportunity to witness when 
participating in the roundtables. 
 
Examples of sticky knowledge became evident during the shipping crisis46 which led to entire 
fleet rationalizations and the setting-up of highly complex vessel sharing agreements47 (VSA) 
                                                 
46 The regional shipping crisis took place in the late 90s owing to a growing overtonnage which resulted in an excess 
of supply along with a sharp fall in ocean freight levels further to continuous increase in the bunker prices. All this 
led shipping companies to reduce or “flag-out” part of their vessels while entering into joint-ventures and alliances 
with ex-competing firms to match the actual level of demand and better cope with their operational costs.    
47 Vessel sharing agreements were a more elaborated type of joint-venture agreement in which a third or even more 
parties could easily join should the other parties agree to. It also aimed to reduce operational costs and eventually 
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among the world’s largest firms. These agreements entailed a great deal of IT coordination to 
facilitate exchange of very specific and delicate knowledge possessed by a very limited number 
of people with highly technical backgrounds. These people had limited or no experience or 
practice of knowledge sharing or transfer (or even participating in team-work) with other firms 
executives participating in the Corridor engaged in collaboration and knowledge exchange. The 
difficulties encountered could be seen as a result of a lack of absorptive capacity of firms at the 
early stages of engagement in Corridor knowledge exchanges. 
 
Cohen and Levinthal (1990, p128) define absorptive capacity as the ability of a firm to recognize 
the value of new external information, assimilate it and use it for commercial ends. They contend 
that building absorptive capacity requires long exposure to experimentation, trial, error, reflecting 
on lessons learned, and seeking out information and knowledge both from within the organization 
as well as outside of it. However, two distinctions are needed here with respect the way the 
Corridor’s CoPs have dealt with it:  
? The context’s volatility and uncertainty along with its rapidly changing business 
conditions – mainly in Argentina and Brazil – did not adversely affect the roundtables and 
CoPs. On the contrary, and beating the most pessimistic forecasts, the Corridor CoPs 
played a fundamental role (in my experience when compared to traditional non-Corridor 
practice) by shortening knowledge transfer times and optimizing results from these 
interactions. Even though there was no room for long experimentation periods, the 
assimilation process proved to be a potential model for other CoPs worldwide. This 
process brought about a significant number of joint-ventures, alliances, partnerships, and 
commercial or operational agreements of varying magnitude and impact without producing 
major market disruptions. The pace of the economic and political changes in the region 
can be judged as the best teacher on timing issues relating to decision-making. It forced 
executives to absorb what they come across with at great speed – making the concept of 
knowledge stickiness a highly relevant factor. It is instructive to highlight the reputation 
held across the Americas of both Argentine and Brazilian financial managers to anticipate 
and successfully navigate through recurrent financial crises. Similarly, economists 
                                                                                                                                                              
lower the exit barriers. These type of agreements allowed some regional owners compete at international level by 
joining existing outer regional VSAs.  
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specialized in monetary systems from these two countries are also well reputed and sought 
worldwide. It seems that in their cases neither the lack of experimentation nor the 
possibility to assimilate information in due time (that one might well considered difficult 
to absorb) are impediments to a fast and effective knowledge sharing and transfer. 
Naturally, it seems to be the business context imposing its own rules of the game. Thus 
history and experience of coping with prolonged instances of business uncertainty and 
turbulence provided an impetus for developing high levels of absorptive capacity in facing 
the kinds of problems addressed by the Corridor’s activities.  
? The process of seeking out information is more related to outside the organization and very 
little to within the firm. The existing CoPs have given many firms the unique opportunity 
to search for information outside their own firms and in addition to within the group they 
belong to at the same time. This special circumstance encouraged and drove a great 
number of executives to share tacit knowledge and let knowledge seekers and providers 
interact in flexible structures allowing knowledge to emerge and increasing the likelihood 
of prompt access to and interaction with externalization sources of knowledge.    
 
Jewell and Walker (2004) argue that a consequence of poor absorptive capacity is often an 
inability to understand cause and effect loops leading to what Szulanski (2003) describes as 
causal ambiguity - the condition where people are not able to confidently make a cause an effect 
link and thus fully understand an issue. An example of the Corridor’s high absorptive capacity 
and low causal ambiguity is illustrated in the following table:  
 
Table 4.1:  Absorptive capacity example. 
PROBLEM                                     ACTION                                                      RESULT 
a) Wheat, corn, malt (Brazil) 
-  Wheat import restricted in         - Included wheat in the modeling of         - Lowered costs.  
    Espiritu Santo .                             port activities . 
-  Low storage capacity.               -  Attracted investments in new silos.       -  Increased storage  
-  High costs.                                -  Attracted trade lane Ghent-Vitoria             to 60.000 tons. 
-  Annual freight volumes of            for the distribution of Braham malts       -  Increased grain  
   150.000 tons per year.                  to the southeast region .                              throughput to  
                                                                                                                   900.000 tons/year. 
b) Port of Zarate (Argentina) 
 
-  Great dearth of knowledge of      - Investment opportunity in port             - Association    
   trade opportunities afforded by       terminal in Buenos Aires .                       Murchison-Cotia  
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   MERCOSUR on behalf of Corridor  
   inland dry ports. 
   Consortia and MERCOSUR        - Inland dry ports for vehicles                 - Investment in 2  
   countries                                          imports and exports .                              berths and 100.000  
                                                                                                                           square meters . 
-  Many opportunities if                  - Project driven Murchison-                    - New weekly                                                
   Information passed along           Cotia Trading between regions          service VIT-ZAR  
 
c) High costs of storage  
-  Large volumes of cargo               - Benefit/cost analysis of single          - Regulation permitting  
   imports through inland dry ports     payment only at inland dry port           issuance of customs                                       
.                                                                                                                         transit declaration 
 
-  Storage surcharges doubling                                                                     - Warehousing is only  
   costs                                                                                                               paid in the inland dry 
                                                                                                                          ports, whereas cargo            
                                                                                                                          is delivered in 4 hrs. 
-  Expansion of imports restricted                                                                       
   by high final costs . 
 
d) Energy shortage  
- Espírito Santo imports 80% of       -  Joint promotion with the                      -  Extension of  
  its energy                                            Government of Espiritu Santo                 pipeline                                                    
                                                              for gas distribution                                  serving 10 
                                                                                                                               business sectors 
                           
- Petrobras Oil Company is  
  deactivating its research              - Negotiation Petrobras/Government      -  Additional  
                                                                                                                           research resulting in the 
                                                                                                                              discovery of larger deposits 
                                                                                                                                 
e) Malt logistics  
- High costs of road haulage           - Create a new logistic system .                - Port Authority to  
                                                                                                                              build new rail link. 
- Long distances                              – Bring costs down  
                                                                                                                          - Transfer of highway  
- Freight costs impacting on            - CVRD proposed building a rail               cargo to rail cargo  
  manufacturing costs                          link 100 mts from access to malt 
                                                            silos inside port                                        - First transport of  
- Railroads without access to                                                                                 malt via rail . 
  malt within the port, prohibiting   - Forums brought together Brahma  
  modal systems to work                     and Skol breweries, CVRD railways, 
                                                            and the Espírito Santo Port Authority. 
 
Source : Boske, L.B. (2001). Maritime Transportation in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs. The University of Texas at Austin; Policy Research 
Project Report # 138 ; pp226-8 .  
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One of the reasons whereby the Corridor’s CoPs show a high absorptive capacity and low causal 
ambiguity from a knowledge sharing and transfer perspective, may be better explained by 
Livingston (1969:p85) when citing the scientific research undertaken by McClelland of Harvard 
University and Atkinson of the University of Michigan with respect to motivation (Atkinson, 
1957). The research he cited illustrates a bell-shaped curve of risk taking behavior showing the 
relationship between motivation and risk taking effort. The degree of motivation and risk taking 
effort rises until the expectancy of success reaches 50% then begins to fall (suggesting a 
satisficing motivation at that point) even though the expectancy of success continues to increase. 
 
By looking at the Corridor’s roundtables and bearing in mind the context into which these are 
immersed (where business conditions mutate both rapidly and frequently and therefore are highly 
charged with risk and uncertainty) it is not surprising that either success or failure arrives in such 
a short period of time that it allocates no physical time to let CoPs’ members get either too 
excited or somehow indifferent as to produce a sharp fall in the motivation curve. The above 
suggests that the speed at which events take place does not allow motivation to fall, but on the 
contrary, to be always at or near the peak of the bell-curve. This is because the accomplishment 
of certain types of goals mostly involves a matter of survival. Once these goals have been 
attained then it comes a process concerning the way these firms can adjust and position their 
relative services with respect to the way they will face the new market structure by tackling one 
or various of the following strategies where motivation most likely conforms to a new bell-
shaped curve.  
 
Table 4. 2: Alternative strategies 
STRATEGY                                  DEFINITION                             KNOWLEDGE    
            APPLICATION 
 
Forward integration               Gaining ownership or increased         Sharing / Transfer 
                                               control over distributors or                 (exporters / railways/  
                                               retailers                                                shipowners) 
 
Backward integration             Seeking ownership or increased         Sharing / Transfer 
                                               control on a firm’s suppliers               (airline operators / 
                                                                                                             ports / third-party 
                                                                                                             logistics / shipyards / 
                                                                                                             containers builders)  
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Horizontal integration             Seeking ownership or increased          Sharing / Transfer 
                                                 control over competitors                      (alliances / joint-                  
                                                                                                               ventures / VSA ) 
 
Market penetration                  Seeking increased market share            Sharing 
                                                 through greater marketing efforts         (shipping / barging / 
                                                                                                                railways / truckers/ 
                                                                                                                airlines / airports / 
                                                                                                                ocean terminals / 
                                                                                                                 insurers / bankers /                     
                                                                                                                 ship-building and 
                                                                                                                 repairs) 
 
Market development               Introducing present services and            Sharing / Transfer 
                                                products into new geographic areas       (shipping /railways/ 
                                                                                                                airlines / exporters / 
                                                                                                                importers / brokers) 
 
Product development            Seeking increased sales by improving       Sharing 
                                              present products or services or develop-   (logistic operators / 
                                              -ing new ones .                                            exporters /    
                                                                                                                   importers/    
                                                                                                                   bankers / ship- 
                                                                                                                   building) 
 
Concentric diversification      Adding new but related services                Sharing 
                                                                                                                   (shipowners /  
                                                                                                                    railways /  
                                                                                                                    customs 
                                                                                                                    brokers / coastal           
                                       
 Horizontal diversification       Adding new, unrelated services for          Sharing 
                                                present customers                                       (third-party  
                                                                                                                     logistics) 
 
Retrenchment                          Regrouping through cost and asset            Sharing 
                                                 reduction to reverse declining sales           (shipowners /  
                                                 and profit                                                    truckers /  
                                                                                                                     airlines /  
                                                                                                                     railways  
                                                                                                                     exp-imp / ship- 
                                                                                                                     building and   
                                                                                                                     repairs) 
                                                                                                                     feeders / ports) 
 
Divestiture                              Selling a division or part of an                   Sharing /Transfer 
                                                organization                                                (shipping / ports/  
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                                                                                                                      barging /            
                                                                                                                      trucking /             
                                                                                                                      warehousing /  
                                                                                                                      surveying ) 
 
Liquidation                            Selling of all company’s assets, in parts,   Sharing /Transfer 
                                               for their tangible worth                               (barge operators / 
                                                                                                                     railways /  
                                                                                                                     shipping /   
                                                                                                                     trucking /freight 
                                                                                                                     forwarders /  
                                                                                                                     brokers  
     
Source : adapted from David, (2003). Strategic Management Concepts; Prentice Hall 9th edition, 
New Jersey ; p161. 
 
Table 4.2 suggests to me, given my experience in this logistics field, that even though knowledge 
sharing occurs throughout every and all of the mentioned strategies, knowledge transfer only 
takes place every time a vertical integration possibility opens up, a market development chance 
becomes real, or every time a company take over assets sale take place. Every time a tangible 
advantage presents itself for both parties, then strategic information barriers tend to vanish and 
lead to a fluid knowledge transfer (e.g. mergers and acquisitions). Knowledge transfer has proved 
being an essential element or a process enabler for letting alliances and joint-ventures 
successfully evolve in some sort of vertical or horizontal integration, as well as to foster mergers 
and acquisitions which helped regional firms either facing the effects of globalization or just 
benefiting from it by selling off and give up the logistics market. 
 
The role that mentoring between participants may play in a Corridor-like organization with 
respect to becoming a knowledge transfer facilitator is important. Davenport and Prusak (2000, 
p95) suggests that tacit knowledge transfer requires extensive personal contact in the form of a 
partnership, a mentoring or an apprenticeship and that such a relationship entails transferring 
various kinds of knowledge, from explicit to tacit. Mentoring also has a link with leadership 
whereas the latter is essential to let a CoP be an effective knowledge management vehicle.  
 
 Zaleznik (1998, p62) argues that mentor relationships are crucial to the development of 
leadership personalities, but in large, bureaucratic organizations, such relationships are not 
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encouraged. He further argues that working in one-to-one relationships - where is a formal and 
recognized difference in the power of the players - requires a great deal of tolerance for engaging 
in any emotional interchange. This helps explain one of the most common causes considered by 
executives in avoiding committing in such practices. Further, as explained in Chapter 3 section 
3.8, culture, and power distance in particular, influences the nature of such interactions.    
 
This mentoring process did not happen at the Corridor without first incorporating a gradual 
transformation process from formality to informality between working groups and CoPs. At the 
outset, while individuals within companies began to get to know each other and start to build trust 
and reasonable working and human relationships to let tacit knowledge flow, the forums merely 
resembled working teams of a very formal and structured nature. However, with the passing of 
time and with the reinforcement of a threatening business context approaching the region (where 
rules and variables often tended to shift drastically) such working teams’ formality tended to 
gradually mutate to bring about – in many cases – voluntary and spontaneous CoPs aiming at 
exchanging and transferring knowledge on very critical issues and in a rather informal fashion. 
Examples of the context they worked in include: a business macro-environment of 40% 
devaluation; capital concentration on the railway sector; heterogeneity in the regional customs 
procedures; raising rate of cargo claims; new tax regimes on shipbuilding and ship-repairing; 
Central Bank restrictions on overseas money transfers; and double currency accounting 
legislation required for foreign firms.. 
 
Skyrme (1999) refers to seven steps companies have to follow to secure strategic advantage from 
a knowledge perspective: 
1. Customer knowledge; 
2. Knowledge in products and services; 
3. Knowledge in people; 
4. Knowledge in process;  
5. Organizational memory; 
6. Knowledge in relationship; and   
7. Knowledge assets  
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From the above points, I argue that there seemed to be little doubt that the forum roundtables 
around the region fulfilled at least 6 of the above recommendations, though attaining strategic 
advantage will always be conditioned - to a great extent – to the business environment or the 
accuracy with which business trends could be anticipated. Knowledge in customers, products and 
services, people and processes, relationships and assets can be said to smoothly flow in the 
forums every time the roundtables were held. Organizational memory, however, intends to adapt 
to better process the information in a way that helps avoid overloading the system with 
information of relative low value. Access to organizational memory is neither free nor equal, but 
remains restricted and conditioned to the level of participation and interest of the members.  
 
It can be argued that the richer the tacit knowledge becomes, the more technology should be used 
to enable people to share that knowledge directly – which creates a sort of interdependency 
between what is been sustained so far with respect to face-to-face interaction and the utilization 
of a technology platform to facilitate the set-up of a knowledge market  In this regard, the 
Corridor’s on-going intranet system linking the many forums at regional level plays a key role in 
facilitating codifying and disseminating knowledge for all those knowledge seekers who intend 
finding useful guidelines to deal with specific problems. However, face-to-face contact in the 
forums remains as the triggering factor for knowledge sharing to occur, technology being a 
valuable knowledge sharing and transfer enhancer but of secondary importance.   
 
An efficient knowledge sharing and transfer system seemed to need to consider a number of 
factors (both technical and cultural-related) if an appropriate system design is aimed for. These 
include a dynamic face-to-face interaction / a suitable technological platform / assessing the 
actual absorptive capacity and causal ambiguity dimension / measuring the stickiness of 
knowledge and identifying the potential emotional filters / having a good picture of what the 
triggering factors are as well as the existing motivational level, etc. However, none of these 
variables would display coherent or cohesive results without the existence of a truly cooperative 
spirit among the participants – which according to what it has been developed so far seems to be 
very much driven, or perhaps imposed by, a critical regional business environment  i.e. economic 
triggering motivational factors. The next section will more deeply explore the concepts of 
cooperation and collaboration in an intent to help the reader better comprehend the extent to 
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which these two concepts are of paramount importance in shortening the time to let knowledge 
emerge and spread out to generate innovative outcomes.      
 
4.3 – COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE THROUGH COLLABORATION AND 
COOPERATION  
This chapter argues that face-to-face interaction seems to be of paramount importance in the 
emergence of knowledge sharing and transfer. It also argues that associated technology should 
enable or facilitate knowledge transfer rather than be a system upon which the entire concept of 
knowledge management should be based. However, there is an active role played by this 
technology that goes well beyond the concept of knowledge sharing and transfer. Such a role has 
to do with the very reasons by which companies become global and engage themselves in 
achieving larger economies of scale and broader market coverage.  
 
This important technology driver that relates to the competitive advantage role of technology 
rather than just facilitating knowledge management will now be discussed in detail. Schlier, 
Hunter, Harris & Berg (1998) argue that information systems executives and professionals that 
understand the business drivers of technology demand will be asked to participate in enterprise 
planning and will be expected not only to align technology investments with enterprise strategy, 
but also to help enterprise business leadership understand how to use technology to align the 
enterprise within a dynamic marketplace. They further argue that the emerging global economy 
will be a major driver of enterprise strategy formulation and technology application in the years 
to come. Equally so, improvements in technology, combined with dramatic changes in 
geopolitical economics, have been major drivers of the globalization of competition. Such a 
globalization process (as discussed in Chapter 3 section 3.2) along with the development of 
technologies in its broad sense may be regarded as a prime triggering concept toward regional 
cooperation and collaboration.  
 
In the opinion of Schlier et al. (1998) there are a number of foundation technologies that have 
most affected the globalization of competition: 
? Engineering; 
? Materials; 
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? Manufacturing;  
? Transportation; 
? Information; 
? Communications; and 
? Entertainment. 
 
Transportation, information, and communication technologies seem to have played a crucial role 
in transforming the MERCOSUR region by granting a number of big firms the needed 
technological means to enlarge their geographical reach. The deployment of their resources 
throughout a less technologically advanced region gave them a strategic advantage that 
automatically brought about a defensive reaction in the form of the Corridor. It has been argued 
in this thesis in Chapter 3 that technological improvements have combined with political and 
economic factors to drive the global economy and lead to changes in both politics and economics. 
These changes opened up significant market enlargement opportunities in a number of forms: 
o Changing political and economic models; 
o International currency agreements; 
o More liberal regional trade agreements; 
o Patent and copyright agreements; 
o The changing role of government; 
o Reduced economic risk; 
o Reduced political risk; and 
o Reduced business risk. 
 
Typically, the economic, political and business risk of an already risky and unstable region 
(MERCOSUR) turned out to be of a lesser relative significance than the risk comprised in the 
corporate decision to remain active in more stable markets instead of operating in South America. 
Not having presence in South America would have meant for some of the larger world players 
simply loosing ground in their struggle for enlarging economies of scale and gaining competitive 
advantage. Therefore, it may be argued that the lowering of entry barriers in South America acted 
both as an opportunity for the global players to become even more global (though it seems this 
was not an optional choice for them to select but that it became a vital one to maintain a low 
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global cost base) and a strategic avenue for some regional players to also expand their services 
and lower their cost base while acquiring knowledge.   
 
Porter (1990) highlights the central role a home nation plays in a firm’s international success (as 
discussed in depth in Chapter 3 section 3.2). His argument helps make sense of the steps taken by 
a number of maritime nations’ shipping companies that expanded globally until reaching the 
MERCOSUR coasts. These include Denmark’s Maersk and Lauritzen, Norway’s Gearbulk, 
England’s P&O, Germany’s Hamburg Sud, or Holland’s Nedlloyd. However favorable the 
national circumstances may be, success is not ensured. Global competitive advantage results from 
an effective combination of both national conditions and company strategy even when conditions 
in a nation may create an environment in which firms can achieve this advantage. Porter (1990 
pp578-84) enumerates a number of competitive advantage triggering factors as explained in 
depth in Chapter 3 Section 3.3, that I expand upon below as it relates to the MERCOSUR: 
? Competitive advantage grows out of improvement, innovation, and change: innovation 
leads to competitive advantage when a firm perceives an entirely new buyer need or serves 
a market segment that others have overlooked. This may be the case of America’s river 
operator Crowley that positioned its state-of-the art river tugboats and river container ships 
to operate in the Parana-Paraguay waterways linking four South American countries in a 
way that no other had tried before. Here, a competitive edge was given by improvement, 
innovation and change through service speed, use of navigational equipment and cargo 
tracing devices, and financial standing. Another example is England’s P&O container 
terminal in Buenos Aires which became South America’s most modern facility (after 
overcoming an endless list of both institutional and operational barriers) and a model to 
imitate at regional basis. Typically, load and discharging speed, storage facilities, 
advanced cargo tracing equipment, and modern multimodal transportation systems 
imposed a remarkable competitive advantage in a segment where outdated and inefficient 
competitors previously prevailed. Brazil’s ALL introducing the double-stack concepts in 
their railway wagons that also imposed a technological and service innovation that brought 
about competitive advantage into the market. These two last cases clearly brought 
operational improvements, managerial innovation, and change in the way their respective 
markets started to be serviced.  
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? Competitive advantage involves the entire value system: it entails the participation of an 
entire array of activities connected with the various logistic segments (ocean transportation 
/ river transportation / port terminals / air-cargo operations / railways / trucking companies 
/ warehousing and distribution / surveying / crating / ship-building / logistic firms / 
ancillary activities). Value chains tended to mutate rapidly and either adjust to the needs 
imposed by the new global players across the MERCOSUR, or to reorganize through 
cooperation and collaboration to better cope with the concepts of improvement, innovation 
and change coming from overseas. Corridor members’ value chain combinations were of 
paramount importance in helping these firms adopt a defensive strategy before a 
threatening scenario dominated by larger economies of scale, more advanced technology, 
superior financial capability, and innovative management. All these concepts were 
imported from the global firms’ home base which tended to reorganize and adapt to 
regional needs. 
? Competitive advantage is sustained only through relentless improvement: unless protected 
by national legislation (an issue that is no longer existent within the Corridor scope of 
activities) so that firms that remain a stationary target are eventually overtaken by rivals. 
Permanent improvement was neither necessary nor imposed by a given market phenomena 
prior to the arrival of the global players in search of enlarging economies of scale and 
market expansion. Pressure for more and sustainable improvement was a byproduct that 
emerged as a consequence of the global players positioning their services and setting up 
their systems in a region where both, technology and service, had plenty of scope to 
outperform regional players’ practices. These services ranged from coastal shipping to air-
freighting and port operations and involved the world’s largest firms by segment.  
? Sustaining advantage demands that its sources be upgraded: foreign competitors can 
imitate procedures and acquire the needed technology or make use of the necessary 
facilities to successfully gain regional market share within the MERCOSUR. Operational 
costs or logistic designs can be easily replicated and even upgraded once suitable market 
information becomes available. Even regional well reputed brand names, can be easily 
surpassed by global brand names that become rapidly known in the regional market. 
Further to this, and despite knowledge is supposed to remain in the minds of the holders, 
traditional knowledge could also be hired and grabbed form the regional firms to the 
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advantage of the newcomer global players. Global firms like Maersk, NLL, P&O, Sea-
Land, Evergreen, COSCO, APL, NYK, Hutchinson, and many others, tried first to gather 
all the available market information to later scan the market to capture whatever traditional 
knowledge they deemed it necessary. Naturally, the objective was to facilitate their 
entrance to a new market by shortening their induction time. This was possibly the most 
significant triggering element toward the enhancement of collaboration and cooperation 
amongst the many Corridor members.  
? Sustaining advantage requires a global approach to strategy entails coordinating and 
integrating functions on a worldwide basis in order to: gain economies of scale or learning; 
enjoy the benefits of a consistent brand reputation; and serve international customers. All 
these concepts drive regional firms to unite and seek a joint strategy that helps them face 
an overwhelming business context in order to restructure or redirect both their individual 
and joint competitive advantage profiles. Typically, home base strengths were mainly 
represented by utilized technology, carrying capacity, global customer base, financial 
back-up, global supply chain, and organizational advantage.  
 
It becomes apparent that in view of the above named competitive advantage-related topics, the 
Corridor was urged to reorganize and its members to quickly adopt a number of defensive 
strategies. These were taken step by step, and on a gradual but steady basis, leading to an 
evolving state of business cooperation and information exchange collaboration. Such a 
participative or open-minded corporate attitude was not born per se, but was grounded by a 
number of topics that became the Corridor’s objectives to be attained in the short run. These can 
be summarized as follows. 
? Reducing transaction costs: It became essential for shipping firms to achieve lower port 
handling fares and terminal costs in order to successfully match those of the global 
players. Lower ramp services and distribution costs were also key variables for regional 
air-cargo carriers to achieve to remain competitive with those of the global airlines which 
deployed more frequent services and greater carrying capacity. Railway operators had to 
increase their rolling stock and upgrade their storage and door-to-door delivery facilities to 
compete with the barging operators while at the same time reducing their operational 
expenses by complementing the global shipping companies’ inland transportation 
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necessities. Coastal feeders had to both rationalize and join their fleets in order to lower 
their ports costs to compete with main liner calls that were disputing their market 
segments. Container trucking firms also had to upgrade their assets and join fleets and 
management to better procure their diesel supplies and spare parts to be able to cope with 
both the global and recently reengineered regional ship-owners and the global outsourcing 
ocean carriers’ lower relative pricing. Railway and port terminal operators were also 
similarly affected. Cooperation and collaboration in terms of supply chains, cost matrixes, 
operational management, and utilized technology became strategic issues to reducing costs 
and face globalization. 
? Obtaining greater volume and presence by reaching agreements with suppliers, 
competitors, and customers: As detailed in Chapter 3 Section 3.3, the global threat 
triggered both cooperation and collaboration to emerge as well as regional rivalry decline. 
Those who in the past were regarded as long time rivals became today’s strategic allies. 
These allies came from suppliers and competitors alike, and found a number of examples 
of strong customers of regional reach too, who viewed themselves threatened by an 
aggressive and global competitive shipping that could facilitate their foreign competitors 
make use of their global contracts to effectively reach distant markets. Achieving larger 
economies of scale by entering joint-ventures and alliances through cooperation and 
collaboration would allow these firms increasing their bargaining power while 
rationalizing their assets. Similarly, cooperation between suppliers and customers became 
of outmost importance in their struggle to adapt to a new volume and cost-based scenario. 
? Seeking efficiency in particular strategically significant activities: Cooperation and 
collaboration resulted in market segmentation where achieving a high level of 
specialization would lead to gain competitive advantage and consequently raise higher 
relative entry barriers. Coastal feeding services between Santos and a series of 
northeastern Brazilian ports, for example, involved both long distances and a high 
customer loyalty and proud with respect to national carriers. Other examples illustrate this 
environment. Buenos Aires up-river navigation up to distant Paraguayan and Bolivian 
ports involved complex operations and high levels of distrust towards foreign operators. 
Coastal feeding patterns between remote Patagonian ports resulted in high value for 
customer-carrier loyalty and trust in local-based operators. Provincial ground 
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transportation cooperatives turned out to be unsurpassable with respect to their market 
influence area. These are examples of a specialization effect through attaining operational 
efficiency from cooperation and collaboration in those segments. These also tended to 
result in high entry barriers that dissuaded the global players to enter these markets. 
Collaboration and cooperation amongst the various operators brought about a better 
market coverage at regional level. It also made gaining market knowledge a difficult 
commodity to imitate or acquire for those outside the collaborating participants. 
? Utilization of partner’s assets: Rationalization was perhaps the most important and first 
evident outcome of the cooperation and collaboration process undertaken by the Corridor 
members. No matter which involved segment is considered, it enabled logistic operators to 
dispose of their older and less efficient assets and share their most modern and less costly 
assets with their new partners. The assets to remain in service generally led to deploying 
higher service frequency, faster load/unload operations, more adequate speed/consumption 
ratios, more balanced tonnage supply with the present and projected demand, and a more 
efficient management of a wide array of operational assets resulting in reduced running 
costs. This process brought about a general upgrade of the regional logistic operators 
through cooperation and collaboration as well as adjusting their physical means in a more 
realistic manner to reach actual market potential. Thus, while the competitive threat of the 
entry of global players was acknowledged, it was going to prove being more lengthy and 
costly to those global players than at first appears apparent. 
 
 Corridor members, through their cooperation and collaboration, professionally and more 
efficiently coped with the arrival of global players and their larger economies of scale. The 
Corridor market logic also proved to be a valid strategy to dissuade some of these global firms to 
expand even further into some provincial or inland market niches. When the global operators 
decided not to enter a given secondary or provincial market, a new way to face the market 
became evident. Larger operators now had to deal with a solid group of logistic providers to 
outsource their needs rather than use a number of isolated or disbanded companies they would 
have expected to find prior to the formation of these players joining the Corridor.  
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In this particular situation, rationalization and regrouping of firms through cooperation and 
collaboration proved to be a very powerful set of tools to offset the influence of the global 
players. This also resulted in their helping to improve local logistic market business prospects 
through being more efficient and allowing new business opportunities emerge. This new current 
of business opportunities actually arose out of the global capacity of the global players to achieve 
larger economies of scale and therefore lower operational costs producing conditions that tended 
to foster imports and allowed some export products to reach distantly located destinations that 
otherwise would have not be feasible owing to previously higher relative ocean freight rates or air 
fares. Thus the transformations triggered by the Corridor’s actions in response to the business 
context seemed to instigate greater trade and economic activity.  
 
Consequently, the global players were dissuaded to step in the relatively smaller volume 
provincial or local markets whereas in the larger and more voluminous and perhaps anonymous 
markets, the regional operators saw themselves compelled to restructure the available assets and 
upgrade their on-going managerial concepts. The barriers that naturally arose out of the 
cooperation process helped build a stronger competitive advantage amongst the Corridor 
members by enhancing specific knowledge, relating to competitive advantage issues, increasing 
bargaining power, incorporating allies within the value chain, enlarging economies of scale, and 
improving both the utilized of technology and existing managerial capacity to effectively react to 
the business environment. This has been a naturally evolving case for some distant provincial or 
local markets where the global players experienced higher relative entry barriers and where 
outsourcing proved to be more reasonable because of the above mentioned reasons.  
 
The main Latin American markets however (e.g. Buenos Aires, Santos, Sao Paulo, Rio do 
Janeiro, Valparaiso, Santiago) had lower relative entry barriers and were more susceptible to 
allow external larger economies of scale and greater competitive advantage that favored those 
who were ready to deploy their global player advantage. In this case, regrouping around the 
Corridor, together with a decisive willingness to cooperate and collaborate within a wide 
spectrum of corporate topics that the Corridor offered, proved to be not as efficient or fast track-
oriented as was the case with the provincial or local market examples. This is because  trading 
volumes were not large, local operators showed more unity, and traditional knowledge was 
 148
definitely a factor that was unlikely to be readily imitated. Consequently, these global players 
were more difficult to persuade to enter a market place where the relatively smaller provincial or 
local markets volume existed. 
 
Regional operators, however, saw themselves compelled to restructure their available assets in 
their larger and more voluminous, and perhaps anonymous, markets and to upgrade their on-
going managerial strategy and attitudes to rivalry and knowledge, and reshape an entire market to 
better cope with the global firms. In other words, this group had to reengineer their business 
through cooperation and collaboration though in a relatively slower path when compared to the 
provincial firms who already knew each other thus enabling trust to spread out more rapidly. This 
illustrates an interesting tension between the more global-centric large centers and the more 
regional centers where different dynamics and business imperatives prevailed and so different 
responses and rates of adoption of Corridor possibilities were evident.  
 
An explosion of business opportunities became viable as a result of the Corridor concept that 
permitted the formation of a plethora of alliances and collaborations of various forms. This 
resulted in:  
• customs brokerage firms expanding into the freight forwarding business with the intention 
to gain control over cargo routing; freight forwarding companies and logistic operators 
opening customs brokerage departments as a way to provide more integral services which 
otherwise would turn them vulnerable to loose to the more integrated global firms;  
• ship-owning firms disposing of their contracted shipping agencies and establishing their 
own shipping agencies to reduce costs and become more efficient by gaining control over 
their supply chain;  
• shipping agencies regrouping and offering new or additional logistic-related services as a 
way to face both the new trend of the regional shipping firms and the global impact 
exerted by much larger firms; regional port terminals expanding into the door delivery 
services business ( delivery from supplier to end customer) and added cargo-tracing 
technological devices to better tracked what items they knew global terminals were 
bringing from their home base and worldwide operations;  
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• regional port terminals reengineering themselves to specialize in a given segment rather 
than trying to embrace various segments simultaneously;  
• shipyards tending to specialize in those segments where they not only could show 
comparative strengths but also where they might benefit from supplying the global 
players’ needs in terms of new-buildings and naval repairs; and  
• state and municipal governments realizing that they had a tremendous opportunity to 
become the preferred location for either regional distribution services or road transit 
purposes before both the regional reengineered group of companies and the global 
newcomers who were interested to expand their services through the identification of 
suitable bi-oceanic land-bridges48 and inland nodal connections49.   
 
None of the above would have been feasible without a thorough understanding of global trends to 
enable the correct interpretation of the business context, as well as the willingness on the part of 
the great majority of the national and regional players to remain in business. It seems to be clear 
that the globalization process challenged what used to be a rather protected and isolated regional 
market and that it was precisely this threatening scenario that actually acted as a triggering 
toward setting up the Corridor. However, it also becomes apparent that none of the above had 
been possible either, if cooperation and collaboration would have been restricted somehow or not 
fully developed amongst all the Corridor members. It is important to understand the order in 
which the events took place (globalization > context interpretation > internalization > grouping 
>cooperation/collaboration) and the way cooperation and collaboration led knowledge sharing to 
emerge and later be transferred.  
 
This process was not born just because it was the culture of the regional companies to become 
better and more efficient, but that a global threat was the real cause that was challenging the very 
existence of their businesses. However, and as it will be explained in the coming section and 
chapters, such a process produced an interesting variety of value chain interactions which through 
                                                 
48 A bi-oceanic land-bridge is a transportation corridor linking two locations lying on different oceans. Typically, the 
Corridor grouped companies that were engaged in the transportation between Buenos Aires on the Atlantic and 
Valparaiso on the Pacific. Similarly, Puerto Montt on the Pacific and Puerto Madryn on the Atlantic in the 
Patagonian region.  
49 A nodal point or connection is a inland depot where cargoes coming from a large are of influence are gathered, 
classified and re-routed to its final destination. Typically, this set-up counts on all the needed handling equipment, 
infrastructure, and customs clearance facilities.  
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cooperation and collaboration brought about not only a much more refined regional logistic 
marketplace, but also presented an invaluable opportunity for some national and regional players 
to become truly global firms. 
 
Consequently, it can be argued that the globalization process was not only a strong action leading 
to a strong regional defensive reaction, but also it opened up a new business opportunity for a 
number of regional firms to become more international by entering in joint-ventures and global 
alliances. This would not otherwise have turned out to be possible in view of the region’s 
business, geographical, historical and cultural structural limitations.       
 
4.4 - THE CORRIDOR AS A VALUE CHAIN 
Vertical integration, both forward and backward, relies upon many valuable examples among the 
Corridor members’ value chains. As it has been earlier explained in this chapter and in Chapter 3 
section 3.3, this has been the outcome or a reaction of these firms’ necessity to gain competitive 
advantage as a way to face much larger and resourceful global competitors. These global 
newcomers managed to bring down the existing entry barriers to a South American market in 
view of their more advanced technology, worldwide customer base and larger economies of 
scale. Most, if not all, newcomers had already gone through a vertical integration processes at 
home that tended to upgrade their competitive profile long before the Corridor was established. 
Many of them have gone through horizontal integration processes too50. 
 
This meant that these global players (e.g. shipping companies / ocean port terminals / ship-
building and naval repair yards / NVOCC51 / air-cargo liners / barge operators / chartering 
brokers / insurance firms / legal consultancy firms / ground transportation and distribution firms 
had already gone through the process of value chain interaction leading to a more generally 
competitive industry. This process brought about a steady path of vertical integration (backward 
and forward) that tended to strengthen out those functions that were wrong within their value 
                                                 
50 Typically, mergers and acquisitions in the ocean shipping, port terminal, and air-cargo businesses along with their 
respective inland distribution services. 
51 NVOCC: Non-vessel Operator Common Carrier means a company holding a given volume of business (cargoes) 
that charters from a ship-owning company part of its carrying capacity. 
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chains, whereas the south American market remained somehow dormant or  protected by bilateral 
treaties and restrictive national and regional legislation.   
 
It is useful to refer to Porter’s (1985, pp278-87) sources of global competitive advantage and 
impediments to global competition to better visualize the differences in terms of operational 
capacity and market scope between the global firms and the regional companies. These gaps 
became evident at the outset of the logistics globalization process when the regional players saw 
themselves compelled to face the more resourceful and technologically advanced global firms 
within their own territory or market domains in South America. This can probably be regarded as 
the triggering factor by which the Corridor. In broad terms, it became a need within the region as 
a forum to consider value chain interactions through knowledge sharing and transfer.    
 
As discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 section 3.3, Porter (1985) distinguishes between sources 
and impediments to global competition. The former highlights the causes by which a company 
can become truly global, while the latter refers to the main reasons why a firm may find it 
extremely difficult to overcome barriers to go beyond its national or regional market. Naturally, 
the first group embraces the global companies whereas the second group refers to the firms 
operating within the MERCOSUR region. Porter’s (1985) sources of competitive advantage are 
illustrated in the following examples that summarize the essence of the intent of the Corridor to 
be a unique model of a program of works or portfolio of projects that respond to an urgent and 
regional need: 
1. Comparative Advantage: When a country or countries count on significant advantages 
in factor cost or factor quality, these countries will most likely be the sites of production 
and exports. Put in logistic terms, there is a significant comparative advantage in those 
ocean transportation companies that at home have developed a remarkable track record 
both from a cost and quality perspective. Denmark-based AP Moller (Maersk) is 
possibly the world’s largest full-container shipping line that originally based its strength 
on both an old country shipping tradition and being a country geographically located in 
the heart of large European trade currents. This company has sustained a progressive 
vertical integration of both suppliers (backwards) and logistic distributors (forward) up 
to completing its entire value chain. Shipyards; container manufacturing; off-shore oil 
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rigs; supply vessels; freight-forwarding companies; air-cargo freighters; insurance 
firms; university; ground transportation; ocean port terminals. A similar example is 
represented by Taiwan-based Evergreen. This is the world’s second largest full-
container shipping fleet that originally built its strength on its country’s highly open 
economy that enabled it to develop growing cargo volumes that formed part of the very 
essence of Taiwan’s success in world trading. These two firms first developed on local 
and regional basis driven by both their countries and respective regions growing trade 
flows and later expand into the global market. Germany-based Hapag Lloyd is also one 
of the largest full-container shipping lines that grew through its home country’s 
worldwide export and import potential. This firm’s integration finds more correlation 
with commercial activities such as freight-forwarding and brokerage activities; ground 
transportation and distribution; air traveling business, as well as river transportation. 
Mexico-based TMM is Latin America’s largest full-container company whose vertical 
integration is mainly represented by two large railway companies across the USA and 
port terminals in Mexico and abroad– where large volumes of cargo have to be carried 
within the NAFTA52 region. Hong-Kong based Hutchinson is one of the world’s largest 
port terminal operators with a great number of port terminals around the world. This 
firm grew larger and larger by taking advantage from its very home base where large 
volumes of cargo flowing in and out of the island shaped the ideal location to initiate 
this long learning process that later expanded worldwide. 
2. Economies of Scale: All the above mentioned companies as extended their respective 
economies of scale well beyond the size of their respective national and regional 
markets. This process was facilitated by the internationalization process a great number 
of national shippers went through as a consequence of seeing also themselves in the 
strategic necessity to expand internationally and enlarge economies of scale. Examples 
abound. England-based P&O acquired Holland-based Nedlloyd and expanded 
dramatically its scope of operations and cost base; Denmark-based Maersk acquired 
USA-based Sea-Land achieving an even deeper share in the American market to later 
also take over P&O; Canada-based CP Ships acquired US-based Lykes to better cope 
with the NAFTA region though it later became part of Hapag Lloyd that acquired both 
                                                 
52 NAFTA: North American Free Trade Association ; it includes Mexico, United States and Canada. 
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firms; Germany-based Hamburg Sud bought Brazil-based Alianca to exert certain 
dominance around South America; Brazil-based railway operator ALL also acquired 
two large Argentinean railways as a way to integrate the two largest regional economies 
under a single business unit.  Not only vertical integration was a factor in all these but 
also horizontal integration played a fundamental role in making a number of companies 
doubling their economies of scale overnight and therefore posing a major threat to a 
region unable to react accordingly. Expanding market reach, was a priority for these 
large firms as well as a tangible threat for a number of companies that had great 
difficulty in matching the global players’ costs and service level.  
3. Global Experience: Logistics means mobilization of resources and consequently the 
global experience in logistics represents the cumulative and comparative experience 
coming from a great number of markets or countries where a firm operates. A regular 
shipping line may embrace twenty or thirty countries displaying unique trading, 
operating and cultural particulars. Unlike exporting multinationals whose main business 
consists of exporting to a great number of countries from a few strategically located 
plants, shipping multinationals have to have both a headquarter in its home country and 
a great number of branches in all those ports their vessels call at. Here, global 
experience becomes vital in gaining competitive advantage as it brings tremendous 
managerial flexibility for these large firms to adopt the on-going regional modalities and 
to adapt their resources accordingly to what is specifically needed in every particular 
country or market. 
4. Logistical Economies of Scale: Supplying many national markets often means that fixed 
costs can be spread and variable costs can be reduced in view of expanding carried 
tonnages which otherwise would tend to remain on the high side. Having a sound 
container fleet administration is often considered a healthy practice in the container 
shipping business while counting on large economies of scale sets a significant cost 
difference. Global companies tend to engage in long term volume-based container 
leasing agreements where the leasing cost per unit tends to be significantly lower than 
that of the regional carriers – who in view of their smaller relative volume and limited 
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geographical scope become uncompetitive. Trailers and low boys53 are to a great extent 
hired from specialized firms that offer their equipment at the main ports of entry. Thus, 
those enjoying the larger volumes and tonnages will be the ones setting a favorable cost 
advantage. Once it becomes part of the pricing formation process it becomes very 
unlikely for the regional company to effectively compete, unless they also engage in 
vertical integration to enlarge economies of scale and deepen their competitive profile.  
5. Marketing Economies of Scale: Counting on a global customer base is probably one of 
the main marketing advantages the global firms may count on as it provides them with 
an available critical mass right after having entered a new market. Furthermore, 
showing some degree of vertical integration makes it more possible for these global 
players to target a specific type of account that need a wider scope of geographical 
reach to expand their exports. This is been the case of those regional exporters having a 
significant output volume that prioritized the utilization of the global carriers in view of 
their lower cost base (which translated into lower ocean freight rates) and wider 
geographical reach (e.g. ARCOR’s confectionary / SANCOR’s dairy products  / 
Odebrecht’s construction machinery  / PETROBRAS’s oil and gas upstream and 
downstream / TECHINT’s pipes). By means of the utilization of two and even three 
ports of transshipment and a lower relative slot cost (only possible through very large 
economies of scale) shippers could successfully reach distant markets for their exports 
and supplies, which otherwise would have been too costly and therefore unviable. The 
use of more modern technology also set a difference in the port terminal business in that 
the loading and unloading speeds, storage utilization, berth length throughput, transfer 
productivity and other indicators tended to keep the port’s net occupancy rate (NOR)54 
at a reduced level. Thus, vessel rotation resulted in faster cargo turnaround and port 
costs tended to diminish. Naturally, the global carriers were the preferred customers for 
the global port operators in view of their faster operations deployed during the loading 
and unloading operations were generally a more efficient operation.  
                                                 
53 Low-boy is a special truck that allows carrying extra-dimensional cargoes in accordance with the on-going road 
transportation legislation in most of the countries.  
54 The Net Occupation Rate is defined by the period of time between a vessel commences unloading operations until 
she completes the loading operations.  
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6. Economies of Scale in Purchasing: The global operators, no matter what segment they 
operate in, enjoy a number of competitive advantages that the regional ones lack. These 
advantages are represented by what is possibly the most strategic input (Fuel Oil) and 
the second most important (the charter market)55. As well as bunkering and hiring of 
vessels, other inputs become essential and set a cost difference in favor of those holding 
more global operations and greater bargaining power: dry-docking / crewing / trucking / 
distributing / tracing / warehousing / transshipping / barging / etc. No matter whether it 
is the primary or the support activities of the value chain the ones setting a cost 
difference based on larger economies of scale. Either by outsourcing or vertically 
integrating, the above represents a strategic tool for global companies in their permanent 
search of competitive advantage as well as it means a challenge for the Corridor 
companies to offset these impacts by combining their value chains. 
7. Service Differentiation: Global ship-owners highlight their geographical scope of 
services and faster transit times by linking South American east cost ports with inland 
locations in India, East Africa or the Middle East by making one or more 
transshipments and after engaging with combined railing and trucking transportation. 
Regional railway operators stand out because of their long distance and door delivery 
capabilities all along South America’s east cost and across Argentina until reaching the 
Pacific Ocean as a way to get a number of European ports closer to Chile (through 
combined land-bridge operations), as well as a number of Australian and southeast 
Asian ports closer to Argentina and Brazil (truck-rail modus). Global air-cargo carriers 
set a difference in terms of cargo carrying capacity, loading configuration, frequency, 
and inland connections towards eastern Europe and northern Africa from a number of 
hub airports located across Europe; river operators remark their relative faster sailing 
speed resulting in shorter transit times and greater frequency; foreign-owned regional 
trucking firms advertise their home base knowledge of servicing global companies to 
intend capturing accounts other than those they service at home. The service 
differentiation trend sustained by the global firms proved to be one of the major drivers 
                                                 
55 The time charter market is where most liner shipping companies hire part of their fleets until their new-buildings 
are completed at the shipyard and effectively deployed on service. This market is often utilized to cope with a 
specific market boom which otherwise would become unviable in view of the time lag involve in ship-building.  
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for the regional companies to join the Corridor in search of improving their value chains 
and face these threats with a valid alternative. 
8. Proprietary Service Technology: Porter (1985) argues that global economies can result 
from the ability to apply proprietary technology in several national markets when 
economies of scale in research are large relative to the sales of individual national 
markets. This seems to be the case of those large freight forwarding companies holding 
a dominant position not only in their large home markets but also in a number of 
regional and overseas nations. Germany-based Rohde & Liesenfeld, Kuhne & Nagel, 
and Schenker; Switzerland-based Panalpina and Danzas; Italy-based Merzario; France-
based Saga; USA-based TNT or DHL, are just a few examples of those global firms that 
developed their respective intranet systems to better trace their cargo flows around the 
world. All the shipping companies mentioned earlier and all the global port operators 
that later entered into the south American market, have researched extensively and 
developed their respective intranet systems to let their customers freely log in and find 
whatever piece of information they need to identify their cargoes. Before this complex 
scenario the Corridor was close to an ideal forum to let some of the regional members 
upgrading their support activities and therefore, also their entire operations. 
9. Mobility of Services: This aspect represents the very nature of the logistic business in 
most of its segments. The more ships a company owns, the more chances it has to cover 
a wider geographical area. The more cargo-aircrafts a firm owns, the more global it may 
become. The more hub ports spread out in the world a port terminal management firm 
owns, the higher their chances will be to redirect world cargo flows. The more global a 
logistic firm may present itself before their customers the better their chances will be to 
control cargo routings. The longest the reach of a railway operator, the greater their 
chances to link distant points and reduce the unit cost will be. The greater the number of 
available trucks, the more chances to become outsourced will be. Naturally, the concept 
of mobility is common to all operators, whether large or small, national or global. 
However, the number of assets holds a direct relationship with the potentiality to 
become global and therefore achieve larger economies of scale and gain competitive 
advantage. Even though owning a large number of assets does not allow a firm to 
become automatically global, it generally means it may become so if it wishes. 
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Switzerland-based Mediterranean Shipping Company is a rare and good example of this 
as it is possibly the only global ocean shipping firm that did not go through any 
horizontal integration process and relatively little vertical integration. However, their 
having a great number of vessels, skilled management, an export-oriented and strong 
financial home base, made them one of the most profitable shipping firms in the world 
that are engaged in round-the-world services. The Corridor members had to deal with 
both highly integrated global firms and those with little integration though large number 
of physical assets and great mobilization power. 
 
The above sources of global competitive advantage become impediments for the regional 
companies to become global. These impediments are represented by a number of obstacles i.e: 
o smaller relative economies of scale in the national markets (Argentina / Brazil); 
o limited geographical scope of the regional operators; limited availability of physical 
assets; 
o lesser relative competitive financial schemes;  
o outdated infrastructure and higher relative fixed and variable unit costs;  
o more stringent central bank regulations; 
o lesser developed cargo tracing or intranet systems; 
o  lesser relative ground transportation equipment versatility; 
o  lesser relative market intelligence operational capacity;  
o lower relative productivity ratios in most logistic segments;  
o high relative cargo volume concentration in a few locations; 
o imbalanced trades;  
o outdated or close to obsolescence assets: and 
o  a number of other more specific factors more inherent to the particulars of each logistic 
segment.  
 
Porter (1985) argues that even when the advantages of global competition outweigh the 
impediments overall, the impediments can still yield viable strategic niches for national firms that 
do not compete globally. This was the case of Buenos Aires-based Maruba Shipping Company 
and Sao Paulo-based Di Gregorio, who let a global shipping firm (Haifa-based Zim Israel 
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Navigation Company Ltd) enter into their market in exchange for them gaining access to a Zim’s 
determined extra-regional market. More precisely, the Israeli firm joined the two South American 
companies in the east coast of South America whereas they were given access in exchange to the 
Middle East region – where they would have never been able to sail by their own means.  
 
By doing this, the two lesser relatively developed and more regionally focused firms not only 
were given direct access to a new potential region, but also have benefited from absorbing a more 
advanced managerial, operational, and technological platform by giving up a relatively small 
market share to the global partner. This association later turned into a more formal joint-venture 
discussed in a later chapter and was replicated by many other global and regional companies. 
 
 It can be argued that this to be a win-win situation for those who preferred entering into some 
sort of value chain interaction with the global players instead of confronting them or looking for 
value chain mutations at a regional level. This win-win situation can be observed from a 
perspective that the global firm brought a valuable knowledge component along with higher 
relative technology and physical assets whose impact was gradually transferred to the regional 
companies. Additionally, such inputs were utilized not only in the regional markets but also in the 
overseas markets they were given access to. The global firm not only enjoyed direct access to the 
South America east Coast Market, but also benefited from learning the regional modalities 
further to counting on a future ally in their always needed coastal feeding services in the markets 
the regional firms were let in.  
 
It becomes apparent that there is not only one  lane towards achieving competitive advantage 
when looking into the Corridor as a value chain, but that many different value chain interactions 
can be possible and were in fact undertaken both within the Corridor and beyond the Corridor. 
Many regional firms made up the Corridor while some saw an opportunity to interact with the 
global players by setting up joint-ventures and alliances of various types. Others simply opted to 
sell out and form part of the global companies’ horizontal integration strategy.  
 
Thus the above illustrations highlight the complexity of the Corridor’s evolving role as a CoP and 
means for both economic and its business transformation role can be seen to deepen. Clearly, 
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while this example (the Corridor) of a complex program or work is potentially overwhelming as a 
subject for a doctoral research project, it has elements that can be examined as exemplars of the 
concept and scope limitations that prevent more detailed discussion and investigation may be 
forgiven as being a function of the scope of a doctoral study. The context of the Corridor best 
allows extensive study by multiple researchers over an extended timeframe not available to this 
researcher. 
 
The coming chapters will examine the way knowledge sharing and transfer, cooperation and 
collaboration, and value chain interactions all combined to help both the regional and global 
firms enlarge economies of scale and gain competitive advantage through several cases where the 
Corridor was pivotal to these ends. 
 
4.5 – CHAPTER SUMMARY 
Several key concepts become apparent from this chapter. Firstly, the globalization process has 
provoked a situation where most of the firms that were earlier considered rivals have become 
united under the Corridor’s roundtable forums across the region. The Corridor’s role can be seen 
in this light as an integrating project to link firms in various forms of relationships and 
collaborative associations.  
 
The real magnitude of the global threat was overwhelming for these firms and therefore brought 
about an adequate space where these companies could get to know each other and let the germ of 
knowledge sharing spread out in a way like never before. Naturally, face to face interaction 
seemed to be a key element in making these companies start sharing tacit knowledge, whereas a 
developing technological platform proved to be an adequate enhancer to knowledge transfer. This 
process enabled a growing number of players to deem the Corridor as a suitable arena to acquire 
knowledge by letting knowledge sharing and transfer effectively flow among its participants. 
Thus, the Corridor’s role can also be seen as a knowledge marketplace or project to connect CoPs 
 
It is clear that this situation though quite innovative, was not born in the regional companies’ 
intimate desire to become more efficient per se. But on the contrary, it was driven by the very 
need of facing a tsunami of global players who saw themselves to a different extent somehow 
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compelled to also expand their market coverage and enlarge their economies of scale to remain 
competitive at global level. Not having done so would have meant for them loosing global 
positioning and therefore jeopardizing global leadership. At this point, the Corridor’s capability 
to serve as a knowledge marketplace through its regional roundtables suggests that it proved 
useful for the regional firms in helping them formulate and implement a number of defensive 
strategies where knowledge sharing and transfer was the very first and key step.  This chapter 
helped explain the unique contextual factors that triggered this condition. 
 
Secondly, knowledge dissemination among the many regional members would not have been 
feasible without a genuine spirit of corporate cooperation and individual collaboration within the 
Corridor. This entity seems to have succeeded in helping the regional players to contact with one 
another and quickly adapt to a new business context. This adaptation process meant that the 
regional firms could comprehend how to face much larger corporations showing a high degree of 
vertical integration, an enormous home base competitive advantage, a global approach to 
strategy, and a relentless improvement, innovation and change attitude on the part of the global 
firms. Thus, gaining competitive advantage through cooperation and collaboration at the 
roundtables became a supporting tool for knowledge transfer to take place.  
 
Thirdly and perhaps most importantly, the Corridor has enabled the formation of a number of 
joint-ventures and alliances among the members as well as between members and global players. 
These vertical and integration processes not only helped the members rationalize their assets and 
engage in innovative forms of cooperation, but also brought value to them in terms of access to 
new technology and updated managerial techniques. The context of the Corridor can be seen as 
being a complex change management agent and the various initiatives that took place under its 
auspices can be seen as both change management process projects and transformational projects. 
 
Figure 4.2 illustrates how the Corridor along with its regional roundtables indicate that it played a 
vital role in the adequate channeling of knowledge sharing and transfer first, to later become a 
truly enabler of cooperation and collaboration through its members (and even non-members), to 
finally let the companies’ value chain interact and gain competitive advantage in a number of 
different ways.   
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Figure 4.2: Summary of the Role of the Corridor in response to the shock of global competition and being shaped 
by the Region’s culture, history and geography. 
 
The key and core element is the roundtables that formed effective CoPs that stressed face-to-face 
interaction but was facilitated by leadership to design and enable this project to occur in the first 
place and to be supported by technology. The allowed the knowledge creation, reframing and 
transfer process to happen that also reduced knowledge stickiness and at the same time built trust 
between partners as confidence increased in the ability and integrity of participants that 
collaborated and the face-to-face interactions helped to develop a sense of benevolence. This 
helped bring about business transformations, improved opportunities and business sustainability. 
Example will be provided of these in following chapters.  
 
The aim of this chapter was to introduce some aspects  that provide a strong contextual 
background and highlights potential area of focus. In light of this, the case studies that will be 
investigated and reported up can only scratch the surface of this vast program of projects. They 
will provide useful and key analysis of how knowledge creation and exchange was undertaken, 
how alliances or collaborative arrangements were facilitated and how this impacted upon the 
likely competitive advantage of those firms involved.  
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5. DISSERTATIONS, PROPOSITIONS, AND RESEARCH 
METHODOLOGY 
 
5 .1- INTRODUCTION 
This chapter defines the dissertation’s propositions, study aims, and research questions. It 
establishes the reason why the Corridor provides an important research subject in terms of a PM-
related thesis topic. The research questions are discussed in detail while leading to a comparative 
analysis using a qualitative research approach. While it examines the pros and cons of both 
quantitative and qualitative methodology approaches, a multi-case study type of approach is 
developed and proposed as the most suitable method to study a project of this type. Different 
aspects of a case study research methodology are also examined along with a special section 
dedicated to sources of evidence and validation. Conclusions of the chapter follow.    
 
5.2 - RESEARCH PROPOSITION, STUDY AIMS, AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Further to the concepts previously referred to in chapter 1 and based on the research idea, aims, 
and objectives, the research proposition is that the MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor Project has 
become an instrumental entity, where regional stakeholders find a useful system and the adequate 
tools to formulate and implement a business reengineering strategy towards achieving larger 
economies of scale and gain competitive advantage. As such, the system entails stakeholders 
engaging in a journey of organizational culture transformation to further adapt to a new business 
context that was perhaps simply unthinkable in the recent past. The globalization trend that 
brought about the establishment of the Corridor also required for the stakeholders to adopt very 
difficult decisions as to whether to reengineer, integrate, downsize, or enter into some sort of 
joint-venture or alliance model aiming at overcoming trans-national operational deficiencies and 
gaining regional competitive advantage – all of it embodying both a leadership and knowledge 
management dimension whose potentiality remained till then apparently hidden or perhaps 
unnoticed.  
 
The essence of this study is to establish how a project-focused organization, the Atlantic 
Corridor, from a huge geographical region along with a growing number of participants from that 
organization re-engineered their business activities. This entails overcoming regional and often 
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even national cultural misconceptions which act as significant barriers to integration or obstacles 
toward achieving larger economies of scale and for participants to gain competitive advantage. 
Evidence will be provided to indicate the degree of success achieved by Corridor participants in 
this transformation endeavor. The choice of business transformation was cited by Artto and 
Kujala (2008) as an important PM research area that has been under-researched. 
 
The globalization process along with its immediate response represented by the Corridor, 
introduces research possibilities allowing for various research questions to be raised relating to 
business transformation. These offer the chance to investigate a number of business 
transformation cases of very different nature that can be considered to be a program of 
transformation projects. Consequently, a number of research questions naturally present 
themselves in connection with the proposition and the embodied aims and objectives of the 
dissertation as proposed in Section 1.5: 
 
• Research Question 1: 
What are the variables granting the Corridor project the ability to generate trust first and 
facilitate knowledge transfer among stakeholders? 
• Research Question 2: 
How do Corridor stakeholders share vital internal information and join forces to face extra-
regional threats? 
• Research Question 3: 
Why do Corridor stakeholders tend to adjust themselves and adopt new attitudes and 
motivations toward committing themselves with partnerships, alliances, and joint-ventures? 
• Research Question 4: 
How does culture play a role in easing or impeding the development of the Corridor vision 
throughout the region? 
• Research Question 5: 
What factors hold a more relative influence on stakeholders to allow vertical or horizontal 
integration to occur? 
• Research Question 6: 
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What is the actual awareness degree among stakeholders with respect to sustainable 
development and its future relevance over the region? 
 
5.3 - QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS 
Positivism is based on the idea that facts exist in reality and that are subject to being measured. A 
reality may entail not only a single dimension of “truth” but various dimensions and therefore 
needs a measurement tool based on multiple variables. Under this perspective, the more variables 
that are added to a study the closer a researcher is believed to come to capturing an objective 
reality. A positivist approach is more likely to be associated with quantitative methods of data 
collection and analysis through statistical methods. Dunford (2004) introduces an alternative 
approach to research by arguing that the social situations and interactions require different 
research responses than those embedded in a given objective reality. The actions of people - 
individually and collectively – are based on their constructions of the nature of the world in 
which they operate. Thus, the meanings people attribute to situations shaping an interpretative 
process, determine the actions that they take. This approach is known as interpretivism and 
entails a more subjective dimension and in-depth focus on data that is more likely to be 
associated with a qualitative methodology based on a small number of cases rather than on large-
scale survey methods.  
 
5.3.1 Quantitative Research 
Utilization of appropriate measures such as those suggested by Oliver (1997; pp284-5) in the 
form of scales, may give a number of options that vary according to the event or variables to be 
measured. None of the scales turn out useful if considered as technical tools to collect data. A 
scale to measure stability of attribution is of no use in capturing the different realities and 
numerous perspectives arising out of so many interactions between companies, activity segments, 
and subjective views leading to a wide array of different reactions. A categorical scale – even if 
designed to comprise a wide spectrum of situations – seems inappropriate to register in-depth 
comments, views, and subtleties that often become associated with corporate events. An ordinal 
scale does not help much either in detecting small and subtle changes, nuances or new 
perspectives in a response. Both the Corridor and the globalization phenomena can be considered 
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as dynamic processes in permanent evolution and therefore cannot be ideally contained or 
summarized in a quantitative scale-type method.  
 
Burton and Steane (2004; p41) contend that if a scale is very restricted, one will not be able to 
identify differences between those holding lots of experience and others who have very little 
experience. In terms of this research study, a scale showing too little discrimination can make 
firms, individuals, and particular situations look similar when actually they are not. National and 
regional companies representing different segments of activity within the Corridor may have 
distinct views and perspectives that turn out highly unlikely to be accurately reflected in a scale – 
no matter of what type. However, even though a more discriminating scale showing more 
categories might help to better classify a firm’s different angles or opinions, the rather high rate 
of personnel rotation among the companies operating in the region can make such scales of little 
relative value. With this high churn rate of employment, executives tend to adopt a cautious 
attitude toward expressing what their real views and opinions are with respect to a given business 
context or adopted strategy while holding a new position – not only with respect to their new 
companies but also their former firms they continue to keep ties with. This is especially true 
when an extremely changing or threatening business scenario tends to exert an increasing level of 
pressure on the participants to appear to remain loyal to former corporations and individuals. So, 
quantitative research methods involving responses to questions using various forms of scales 
introduce recognized limitations.  
 
Under a quantitative perspective, data can be collected using a variety of methods, such as 
surveys (e.g. satisfaction scores), direct measurement (e.g. score on a test) and historical records 
(e.g. share prices over time) (Burton & Steane 2004; p144). Choice of the modeling technique 
(by which a different emphasis is laid on the number of surveys to be sent out, the probable 
response rate to the questions included in the survey, what the incentives are for people to 
respond and what its variability is) determines how sensitive the survey design turns out to be in 
relation to the way that data are gathered.  
 
The above, however, does not quite fit into what the Corridor may generate in terms of data. This 
is because it is an entity that is made up of a significant number of cases (each of them unique in 
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many aspects) that go through processes that may look at first sight conceptually similar but in 
fact generate data in unique ways. One might speculate that every logistic segment might well 
share or gather a similar typology of data. However, reality shows that every case is the result of 
very particular circumstances inherent to the firm’s strategic positioning in the region at a given 
moment. Further, the prime motivation of these organizations was survival in one of many ways 
or to sell the business in face of what was almost universally regarded as an economic “tsunami”. 
The generation of data in a common form across Corridor participants was not a high priority. 
Thus, the research context does not favor standard quantitative data gathering techniques.  
 
A brief sample of conditioning variables that suggest that a quantitative survey type of data 
collection would not be the most appropriate is provided as follows: 
• Complementation of distinct segments leading to various types of integration; 
• Different economies of scale and therefore cost structures;  
• Distant locations and a diverse cultural spectrum all spread over a huge geographical 
area; 
• An heterogeneous list of business assets to be optimized along with a tangible lack of 
infrastructure in some markets; and 
• National barriers represented by associated cultural prejudices and operational 
obstacles. 
 
To conduct a survey holding with a valid response rate turns out to be unrealistic in a Corridor-
like organization within South America. This likely outcome may be explained as being derived 
from both a limiting cultural factor leading to a general distrust for surveys of all kinds, and an 
ever critical business context where no time is left for reflective learning or strategic thinking on 
the part of the Corridor members. The latter being a direct consequence of the pressure exerted by 
the speed and scale of globalization’s impact. As such it assures a very low number of 
respondents – no matter how well designed and user-friendly a given survey turns out to be. 
 
Research methodology literature often recommends that researchers should draw up a polite and 
informative covering letter explaining to people a number of good reasons why they should fill in 
the survey and how this may contribute to society in general. However, it has been my experience 
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that the urgency of the immediate always prevails over any other strategic or research endeavor. 
Even to offer the respondents a copy of the results and to make it clear that the survey is of an 
academic nature and not a commercial one, cannot be reasonably expected to pave the road 
towards reaching the objective of a good response rate. Skepticism and lack of genuine interest 
and time appear to normally prevail.  
 
My direct and deep experience of the context of this research suggests that research methods 
literature that favors quantitative research approaches may have been written possibly for 
societies with less survival-critical, urgent or more stable business contexts. Cultural asymmetries 
and economic contexts present in less developed regions such as that under study here, shape 
potential respondents’ attitudes towards investing their time to respond to surveys and so the 
priorities of this group of people tends not to support academic quantitative research. As will be 
stressed recurrently throughout this dissertation, people from South America tend to privilege a 
short term tactical view at the expense of what might become a long term and more strategic 
vision yielding welfare in the long run. The immediateness of the urgent (recurrent 
transformations) prevails over issues of more strategic profile (potential growth) and therefore 
studies or surveys are definitely not a data collection technique to rely on. 
 
5.3.2 - Qualitative Research Methods 
Shank (2002) defines qualitative research as the study of processes and behaviors in their natural 
settings, through which the researcher tries to make sense of phenomena and the meanings that 
people attribute to them. Denzin & Lincoln (2000; pp1-28) argue that qualitative researchers 
often use multiple methods to tease out the complexity, depth and richness of the natural setting 
being studied. In principle, the concepts of complexity, depth, and richness seem to match the 
needs of the Corridor from a conceptual approach to research methodology. 
 
Research methods can include observation, conversation, interviewing, and participative or 
archival research. I was part of the Corridor project management team and so that brings two key 
elements that ease data collection with an in-depth view arising out of my direct engagement in 
intense, prolonged, and direct exposure to the field. I played the role of both a project’s 
participant and direct observer. This form of engagement serves the researcher objective of 
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capturing perceptions and understanding the actors “from the inside” so as to better comprehend 
how they make sense of and manage their daily activities (Miles & Huberman 1994). 
 
Further to the value of reflective practice being a core element of this research, as supported by 
the work of Raelin (2007), I was able to reflect upon my role as Corridor facilitating agent and as 
a Corridor participant. Coghlan and Brannick (2005) support the use of what they term 
participatory action research (PAR) in which the research is an active and participating member 
of events being studied. They argue that this is valid because the participating action researcher 
brings deep insights, large measures of tacit knowledge and often shares substantial trust and 
social capital assets with those being researched in such situations. The also note that PAR can be 
subject to bias so that researchers should always be mindful of this potential bias and take active 
measures to minimize any bias.   
 
Unlike the quantitative research approach that relies more on analytical statistic models, the 
qualitative researcher’s analysis is based on a careful and deep understanding of language and 
idiomatic turns, gestures meaning double sense responses, body language, ambiguity, as well as 
the often existing thin differences in concept and argument that become evident during an 
informal conversation or casual meeting. It seems that a qualitative research methodology fits 
better into a model that needs comprising diversity, difference, and uniqueness. This is because 
the Corridor involves many everyday routine processes (e.g. roundtable forums / discussion 
panels / cost structure assessments) as well as exceptional or unusual events, situations or 
practices (e.g. vertical and horizontal integrations / joint-ventures / VSA) that provide 
opportunities for deep observation and authentication of data.  
 
Qualitative research also permits researchers to apply multiple theoretical perspectives as part of 
a strategy of accumulating understanding of the complex world in which we live, and allowing 
research and research findings to reflect many differing and changing social and organizational 
cultures, histories and contexts (Flick 2002). The Corridor can be categorized as a defensive 
reaction arising out of a complex extra-regional phenomenon (globalization). Consequently and 
further to containing a rather great diversity of situations and individual realities of unlikely 
standardization, it seems to adequately favor some form of qualitative research approach. 
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A qualitative research methodology may comprise a number of potential alternatives: 
? Historical methodology: even though this method has made great contributions to 
understand the present by explaining the past, it is not intended for the Corridor in view of 
its recent or contemporary nature beyond a brief explanation of the Corridor’s historical 
and geopolitical context. 
? Ethnography: it focuses on describing and interpreting a group of actors and their cultural 
systems, its roots lying in cultural anthropology studies of primitive cultures by early 
twentieth-century anthropologists (Creswell 1998; Glesne 1999; Silverman 2000). The 
Corridor being a contemporary event made up of both individuals and corporations falls 
outside the scope of this methodology. 
? Phenomenology: it is concerned with how people make sense of their everyday activities 
and how they develop meanings from their social interactions. It focuses on actors’ 
descriptions and interpretations of their lived experiences in relation to a particular 
phenomenon that the researcher is investigating – they way they are experienced and 
perceived (Creswell 1998; Glesne 1999; Gubrium and Holstein 2000). Prior experiences, 
knowledge and views should be set aside by the researcher to refocus exclusively on the 
data gathered through extended interviews with actors. The researcher conveys to the 
reader a sense of the essence of the experience; its underlying structure and what it was 
like to experience that phenomenon (Creswell 1998; Shank 2002). 
? Hermeneutics: Burton and Steane (2004) explain it as the person reading a text about a 
subject, or holding a conversation or interview on an event or interaction, is just as 
involved in constructing a view of reality as the author of the text. In view it requires the 
researcher to draw on the historical context as the setting for their interpretation 
(Llewellyn 1993) - in order to reconstruct the past and anticipate the future – logistically it 
was too difficult for one researcher to perform ethnographic studies on all 
players/communities/tribes. 
? Field-based case study: the researcher is the actor himself (or one of the actors inserted in 
an event) studying phenomena in their natural context over a period of time as a form of 
action research (McNiff and Whitehead 2000) in which the research participated as 
described earlier. Although better developed in the upcoming section, field researchers can 
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be outlined as those who focus on actual events, activities, processes, people and 
relationships to generate outcomes embodying rich descriptions and analyses of contexts 
and practices (Adler and Adler 1994; Ferreira and Merchant 1992; Neumann 2003; 
Silverman 2000). Data from these studies can be made sense of by using grounded theory 
approaches (Glasner and Strauss 1967) in which themes are explored and developed to 
derive meaning and explanation.” 
 
Field-based case studies produce theories that explain observations in specific contexts by 
embodying a cultural dimension and interpreting contemporary management practices in a given 
socio-economic context. Therefore, it is been chosen as the most suitable research methodology 
for the Corridor project. It turns out suitable for the researcher to gather subjective data and 
develop specific contextualized theories that explain actual observations made in the field 
(Dawson 1997; Scapens 1990). Following this rationale, grounded theory is also a component of 
the chosen research methodology in that a number of research questions about a phenomenon 
have been posed in order to inductively generate relevant theoretical elements through data 
collection and analysis (Glaser and Strauss, 1967).       
 
 5.4 - CASE STUDY RESEARCH 
The flexibility that case studies allow for multiple research approaches/tools to be used to 
investigate a phenomena with, turns out convenient for a Corridor-type of project. A case study 
approach proves useful in presenting detailed accounts of organizational practices, in scanning 
the cultural perceptions as a channel to a better understanding of the different actors, and in 
interpreting management practices in their socio-economic, institutional and organizational 
contexts (Silverman 1985; Walker 1985; Werner and Schoepfle 1987). Potential research 
methods may range from semi-structured to quite highly structured processes. These methods 
include observation of activities, processes and meetings, unstructured and semi-structured 
interviews, and documentary and archival research (Creswell 1998; Miles and Huberman 1994).  
 
In view of the many existing different realities embodied in the various logistic segments that 
make up the Corridor along with its roundtable forums, a case study approach allows the 
researcher to design the interviews in a variety of forms instead of imposing a rigid format. 
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Structured questions in a close-ended format are less likely to be responded to, and even 
uncomfortable to be asked, as the nature of the interviews and the occasions in which they were 
held were highly informal. Thus, semi-structured (open and closed-ended questions) or 
unstructured (open-ended questions), or even a combination of those turned out to be easier to 
formulate and more likely to be accepted and duly responded during the many face-to-face 
occasions throughout the roundtable forums, lunches, breakfasts and events. 
 
The business context in which these interactions took place was often quite critical and therefore 
the mood of the actors were far from optimal to be approached with a kind of questionnaire or 
formal approach whatsoever. These companies were struggling to survive and usually going 
through tough reengineering processes; some were just assessing whether to join forces or simply 
sell out and disappear, while others facing a potential threat of bankruptcy. Consequently, 
informal encounters and relaxed conversations in a neutral setting was found by the researcher to 
be the best strategy to gather personal views and perspectives which otherwise would have been 
unlikely to be truly reflected in a close-ended question type approach. 
 
The dynamic nature of the Corridor as a mother project embodying a number of sub-case studies 
may well be associated with Winter and Checkland’s (2004) view, in that  to “manage” anything 
in everyday life is to intend to cope with an ever-changing flux of interacting events and ideas 
that is continuously unfolding through time. They further argue that the manager tries to improve 
situations that are seen as problematical and the job is never done because as the situation 
evolves, new aspects calling for attention emerge, and yesterday’s solution may now be regarded 
as today’s problems – a constant that becomes apparent in a recurrent way through various 
examples on horizontal and vertical integration that are better captured in a case-study format or 
approach. Winter and Thomas (2007) argue that the typical or traditional approach to project 
management practice tends to be rather narrow or limited in that it focuses on planning, 
organizing, coordinating, and controlling, but do not fully reflect organizational reality as messy, 
ambiguous, fragmented, and political in character. All these aspects can be better captured and 
assessed in a multiple-case study approach within a business context governed by change and 
uncertainty.   
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The Corridor project study is primarily exploratory, where representative individual case studies 
of business transformations help to describe the workings of the Corridor by explaining its unique 
particularities. Findings are used to explain how these transformations were achieved. 
 
Even though each strategy has its distinctive characteristics, there are large areas of overlap 
among them (Sieber 1973). Yin (1994 p15) distinguishes at least five different applications for 
case studies as far as evaluation research is concerned. They tend to explain the causal links in 
real-life interventions that are too complex for the survey or experimental strategies; they 
describe an intervention and the context in which they occur; they can illustrate certain topics 
within an evaluation in a descriptive mode; they serve to explore those situations where the 
intervention being evaluated does not lead to a clear and single set of outcomes; they may be a 
meta-evaluation or a study of an evaluation study (Smith 1990; Stake 1986).          
 
The MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor case study project is developed here as the major focus of 
study of and analysis as a single case (main) study though it embodies study of a number of 
representative short term sub-case studies and a larger and more detailed long term sub-case 
study. These sub-case studies help strengthening the units of analysis and address more 
consistently the research questions within a pattern-matching dimension by incorporating 
different angles and conclusions arising out of a greater number of situations. The thesis design 
therefore looks more like a multiple-case design dissertation despite containing the three basic 
elements of a single-case design: critical test; unique case; revelatory case (Yin 1994, p45).  
 
Yin contends by definition, that the unusual or rare case, the critical case, and the revelatory case 
constitute the basic components of justification of a single case. He further argues that the 
rationale for single-case designs usually cannot be satisfied by multiple cases. However, and as it 
will be exposed in the upcoming chapters, the various short-termed cases and the larger long-
termed case are all aimed at addressing every research question from different logistic segments, 
particular angles, and specific perspectives. All of them will turn out useful means to demonstrate 
how different actors displaying great resource base asymmetries can reengineer and produce 
change towards enlarging economies of scale and gaining competitive advantage – two concepts 
that are inclusive of a knowledge, cooperation, trust, ethics, and cultural dimensions. 
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The Corridor project can be regarded as a mother project embodying a significant number of 
multiple-case studies without which it would turn out to be a hollow concept with no substance. 
The very sub-case studies are precisely the project’s backbone that allows the project itself to 
grow and consolidate even further across time. The sub-case studies do also interact among 
themselves leading to a more fluent knowledge sharing and transfer avenue that make no other 
thing than enriching and constantly feeding the cycle. The evidence from multiple cases is often 
considered more compelling, and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust 
(Herriot & Firestone, 1983).   
 
The idea behind of conducting a multiple-case study design is to be able to reach cross-case 
conclusions. Each individual case study consists of a whole study, in which convergent evidence 
is sought regarding the facts and conclusions for the case. Thus, each case’s conclusions are then 
considered to be the information needing replication by other individual cases. Another aspect 
that is of paramount importance and that is dealt with in the coming section is given by both the 
sources of evidence and the validation process. 
 
5.5 - SOURCES OF EVIDENCE AND VALIDATION  
Yin (1994 pp 80-90) refers to six major sources of evidence from case studies along with its 
strengths and weaknesses: documentation; archival records; interviews; direct observations; 
participant observation; physical artifacts. All these sources with the exception of the latter – 
which is mostly utilized in other type of research such as anthropology - are far from being 
isolated pieces of evidence for the Corridor project but that on the contrary, they turn out to be 
highly complementary. 
 
The available documents attached to this dissertation include a number of roundtable forum’s 
minutes which clearly describe the nature of the problems discussed in the gatherings as well as 
the number and diversity of participants along with their main concerns. An author’s conference 
paper (Arroyo and Walker, 2004) presented at the University of Otago, Dunedin, New Zealand, 
on the Corridor project’s contribution to knowledge management also helps substantiate the 
content of the dissertation. A second paper presented at EURAM Conference in Liverpool, 
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England, on the Corridor’s contribution to business transformation (Arroyo and Walker, 2009) 
also helps conceptualizing its actual regional role. Also, a co-authored book on this very project 
recently published in Australia also corroborates the fundamentals of this thesis, its main contents 
having been exposed to the public scrutiny of both academics and practitioners (Arroyo and 
Walker, 2008).  
 
The archival records are made available in the form of maps, charts, and graphs comprising the 
vast region the Corridor project embraces, as well as the names of participating firms and the 
typical commodities that give birth or sustain the very nature of a given problematic situation. 
These sources of evidence, however, cannot be deemed as very relevant or of extreme importance 
but that they serve as a good complement to help the reader better comprehend or conceptualize 
the essence of the problems that are intended to make clear as well as the various potential ways 
to work them out. 
 
Interviews are of fundamental importance as they bring testimony of a wide array of situations 
which tend to repeat across the various case studies and therefore become useful for replication 
purposes. They were designed and implemented in two different ways. Firstly, in an open-ended 
nature and mostly informal, spontaneous or accidental fashion they were administered by the 
author who intimately knew respondents and had their trust. Those interviewed were informed of 
the aim, purpose and intent of the interview and all applicable documentation relating to this was 
administered as required by the RMIT ethics approval process. These interviews took place at 
sporadic times between 02/1996 and 12/2005. Validation of data was ensured by clarification 
with interviewees of content at the time of questions being asked and subsequently through 
further conversations, emails and other documented forms. Thus, file notes, diary entries and post 
hoc confirmation documents provided authenticated valid data to work with. 
 
Secondly, in a more formal or structured pattern of more general evidence emerged from a 
questionnaire that had been distributed by a consulting company member to the Corridor that had 
received a rather high rate of response. The Corridor project had already commenced before this 
study began and so the motivation for Corridor participants was high and their need to supply 
valid data to gain reliable feedback was also strong. Further, this data was not gathered by me and 
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therefore I did not seek or receive any ethics clearance from RMIT, however, it did form 
documented quantitative evidence that was useful as background information. This Corridor 
sanctioned type of survey and its informational-value response les in stark contrast to any further 
attempts to gain additional non-Corridor sanctioned quantitative survey data. Both the said 
quantitative methods survey data and qualitative data gathered in this research proved useful and 
complementary to further accomplish another step in the validation process. Even though the 
interview strategy adopted later for this research was intended to produce a number of critical 
responses from a limited number of key representative respondents to open-ended questions, it 
was the more formal or structured questionnaire that guided the trend and nature of the overall 
replies. Key interviewees tended to concur in general terms with the outcomes and findings of the 
formal questionnaire although their comments and views turned out to be richer and more 
detailed. Interviews are often only regarded as verbal reports and therefore subject to bias, poor 
recall or even inaccurate articulation, however, the previous questionnaire’s outcome turned out 
to be a solid tool to corroborate interview data with information from other sources. When 
coupled with documentary evidence such as minutes of roundtable meetings, the authenticated 
evidence form interviews and observations provided powerful and rich triangulation of evidence. 
 
Both my direct and participant observation were critical to understanding the many complex 
variables embodied within this project, despite the potential bias an internal observer or 
participant is often argued to hold. The major problems related to participant-observation have to 
do with the potential biases produced (Becker 1958). However, being a participant of the 
project’s development from its initial stage has helped the author better design and target the 
various questions in an open-ended fashion, as well as better conceptualize responses and 
gestures about a complex project which otherwise would have been unlikely for an external-type 
observer who was not familiar with the project itself nor with a deep understanding of its modus 
operandi and philosophy. Raelin (2007) also advocates the value of the kinds of epistemology of 
practice that reflective practitioners bring to bear on action based learning. In a sense, this work is 
also a product of a massive action learning exercise undertook by all Corridor participants as they 
engaged in learning activities that they struggled to make sense of. The nature of the Corridor 
experience was, as this thesis will demonstrate, one of learning and so not only were participants 
 176
engaged in action learning but the author’s role as facilitator and intermediary in critical events 
reported upon in this thesis also followed an action learning trajectory. 
 
The following paragraphs support the way that co-learning, which could also be seen as a form of 
action learning by participants as suggested by Raelin (2007), also provided validation through 
action, reflection, and further action cycles. It must be appreciated that all participants are experts 
in their field and so this forms another level of validation. Cicmil (2006 pp27-37) addresses in a 
critical and constructive manner the nature of knowledge, skills and competencies that are 
relevant to practicing project managers in their everyday coping with the complexity of 
contemporary projects. The critique concentrates on the functionalist/positivist goal of 
disseminating best practice in project management to large number of practitioners under a kind 
of commodification of knowledge across management fields by focusing on planning, organizing, 
coordinating and controlling without reflecting the often complex project’s realities as messy, 
ambiguous, fragmented, and political in character. Cicmil and Hodgson (2005) argue that the 
widely accepted conventional project management knowledge system tends to reduce or 
marginalize complex and subtle political and social processes to simplistic “critical factors” or 
problem areas that arguably can be removed through an appropriate action. 
 
Cicmil (2006) further contends that an interpretative qualitative methodology itself can present 
the researcher with a significant challenge as it involves much more uncertainty and ambiguity 
than traditional positivist research, and demand a high level of communicative skills, richness of 
one’s vocabulary, sensitivity to moral and ethical issues, and a wide theoretical repertoire. The 
Corridor project can be defined as both uncertain and ambiguous in itself in view of the many 
different existing realities and the apparently ever evolving or mutating situations of very difficult 
anticipation. Cicmil (2006) stresses that this methodology also requires an enormous amount of 
both enthusiasm and personal discipline, and a willingness to take risks that inevitably come with 
interrelating with people in a research situation which has a participative character. In fact, my 
participation began at the outset of the project – which helped me understand much of what today 
would be almost impossible to conceptualize without having first interacted from inside  – while 
today acting as an outside researcher – which makes biases even more unlikely to be produced or 
alternatively offset by having fulfilled both roles. 
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Complex projects have been defined by Williams (2002 pp58-9) in terms of the dimensions of 
structural complexity and uncertainty. Structural complexity is derived from the interaction 
between the number of elements which make up the project and the interdependence of these 
elements. Uncertainty is derived from the lack of clarity and agreement concerning project goals 
and the means to achieve goals. The result is that project elements interact in complex and 
unpredictable ways and undermine attempts to manage them using a rationalistic project 
management framework.     
 
Flyvbjerg (2001, p136) argues that the feel for the game is central to all human action of any 
complexity, and it enables an infinite number of moves to be made, adapted to the infinite 
number of possible situations, which no rule, however complex, can foresee. Schon (1983) 
contends that given the complexity of real-world situations, practitioners are not usually able to 
follow or apply the ready-made prescriptions and propositional knowledge taught on training 
programs. Real-world situations are always much more complex than the textbooks imply and 
therefore intuition and experience can make all the difference. These are the reasons why I 
considered it an advantage having my role as participant of the Corridor project at a given point 
and therefore a participant observer. Such a role enabled me to really interpret the many insights 
of a complex project which otherwise an outer observer would unlikely capture and interpret 
when observing it from a typical processual perspective.  
 
Schon (1983) further contends that practicing managers constantly have to deal with complex 
situations for which there are no right answers while the way they deal with these situations is 
rarely through the systematic application of textbook theories, but through sophisticated 
processes of “reflection-in-action” (thinking on one’s feet), and reflection-on-action (thinking 
back on events and planning the next move). Having to look back to reflect on the past to better 
comprehend the current situation and interpret the “whys” of the next moves proved to be of 
outmost relevance for the author while the very complexity of the various situations meant in fact 
an effective barrier to develop any biases.  
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Winter and Gale (2003) argue that the classical research dissertation is not always appropriate for 
busy managers on part-time programs because the academic activity of producing a research 
dissertation is somewhat far removed from everyday practice of managing. They further highlight 
that studying part-time and keeping focused on a specific field brings about an opportunity for 
mature students to develop their own experience of managing through a period of more deliberate 
and more reflective engagement in real-world practice. As Brown and Duguid (2000) state: 
“learning to be requires more than just information. It requires the ability to engage in the 
practice in question”. Such an engagement in fact comes naturally when playing both 
observation roles: direct and participant observation.  
 
In terms of the approach to the analysis of data to address the research questions and general aim 
of the thesis, a combination of a sensemaking and grounded theory approach was adopted. Weick 
has long been considered an authority on sensemaking and recently (Weick, Sutcliffe, and 
Obstfeld, 2005) linked its value with that of reflection from experiential learning. The state that 
“sensemaking involves turning circumstances into a situation that is comprehended explicitly in 
words and that serves as a springboard into action.” they continue to say “The emerging picture is 
one of  sensemaking as a process that is ongoing, instrumental, subtle, swift, social, and easily 
taken for granted. The seemingly transient nature of sensemaking (“a way station”) belies its 
central role in the determination of human behavior.”  (Weick et al 2005, pp409). This illustrates 
how the data was treated along with developing themes and meanings through grounded theory. 
 
Grounded theory has also been a long established approach to build theory from the ground up 
(Glaser and Strauss, 1967) and (Strauss and Corbin, 1998) using real data such as that described 
above.  Meaning is developed from analysis of a range of data sources, bearing in mind and 
guarding against biases referred to earlier, by undertaking a conscious and sub-conscious process 
of coding the data and formulating and testing themes of findings against theory and accepting, 
adapting or building theory to address the research exercise. 
 
5.6 – CHAPTER SUMMARY 
After presenting the research questions first listed in Section 1.5, and discussing the philosophical 
stances, merits and usefulness of quantitative and qualitative research approaches, it remains 
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clear at this point that given the nature of the Corridor project (uniqueness; size; multiple 
insights; trans-national configuration; trans-cultural in essence; multi-sector-oriented) a 
qualitative research approach turns out more inclusive and therefore appropriate than a 
quantitative method. A qualitative method enables the researcher to better cope with the many 
subtleties that are hidden or immersed in a number of situations arising out of the globalization 
process and its impact on the Corridor project. Furthermore, data availability along with the way 
it might be gathered suggests too that a qualitative approach proves more adequate and flexible to 
capture the various realities. Finally, the chapter concluded with a section clarifying the data 
sources used and the way that findings were developed and validated. 
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6. SUB-CASE STUDIES OR SUB-UNITS OF ANALYSIS 
 
6.1 - INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents four different and unique logistic case studies that illustrate and provide 
data relating to research questions that this dissertation is focused upon. Underlying 
circumstances and the evolving nature of global and regional coincidental actions refer to the way 
that distant and heterogeneous global players or firms can collaborate, exchange data and 
information, and cooperate with one another under the set of described particular circumstances. 
 
The way that each case study’s collaboration group responded to the globalizations process for 
each case study provides concepts that are developed and outlined to explain how these 
collaboration groups transformed their business approaches. A number of concepts connected 
with this thesis’ contributions interact and are exposed and discussed to bring about a unique 
view of these case studies which provide answers to the research questions. 
 
The chapter describes each of the four case studies and addresses key concepts that made possible 
both global and regional companies achieve larger economies of scale to gain competitive 
advantage. Each case study turns out to be very specific and unique with respect to its operations, 
strategy, and leadership style. However, each developed their strategy in a similar way that 
exposes a similar rationale governing issues of collaboration, cooperation, knowledge sharing and 
transfer, leadership, and culture.  
 
The first case study features an ocean shipping companies’ joint venture (JV) linking 
organizations with a very different combination of structure, nationality, culture, technology, and 
vision. The JV comprised two regional firms and two extra-regional companies. Each of these 
firms followed very different strategies in the way they got together and how they agreed on the 
fundamental aim of facilitating outsiders to become regional operators and for them to become 
more international and global in future. The overarching aim from the outset was to avoid 
incurring heavy investments.  
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This case study strongly relates to issues of the role of cooperation, leadership, knowledge, and 
corporate strategy in driving the business transformation.   
 
The second case involves a multimodal transportation business transformation, through the way 
that it connected its operations in ports of the Mediterranean Sea in Europe to end destinations in 
South America’s West Coast. More specifically, this project entailed the set-up of a land-bridge 
between west Mediterranean ports (Spain; France; Italy) and the industrial pole of the Santiago-
Valparaiso area through the port of Buenos Aires in Argentina by combining ocean, road, and rail 
transportation on a door delivery mode, that is to the customer’s ‘door’.  
 
This case study will demonstrate the important role of successfully combining traditional 
knowledge, physical assets, and management to achieve differentiation and gain competitive 
advantage.   
 
The third case study refers to the way the longest and most strategic railways in Argentina passed 
on vital knowledge about how foreign companies could reengineer themselves and become a 
competitive asset not only at regional level, but also in a global dimension. Without 
collaboration, cooperation, and leadership by partners in this case study, the business 
transformations would have not occurred.  
 
This case study illustrates the logistic complementation of knowledge and leadership between the 
various agents involved that was pivotal in allowing the transformation project to successfully 
evolve.  
 
The last case study embodies a Buenos Aires up-river operator that realized the urgent need to 
react to the globalization process by becoming regional and gaining world-class competitive 
advantage to face threats posed by emerging global maritime terminal operators’ structure, 
technology, management, and investment.  
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This provides a typical reactive model where two regional players enter in a JV to face global 
companies that might easily outperform any of them individually. Aspects of leadership, 
cooperation and collaboration, strategy and knowledge become apparent.  
 
Each of the four case studies refers to short-term tactical transformation project actions. They 
are individually presented and developed and outcomes and insights from them are compared to 
provide findings summarized in the chapter’s conclusions.           
  
6.2– CASE STUDY # 1: INTRODUCTION 
This section is further complemented by Chapter 2 that sets the context of this study. Before the 
Corridor was born or even prior the globalization process became unquestionable in South 
America, the region was serviced by a limited number of shipping companies. Some were 
regionally-based with limited number of lines linking the region to overseas or regional markets, 
while just a few were extra-regional and displaying a more diversified commercial base, though 
none had reached the definition of global shipping company in the sense of operating around-the-
world services or being engaged in global logistics. 
 
At that time the concept of door-to-door transportation was already known and implemented 
across South America though there was practically no integration among the logistics services. 
Ocean transportation, port operations, customs clearance services, road transportation, rail 
transportation, fluvial transportation and air-freighting were all separate businesses that were 
carried out by independent companies showing little or no operational complementation. Forward 
or vertical integration strategies were by then just pure theory as was horizontal integration. At 
this point one might easily speculate that company owners or CEOs had no concept of the 
competition or market expansion that they would soon confront. 
 
The region or the market was protected by cargo reservation laws which tended to favor those 
ships nationally registered and flying the national flag – provided that a genuine link existed 
between the port of registry and the ship’s flag. The lack of integration trends by then suggests 
there was no clear or identifiable need to enter into this type of venture. This was due to the 
relative safety granted by protective laws as well as the inexistence of any level of innovation that 
 183
could enhance or promote a minimum degree of competition. Porter (1980, p301) corroborates 
this particular situation well by arguing that the essence and decision of the vertical integration 
must go beyond an analysis of costs and investment requirements to consider the broader 
strategic issues of integration versus the view of a financial market transaction. The regional 
companies failed to consider these aspects which later flourished almost naturally within the 
Corridor and under a very different business environment. 
 
The shipping business in South America was to a great extent cartelized and therefore the 
competition turned out to be negligible and business complementation was practically absent. 
Also, a general increase in operational costs was caused by increases in the shipping-related 
ancillary service costs combined with the shipping business’s ageing fleet.  Large national 
companies became larger, despite a tendency towards what would have normally created an 
unfavorable business scenario, and expanded overseas though without reaching the status of 
becoming global shipping companies such as Argentina’s Elma with more than 45 vessels or 
Brazil’s Lloyd Brasileiro with more than 50 vessels. More importantly, these large national 
companies failed to catch up with upcoming international trends of lower costs and global 
logistic reach. These companies grew up and became relatively global thanks to governmental 
subsidies duly backed by geopolitical visions of those who by then were in charge of the 
maritime interests within the shipping policies secretariat of both Brazil and Argentina. 
 
Global carriers started to open their services in SAMEC56 first – where larger economies of scale 
became apparent - to later cope with SAMWC57 (a region that held strategic value for its 
proximity to Asia) while those foreign-based liners already servicing South America began 
diversifying their lines. They did so by adding new ports of call to their schedules, either by 
launching new lines or combining with other existing liners either through combined services or 
by making use of extra-regional transshipment ports to cover new and distant markets.  
 
During this transformational and growth process, possibly made confident by the on-going 
restrictive cargo laws, the regional ship-owners did not react nor realize the by then emerging 
                                                 
56 SAMEC: South America East Coast. 
57 SAMWC: South America West Coast. 
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global trends of struggling to achieve larger economies of scale or diminish operational costs. 
Regional ship-owners remained indifferent to competitive newcomers and the trends they brought 
with them. By contrast, foreign-based lines with enough international experience to be 
accustomed to dealing with the international shipping free market foresaw what globalization 
would bring to South America and reacted by extending their services in an attempt to achieve 
larger economies of scale and remain competitive to face any upcoming market transformation. 
Gradually, national flag owners had to face not only foreign-based vessels holding a much greater 
carrying capacity and a much lower slot cost, but also saw their cargo reservation laws being 
eroding and having less and less impact on securing them a minimum market share that enabled 
them operate without investing and therefore surviving. This process took place at the same time, 
and following a similar path in both Brazil and Argentina with the other countries of the region 
remaining consistent with the two bigger neighbors. To better illustrate the relative size and 
structure of the companies that make up this case study it becomes necessary to briefly assess 
each of them in the next section.  
 
6.2.1. –Structure of the joint-venture companies 
Sources of data and information gathered for this first case and used for analysis of this study 
from the JV companies can be summarized as follows: 
 
Table 6.1- Sources of Data for Case Study #1  
Company Source Content     Notes 
Zim Lines General context 
information 
Data Gathered on 
present services and 
global structure from 
corporate website. 
Data gathered in 2008 (www.zim.co.il)  
Hanjin General context 
information 
Data gathered on 
present services and 
global structure from 
corporate website. 
Data gathered in 2008 
(www.hanjin.com)  
Maruba General context 
information 
Data gathered on 
present services and 
global structure from 
corporate website. 
Data gathered in 2008 
(www.maruba.com.ar)  
Zim Lines Operations 
specific 
information 
 
 
Director for 10 
years at Zim; 
Business strategy and 
the impact of the 
upcoming trends on 
both the region and 
the regional shipping 
market. 
Regular short, informal and frank 
conversations normally held during 
lunch time and working periods between 
03/1996 and 12/00. Concepts arising out 
of these conversations were written 
down and discussed over and over from 
time to time in view we were colleagues 
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Operations 
Manger for 6 
years at Delta 
Line; 
Multimodal 
Manager for 10 
years at Elma. 
working for the same company. Content 
was checked with the source and 
validated during 2007.   
Multicargo CEO for South 
America for 
more than 10 
years; Country 
Manager for 
more than 15 
years at K+N, in 
charge of ocean, 
ground, and air 
transportation 
departments. 
Business strategy to 
take the best possible 
out of the situation in 
terms of market 
intelligence as well as 
knowledge sharing. 
Several meetings, both private and 
business, where concepts and trends 
were reviewed and opinions exchanged 
on an informal fashion throughout 1997, 
98, and 99. I have been in regular contact 
and had the opportunity to discuss in 
detail various aspects of the potential 
contribution of the Corridor, in view of 
my position at the Corridor and 
Multicargo being a regular customer of 
Zim. Content was checked with the 
source and validated during 2007.   
Maruba Operations 
Manager for the 
River Plate for 
more than 12 
years and an 
extensive 
experience in 
marketing and 
multimodal 
business across 
the region. 
Business development 
strategy connected 
with both the Corridor 
as an enhancer and the 
JV as an enabler to 
intend becoming a 
global operator. 
Regular discussions and exchange of 
opinions during regular business 
meetings, joint trips, and lunch time on 
numerous occasions. Extensive 
discussions were involved from 1996 up 
to 2000, period in which notes were 
taken and images of situations and 
events were kept fresh in my memory. 
Content was checked with the source and 
validated during 2007 
Di Gregorio Brazil marketing 
manager for 
more than 20 
years. 
Leader-follower views 
and cultural 
differences within a 
Corridor roundtable 
forums context. 
Isolated comments and informal 
statements gathered during JV meetings, 
coffee breaks, and dinners while 
traveling together around South 
America. Some comments were written 
down while others just kept in mind as 
they resulted to be obvious or common 
to the on-going business context. 
Content was checked with the source and 
validated during 2007. 
 
The JV was made up of four shipping companies of different size, service scope, technology and 
management. Two of them were foreign-based58 out of which only one59 was already operating in 
SAMEC. The other two were from Argentina and Brazil though displaying very different 
structure and strategies: Buenos Aires-based Maruba was a traditional Argentine flag shipping 
company that was successful under the protective cargo reservation laws during the 1970s and 
1980s. Rio do Janeiro-based Di Gregorio was a successful and well established road 
                                                 
58 Zim Lines of Haifa, Israel and HANJIN SHIPPING of Pusan, South Korea. 
59 Zim Lines. 
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transportation firm in Brazil with extensive services all over the country that wanted to become a 
ship-operating company as an extension of their well established on-shore operations aimed at 
securing cargo flows for their on-shore operations and creating synergies between the latter’s 
customer base and their needs to be serviced overseas.  
 
Even though identifying regional firms with even moderate degree of vertical or horizontal 
integration was by then very rare, these two companies entered into a substantial degree of 
integration. This possibly may explain why they also entered later into the maritime JV. Maruba 
also operated tug services in the port of Buenos Aires further to owning a limited number of 
trucks with which exerted some control on part of their cargoes. Further to that, they also reached 
a moderate level of internationalization in that they operated a number of shipping lines linking 
SAMEC with the North Atlantic market, the Asia-Pacific region, SAMWC, and the PNW60 
region. In this particular case one might conclude that even though it was a company that had 
already launched itself to the international arena, there were many steps yet to be taken for it to 
truly become a truly global player - both in terms of geographical scope and the extent of its 
trans-national value chain. 
 
Di Gregorio owned a fleet of over 600 trucks to service Brazil first and Argentina later, but also 
expanded their activities into warehousing and cold-storage facilities. The operation of the latter 
ones might well be considered as horizontal integration, although it can also be regarded as 
natural assets for a trucking company to carry out their services with a minimum physical back-
up. This company was by then regarded as within the top 1061 road transportation firms within 
the MERCOSUR region with an extensive regional market coverage and significant distribution 
assets spread all over the coastal cities and inland destinations, which might explain the above 
mentioned facilities as a natural settings to sustain the firm’s expansion rather than strategic 
moves towards accomplishing an objective of greater dimension. 
 
                                                 
60 PNW refers to the Pacific Northwest Region that embodies North America’s west coast. 
61 Di Gregorio counted on distribution facilities in Sao Paulo, Santos, Paranagua, Sao Francisco do Sul, Rio Grande, 
Porto Alegre, Rio do Janeiro, Vitoria, Curitiba, Salvador, Recife, Fortaleza, Belem, and Manaos – further to a 
number of  hub warehouses placed in strategically located inland cities where neither railway or barging services 
were available. Through a network of agents they also had access to key locations within Paraguay, Uruguay, 
Bolivia, and Argentina.  
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This company based its corporate growth on Brazil’s economic dynamism which showed a 
consecutive growth and development for a number of years62. This might well indicate at this 
point that this firm wanted to exert some control on the incoming cargos’ routing decision 
making by committing to the launching of new maritime services. However, I had the 
opportunity to address these issues with the president of both companies who repeatedly 
confirmed that this kind of integration was not intended nor viewed as a strategic dimension by 
the time it was adopted. The decision to collaborate evolved purely from a tactical financial 
transaction opportunity costs basis that appeared to be timely when made. As they repeatedly 
said, “we are not in a position to keep our assets under-utilized for a long time but that we have to 
join our structures to make the business sustainable”. 
 
Even though these two companies could well be regarded as the exception and not the rule (in 
view of their incipient integration degrees at the outset of the globalization process) they never 
undertook their value chain take-over acquisitions with the intention of catching up with 
upcoming trends—their decisions were merely triggered by timely situations, absent from extra-
regional strategic thinking. It also turns out interesting to consider different structures and 
management styles of the bigger global firms involved in this JV because these global players 
more consciously took a similar strategic path. The following outlines some relevant features of 
these global firms taken from their web sites: 
 
a) Hanjin Shipping63: is Korea's largest carrier that operates some 60 liner and tramper services 
around the globe transporting over 100 million tons of cargo annually. Its fleet consists of some 
200 containerships, bulk and LNG carriers. A member of the Hanjin Group, Hanjin Shipping has 
several subsidiaries including Keoyang Shipping and Senator Lines GmbH, and affiliates 
including logistics IT specialist CyberLogitec, Pyeongtaek Container Terminal Co., Ltd., ship 
management company, Hanjin SM (Ship Management), and terminal operation company, HPC 
(Hanjin Pacific). Hanjin Shipping has a comprehensive global business network with 3 regional 
headquarters, 200 overseas branch offices, and 30 local corporations, earning about 90% of its 
total revenue overseas. Hanjin Shipping's world-class logistics network includes 11 dedicated 
                                                 
62 Brazil’s GDP showed an average growth of 2% during the 80s and above 3% during the 90s while the trade 
between Brazil and Argentina expanded more than proportionately during said periods of time. 
63 Information available at www.hanjin.com  
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terminals in Long Beach, Tokyo, Kaohsiung, and Busan among others and six inland logistic 
bases in such locations as Shanghai, Qingdao, and Port Kelang. 2 more dedicated container 
terminals are scheduled to open in the near future; one in Busan New Port of the development 
Phase 2-1 in 2009 and the other in Jacksonville, Florida in 2011. Furthermore, Hanjin Shipping’s 
ship repair yard in China scheduled for completion in 2008 will provide efficient repair services 
not only for its own vessels but also for other carriers, thereby functioning as a new source of 
income for the company. In early 2003, Hanjin Shipping allied with COSCO of China, Yang 
Ming of Taiwan, K-Line of Japan, and Senator Line of Germany to form 'CKYHS Alliance,' the 
world's largest strategic alliance in this industry sector. The CKYHS Alliance has enabled Hanjin 
Shipping to sharpen its competitive edge by broadening its service coverage, offering Express 
Services64 and sharing space with the allies to lower costs. To achieve its goal of becoming "the 
premier total logistics service provider respected by the global community, In addition, Hanjin 
counts on a number of 3PL65 businesses on track and building a ship-repair yard as part of its 
business diversification efforts.  
 
b) Zim Lines66: has more than 60 weekly services with rapid transit times to 180 ports of call 
end-to-end multi-modal services reaching destinations on five continents, full-service logistics, 
including state-of-the-art hubs in Asia, the Americas and Europe, and regional offices throughout 
the world: four operational headquarters, an extensive regional office network and agents 
throughout the world.  
 
To reduce the total supply chain costs, Zim has created the ZPL Global Logistics Network with 
hubs in China, the Caribbean and Europe. These world-class logistics centers offer a full range of 
services such as freight forwarding, customs brokerage, consolidation and deconsolidation, off-
dock container terminals67, warehousing, trucking and container repair, liner and feeder services 
connecting Asia, Europe, Africa, North and South America, and the Middle East; end-to-end 
                                                 
64 Express Services are those linking two ports straight with no transshipment or on-carriage services. 
65 The term 3PL refers to is a firm that provides outsourced or "third party" logistics services to companies for part, 
or sometimes all of their supply chain management function. Third party logistics providers typically specialize in 
integrated warehousing and transportation services that can be scaled and customized to customer’s needs based on 
market conditions and the demands and delivery service requirements for their products and materials. 
66 Information available at www.zim.co.il  
67 Off-dock terminals are those facilities located outside the ports’ primary zones where operations of various kinds 
can be conducted. 
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services; and a multimodal network for end-to-end shipments to thousands of inland destinations 
on six continents, with unique strength in China. 
 
 It has local support with extensive customer and logistical services with three well-located hubs. 
Zim currently operates a fleet of about 100 vessels, deploying a total carrying capacity of over 
240,000 TEUs. This includes 13 state-of- the-art Panamx 4,900 TEU vessels added in 2004. Zim 
offers 60 services to ports of call throughout Europe, the United States and Canada, Central and 
South America, Africa and Asia. They have established a particularly strong presence on routes 
between the Far East and the Caribbean, Mediterranean and China. 
 
It becomes apparent from the company profiles outlined above, that both firms rely upon global 
structures along with a considerable degree of both horizontal and vertical integration. On the one 
hand there are shipping companies, shipyards, marine terminals, and logistic facilities that form 
part of the global firms’ integration strategy where South America fell totally or partly out of 
their operations radar. South America appears to be somewhat of a gap in the integrated chain of 
logistics that is more commonplace elsewhere in the world for these global players—this 
presented a challenge and a gap to be filled by these organizations in a bid to be truly global. 
 
On the other hand, an opportunity for forming an alliance or JV presents itself with a regional 
company such as Maruba that showed more daring than the other JV partner – Di Gregorio - in 
terms of pretending to compete at an international level despite showing both serious weaknesses 
in those areas where the global firms had undisputable strengths (larger carrying capacity / faster 
vessels / bigger load factors / lesser consumption / more efficient loading and discharging rates / 
well functioning JVs around the globe / superior technology). The next section describes and 
analyses the way these four companies got in touch with one another and evolved until 
effectively agreeing on entering into a joint-venture on a win-win basis.  
 
6.2.2.- The corridor as a facilitator 
The situation that unfolded can be illustrated by Figure 6.1. 
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Figure 6.1:  Joint Venture Formation Scenario to Gain Win-Win Outcomes from a Rationalization and Effective 
Asset Re-Alignment Project 
 
Not only were Maruba and Di Gregorio original members of the Corridor but also Zim Lines had 
well established roots in the region when globalization pressures approached South America. 
Even though Hanjin was an outsider as it did not service South America, however it had entered 
into a JV with Zim Lines in different trading areas of the world where the market scales were 
substantially larger and competition much better developed than in the MERCOSUR. Therefore 
Hanjin and Zim operated under the same concepts and philosophy with which many JVs, 
alliances, and partnerships of various types were evolving elsewhere and these matured with the 
passing of time and as the globalization impact reached closer to the MERCOSUR.  
 
One retrospective view of events suggests that Zim Lines’ executives, who already had 
experience from their Asia-Pacific’s alliances,  proposed the germ of the idea that advantages of 
combining physical resources could be brought into the Corridor roundtable discussions. At this 
point, there was probably a kind of pre-corridor knowledge sharing and transfer process evolving 
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from different global players who subsequently joined the Corridor with business experience of 
such scenarios and these were eventually introduced to the Corridor.  
 
I suggest that the following is a realistic representation of how the concepts and arguments 
inherent to putting into practice cooperation and collaboration (combining various resources, 
initially knowledge sharing, with knowledge transfer introduced later) through discussions with 
various Corridor and access to other more tangible records of accounts that I have obtained from 
Corridor players and assembled from my own reflections. These were the pillars of a structure 
that let these companies to undertake a reengineering process within the Corridor. 
 
My reasoning and analysis for this follows the strategic position each player held at the time of 
forming the JV: 
? Zim had on service 12 vessels spread over three different lines with: 
o The Mediterranean service68  sailing every 10 days (with 4 ships); 
o USEC+G69 service (with 4 ships); and  
o USWC70 service (with 4 ships), both based upon weekly sailings.  
 
Northbound and southbound vessels utilized a hub port in Kingston, Jamaica. This hub was a 
centre for directing all kind of operations to reach practically any destination in central and south 
America, the Caribbean, continental US and Canada, and further combinations toward extra-
regional ports in the Asia-Pacific region through the Panama Canal. Eastbound and westbound 
vessels utilized a hub port in Barcelona, Spain from which a long list of ports and inland 
destinations were accessible along West and North Africa, Eastern Europe, near, middle, and Far 
East – in addition to the traditional destinations of Western Europe. 
? Maruba had a similar number of vessels in service out of which only 3 were assigned to 
their Mediterranean service and this entailed a sailing every 20 to 25 days. Therefore it 
was one of Zim’s competitors in the Mediterranean market. This company also had in 
service a number of vessels in lines that were out of the scope of interest of the other JV 
                                                 
68 Mediterranean services include all those ports that lie on the Mediterranean sea from Israel up to Spain. 
69 USEC+G means United States East Coast and Gulf. Even though it refers to a service to and from the USA, it also 
includes Canada’s Atlantic ports. 
70 USWC means United States West Coast. Even though it refers to a service to and from the USA, it also includes 
Canada’s west coast ports. 
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members at the time talks were held. Their operational hub port was Montevideo, Uruguay 
where a fully containerized service to Patagonian ports was operated based on a monthly 
sailing. These services were to SAMWC, SAMEC, PNW, and the Asia-Pacific region. 
None of these services were in principle of any strategic interest to the parties.  However, 
at a later stage – as it will be explained later in this chapter – it became subject to 
negotiation in their search to gain competitive advantage and extend their geographical 
scope even further. Both tugboat services and trucking operations were also carried out in 
the Buenos Aires Province that also provided a given degree of vertical integration. 
? Di Gregorio had neither vessels of their own nor any chartered. In fact it had no maritime 
background at all. However, it did have a significant on-shore cargo-volume out of which 
75% was export or import-oriented. This was their main motivation to become involved in 
a maritime venture that could eventually grant them a given level of control on both the 
incoming and outgoing cargo flows. It counted on a number of on-shore hubs or inland 
nodes spread all over Brazil where it conducted all sorts of warehousing and distribution 
operations to and from the MERCOSUR partners. This company had operations from 
practically all Brazilian ports and their fleet units were versatile enough as to be capable to 
carry both container and over-dimension cargoes.  
? Hanjin: South America was a pending issue for this shipping company even though it was 
a huge global shipping company with world class logistic facilities and an impressive 
degree of both vertical and horizontal integration. It was engaged in a large number of 
trade lanes, either by operating its own vessels and lines or through JVs and VSA with 
other shipping companies as large as them. It had enormous inland transportation and port 
operations capabilities across the globe. Also it deploying the latest maritime technology 
in terms of effectiveness which meant that by the time it approached the region it 
possessed enormous economies of scale and therefore the lowest slot cost, automatically 
leading to gaining competitive advantage. In doing so, it becomes apparent that Hanjin 
also needed a number of suitable partners in order to deploy its services efficiently with 
the required number of vessels and it needed sailing frequency to avoid oversupplying the 
market if it had decided to operate entirely by itself—resulting in flooding shipping traffic 
with excessive tonnage. Such an action would have almost automatically made ocean 
freight rates fall dramatically because the MERCOSUR trade did not at that time, have the 
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absorbing capacity for new operators of such an operational volume. This issue was salient 
to newcomers to the region as they took due care because it was in nobody’s interest to 
destabilize the market by deploying an excess of supply – or a huge over-tonnage situation 
that would have eroded the freight level to unsustainable levels.   
 
As a general concept, and as I will explain in detail later on, the JV’s strongest point was given 
by having the existing ship-owners rationalizing their fleets (Zim / Maruba) without having to 
entirely flagging out a significant number of vessels of their respective fleets, but by part-
chartering their vessels to those who they were sure were not going to bring additional tonnage to 
the market (Hanjin / Di Gregorio). This process also entailed an orderly process of replacing 
older and bigger tonnage by newer fuel-efficient smaller vessels.   
 
Thus, what before turned out to be two independent shipping companies each operating a number 
of vessels holding relatively low load factors, increasing operational costs, and a limited 
geographical scope, found through the JV, the way toward rationalizing their non-revenue 
generating assets without having to face any onerous exit costs.  
 
Additionally and incidentally, these very same companies profited from one another in that they 
gained access to new markets, deployed better technology, developed global and regional 
management skills through knowledge exchange, and achieved larger economies of scale. These 
all led to JV partners gaining a new dimension of competitive advantage that could help them 
face new global trends in a more sustainable way. 
 
The next section will address the advantages for each member with respect to the various 
operational stages this JV went through. Given the different structure and dimension of each 
company, it turns out interesting to identify how every company has found the way to build a 
win-win situation despite the existing heterogeneity. 
 
Perhaps one of the greatest merits of the MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor resides in having created 
the necessary ambience to let knowledge spread out among their members, build trust through 
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cooperation and collaboration – all leading to undertaking a number of projects under a very 
special or unique regional business context.    
 
6.2.3. - J/V Project operational advantages 
It is essential for the reader to understand that the MERCOSUR had by nature unbalanced trade 
partners that varied according to the rate of exchange at any given time. Large regional country 
imbalances between imports and exports produced a serious container use situation for the 
shipping lines. Additionally, regional-world import and exports volumes also produced similar 
problems. Moreover, there were similar macroeconomic imbalances between MERCOSUR 
countries whose policies rarely coincided and therefore resulted in non-harmonized patterns of 
respective currency parities. This caused intra-regional trade imbalances that had to be offset or 
compensated for extra-regionally.  
 
Typically, a devalued currency would foster exports and discourage imports while systematically 
promoting import substitution schemes. A revalued currency encouraged imports to grow more 
rapidly than exports thus producing trade imbalances—unless corrective policies were designed 
and put into practice to achieve higher industrial productivity. Whatever the case, being 
regionally or individually incurred, these trade imbalances often had a profound impact on all 
shipping companies with tight business operations in the region and little shipping activity 
abroad.  
 
All loaded import containers that were brought into the region had to be re-exported empty or 
somehow subsidized to capture a lower existing volume of exports to diminish the impact of a 
negative balance – this known in the industry as “imbalance”. The same situation was incurred 
when a devalued currency resulted in much bigger exports than imports. This caused a different 
trade imbalance because traded containers had to be repositioned in South America either empty 
or at relative lower ocean freight rates adjusted to the existing demand at any given moment.  
 
One of the most worrying operational issues for a shipping company to manage is precisely the 
efficient management of hundreds of thousands of containers spread out all over the world. Most 
shipping companies held global leasing contracts with the global container leasing firms which 
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let them hire and deliver huge numbers of containers around the world. It is with an inadequate 
supply of these containers, positioned in the right port at the right time, which prevents the 
shipping company from generating income. This may well result in a financial burden of holding 
and moving non-performing containers which can easily bankrupt shipping companies. 
 
Most shipping companies hold global leasing contracts with the global container leasing firms 
which let them hire and deliver huge number of containers around the world. These containers 
allow a global shipping concept to work on a door-to-door basis, no matter what the origin or the 
destination may turn out to be. This concept is essential as it demands an accurate administration 
and operational follow-up for shipping companies to remain competitive. Consequently, the more 
globally or geographically operational a shipping firm becomes, the better chances it has to 
combine different balancing situations across the globe. Balances and imbalances may be better 
and faster offset or worked out by a shipping line that operates multiple trades and manage 
different demands, seasons, and operational limitations of various kinds. A company that is too 
committed with a single trade or region that has modest opportunities to efficiently work out the 
existing trade imbalances (e.g. MERCOSUR), is likely to consequently suffer inefficiencies by 
being not capable of maintaining high load factors and an effective rotation ratio of their 
container fleet. 
 
Two further aspects are worth further scrutiny to better conceptualize the reason why the 
globalization wave reached South America and triggered a structural shipping change throughout 
the region. Firstly, global shipping lines engaged in the so called “Round-The-World” services 
(east-west-east) engaged in a continuous pursuit of achieving larger and larger economies of 
scale. As vessels grew larger and larger in their container carrying capacity, the ports of call 
tended to reduce in number and adopted the function of not only ports of loading  and discharge 
aimed at servicing the country where they laid, but also ports or hubs where huge number of 
containers were transshipped to worldwide destinations.   
 
Thus, vessels that used to serve in those trades became obsolete because of their lower relative 
carrying capacity and were therefore relayed to service markets not actually served by the round-
the-world services. Regions or markets became hidden or outside the radar of the ever-expanding 
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shipping companies, all of a sudden it became in their interest to operate in emerging 
opportunities. South America therefore faced a wave of larger, more efficient, better equipped, 
and better managed shipping companies with the objective of entering this market. Many entered 
into JVs and alliances to avoid flagging in tonnage on top of the existing tonnage oversupply. 
Others overlooked this situation and deployed their entire fleets and on-shore facilities to service 
their global accounts the way they did it anywhere in the world. Naturally, this situation led to an 
even more delicate balancing situation as well as depressing the ocean freight level.  
 
Secondly, the main economies of the MERCOSUR found themselves in the process of opening 
their economies to the world and reengineering a number of state-owned companies as well as 
generally modernizing their industries. This political process caught the attention of existing 
companies who foresaw a regional trade expansion business opportunity and acted accordingly. 
Many shipping companies that were traditional operators in the region started to improve their 
sailing frequency by flagging in new ships, positioning a more diversified fleet of containers, and 
calling at new ports. This led to a significant market oversupply so these companies faced the 
option of restructuring or disappearing. Several aspects are worth discussing in further detail: 
? Economies of combined operations: existing volume of cargoes (export and import) did 
not allow outsiders to deploy entire fleets and enlarge the carrying capacity to a level that 
would have turned out detrimental to both local and foreign operators so the shipping 
companies had to start talking to one another to find suitable combinations without 
harming the market. By the time the MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor was established, the 
existing foreign trade ratio for Argentina was a 3 to 1 import ratio while Brazil had a more 
favorable 2 to 1 export ratio. Consequently while Argentina could be regarded as an 
import-oriented market holding a currency parity of 1 to 1 PESO/USD, Brazil turned out 
to be the opposite by having a parity of 2.5 to 1 REAL/USD parity. The Brazilian import 
ratio was more oriented toward reindustrialization of its economy than to consumption of 
goods as was the Argentine case. Brazil being a much larger economy and much more 
export-oriented than its neighbor Argentina caused the region to run out of containers for 
export, as there was an overall shortage of containers to supply the maritime export 
demand. Intra-trade between Brazil and Argentina was relatively balanced which meant 
that the excess of containers laying in Buenos Aires had to be repositioned in various 
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Brazilian ports (Rio Grande / Itajai / Sao Francisco do Sul / Santos / Rio do Janeiro / 
Vitoria / Recife). Therefore and from a balancing standpoint, the more globalized 
companies (Hanjin / Zim) were useful to the regional ones (Maruba / Di Gregorio) in 
coping with an increasing imbalance problem to the advantage of all carriers. Imbalances 
in the Asia-Pacific market could be compensated for with an existing relative higher 
freight rate market, shorter transit times, better turn-around-time (TAT) ratios, or access to 
niche markets. For the bigger companies, facing imbalances this effectively turned out to 
be much easier in view of all their global opportunities to offset their imbalances in one 
way or the other and through their internal operational accounting systems. Regional firms 
agreed to flag-out a number of ships while the global firms flagged-in an equal number of 
vessels. This helped the former rationalize their operations effectively and the latter enter 
into a new market without bringing tonnage on top of what the market might tolerate 
(Hanjin), while also rationalizing by flagging out two of their existing vessels (Zim) on the 
Mediterranean traffic. The overall result was: a similar number of deployed ships; a well 
orchestrated rationalization scheme; a kind of joint administration; a betterment of the 
service based on management and technology; and a larger number of operators. Zim’s 
hub ports in Kingston and Barcelona were utilized by Maruba and Di Gregorio where they 
could offer their customer base new destinations to reach; they also took advantage of the 
global firms’ lower costs to carry out operations at the various terminals, hubs, and inland 
transportation means far from South America. In exchange, the global companies learned 
the way to access and do business successfully in the region from an operational, financial, 
managerial, and legal way. Hanjin also took advantage of Zim’s hubs to connect with their 
round-the-world services while supplying the other members an immense spectrum of 
ports and inland destinations worldwide at much lower costs that any of the others would 
ever have access to. Hanjin’s global transportation chain turned out to be of value not only 
for the regional firms but also for another global company like Zim that despite being 
global knew how to take advantage of Hanjin’s larger scales, lower costs, and deeper 
integration status across the world. Combinations of all types involving ship-repairing, 
chartering and port operations became gradually apparent as the JV developed.    
? Economies of internal control and coordination: the cost of scheduling, coordinating 
operations (ships flagging in and out / bunkering / transshipment / balancing / crewing / 
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dry-docking / money pooling / freight rate policy / financial policy) were set up in Sao 
Paulo, Brazil where Zim had their regional headquarters and information systems for the 
entire region. Having flagged out a couple of vessels within a pre-established 
rationalization program within the JV, Zim proceeded to reduce their operations staff in 
Sao Paulo as well as Maruba who also flagged out two vessels and had their operational 
staff based there. Di Gregorio and Hanjin had to sign on new staff to fulfill a controlling 
function. Many operations were internally compared and only the most efficient and less 
expensive operation was jointly selected for members to permanently use. Ocean 
terminals, containers repair shops, chartering brokers in charge of supplying vessels, and 
all type of suppliers were rationalized and selected accordingly. 
? Economies of Information: integrated operations proved useful not only to reduce the need 
for collecting some types of information about the market, but also to jointly lower the cost 
of gaining information from a rather big number of dynamic variables related to the fleet’s 
daily running cost (DRC)71. The operational centre in Sao Paulo, Brazil was also in charge 
of collecting, calculating, and distributing all the fixed and variable costs further to the 
setting of a margin which also embodied a permanent feedback from the marketing staff 
who were testing the market. Establishing individual carrying capacities according to the 
individual shares and looking into the evolution of both T/C72 and V/C73 rates was a 
function the coordination centre had to fulfill while taking decisions which deemed best 
for the interests of the members. Zim’s intranet was made available to the other members 
for a fee which meant Zim reduced their operations centre cost structure while the other 
members also did so by dismantling their own regional systems and enjoying a more 
economic and efficient system.  
? Economies of avoiding the market: even though some internal transaction costs were faced 
by every member, marketing, selling, negotiating, and transaction costs of the market for 
the individual members could be significantly lowered or internally outsourced with the 
most efficient member. Maruba took a leading position in integrated logistics within the 
                                                 
71 DRC: daily running cost of a vessel embodies all the cost variables that make up the running of a ship which once 
divided by 360 days results in a cost per day. It serves as basis to figure out slot cost, margins and prices or freight 
rates.  
72 T/C: time charter rates mean the on-going rates for hiring a ship on time basis at a given moment. It usually 
displays a daily amount in USD with which a potential charterer may consider for his calculations. 
73 V/C: voyage charter rates mean the on-going rates for hiring a ship to sail from port A to port B, where the 
charterer assumes the responsibility to afford all operational charges concerning the voyage/s. 
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MERCOSUR region because of their knowledge and operational strengths. Maruba’s 
commercial team undertook marketing and fixing deals for the group to share 
proportionally, instead of having every member engaged in any independent 
MERCOSUR-oriented sales. Maruba, Zim led the sales effort for the entire group to 
market the refrigerated cargo segment in view of their knowledge, connections with 
customers, and understanding of the market variables for the benefit of the group. Having 
to hire reefer cargo specialized professionals to work independently in every company 
would have resulted in an enormous waste of resources in terms of very high costs and loss 
of precious time to become known in the marketplace to cope with possibly the most 
yielding segment for a shipping company.  
 
The variable costs table from a global shipping company illustrates the way the imbalance 
impacts on a given cost structure and the rationale behind it is presented in Table 6.2. 
Table 6.2 - Shipping company’s variable costs structure for 20 foot containers in South America for Export 
(above) and Import (below). 
VARIABLE COSTS STRUCTURE FOR 20’ CONTAINERS 
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The table headings have the following meaning: POL means port of loading along with the 
abbreviations of the most important ports of call on SAMEC; Loading refers to the cost of 
loading a container; Feeding is the cost of carrying a container either by feeder vessel or river 
barge which in this case is Asuncion in Paraguay (barging); Drayage refers to any ground 
transportation involved to and from any inland location; Balance is what it would cost for a 
shipping line to reposition a container from a low demand point to a high demand point; 
Equipment is the cost associated to the hire of the container; Commission is the amount of money 
a ship-owners pays to their agents for handling containers; and Total represents the final result of 
the logistic container cost.  
 
The important aspect to bear in mind here is the balance column (5) where a number may be 
positive or negative according to a set of operational topics inherent to a particular port. Thus, 
both Buenos Aires and Montevideo on the river Plate show negative export figures and positive 
import figures. The rationale behind this is that the import freight rate already includes a balance 
cost which covers the repositioning cost of that container from the River Plate to another port in 
Brazil – provided that the import market keeps strong and avoided operators cutting rates to 
compete.  
 
Conversely, the balance cost for the export shows negative values and therefore acts as tool to 
quote competitive ocean freight rates relating to intended evacuation of that container and 
avoiding incurring repositioning costs to Brazil, despite these being covered by the import 
freight. This entails the vessels holding unutilized space on board, or what in other words would 
mean an excess of supply at a given port at a given moment. Therefore it works as a kind of 
subsidy that aims at speeding up the TAT concept. The port of Asuncion in the landlocked 
country of Paraguay offers a different situation. Despite having more imports than exports, the 
former shows a negative balancing number while the latter shows a much bigger negative figure. 
 
The rationale is that while the import trade to Paraguay is a very competitive one and therefore 
needs competitive freight rates, the excess of equipment is to a great extent repositioned at no 
cost on different locations along the Argentine side where there are plenty of exports. However, 
the situation may change the rationale if we address the 40 footers which are designed to carry 
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voluminous and lighter cargoes. Table 6.3 shows the particular case of both Rio Grande (RGB) 
and Itajai (ITJ) ports in Brazil. These two ports have practically no imports and therefore show a 
neutral balancing cost on the southbound leg, while on the exports the balancing represents the 
re-positioning costs from nearby ports holding an excess of 40 footers (e.g. Buenos Aires; 
Montevideo). The port of Santos (SNT) faces both a high level of competition on the southbound 
leg and a growing need of containers on the northbound, this process leading to show a negative 
balancing on the import while keeping it neutral or competitive on the export.  
 
Table 6.3:  Shipping company’s variable costs structure for 40 foot containers in South America. 
VARIABLE COSTS STRUCTURE FOR 40’ CONTAINERS
 
  
A different situation can be observed in Rio do Janeiro (RIO) where there is an historic 
overstocking of containers, this is because the import balancing cost is heavily charged while on 
the export side the balance variable is nil. While RIO is not often serviced southbound by the 
competition, practically all shipping companies are calling at RIO on the northbound leg of the 
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journey. This is the reason why the Brazilian importer or foreign exporter can afford paying not 
only such a high balance costs but also the feeding costs via a third port. Both the frequency of 
sailings and the available carrying capacity define a given port terminal’s competition level and 
consequently leads to a given balancing policy on the part of the shipping companies. Greater 
globalized or interconnected a shipping company leads to improved chances for optimizing 
shipping operations. 
 
Every port has its own stock and balance position further to facing market particulars that are 
inherent to its own market dynamics and structure. Consequently it becomes apparent that 
counting on such a detailed matrix of information on a regular basis (not only for the region but 
also with respect to a long list of extra-regional ports that are somehow connected with the region 
on worldwide basis) entails a great effort in terms of market information, knowledge sharing and 
transfer, cooperation, collaboration, and definitely a good amount of trust. Whoever has a well 
organized and efficiently managed system of global equipment balancing already holds a 
strategic tool that will make its regional presence more sustainable than those who do not.    
 
Result of a number of informal interviews that were conducted by the author during the JV and 
right after it started working will be exposed and compared with the author’s own opinions and 
views based on his direct observation and participation throughout the process in the next section. 
 
6.2.4. - Interviews, comments and insights 
I played two roles relating to this specific case which gave me a parallel view and most 
importantly, the opportunity to informally discuss a variety of relevant issues to this case study 
with some of the referents at the time the JV was formed. Firstly, I participated in the 
negotiations on Zim’s behalf as country manager for Argentina. Secondly, I initiated the 
promotion of the Corridor concept across the region by explaining it and recruiting potential 
candidates. 
 
Therefore, in this dual role I was able to approach a number of key executives and gather, assess 
and validate their opinions, views, insights, as well as fears or contradictions relating to issues 
discussed. I was also aware of potential biases that could potentially arise out of my direct 
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participation in one of the JV firms. This is why I laid a greater emphasis on discussing issues 
with Zim executives to offset personal insights that could excessively reinforce or support sought 
answers to the research questions.  
 
It is my considered opinion that this JV owes its sentiment to: (a) false expectations of the 
region’s growth and other developments leading to a market over-tonnage/oversupply for both 
the regional firms and the outsiders and newcomers; and (b) the speed and aggressiveness with 
which the globalization phenomena expanded into the MERCOSUR. Cooperation or 
collaboration was neither natural nor common before the above two issues emerged within the 
region. On the contrary, rivalry, secrecy, pride, distrust, and a cautious optimism on what the 
regional future might bring did reign in the minds and spirits of both the corporations and their 
managers. 
 
Cooperation and collaboration appeared as distant issues to be achieved amongst those who were 
considered as fierce rivals and even liable for the on-going market over-supply and its consequent 
fall in ocean freight rates. Knowledge sharing and transfer was therefore a totally internal issue. 
Sharing economic and market information was a matter to be dealt with only by a few within a 
limited corporate circle of trust. The main objective of the Corridor roundtables was to widen that 
circle to allow knowledge, cooperation, collaboration and leadership to emerge and evolve. 
 
Edgardo Illia - Zim’s director of operations based in Buenos Aires – commented74: “When the 
over-tonnage became apparent and together with it the fall of freight rates and cargo volumes, 
we all realized that we were going to face a downsizing process, rather sooner than later. When 
we started to attend the roundtables I must admit I was totally lost as I used to regard all the 
attendees as rivals or in the best of cases as colleagues – provided they did not operate or traffic 
where my company operated. I was close-minded and went through many feelings that had 
nothing to do with trust build or knowledge sharing. I never felt comfortable with disclosing the 
real situation my company was going through before others. However, I found a more open-
                                                 
74  Note that all quoted comments in this thesis are translations from Spanish or Portuguese and have been    
     checked for validity of meaning with each quoted person. 
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minded behavior coming from my foreign-based principals who obviously did no have any 
resentment or bad feelings against other players – possibly because of their past global joint-
venture experiences with Hanjin and others companies. I learnt to share information and 
conceptualize others’ information from my foreign bosses who also used to attend these meetings 
aiming at identifying potential partners. In other words, I did make up my mind from total 
indifference and mistrust to a gradual and growing acceptance towards concepts that sounded 
weird to my ears such as CoP, roundtable forums, knowledge sharing and transfer.” 
 
I remember having operated a dozen full-container ships when representing Zim Lines in the 
River Plate. We all felt proud of our fleet which by then was regarded as being technologically 
more advanced than that of most of our competitors. We all felt confident about the company’s 
capability to further expand toward SAMWC and from there to the Asia-Pacific market - thanks 
to the driving force arising out of the ever-expanding MERCOSUR cargo flows.  
 
All of a sudden we started witnessing the arrival of global companies searching for executives 
with regional business experience while announcing the launching of new services of global 
reach and state of-the-art technology. The market transformed so quickly that we saw our 
executives flocking to these new global recruiters while at the same time our cargo flows started 
spiraling downward. 
 
To summarize, partnering seemed to be our only option to keep active in business as 
globalization showed no mercy to those lacking significant economies of scale or a given level of 
integration. Edgardo Illia commented further that the MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor was for 
them like being in limbo as skepticism, rivalry, and possibly hidden agendas were suspected to be 
present; “I found myself very uncomfortable to share a roundtable with people I could barely 
stand out”. 
 
He further carries on to admit or recognize that once the personal antipathy phase was somehow 
overcome (or at least tolerated) knowledge sharing started to flow in terms of informal 
conversations during occasional encounters or coffee breaks right before or after the roundtable 
forums were held. He also recognized that with the passing of time and the business context 
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becoming increasingly threatening, they all started to gradually open their minds and share more 
vital information in a much more sincere and open way.    
 
Carlos Milione was by then Multicargo’s CEO for South America – an Italian-based freight 
forwarding company who became one of the main cargo providers for Zim as well as very well 
known by the other three members of the JV. He was an active participant of the roundtable 
forums representing his leadership role of this freight forwarding company and their multiple 
logistic operations across Brazil and Argentina. 
 
When asked about the way Multicargo formulated and implemented their business planning in a 
volatile and changing context, he replied: “Since we started operating in South America we never 
applied any linear model as we used to do in Europe but had to limit ourselves to drawing 
analogies and try to recognize patterns to better face the unexpected. In this regard the 
roundtable forums turned out to be an exceptional place to listen and conceptualize others’ 
experiences and methods to face the unexpected – further to make strategic contacts in order to 
prepare the ground for potential alliances”. Mr. Milione’s comments seem having a link with 
Courtney, Kirkland and Viguerie’s (1997) true ambiguity concept where there is no solid basis to 
forecast the future, other than innovating and looking for new patterns. “As a logistic company, 
we were accustomed to do market intelligence; this is attending to every possible meeting; 
exchanging information with key market referents; capturing evolving situations and identifying 
new trends; raising daring comments to provoke others to make their statements and get them 
contrasted with others’ opinions. So I found myself very comfortable attending the forums. 
However, it was hard for me to understand what the real value was for all those people attending 
the forums without showing any willingness to share information”. 
 
 Edgardo Illia was also of the opinion that it was extremely unlikely to start sharing information 
or data in a sort of public event especially when apparently nobody knew well what they were 
doing there. “Everybody was very much expectant to see what the others were about to say or 
what kind of data and information was going to be disclosed. I found those events really closed 
and useless owing to its rigid formality that focused too much on corporate presentations without 
really addressing the upcoming trends or current problems. However, I must admit that most of 
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my personal progress in terms of contacts and information flow was achieved through informal 
communications on a face-to-face basis, far from the stage or public exposure. Informal 
communication channels worked beautifully and actually proved essential in easing the JV that 
was later implemented”. 
 
Alejandro Faliotti was Maruba’s operational link with the other members of the JV as far as joint 
port operations and inland logistics were concerned all over the MERCOSUR ports. His role was 
crucial in organizing Sao Paulo’s coordination center where three shipping companies and a huge 
road transportation firm had to bring all their operational and systems data to be coordinated and 
therefore optimized. Mr. Faliotti’s view can be summarized as follows: “What I went through at 
the Corridor roundtable forums turned out to be much easier than having to deal and negotiate 
with the JV partners once the alliance was made. The globalization trend  spread out all over the 
region so fast and so aggressively that one had to be blind not to realizing what was coming 
along with the impact on all and every of us here. The coming of the global carriers along with a 
tremendous excess of supply and a consequent fall in the ocean freight rates made it clear there 
was a need for a deep and fast reengineering process of their respective business for all the 
regional players. In our case it turned out to be simple: Maruba neither had enough economies 
of scale to compete with the cost efficiencies held by the global carriers, nor the needed 
horizontal integration to offset the global companies’ on-shore logistic activities”. 
 
Mr Faliotti argues that it quickly became a kind of learning organization perhaps because of the 
fact his company was regional and not global—and therefore was aligned with those who felt 
threatened by globalization. Garvin (1998, pp48-78) contends who contends that an organization 
cannot improve without first learning something new and that solving a problem, launching a 
service, or reengineering a process all require adopting a learning attitude on the part of both 
companies and individuals.  
 
Mr. Faliotti further commented on the way he perceived the globalization impact on the regional 
business: “we all of a sudden became open and receptive not only to exchange vital information 
with the larger firms but also to make available our regional knowledge to the newcomers. I 
would rather regard this situation as a self defense attitude rather than a genuine desire on the 
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part of the regional firms to pursue any managerial excellence criteria or diversification 
strategy. We also foresaw a  unique opportunity not only to learn and capture the knowledge on 
operations from the global ones, but also to expand our services by making use of their existing 
global infrastructure at very competitive costs – which for them turned out negligible in terms of 
volume and for us was simply huge”. 
 
It becomes apparent that the opening learning process for the regional companies was slow and 
hard at the outset regardless of how skeptical or optimistic their executives might have felt with 
the on-going system. However, they all seemed to open up and let knowledge sharing and 
transfer occur at a much faster rate and to intensify cooperation and collaboration as time passed 
and they faced rapidly approaching globalization forces. 
 
Di Gregorio’s regional manager Mr. Federico Faliotti was in charge of representing the company 
before the roundtables and for identifying and initiating conversations with those potential JV 
partners. When asked for his impressions on the way leadership emerged in those forums he 
replied: “Leadership at the outset was brought to the roundtables by the Corridor brokers who 
were all the time highlighting the importance for all the attendees to take the lead of their own 
segments by displaying what their problems, limitations or even opportunities were to cooperate 
in search of larger economies of scale, associations, partnerships etc. Firstly, there were global 
companies with existing services in the region to take the lead; secondly there were global firms 
with little or no presence in the region; and finally the regional firms were the ones playing the 
role of followers though pretty active in terms of joining committees, teams, and working groups 
specialized in different segments of activity”.  
 
It becomes apparent here that the concept of the CoP was born somehow naturally - though it was 
indisputably driven by the leadership on the part of the global companies who held more 
experience and showed themselves much more receptive. “Leadership here had no connection 
with origin or nationality but that with knowledge and possibly international or global 
experience. When the time came for the regional companies to expose their weaknesses and 
strengths it was very clear that the leadership in conducting alliances and partnerships were on 
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their side and not on the global firms – who appeared more interested in achieving a wider 
market coverage than finding managerial quality or assets differentiation”.          
 
Sharp differences were identified when addressing the issue of cultural barriers and assessing 
whether they impeded or fostered the dialogue among the stakeholders. Mr. Edgardo Illia of Zim 
and Mr. Alejandro Faliotti of Maruba – both Argentine nationals – were of the opinion that the 
globalization threat flattened all possible differences in favor of a rapid and straight forward 
approach to the main topics. The other two JV executives held a different perspective. Di 
Gregorio’s Federico Faliotti – Brazilian national – categorized their Argentine colleagues as less 
open-minded and cautious than both his team and Brazilian executives in general. He regarded 
the Brazilian executives as more willing to share experiences and more open to disclose what it 
might be considered strategic business data.  
 
Multicargo’s Carlos Milione – Italian national – was of the same opinion than Di Gregorio’s 
executive though highlighted the fact that despite their apparent initial mistrust on the functioning 
of the roundtables and the disclosing of key data and information, the Argentine executives were 
surpassed by the business context that demanded to find urgent alternative ways of action and 
therefore compelled them to leave any resentment or mistrust aside to give themselves a chance 
to reengineer by complementing other firm’s services, partnering or finding a strategic ally to get 
integrated with. 
 
One may infer at this point that for the Brazilian firms holding larger economies of scale and a 
more advanced technology may have granted them a (perhaps limited) sense of confidence  to 
face the globalization wave in better shape with respect to knowledge, cooperation, and 
leadership.  
 
The next section will draw some preliminary conclusions on this first case study.  
 
6.2.5. - Conclusions on case study # 1 
I have participated in various roundtable forums almost from the outset of the Corridor and had 
the opportunity to witness the difficulty the attendants had to communicate and interact with their 
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peers, competitors and participants in general. However, this situation was not too much different 
from that of any typical professional conference, symposium, or seminar regardless of topic. The 
following summarizes the case findings:  
1. Forum attendees did not come to the forums to learn or selectively pick a piece of 
information on a specific issue. They attended with the intention to discover a new 
dimension for their businesses as well as to better understand the context they were 
operating in. However, and as earlier referred to by a global company representative, 
leadership was exerted by those who went through similar critical situations in other 
geographical areas outside the Corridor who had previously engaged in negotiating JVs 
and alliances of various kinds in business scenarios of perhaps greater cultural complexity 
– e.g. Asia-Pacific; Middle East.  
2. Leadership seems first to have been taken by those global operators with both regional and 
global experience to be later be followed by global companies that held a lesser-relative 
degree of commitment to the region. However, an upcoming threatening business 
environment dominated by a growing excess of tonnage and a depressing ocean freight 
market seemed to ease all sorts of interactions and communications amongst at least a 
majority of the attendees. The launching of new global and fully integrated logistic 
services across the region can be considered as an astonishing experience for all those 
regional companies and executives accustomed to an almost linear-projected and legally-
constrained business context. This kind of executive was precisely the one that showed a 
relatively lower level of willingness to share knowledge when compared to those holding 
international experience or having lived comparable experiences abroad. 
3. It was apparent that the openness of people to reveal data and information they believe was 
important, did not depend so much on their culture or nationality, but that was more 
related to their company’s relative strength and competitive position in a given activity. 
Relative forces and market positioning appears have to played a role in influencing the 
executives’ minds and attitudes at that time to expose, comment, or communicate their 
motivations. 
4. All interviewees appear to agree with my observations that rivalries and personal mistrust 
tend to soften over time to eventually become resolved. This process led first to an 
informal and tacit face-to-face stage of preliminary communication, to later bring about a 
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more formal and sometimes explicit knowledge sharing and transfer process in the form of 
a potential corporate cooperation, integration, alliance, or partnership of any sort.  
5. The way CoPs became established and evolved within the forums and their members 
managed to actually overcome barriers such as: mistrust, envy and antipathy (relationship 
inhibiting); information ambiguity and knowledge viscosity (knowledge hording); cultural 
rivalry as well as many other possible relevant leader-follower aspects (commitment 
barriers). There was something about the way that these CoPs operated that helped build 
trust, build commitment, develop a general understanding of the threat facing these 
companies, and to focus a means to counter the threat.  
6. There seemed to having been a mother or master vision concept present that eventually, 
one way or the other, pushed most attendees toward reengineering their businesses or to 
simply face commercial extinction.  The impact of globalization can therefore be regarded 
as the real driver and trigger for companies of different size, structure, and segment to 
want to get together in search of a new business dimension. This process also brought 
about a tremendous business possibility for those secondary stakeholders that had no direct 
interest in any logistic segment but rendered consulting, engineering, legal, insurance, 
environmental, and further services. For them, their businesses being already more 
international in nature, the process the logistic community was going through meant 
nothing short of a business opportunity in itself to facilitate the upcoming organizational 
transformations.  
7. It can be affirmed that even though the globalization wave was the main driver toward 
knowledge sharing and transfer that later led to a number of associations, it was also the 
critical high value traditional knowledge held by a number of regional operators combined 
with the existing cultural asymmetries between the outsiders and the regional players that 
helped the latter retain sufficient competitive value to therefore remain active in their 
respective fields – though with a transformed managerial and operational structure. 
8. Leadership seems to have been initially exercised by those holding an extensive level of 
overseas experience as well as those companies that owing to their size and relative market 
position, felt secure enough to open up and expose their situations, views, and expectations 
through knowledge sharing. This sharing process did not naturally turn into a transferring 
stage until a certain level of trust had been achieved among the attendees. 
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9. Globalization as such, seems to have sped up the process for the leaders and immediate 
followers to engage in a number of transformations that helped them overcome the 
upcoming challenges. Globalization also induced the laggards, often holding lesser relative 
market share and a weaker market positioning, to imitate the leaders and take positive 
action upon their businesses and structures.  
 
Case study 1 illustrated how the Corridor leaders engaged in enterprise and how it acted as a 
trigger for a transformation project or program of changes.  The next case study involves one of 
the leading participants of the roundtable forums (a global shipping firm with presence in the 
region) that could be considered an immediate follower though holding a strong market position 
and large structure (a railway company) – as well as a number of laggards represented by 
trucking companies of small operative range.   
 
6.3– CASE STUDY # 2: INTRODUCTION 
This provides another example of the ‘project’ being a sophisticated program of work involving a 
business transformation entailing managing the change initiation as well as one that involved 
managing networks of players as well as multiple business re-engineering process improvements 
as outlined in Section 6.1, this involves a multimodal transportation transformation. Table 6.4 
provides summary information about the case study. 
 
Table 6.4-  Sources of Data for Case Study # 2 
Company Source Content Notes 
Zim Line Operations Director for 10 
years at Zim; Operations 
Manager for 6 years at 
Delta Line; Multimodal 
Manager for 10 years at 
Elma. 
Knowledge sharing 
and transfer strategy 
within the roundtable 
forums. 
Numerous comments and 
exchange of opinions were 
registered in view of my capacity 
of Corridor promoter and Zim 
executive. Notes and comments 
were taken and periodically 
reviewed and discussed with the 
source from 1997 up to 2000. 
BAP Marketing Manager for 5 
years after holding various 
positions at BAP on traffic, 
operations, and quality 
control for more than 10 
years. 
Reengineering 
strategy: how to shift 
from follower to 
leader while 
overcoming apparent 
cultural inhibitors. 
A limited number of informal 
chats held during coffee breaks in 
the roundtable forums during 
02/1996 and 06/1996 – while the 
land-bridge was designed and put 
into practice. Also in my capacity 
of Zim executive had access to 
some deeper insights on BAP’s 
expectations and comments 
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during operational coordination 
meetings. 
Refinerias De Maiz Commercial Director for 5 
years at Refinerias; CEO of 
Kraft Foods; and 
International Business 
Director for Molinos Rio 
De La Plata (all of them 
large corporations with a 
diversified global business 
base). 
Tangible benefits from 
CoP through 
knowledge sharing. 
Occasional short gatherings during 
roundtable forums, where practical 
concepts on operational issues and 
alternative opinions were 
registered while ideas were 
exchanged and assessed.  Data 
gathering took place between 
approximately 6 months intervals 
from 1997 and 1999. Data was 
validated with the source by early 
2008. 
P&O Ports Operations Manager for 
more than 6 years and an 
extensive experience in the 
River Plate port business 
for more than 2 decades.  
Corporate strategy. Two short informal conversations 
held in 06/1998 as well as my 
private observations of the 
different roles P&O adopted 
according to who the participants 
were. Data was checked with the 
source in 2007.  
Zim Lines - BAP Senior Managers Operations planning 
and logistics design 
implementation. 
Planning and coordination 
meetings leading to the exchange 
of concepts and opinions inherent 
to the Corridor’s contribution on 
knowledge sharing and transfer.  
 
This case study involves two direct participants and a number of indirect stakeholders or service 
providers without whom this project would have been impossible even to formulate. This project 
was about setting up a combined multimodal transportation system linking two continents and a 
number of markets spread out across Western and Eastern Europe with Chile in South America.  
 
The SAWC market was (prior to the Case Study  #2 JV formation) normally serviced from the 
Mediterranean trade by various shipping liners deploying both full-container vessels and multi-
purpose ships75 that called regularly at a number of ports along western Europe (Spain / France / 
Italy) and a number of ports in Chile – mainly San Antonio or Valparaiso. San Antonio was by 
definition a container terminal designed to efficiently handle the loading, discharging and transfer 
of containers from and to full-container vessels. 
 
Valparaiso fulfilled both roles – container and break-bulk cargo terminal. Actually Valparaiso 
turned out to be more efficient in handling refrigerated and dry break-bulk cargo while the 
                                                 
75 Multi-purpose ships are those designed to carry a variety of cargo types such as containers, loosen pieces of cargo, 
refrigerated cargo, and in some cases liquid bulk cargo. They were design to complement the full-container vessels 
servicing only the container segment.  
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container segment kept predominantly dominated by San Antonio. However, Valparaiso became 
congested during the export season of reefer cargoes often leading the container segment to 
entirely being operated from the San Antonio container terminal. 
 
Both San Antonio and Valparaiso lie equidistant to Chile’s capital and most important industrial 
pole – Santiago. Import and export goods, to and from the Mediterranean market, were met 
through the two mentioned ports by sea-going full-container vessels. Typically these services 
used to call at the ports of Genoa, Leghorn, Naples, Marseille, Valencia, and Barcelona in Europe 
further to connecting with Eastern Europe markets by utilizing any of the mentioned ports as 
hubs or transshipment ports towards SAWC. Even though the SAWC market embodied Chile, 
Peru, Ecuador, and Colombia, there were few existing liner shipping services because of the 
relatively lower available cargo volumes when compared to the SAEC market where. Brazil was 
the principal market driver of the SAEC that attracted many shipping companies even further 
south into the River Plate by adding greater economies of scale.  
 
Brazil’s GDP was by then 5 times Argentina’s, while the latter’s GDP was 3 times that of Chile. 
This lesser relative GDP scales on the SAWC along with the absence of a huge or leading 
regional GDP explains why the SAWC trade was less serviced than the SAEC. One may infer 
that this was the reason why the globalization wave focused first on SAEC to only later reach 
certain specific segments on SAWC.  
 
This market situation (along with the Panama Canal costs ship-owners had to face to have access 
to the Pacific Ocean) led to a level of ocean freight rates of greater relative cost as compared to 
the existing levels on SAEC’s Atlantic Ocean. While the trade between the Mediterranean and 
SAEC market offered a sailing every 2.5 days, the Chilean ports were called at every 8 days. This 
situation led to less competition and consequently to a higher relative level of ocean freight rates, 
longer transit times, congestion surcharges, as well as recurrent waiting times at the 
transshipment ports in Europe.  
 
The alternative to competing with this situation was to set up a door-to-door service linking both 
west and east European ports and inland locations with Buenos Aires port in the River Plate to 
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further continue on a land-bridge mode up to the industrial pole of Santiago. Detrimental factors 
for the SAWC market included the relative lack of a competitive sailing frequency along with a 
higher relative cost and longer transit times through the Panama Canal to reach Chilean ports. 
However, this presented an attractive window of opportunity to exploit finding a land-bridge 
alternative. 
 
The Mendoza market in Argentina was of critical importance in the development of the 
economics of a land-bridge as it provided strong and ever-growing cargo flows that could help in 
utilizing the containers that had returned empty to Mendoza from Chile having exported regional 
goods. While most imports to Chile demanded 40 foot containers – used for lighter cargoes – 
exports from Mendoza mostly required 20 foot containers – designed to carry heavier cargoes. 
Therefore a growing imbalance of empty containers threatened the whole logistic rational of the 
land-bridge which was eventually worked out by adapting the relative heavier cargo flows ex 
Mendoza to partly fit into the 40 foot containers.  
 
This sub-utilization of the equipment was aimed at achieving an acceptable equipment turn-
around-time that enabled the shipping companies to profit from the horizontal integration without 
running the risk many ship-owning firms incurred in the past when dealing with long TAT ratios 
and large numbers of lost equipment on worldwide basis. This efficient utilization of the 
equipment counted on the cooperation of the interested parties who accepted reengineering their 
operations and lowering their margins to remain competitive enough to capture a new promising 
market. Thus Zim Lines, BAP, and a number of contracting parties showed a high degree of 
corporate cooperation and leadership to make the land-bridge competitive. The next section will 
explain in better detail the way this land-bridge worked and the rationale behind it.  
 
6.3.1. –Structure of the alliance 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the nature of this case study alliance. 
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Figure 6.2 :  Case Study 2 Alliance Relationships 
 
Two firms were involved from the beginning of the project while a number of companies that 
fulfilled different roles gradually joined to set up a strategic alliance for the duration of the 
project. One of the leading companies was Zim Lines whose structure and scope of services was 
duly exposed in the first case study. Zim Lines was in charge of providing ocean transportation 
services from the entire Mediterranean market up to its regular port of call in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. While western Mediterranean ports were serviced directly, both eastern Mediterranean 
and northern African ports were serviced either via Barcelona or Marseille. The port of Haifa in 
Israel was not only used as a second transshipment port but also as the entry gate to Chile for the 
entire inland Eastern Europe market. Therefore the land-bridge represented a huge market to 
focus upon and to develop by taking advantage from the by then on-going inefficiencies on 
SAWC market.     
 
The other leading company was by then named BAP railways or Buenos Aires al Pacifico rail 
services. The Buenos Aires and Pacific Railway (BAP) was one of the Big Four broad gauge 
British-owned companies that built and operated railway networks in Argentina. This company 
provided railway services from their Buenos Aires railhead up to their terminal in Mendoza city – 
about 1000 kilometers west of Buenos Aires and lying on the Andes Cordillera.  
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Linking road transportation services between the port terminal and Buenos Aires railhead was an 
operation almost completely outsourced to a number of independent domestic operators, further 
to BAP that also provided a number of trucks of their own to assure a minimum safety level of 
cargo flow operations. Trucking services from Mendoza’s railhead to Chile and back were 
entirely outsourced to a number of bi-national trucking companies from both Argentina and 
Chile.  
 
In addition to the road transportation component of the alliance, a number of ancillary services 
were either outsourced or integrated in the alliance including ship-agency services, warehousing 
operations, crane operations, customs brokerage, insurance services, cargo surveys, and others. 
 
Possibly the strength of the alliance laid in the complementing role of the various players to 
render a competitive service on a sea-road-rail mode aiming at outperforming the traditional 
direct ocean shipping services linking the Mediterranean market and the Chilean ports. The land-
bridge achieved a lower level of freight rates and therefore a more competitive service profile. An 
important feature was the existing transit times were shortened by 1/3 thanks to holding a better 
frequency of sailing ex Europe as well as shorter distances and no Panama Canal to get through. 
 
Europe is to Argentina what the Asia Pacific region is to Chile in terms of distances and access to 
logistic services and operational combinations. The economies of scales between Chile and 
Argentina will always make the latter being better serviced than the former.  
 
An additional advantage was given by the fact that by the time the alliance was set up and the 
land-bridge established, shipping companies rendered their services on a port-to-port basis 
without involving themselves in additional services that could have granted them both more 
control on the cargo-routing decision making and possibly achieving higher margins. Therefore 
horizontal integration was practically non-existent as the market remained untouched for so long 
that every segment did develop by looking inwards and without watching global trends in similar 
markets. 
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 The way this group of shipping companies rendered their services in SAWC by the early 90s, 
was representative of an on-going business environment characterized by their firms, shipping 
agencies, ground transportation companies, warehousing firms, port terminal operators, customs 
brokers and many other ancillary services facing little competition within a cartelized business 
context, modest innovation, fleet ageing, protective cargo legislation, no clear market leadership 
of any group, and very little natural integration.   
 
On the railways side, Argentina had South America’s most extensive railway network that 
despite connecting with the gauges of all the neighboring countries (Chile / Bolivia / Paraguay / 
Brazil) concentrated only on carrying domestic cargoes with no projection outside their domestic 
market. Analogies can be found in both Chilean and Brazilian networks, for reasons of 
geopolitical nature and beyond the scope of this thesis. 
 
Therefore it becomes apparent that the land-bridge can well be regarded as the initiator of a new 
concept that brought about a complete new horizon for developing land-bridges within the 
MERCOSUR region. The following section will bring to the reader’s attention some operational 
particulars of both the land-bridge and its players further to their opinions and views on the way 
the Corridor has played its role in paving the road of a good part of the alliances and JVs across 
the region. 
 
 
6.3.2. –The corridor as a facilitator 
Once the globalization process affected the region, practically all on-shore transportation 
operators as well as the ancillary services found themselves non-integrated, working isolated 
from one another, and functioning within a world where concepts such as strategic alliance, 
innovation, differentiation, and diversification were not seriously considered. This situation 
happened to be common on both sides of the Cordillera.  
 
The very first example was Zim Lines that operated a number of lines with 12 vessels that soon 
had to partly flagged-off to reengineer their structure as it was explained in Case Study #1. 
Secondly it was the railway company that focused all its efforts on the domestic market as if a 
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country’s economy (in this case Argentina) was immune to any kind of foreign-based economic 
competitive trend. They believed in a sort of linear market model with no outer economic 
interference to successfully expand by strengthening their services either regionally or even 
internationally. This was exemplified by their reliance on all necessary legacy infrastructure 
elements that the British had envisioned and designed a long time ago in the country—plenty of 
rolling stock; direct access to leading industries; direct access to port terminals; access to 
strategically located markets and industrial poles; fully operational rail-heads; cranes; trucks; etc.  
 
A similar situation can be illustrated by a number of road transportation services which, before 
the land-bridge was launched, did not even try to complement their services with that of the 
various railway companies to better cope with the available market segments. Each trucking 
company focused on their base Province and dedicated themselves to render services to and from 
their respective Provinces. 
 
This situation hindered the operators from realizing how low entry barriers were to their markets 
or their weaknesses relative to larger scaled competitors. Among the ancillary services the ship-
agencies were the ones who showed a total passivity towards innovative service trends. This was 
despite the fact that they generally represented a business sector which had the closest links with 
the shipping business. One would have expected this kind of access to knowledge of emerging 
global trends to have penetrated the consciousness of these ship-agencies. 
 
Edgardo Illia – Director of Operations at Zim Lines in Buenos Aires – highlighted the fact that 
for them meeting logistic operators of different kinds (other than ship-owners)  was a truly 
enriching experience; “Being myself fully committed with the shipping business itself and with the 
company I represented, sharing views and opinions on the upcoming trends with different 
sectors’ colleagues, as well as witnessing the way the attendees tended to relate to one another 
regardless of the sector they were engaged in, was truly demonstrative of the Corridor potential. 
The inhibition I experienced when facing competitors on the shipping business vanished almost 
completely when talking to railways, trucking companies, feeding or river barge firms”.  
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Walter Markevich was BAP’s Marketing Manager and was perhaps a dynamic activist in 
pursuing some sort of complementation that might enable his company increase the cargo 
volumes and intend reaching some innovation degree. “I was personally convinced that with the 
coming of the large global carriers to the region and the relative loss of importance the domestic 
market held to our company, we were compelled to look for some sort of reengineering. By the 
time we joined the Corridor and started attending the roundtable forums we did not have a clear 
idea of what we were looking for or what to expect from it. We just intended to experiment with 
offering some approaches to a number of shipping companies to see whether they might be 
interested to outsource their inland door to door services through our railway network. Nothing 
very innovative I presume. However, one of these shipping firms brought up the idea of a land-
bridge and all continued from there as we all know. I would say we pretty much followed the 
attitude and behavior others were taking by approaching colleagues and competitors to exchange 
views and opinions”.     
 
When asked about the best way to contact potential allies and if tacit or explicit information was 
as a result, best to their ends. Both Edgardo Illia and Walter Markevich replied that exchanging 
tacit information delivered in an informal fashion was definitely best used to sound out potential 
firms. Face to face contact was primarily of paramount importance to establish the relationship 
that enabled them to later look into detailed facts and figures. Cultural barriers to knowledge 
transfer were not specifically identified but were categorized simply as cultural differences that 
had an impact on timing and decisiveness of engagement, but appeared to have no tangible 
effects on conceptual or central issues. 
 
In this regard Walter Markevich emphasized that when approaching regional companies to 
exchange opinions and views on a specific market situation, he only later realized that they 
actually were sounding each other out without being really aware of it. In this exercise he noticed 
a certain resistance on both their colleagues and themselves to freely expose their arguments 
though he attributed this phenomenon to be a rather natural human behavior and not too much of 
cultural inhibitors or barriers of any kind. 
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Refinerias De Maiz is an Argentinean top ten exporter of agricultural products. Marcelo Rosatto, 
Commercial Director, was the company’s representative at the roundtables and an active 
participant in all those topics concerning regional logistics operators and available physical 
infrastructure. He stated that “In my capacity of exporter I never attended the roundtable forums 
to find a business partner with whom I could formalize a strategic alliance. On the contrary, I felt 
free to expose what our operational limitations were and claim from the participants to help us 
overcome those problems. Therefore I’ve never gone through any sense of cautiousness or 
mistrust on the part of the attendees when sharing information. I must admit that the complexity 
of the problems that were often exposed resulted for me a bit difficult to comprehend as they were 
entirely logistic issues beyond my scope of interest. I was in fact trying to make sure these 
companies found the solutions to our global problems and not the other way around”. 
 
When asked about how he would regard the roundtable forums should his company have to look 
for a partner he replied, “It was not my case but if I had to propose an event or (business 
knowledge exchange) system for my company to attend and try to identify a suitable firm to get it 
vertically integrated in with, no doubt it would be the Corridor roundtables. However, I imagine 
their apparent positive attitude toward sharing data and keeping open and frank in their views 
and perspectives may have been influenced by the on-going business context. My company is a 
leading exporting firm and therefore I do not imagine the Corridor roundtables being of any 
potential other than a suitable forum to expose my company’s operational bottlenecks and 
naturally demand solutions from them. I do not see an agricultural exporter of our size 
committing to a vertical integration process with a company we came to know in a forum of this 
kind because of two things: a) we do not need it as the degree of integration in a business like 
ours is in fact pretty low, and b) we have enough global contacts to undertake an integration 
strategy should we decide to”. 
 
When asked about the extent to which he came to comprehend what was discussed or exposed in 
the forums, he explained that he was aware that he was witnessing a rather rich or complex 
knowledge transfer process amongst the logistic companies though he stated he was not really 
qualified to follow the discussions. Even though it becomes apparent that, knowledge stickiness 
was a factor for Refinerias De Maiz, the Corridor roundtable meetings became useful for it to 
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investigate various business problem solutions that otherwise would have incurred a waste of 
resources (in terms of time and personnel).   
 
A clear leadership role seemed evident for many of the participants in the sense that companies 
who exerted control on the cargo routing decision-making, were the ones showing leadership in 
the discussions, while the all other firms rendering supporting services regardless of their size and 
structure seemed to be the followers. 
 
This was apparently the case of the railway company BAP which, despite counting on a huge 
federal structure within Argentina as well as regional connections, had little influence on the 
cargo routing. BAP’s marketing manager defined the role his company adopted during the 
roundtable forums: “It turned out to be a bit embarrassing I must admit but we had no option. In 
terms of leaders and followers we definitely were followers despite having lots of physical and 
human resources at our disposal. The reality showed us we had no control on the cargo routing 
though we could become an essential part of the chain should we follow the shipping companies 
and ally to one or two of them to better operate our rolling stock”.  
 
For the railway company it becomes apparent that the roundtable forums gave them the 
opportunity to not only get in touch with potential allies but to also better face the impact of 
globalization, and to also realize (and most importantly to conceptualize) their real role in the 
market. 
 
P&O’s operations manager Carlos Barbero had a partly coincident opinion as regards who led 
and who followed in the discussions: “We sometimes adopted a clear leadership position while 
in other occasions we found ourselves half way in topics we had nothing to say but, owing to our 
structure and economic importance for the region, we could not be seen as followers”. 
 
He commented on the various topics they had a say in by making a clear distinction between 
those they had control over and those they had little or no control over: “Naturally Zim was our 
client in Buenos Aires and we were compelled to listen and follow their directives. However, even 
though the railway company had direct access to the berths to operate alongside ships and make 
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the whole land-bridge operations really efficient, it was up to us to permit this operation by 
negotiating with the port railway union. So sometimes we just felt ourselves to be followers with 
a say on our client’s planning, while other times we were clearly the leaders”.  
 
P&O’s terminal operations manager opinion on the Corridor as a facilitator seems to be not that 
positive or at least a bit ambiguous: “I personally do not believe in companies exchanging 
information and key data. I believe the roundtables were a good place to interact and develop 
personal relationships at a corporate level, but by no means proved useful to develop a solid 
business strategy or a place where someone could pick up a challenging idea”. 
 
However, the land-bridge seemed gathering all the variables of a challenging concept while the 
port terminal also seemed having benefited from additional traffic which otherwise would never 
have likely been realized. When asked about the leader-follower relationship and the real value of 
the Corridor itself, Zim’s operations director stated: “I do not really know whether we were 
leaders or followers. I can only say we were all immersed in a kind of anxiety that led us to find 
ideas, concepts and elements that could help us identify a way of achieving larger economies of 
scale while remaining competitive. We were aware of what was coming and that we had to 
somehow reengineer to get by. I must admit that we could have approached the railway company 
long before meeting them at the roundtable. However I doubt very much that an approach would 
have evolved the way it eventually did as the Corridor gave us the unique opportunity to 
exchange lots of tacit information that later turned into explicit. Face to face contact was also of 
paramount importance to face hidden agendas, preconceptions of any kind, and to build trust. At 
the end of the day we all were members of the same Club”. 
 
It becomes apparent that there is no single current of opinion as the way each executive felt the 
pressure of the globalization impact. It also has to do also with the size and structure of their 
organizations as well as the role their own organizations were taking while in the roundtable 
forums. The next section will address some preliminary conclusions.  
 
 223
6.3.3. - Conclusions on case study # 2 
A number of elements can be identified from the comments of the interviewees as regards what 
they perceived and the way they felt while attending the roundtables: 
1. Lack of inhibition: inhibition to expose, interact, and eventually make data and information 
available tended to significantly soften and even disappear when interacting firms were not 
directly competing but rather offering complementary services. A shipping company, a 
shipping agency, a railway company, and a number of small-size local range road 
transportation operators did not offer much resistance to interact and generated a positive 
outcome. At this point one might infer that the information complexity or its attached 
potential knowledge viscosity did not impede players from reaching a win-win situation 
despite the unique nature of their respective businesses. In other words, the above might 
well suggest that cooperation and collaboration amongst the interested parties must have 
played a role to make inhibition negligible.  
2. Lack of focus: despite the railway company being a rather large and well established 
organization, its management did join the Corridor without being really aware of their 
reasons to do so or the goals to be attained. This suggests a possible link with their state-
owned management style and that consequential inertia was involved - all were immersed 
in a kind of lack of strategic thinking and therefore motivation. I had the opportunity to 
witness this aspect to happen rather often with state-owned or provincial-owned firms who 
seemed more interested in writing reports on their political views on the forums than to 
interact and exchange information and opinions. This aspect no doubt needed special 
attention from the Corridor brokers who were in charge of fostering direct contact and 
dialogue as to let knowledge emerge and flow amongst the members.  
3. Cultural cautiousness: this is an aspect that even though it cannot be regarded as a 
knowledge transfer inhibitor in view of an existing rather homogeneous regional cultural 
profile, it might have slowed down the interaction of both competitors and firms from 
complementing logistic fields. The information registered from the interviews suggests 
that there was an intermediate stage where the participants took their time to perceive 
certain signals to get them processed and reflect upon these and to only later let an avenue 
of acceptance and further dialogue continue. 
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4. Enhancer roles: the participation of a multinational agro-exporting company whose main 
interests were based on improving their own export logistic channels rather than looking 
for partners or potential associates to vertically integrate with, became a driver to the 
forums. Although the forums were thought of as entities for companies and individuals to 
share and transfer their knowledge and leadership to emerge, in my opinion this led to a 
general betterment of the Corridor roundtable system. The presence of a powerful outsider 
seems to have exerted additional pressure for the logistic players to innovate and come up 
with solutions while their interaction performance was being watched or somehow 
monitored by participants. Some of these logistic players found themselves compelled to 
present themselves as being active and resourceful before those who were possibly their 
main client or could become a potential customer in the near future. The above suggests 
that a passive attitude on their part while in the forums could have turned out 
counterproductive and that the presence of an outsider might be regarded as a powerful 
incentive or driving device to generate positive outcomes within the respective CoP.  
5. Knowledge stickiness: difficulty in entirely understanding the topics that were regularly 
discussed on the roundtables seems to find very clear distinctions by participant segment. 
Outsiders tended to focus on their own interests without really interpreting the value of the 
exchanged information, while the complementing segments also found difficulty in 
absorbing their colleagues’ knowledge despite the fact they operated under comparable 
logistic parameters. The Corridor brokers also had a task here of easing the information 
flow and forming interdisciplinary CoPs capable of letting interdisciplinary knowledge 
sharing and transfer occur for the benefit of all. 
6. Leader-follower relationship: it seems to depend more on who held a greater relative 
power over the cargo-flow decision-making process and what their relative market 
positioning was at a given point, than on the company’s structure, investment 
endowments, or managerial expertise. A sense of security on the part of those global 
companies seems to have dominated the leadership scene at the outset of the process. This 
suggests a direct link between the leadership group’s influence stemming from their 
confidence of power and motivation to engage in knowledge sharing.  
7. Direct interaction: face-to-face interaction seems to be the preferred and most efficient 
way to initiate a business relationship leading to a later exchange of information, views, 
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and opinions – either tacit or explicit. Direct informal contact suggests it might also be a 
better way to deal with information stickiness. 
8. Indifference: a certain degree of indifference becomes apparent in those global 
corporations that attended the forums in their quality of well-established and financially 
solid entities aiming more at following the trend of the systems rather than being part of it 
(e.g. P&O PORTS).        
 
This case study seems to bring to light a few new elements the previous case study did not expose 
so clearly. These are: enhancement impact of an outsider organization may have on the 
roundtables; the relatively low cultural barriers that might slow down the knowledge flow; and 
the indifference on the part of large corporations.  These all seemed to be problems needing to be 
closely monitored and obviated in the Corridor to allow a more efficient and possibly faster 
interaction to happen—given the threatening business context. Leadership, knowledge, and 
interaction seem to share some common factors with the previous case.      
 
6.4 - CASE STUDY # 3: INTRODUCTION 
The railway cargo transport segment, during the early 1990s, was a very much isolated or non-
integrated business in the various countries that made up not only the MERCOSUR Corridor 
Project but also the entire region. Brazil, Chile, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, Paraguay were all 
countries where to a lesser or greater extent the railway played a significant and important role in 
their respective national economic development. Table 6.5 describes the following sources of 
information. 
 
Table 6.5- Sources of data for Case Study # 3 
Company Source Content        Notes 
Mercosur Trade 
Center 
President; Director 
of Sao Paulo-based 
Sebrae; Director of 
Sao Paulo-based 
Fiesp; Director of 
Olam.  
Internationalization strategy 
and consulting role. 
Occasional and formal meetings 
were held from 02/1998 to 
12/2000. Notes were taken and 
messages were exchanged on 
concepts, processes, and 
methodologies on CoPs, 
knowledge sharing and 
stakeholders integration. Data 
was validated with the source by 
early 2007.  
P&O Ports Operations Manager 
for more than 6 
Observation role on ALL’s 
learning and knowledge 
Several short informal 
conversations were held and 
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years and an 
extensive experience 
in the River Plate 
port business for 
more than 2 
decades.  
internalization process. tended to confirm my own 
observations.  Specific notes 
were not needed but that my 
others’ notes were confirmed 
and subsequently highlighted fir 
future reference. Data was 
validated with the source in 
2007.  
Multicargo CEO for South 
America for more 
than 10 years; 
Country Manager 
for more than 15 
years at K+N, in 
charge of ocean, 
ground, and air 
transportation 
departments. 
Observation role on ALL’s 
absorptive capacity. 
Numerous conversations were 
held and impressions and 
insights were corroborated on 
regular basis at both the 
roundtable forums and on 
business meetings between 1996 
and 1997. Content was checked 
with the source and validated 
during 2007.   
Skanska Latin 
America 
Regional 
Procurement 
Manager with more 
than 15 years of 
work at Skanska. 
Outsider’s view on the 
Corridor potential outcomes. 
A single informal lunch meeting 
was held by late 1999 while 
working for the Corridor to 
ascertain Skanska’s actual 
involvement and views. Data 
was validated with the source by 
late 2006.  
 
 
This case study embodies two independent railway companies that operated in a single country 
but that, at a given point in time, were jointly sold to a major railway conglomerate of a bigger 
regional player. These two railway networks were Argentina’s BAP – previously described – and 
Ferrocarril Mesopotamico. While the former run westbound to Mendoza and Chile, the latter run 
northbound connecting Argentina’s northeast with Brazil’s southeastern region. 
The new owner was Sao Paulo-based America Latina Logistica (ALL) which, while also already 
being a railway operator in Brazil, acquired these two strategic networks in Argentina with the 
aim of playing a regional role in railway logistics. Thus, ALL counted on the necessary network 
to duly interconnect the major industrial poles of the region by linking Sao Paulo and other 
coastal Brazilian industrial areas (Sao Bernardo; Curitiba; Rio Grande; Porto Alegre etc) with 
Buenos Aires and Mendoza in Argentina, as well as with Santiago’s industrial pole in Chile. 
Later, ALL acquired a new railing network connecting Sao Paulo with other industrial areas 
further north in Brazil until reaching certain locations which made the railway unbeatable in 
terms of cost per ton/km.  
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The stages of ownership are illustrated in Figure 6.3 below. 
 
 
Figure 6.3 - Three stage ownership of case study railway organizations 
 
Even though these two Argentine-owned railways were in private hands by the time they were 
sold to Brazil-headquartered ALL, they belonged to the federal government - perhaps for too long 
as they carried over all the operational problems one could possibly expect to deal with in a 
public company (e.g. lack of investment; obsolete rolling stock; overstaff; inadequate information 
systems; inefficient marketing and sales structure; highly unionized; highly politicized; etc).  
 
Most of these topics were not even intended to improve as the sale to private Argentine owners 
was just a political move to later pursue a better sale to a foreign-based regional operator – ALL 
company. Thus, ALL inherited a long list of operational problems in Argentina which tended to 
aggravate ALL’s own operations as it was not an international or even regional operator, but just 
a domestic operator within the vast Brazilian geography.  
 
Consequently both ALL and their newly acquired networks in Argentina shared many common 
problems. While the Brazilian network showed itself to be more efficient in all those 
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operationally-related aspects of the business, the Argentine networks not only had to be 
completely reengineered from an operational standpoint, but also had to open up their vision of 
the business together with their new Brazilian owners. Each company entering the ALL umbrella 
organization shared a totally domestic vision in their respective markets or countries. 
 
Further to sharing many of the operational problems and despite being pretty active in their 
respective inland distribution segments, the two networks failed in accomplishing any serious 
degree of horizontal integration as far as trucking, warehousing, customs clearance; rail-head 
operations, or distribution services were involved. An additional condiment to this apparent 
difficult situation was given by the little or practically no control on the cargo flows decision-
making process other than the domestic portion which they used to profit from based on the two 
countries’ long distances and a rather captive domestic market.  
 
While the barging segment in the Parana-Paraguay waterways in Argentina was exclusively 
foreign-oriented, both the coastal barging and the Amazon River barging services in Brazil were 
to a great extent coping with the overseas markets. Little domestic coastal barging was carried 
out in Brazil despite the enormous distances that might make it highly advisable in view of its 
evident transportation economics.  
 
The next section will address in more detail the challenges ALL had to face and the nature of 
their strategic plan I had the opportunity to contribute too.  
 
6.4.1 - Regional expansion and strategic plan   
The following lists the main challenges this company had to face when incorporating their two 
new westbound and northbound services in Argentina; 
? Senior management holding a significant amount of tacit knowledge of a technical and 
operational nature, as well as a great difficulty in transfering this knowledge - mainly due 
to their immediate previous bad experience attributed to fear and mistrust on the part of 
the existing management with respect to the new private Argentine owners; 
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? Non-existent marketing knowledge other than the one exclusively related to the domestic 
markets linking Buenos Aires industrial pole with Mendoza city in the west and 
Argentina’s eastern cities reaching up to the border with Brazil. 
? No agreement of any sort or operational complement with any of the Buenos Aires port 
terminals or with Buenos Aires up-river terminals which together offered more than a 
dozen opportunities to expand and grow beyond the domestic market. 
? Overstaffing and a very strong presence of in-house union representatives as a result of 
having belonged to the government for too long. 
? High level of inter-provincial politics with respect to the social role a railway had to fulfill 
with a great number of stakeholders in every single Province the railways went through. 
? Outdated locomotives, wagons, and poorly functioning or suitable rolling stock in general 
which made its operations highly inefficient.  
? Non-operational rail-heads, inadequate transfer facilities and a high need of cranes and 
further transfer equipment. 
 
Based on today’s world market principles and capitalistic visions, one may easily infer at this 
point that there was a complete lack of vision, or at least a severe lack of talent and leadership, to 
allow these three strategic railway networks to even cope with the domestic markets. However, 
the domestic markets were by then generous for carriers that operated them. The region in 
general appeared to be closed or not receptive to foreign investors to enter their market and so 
this made the whole system fertile for inefficient operators to develop within a cartelized business 
context. 
 
All this naturally tended to quickly change once the globalization wave of change approached. 
Both the legal framework and regional market favored opening up to foreign investment leading 
the whole business system towards needing more integrated and efficient companies. Thus, ALL 
had not only to renovate both their inherited assets and structure, but also to reengineer their 
vision and management with respect to the way they should be coping with the globalization 
process both in Brazil and Argentina.  
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At this point, identifying and defining the way to influence the cargo routing decision-making 
processes became key drivers to further formulate a strategic plan that could enable the 
organization to get rid of its typical dependence on the shipping line that a railway company 
normally held. It was and still is the shipping line that primarily keeps contact with the exporter 
and importer and therefore exerts a high level of decision-making on the cargo-routing aspect. 
This only became apparent to ALL once clearly exposed in the roundtables. Once this phase had 
been completed, then recruiting the right people to formulate and implement a business plan was 
of paramount importance for the company in their intent to gain control of the cargo flows. 
 
The Corridor roundtables proved to be of great use for an entirely domestic-oriented company 
with no international experience. It allowed the exchange of data and information along with 
countless face to face interactions ALL executives had with other segments’ executives. Having 
experienced the way others were reengineering themselves to rationalize their services, optimize 
their assets, and restructure their management made them understand the main variables of the 
regional logistic market along with the international potential. 
 
The regional railway company subsequently adopted a strategic plan that went beyond 
expectations, despite their management’s modest exposure to international competition. As well 
as quickly advancing on all kinds of horizontal integration initiatives with trucking companies, 
warehousing facilities, and port terminals, they also engaged in setting up their own international 
structure instead of entirely relying on potential agreements with the shipping companies.  
 
Such a structure meant initially to appoint a number of agents worldwide to sell door-to-door 
container services as a way to exert some control on the cargo routing by contracting the services 
of a number of shipping lines. At the outset this strategy turned the railway firm into a direct 
competitor for the shipping lines servicing Saec, as they were selling both export and import 
ocean freight services and inland transportation beyond the MERCOSUR region.  
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However, over time, the railway became another significant NVOCC76 in the market enabling the 
shipping companies reduce their marketing staff in those locations where the railway’s 
commercial structure had substantially grown. The second stage of their strategy was based in 
setting up their own regional commercial office in the main overseas markets to better monitor 
their growth and exert controlling functions on their appointed agents. 
 
While their appointed agents were spread out all over the main global markets (European Union / 
NAFTA77/ Asia-Pacific region / Latin America), it kept a reduced number of regional head-
offices aiming at monitoring the market trends and conducting negotiations with the port 
terminals, trucking companies, inland depots, and other suppliers as well as deepening the 
relationship with their appointed agents and shipping companies.  
 
It becomes apparent that there was a significant shift in the way ALL operated and how it decided 
to cope with the new business scenario. From being first a domestic company to later focus on 
the region with neither regional nor international structure or experience and gain access to the 
global market cannot be considered as a natural managerial process.  
 
On the contrary, it was the synergies found in the roundtable forums along with a knowledge 
transfer process that took place among the various sectors’ representatives. Those interactions 
seem successful in that they proved useful to let them undertake a deep reengineering process of 
their business and a radical change of vision. The next section will address some executives’ 
views and opinions on the influence the Corridor roundtables actually had in the entire process.      
 
6.4.2. - The corridor as a facilitator  
Roberto Cristaldi – Mercosur Trade Centre President (MTC) and consultant to ALL during the 
acquisition process, highlighted the learning attitude of all the railway firm’s executives that used 
to attend the roundtable forums. “ALL executives possibly had one of the most willing attitudes 
toward incorporating knowledge and interacting with peers from other companies and segments. 
                                                 
76 NVOCC: Non-vessel operating common carrier means the kind of company that handle other companies’ cargoes 
but that doesn’t own or operate a vessel as a typical ship-owner does.  
77 NAFTA (North American Free Trade Association): it means a regional free trade association that includes Mexico, 
USA, and Canada).  
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They integrated with whatever committee they were invited to participate and join with no 
reserves in exposing their on-going market positioning and the challenges they thought they were 
compelled to face”. 
 
Buenos Aires port terminal operator P&O Terminals also attended the roundtables regularly. 
Their operations manager – Carlos Barbero – had the following opinion on ALL’s participation 
during the roundtables; “I remember they gave me the impression of being an organization that 
grew too fast and too much in pursuit of defining their goals and objectives. They were aware of 
the upcoming trends though did not conceptualize what to do or whom to talk to. However, after 
attending a number of gatherings and witnessing what others had to say and what some 
effectively accomplished in terms of JVs and alliances, I believe they did remarkably well. 
Clearly, it is difficult for me to imagine how they could have possibly taken the right strategies 
without having had the possibility to benchmark and interact with other firms and people. It is 
simply unthinkable”.  
 
Multicargo’s CEO Carlos Milione had also played the role of witnessing the railways executives’ 
behavior further to having acted as one of the various overseas agents in charge of marketing 
their services abroad. In his quality of being a supplier of advice and knowledge and attendant to 
the Corridor roundtable forums he remarked that the regional business context resulted alike for 
all. However, some were more aware than others of the globalization impact and its possible 
ramifications. “In the particular case of ALL, it was a great opportunity for them to absorb 
others’ ideas and reengineering proposals regardless of how innovative or challenging they 
looked. In a threatening scenario like this one, one may easily assume that an organization tends 
to wait and see rather than jumping into the scene and going through a learning experience 
against the clock. In this regard I believe these people had the right attitude toward learning, 
cooperating, and inter-acting with peers and competitors in a really constructive way”. 
 
I had the opportunity to act as consultant for this company while they were attending the 
roundtable forums. One of the outstanding aspects that describe the way this company has 
benefited from belonging to and sharing the roundtable outcomes is given by the general upgrade 
they went through as regards their human resources. ALL soon realized that their marketing and 
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sales teams were completely domestic-oriented and that a quick and in-depth human resources 
internationalization process was badly needed if they pretended to successfully cope with 
overseas agents, port terminals, and shipping companies.  
 
As such, they identified that the best type of executive they needed to carry out their 
internationalization strategy was that of a shipping company. In other words marketing and 
operations executives capable to identify what the international trend in the cargo flow decision-
making process was, as well as the sales and operations executive having the ability to develop 
business under an integrated transport mode business (road-ship-rail).  
 
It became apparent to me, as a witness of the process and also being an ocean shipping executive, 
that a company this big would have never accomplished such a level of awareness of what their 
weaknesses and needs were, if it were not by the interactions incurred throughout the roundtable 
forums. The roundtables seemed having proved a fertile ground to capture knowledge, get it 
internalized and its outcomes channeled toward formulating overseas goals. Without these 
roundtable interactions, this knowledge would have made little sense. 
 
ALL’s President – Eduardo Oliver – admitted needing to reengineer their entire commercial 
structure which he would have never embarked on if it were not by the experiences and learning 
process his company went through by attending the roundtables.  
 
Skanska Latin America, a Buenos Aires-based engineering company of Swedish origin, also 
attended the roundtable forums. They were not a logistic firm but that they attended the forums to 
better understand the trends some of their clients had to face for them being able to anticipate 
their future as engineering contractors. 
 
Their regional procurement manager – Martin Gerbino – made the following comments from his 
non-logistics perspective; “Being ourselves an engineering company and therefore accustomed 
to dealing with rather complex projects in a very competitive environment, I never expected such 
a large number and variety of logistic operators interacting and dealing face to face, exchanging 
information, and to some extent selling themselves on a personal basis to a future potential 
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employers. I had here some aspects I did understand and some others I frankly did not – for 
example why the employers exposed themselves with perhaps those who were their best 
executives to be head-hunted. On the other hand, I admire the way they intended to get the best 
from the situation they were going through by doing their best to comprehend others’ businesses 
and market situations. I do not imagine engineering firms doing the same, although must admit 
that this situation might change if we had to reengineer the whole sector as they had to do”. 
 
MTC’s president – Dr. Roberto Cristaldi - had a more cautious view of the role played by this 
type of participant. He underlined that even though there was an initial sentiment of general 
skepticism on the potential outcomes a roundtable forum might generate, step by step an apparent 
anti-business or non-cooperative environment started turning into cooperation and collaboration 
going from modest to significant. “I personally felt more comfortable to integrate with those 
groups or study commissions where I came to know somebody from before. I admit that knowing 
somebody beforehand could have facilitated in the exchange of views and information in my 
case”.    
 
6.4.3. - Conclusions on case study #3 
From the way this case study evolved and by following the comments of the interviewees, as well 
as my own views from direct participation as a consultant, it becomes apparent that this large 
regional company found itself isolated while holding a huge potential that needed new goals to be 
formulated and pursued. Initially it was focused almost entirely on the domestic market to later 
expand into the region: with no global back-up; having inherited a rather heavy and inefficient 
managerial and operational structure; lacked a suitable plan or strategic alternative; and needing 
to increase its load factors to balance an ever-increasing cost base. These were some of the many 
challenges that seemed to lead this group to join the Corridor. 
 
However, all the above can be considered by no means to be necessary and sufficient conditions 
to see it as an obvious or natural step joining the forums. The above evidence suggests that ALL 
comprehended the delicate situation it was about to face as well as it having reduced its scope of 
action and a great degree of exposure across South America.  
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ALL’s attitude toward joining the roundtable forums (participate in numerous commissions or 
CoPs, exchange data and information, and most importantly to try to conceptualize the way other 
logistic segments were reacting to better face the upcoming globalization) suggests perhaps a 
daring attitude that was tightly connected with its leadership strategy that the previous case 
studies did not illustrate. 
 
An active participation in the roundtables and a positive attitude toward exchanging information 
turned out to be an adequate channel for ALL to reengineer its business almost completely. What 
transpires from this case study is that it illustrates how the Corridor roundtables facilitated ALL 
to develop a vision, its leadership, and a positive attitude towards first capturing the value of 
others’ information and to later internalize it to draw a unique global strategy.  
 
What seems to be different in this case study when compared to the first two is that through the 
knowledge sharing and transfer process, ALL managed to internalize and adopted a different set 
of dynamics. It was others’ exchange of information, views, and opinions that ALL benefited 
from without having to really enter into any type of formal alliance. Their participation in the 
roundtables suggests that it was right there where it nurtured its ideas and where it came to learn 
from and adapt to practices that more international-oriented, better experienced or more talented 
businesses tended to demonstrate.  
 
Strategies that ALL could only find in the fertile ground and develop at the roundtable forums 
include: integrating other modes of transport to their existing regional railway network; hiring 
executives from the maritime segment to better sell their newly multimodal services; appointing 
overseas agents to exert control over the imports cargo flows; and setting up overseas regional 
offices for promoting and controlling functions.  
 
It is hard to imagine how a company with such an extensive structure and having inherited a 
significant burden of managerial problems (typical of a state-owned organization) could have 
reengineered so quickly and innovatively without being an active member to a Corridor-like 
entity. Capturing third parties’ knowledge, to get their input internalized, and imitating to a great 
extent what others were doing, seems to well represent lessons to be learned from this case study 
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6.5 - CASE STUDY # 4: INTRODUCTION 
This case study describes how a former Buenos Aires port operations leading organization 
decided to sell the business to a large foreign multinational corporation and withdraw from the 
market to later set up elsewhere in the region and become a competitor to that foreign 
multinational corporation. Table 6.6 summarizes the data and information concerning this case 
study. 
 
Table 6.6- Sources of Data for Case Study # 4. 
Company Source Content        Notes 
MERCOSUR 
TRADE 
CENTER 
President; Director of 
Sao Paulo-based 
Sebrae; Director of Sao 
Paulo-based Fiesp; 
Director of Olam.  
Corporate strategy. Occasional and formal meetings were 
held from 02/1998 to 12/2000. Notes 
were taken and messages were 
exchanged on concepts, processes, 
and methodologies on CoPs, 
knowledge sharing and stakeholders 
integration. Data was validated with 
the source by early 2007.  
BAP Marketing Manager for 
5 years after holding 
various positions at 
BAP on traffic, 
operations, and quality 
control for more than 10 
years. 
Integration strategy. Concepts and personal views and 
comments were occasionally gathered 
in view of both their secondary 
involvement in the forums and their 
later set-up of a rail-head within 
ATZ. Notes were taken during 1998 
and data was validated in 2006. 
ATZ 
 
 
Business Development 
Manager for 4 years 
after holding different 
positions within 
Murchison’s structure 
during 20 years. 
Search for strategic 
partners. 
Many informal meetings were held 
throughout 1998, 1999, and 2000 in 
view of my role at the Corridor and in 
my capacity of a potential customer 
for ATZ (Zim). Notes were taken at 
different intervals and gathered data 
was validated by early 2008. 
 
Bill Murchison was for decades the owner of one of the most traditional and notorious 
stevedoring company operating in Buenos Aires port right up to the outset of both the 
globalization and privatization process – which in the case of Argentina arrived almost 
simultaneously during the late 1980s and early 1990s. Murchison Stevedoring Co. (hereafter 
referred to as Murchison) accounted for 50% of both the break-bulk and container segments.  
 
Buenos Aires port terminal is the country’s largest port but by then was neither a modern 
terminal nor fully segmented one. This port was for long periods of times categorized as a dirty 
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port, that is, a port demonstrating a number of inefficiencies among which the most notorious are 
described as the following characteristics, being: 
o Highly unionized and therefore extremely costly in terms of manpower and utilized 
operational times; 
o Federally protected by national legislation and therefore immune to any sort of reform or 
opening process toward foreign investment; 
o Cartelized and therefore facing no price or service differentiation of any kind; and 
o Lacking of technological renovation and consequently showing very inefficient in terms of 
cargo handling and transfer ratios. 
 
Once the port privatization process began with a number of global players arriving in the region 
and the globalization process was underway, MURCHISON managed not only to remain in the 
business scene but also to become partner to P&O PORTS (henceforth referred to as P&O). P&O 
is one of the world’s largest port operating conglomerates that was awarded the contract to 
operate possibly the most strategic terminals of Buenos Aires Port. This partnership agreement 
established that Murchison should remain as a partner for a limited number of years after which it 
should sell out its stake to P&O to let P&O control the terminal’s full operation. P&O also 
established a condition by which Murchison could not become a port operator in Argentina in the 
container segment for a number of years as a natural way to preserve the business P&O had so 
heavily invested in. Figure 6.4 illustrates how this case study situation evolved. 
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Figure 6.4 – Case Study 4 Three Stage Development 
 
In Stage 1 the Port of Buenos Aries was serviced by a number of operators including Murchison. 
In Stage 2 the port was privatized and Murchison continued its role but dealing with P&O. Even 
though Murchison Co. had to ultimately sell out and withdraw from what is been for so long its 
own territory, to allow a world-class operator to come in and renovate the whole system, they did 
not disappear at all. Right after selling out they acquired a significant land parcel along the 
Parana River lying 70 km up-river from Buenos Aires. 
 
A new terminal was built and developed there to meet the automobile industry export and import 
needs which by then turned out to be a promising business in the long run, given the ever-
growing strategic business alliance between Argentina and Brazil. This triggered Stage 3 in 
which Murchison transformed from a stevedoring company with specialized local, regional and 
segment-specific knowledge to investor in the new terminal and principal transformation agent in 
which new port facilities were developed supported by other supply chain members including 
ALL and BAP (see Case study 3) and Sadia through the active facilitation of the Corridor 
supported by the MTC.  
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Auto Terminal Zarate (ATZ) was by then set up to first operate an automobile terminal to later 
expand into a RO/RO78 terminal as well as expanding into the dry bulk segment as a way to 
generate higher berth occupancy ratios while strategically diversifying their investment. One may 
assume at this point that while ATZ was becoming capitalized and operational in both the RO/RO 
and dry bulk segments, it was also getting ready to launch their new full-container terminal from 
the very moment the ban was over. In order to do so ATZ formalized a JV agreement with a huge 
foodstuff Brazilian company – Sadia – who despite having no experience in the regional port 
business foresaw its potential for further development not only in this specific activity, but also in 
their foodstuff exports and distribution system throughout Argentina. This meant that more than 
one third of their exports would later become the main destination for Sadia’s products. 
 
This case was chosen to be included to illustrate how the Corridor facilitated not only a unique 
example of knowledge exchange between potential and actual rivals but also how a business 
opportunity was opened through this mechanism. 
 
The next section will address the way these two players actually interacted and what they saw 
and learned from each other’s opinions on other stakeholders.  
 
6.5.1. –Buenos Aires’ Hinterland potential: A matter of knowledge and vision 
It becomes clear at this point the Murchison’s expertise in the port business was born and 
developed much earlier than the Corridor had been established. Having decided to invest and 
operate a new terminal specialized in those non-conflicting segments with their former partners 
P&O, while nourishing the concept of a nearby new-brand container terminal, are aspects that 
cannot be attributed to the Corridor.  
 
These are aspects that are naturally based on the knowledge and vision of the company’s owner 
and managers. It was precisely this level of knowledge that allowed Bill Murchison’s firm to first 
partner with a global player, then to later expand into other segments and challenge P&O on their 
                                                 
78 RO/RO: roll-on/roll-off facilities are those where self-propelled on-wheels cargoes are operated. Not only 
automobiles but also trucks, road-making machinery, side-booms, etc.         
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own terms. What remains to be ascertained is the identity of the party that actually benefited most 
from the original JV.  
 
Was it P&O PORTS gaining from Murchison in that the former gained the regional knowledge of 
uses and customs of the trade through a process which let them explore and perhaps capture their 
ideas and concepts that they managed to develop throughout the years they were bound in the 
JV? Or did Murchison gain from P&O in terms of global vision, technology, management, and 
operations? While P&O brought to the region very sophisticated information systems to 
efficiently design loading and discharge pre-planning operations, global positioning system 
(GPS) tracking devices for chassis and containers, container freight station (CFS) management, 
and port-designed handling and loading equipment. Murchison contributed by: making available 
their long-standing relationship with customers (shipping companies and shippers); having an 
efficient union management; having effective coordination with all the multimodal players along 
with a deep understanding of the political context that for long periods of time led the country’s 
economy to face stop-and-go economic processes.    
 
One might possibly infer that both have benefited from each other though from different angles. 
However, Buenos Aires’ hinterland still today hides an enormous potential in terms of port 
business development as a result of an historic dependence on Buenos Aires for most of the 
country’s foreign trade. Similarly, the northeastern strap of Brazil is not serviced by the global 
shipping companies or world-class port operators. Traditional or regional knowledge therefore is 
of decisive importance for both the regional companies to reorganize and compete, and the global 
firms to avoid or limit local competition. 
 
It becomes apparent that besides the very particular characteristics that the Buenos Aires’ 
hinterland might hold, which on first sight one may infer is at the advantage of the Argentine 
firm, both companies held a significant amount of knowledge to share and transfer to each other. 
Knowledge viscosity levels and absorption difficulties remained low for both parties given their 
respective expertise in the field.  
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Unlike the previous case study where the railway company had everything to benefit from the 
Corridor, the situation seemed here to have been quite the opposite. Knowledge, leadership, 
change, vision, cooperation, and collaboration, all played a fundamental role to make their 
contribution before the Corridor roundtable forums became established.  
 
While P&O focused on both upgrading and reengineering their business by installing the latest 
port handling technology and infrastructure aiming at achieving larger economies of scale and 
gaining competitive advantage, ATZ capitalized on all those agro-industries that for decades had 
been asking for a competitive alternative port to Buenos Aires – a port which they have always 
regarded by a wide array of hinterland industries as being expensive, inefficient, and corrupt. 
 
In this regard I had the opportunity to assess ATZ’s SWOT analysis where perhaps one of the 
outstanding features was precisely the anger and frustration a rather large number of industries 
located in the hinterland had stated against the dominant and centralized role that Buenos Aires 
port had played for decades. A search for revenge on the part of a wide array of industries was 
duly capitalized upon by a company that no long had been profiting from such a centralization 
scheme. What these industries failed to realize, and did not want to experiment with, was that 
P&O had come to reengineer the whole port system along with other global players who 
undertook the same process in the nearby terminals.    
 
The growth of a number of Chilean ports outside the main Valparaiso port clearly illustrates the 
potential of Buenos Aires hinterland as it can be attributed to the above mentioned Argentine 
industries that by all means looked for operational alternatives in their permanent search for both 
remaining competitive in the international markets and keeping their imports of raw material and 
equipment as inexpensive as possible.             
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6.5.2. –The corridor as a facilitator 
Both ATZ (ex Murchison) and P&O Ports knew perfectly well what they were after and what 
their possibilities were to successfully develop their own business either prior to or during the 
nurturing of the Corridor. P&O had shown themselves indifferent and even somehow arrogant 
during the roundtable forums – possibly based on their size, financial resources, and a formidable 
global structure.  
 
ATZ, on the other hand and even though it could not be compared to P&O in terms of size or 
resources, was the owner of a very deep regional knowledge arising out of long years of having 
been in touch with worldwide ship-owners in their capacity of being the Buenos Aires port main 
stevedoring firm. Such an exercise supplied them with the necessary global vision to anticipate 
how the globalization would modify the way to do business in the region as well as to leaving 
their port knowledge and regional expertise untouched.  
 
Sadia was also a member to the Corridor despite having no direct intervention on the logistic 
subjects that were exposed and analyzed during the regional sessions. Very much alike 
Argentina-based Refinerias De Maiz, their main task was to make sure their various logistic 
channels linking Brazil with Argentina remained open and efficiently run. 
 
MTC not only represented a number of companies that effectively joined and participated in the 
Corridor, either as primary or secondary stakeholders, but also some specific trade and industrial 
federations based in Sao Paulo, Rio do Janeriro, and Porto Alegre, Brazil. MTC’s President Dr. 
Roberto Cristaldi described Sadia as a company that despite having played a secondary role 
within the Corridor, became more and more involved as the globalization was transforming the 
regional business scenario: “it was a company more interested in establishing a political 
presence rather than actively participating in the various commissions that focused on a number 
of topics that were not of their direct interest. However, once the barging companies started 
being absorbed by some ocean shipping companies while the port terminals changed ownership 
along with the by then existing coastal feeding services, they must apparently have seen their 
transportation and distribution channels threatened”.  
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BAP’s marketing manager’s opinion tends to concur with the above opinion in that SADIA was 
regarded as a secondary stakeholder until reaching the stage when it allied with ATZ. From then 
on it changed its attitude and started interacting and exchanging information in the various CoPs 
it had joined. Sadia had approached BAP together with Murchison to establish a fully-dedicated 
operational rail-head capable of storing and distributing from nearby their terminals into the 
centre and centre-west region of the country.  
 
ATZ’s business development manager – Maria Quiroga – had the function to look for strategic 
alliances that might lead her company to better cope with the huge export and import potential 
the interior held for so long. To that purpose the Corridor seems to have played a suitable role as 
the most qualified and reliable partners at hand; “we actually never attended the roundtable 
forums in search of knowledge, people, or concepts that we might later adapt to or make good 
use of, but that we rather concentrated on interacting with potential allies that could help us 
challenge the dominant position we lost to P&O in Buenos Aires. We always knew to a great 
extent what the globalization was like and the effects it could bring attached. We had the 
necessary skills to adapt to that situation and the Corridor resulted being the ideal place for us to 
select the right partners”. When asked about the attitude taken by P&O Ports when attending 
both the roundtables she made clear their impression on P&O’s indifference to the on-going 
activities. “It was evident for P&O that they suspected we were getting ready to strike back as 
practically all attendees or primary stakeholders were engaged in making their own 
arrangements in terms of merging, reengineering, downsizing, joint-venturing or whatever. And 
we were not the exception to that rule. Besides, they had both the size and structure that made 
their participation more political than practical as they were not in need to restructure, 
reengineer or identifying a potential partner to expand into the region.” 
 
When asked about which, in her opinion, where the outcomes sought by both ATZ and P&O at 
the forums she stated that for ATZ the roundtables provided them with a very unique opportunity 
to interact, exchange views and opinions, and identify potential allies to help them expand into 
the multimodal business within their hinterland as well as benchmarking opportunities beyond 
their hinterland. The JV with Sadia demonstrates that the Corridor roundtable forums proved to 
be strategic for ATZ’s development plans. 
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As far as P&O was concerned she believed their main interest was to show commitment with the 
Corridor’s original idea and fundamental concepts before their customers (shipping lines and 
major shippers), as well as benchmark with other terminals to find out and compare what they 
were doing and to present themselves before potential new customers who happened to be 
primary stakeholders of the Corridor.        
 
As a direct participant I had the opportunity to witness the existing close relationship between 
Sadia and ALL and the quite open way they dealt with one another in view of their long existing 
relationship in Brazil that later projected into Argentina. The railway company used to carry 
many of Sadia’s products across the vast Brazilian geography and get them door-to-door 
delivered by utilizing a large number of both trucking contractors and its own fleet, while Sadia’s 
competitive logistics within Brazil was due to ALL’s wide network and relative lower operational 
costs for long distances. 
 
It is been my perception that as well as the previous business relationship maintained by these 
two firms, a certain degree of cultural affinity may have helped the two companies understanding 
each other more rapidly than if had they been of different nationality. However, when the latter 
situation actually arose between an Argentine and Brazilian firm, the most common of the 
situations, by no means tended to hinder the interaction and its consequent knowledge exchange 
from happening but that it tended to slow it down at the beginning to later catch up with those of 
a closer affinity, suggesting the existence of fairly low cultural barriers amongst the Corridor 
players. 
 
MTC’s Dr. Cristaldi highlighted the salient point that the main cultural difference he perceived 
during all those years of attending the forums and dealing with those professional federations he 
represents. He observed that cultural difference was not evident from codes, values, or more daily 
aspects such as feeding habits or life styles.” It was only a matter of timing by which Brazilians 
looked more reflective than their Argentine counterparts who tended to be more resolute on the 
decision-making process though perhaps less strategic. Other than that, I see no major barriers 
as far as culture is concerned”. 
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None of the interviewees showed discrepancies with the above mentioned opinion nor defined the 
term culture as a real inhibitor or barrier to surpass, but that highlighted the existing high degree 
of integration among the Corridor members long before the Corridor was established. The next 
section will address the case study conclusions by focusing on the role taken by the two main 
players.       
 
6.5.3. –Case study conclusions 
The evolution of this case study along with the comments and opinions gathered from the 
interviews along with my own view, suggest that both ATZ and Sadia brought with them a 
considerable level of both knowledge and leadership in their respective fields. ATZ was a 
successful port terminal developer and operator in Buenos Aires port that right after selling out 
their stake to a global leading company, set up a new and entire port terminal to challenge their 
old partners. Sadia was a leading Brazilian foodstuff producer and exporter of both regional and 
international reach holding an increasing market position in Argentina.  
 
None of the two companies had apparently joined the Corridor to pursue the objectives they later 
set, but that initially played a kind of political presence with the intention to sound out potential 
synergies with a limited number of contractors (ATZ), and to control or reassure their logistic 
channels were kept operational and competitive (Sadia). However, the Corridor seems having 
facilitated these companies achieving higher benefits from their association through roundtables. 
ATZ, for example, found a solid partner to carry on with their expansion strategy while Sadia 
also found the ideal partner to consolidate their presence into what was becoming their main 
exporting market.  
 
The Corridor roundtables facilitated these companies to get together as well as exchange vital 
data and information that later led to a successful JV on a win-win basis. Regardless of the JV 
partners and their respective leadership and visions on the upcoming transformations the region 
was going to face, the strategic outcomes arising out of their participation on the roundtables 
seems having a direct link with their own businesses’ strategic positioning.  
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Even though the two corporations joined the Corridor with different objectives, both found a 
fertile ground to develop contacts and synergies to grow beyond their primary goals and without 
coming across with substantial cultural barriers. Both tacit and explicit knowledge sharing and 
transfer seems having been fluid between the parties. The relative easiness with which the 
contacts were made and developed in the right direction with respect to the main players and a 
great number of logistic contractors, does suggest that the two main actors must have been very 
much aware of the upcoming threats and that an urgent transformation was needed, the business 
context pressure being of paramount importance. 
 
Perhaps being both well established companies in South America, they also knew that a crisis 
might bring about opportunities to take the place others would leave open, especially by taking 
advantage from the apparent cultural advantage outsiders could not count on. The relative 
homogeneity with which the various players approached the Corridor together with a rapidly 
changing business environment, seems to have played a key role in making knowledge sharing 
and transfer take place, leadership to emerge, and cultural barriers to be lowered to allow 
associations and alliances of various types to be shaped.     
 
Thus, the Corridor looks for this particular case study like having played an essential role not 
only in making the two corporations contact each other, but also in having created a knowledge 
exchange-oriented forum for them to explore each other and nurture the germ of strategic 
corporate collaboration and cooperation, possibly witnessing the way others had undertaken this 
attitude. This case study suggests that the roundtables forums and their respective CoPs were 
crucial to letting leadership, knowledge, cooperation, and collaboration interact and bring change 
and innovation. This also allowed synergies to play a new dimension in leading to strategic 
alliances which otherwise would have probably taken too long to happen. 
 
6.6. – CHAPTER SUMMARY        
This chapter presented 4 case studies that involved the Corridor roundtable discussions and 
associated CoPs for companies forming associations and business transformations. These case 
studies were selected to illustrate how change may be seen to have been instigated as a ‘project’ 
or at least program of activities that: 1) brings together potential independent actors with a 
 247
common interest and rationale to collaborate; 2) explains the rationale and motivation and 
process of the Corridor’s involvement and impact in facilitating this transfer; and 3) focuses on 
the role of knowledge transfer, trust and commitment building, and leadership in implementing 
these transformations. 
 
These four case studies are of a business network development and management type identified 
by (Artto and Kujala, 2008) as falling within a management of a business network type of PM 
study. In fact they extend that emerging field of study by providing insights into the genesis of 
the formation of a business network as well as a radical transformation of the way those 
businesses dealt with severe problems they faced. 
 
The four case studies show a number of similarities as well as differences that vary according to 
the type of segment dealt with, the market positioning of the involved companies, their global 
structure, size, expertise, and a number of other variables. There are a number of variables that 
happen to be common to all of them, supporting the idea that the Corridor roundtable forums 
have been instrumental toward allowing cooperation, collaboration, knowledge, and leadership 
turn up and produce realistic alternatives before what was regarded a global trend and an 
uncertain business context. These can be summarized as follows: 
1. The relative easiness or willingness to communicate and interact on the part of a vast 
majority of the stakeholders, either primary or secondary, suggests that a stronger pressure 
was exerted on the region by a threatening uncertain business context than from an implicit 
level of cooperation amongst the participants. This immediately present driving motivator 
seems to have offered the Corridor as looking like a promising and appropriate entity to 
channel their worries, anxieties, and corporate ideas toward a productive and sustainable 
end. Typical variables often found on the CoPs such as rivalry, antipathy, envy, 
jealousness, information ambiguity, or cultural barriers were not identified as real 
knowledge detractors.   
2. Leadership in terms of gaining trust, commitment and shaping a vision for a preferred 
future seems to have a direct link with those firms showing previous overseas experience 
from business contexts being more cultural diverse and operational constrained. Not only 
did the Corridor leaders’ extrapolation of knowledge and experience turn out to be 
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contagious for others Corridor members (followers) to undertake a more active interaction 
with peers and competitors, but also their pro-active attitude toward searching for potential 
allies and transformations helped them achieve larger economies of scale and gain 
competitive advantage. 
3. Immediate followers followed the example of the truly global firms but held a lesser 
relative degree of commitment to the region though showing a certain level of global reach 
and operations. There also seems to have been an influencing factor to either become a 
leader or a follower. Leaders tended to be actually holders of a greater relative influence 
on the cargo-routing decision making along with their relative market positioning at a 
given point in time. A game seems to have evolved where members try to ascertain who 
most influenced the relative market forces in order to define leaders and followers. This 
was not so much a matter of a corporation’s size, structure, or deployed assets across a pre-
determined geography. 
4. Openness to interact and consequently share and transfer knowledge within the forums 
seemed dependent more on a company’s relative strengths and competitive position at a 
given point, and not so much on what one might assume related to cultural or nationality 
aspects. Those firms enjoying perhaps a stronger perception of their present market 
positioning and/or what the future might bring in terms of business opportunities or market 
structure transformations tended to be knowledge facilitators. Such phenomena may have 
impacted contagiously on others who by then had been seen only as followers or somehow 
indifferent to the on-going business context. 
5. Similarly, the interaction and communication process (and the driving and proclaimed 
voluntary nature of the various CoPs) found participants’ actual motivation more impacted 
by the rapidly mutating business context than on the executives’ own initiative in their 
search for answers. This suggests that the region had to reach a critical tipping point at 
which participants’ own market structure and business development were at stake for them 
to react and support these kinds of professional interactions. Once again, an extreme 
business environment situation along with the upcoming globalization seemed being the 
driving force for many actors to join the Corridor and support their functioning.  
6. The existing traditional knowledge on the part of the regional companies along with the 
cultural asymmetry between the regional players and those from abroad, tended to help the 
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regional players to accrue knowledge value in their own companies. Even though the level 
of traditional knowledge varied according to the geographic scope and type of logistic 
services in question, it did help in creating a given level of dependence or knowledge 
market which many regional operators tended to conceptualize and profit from. 
Additionally, the existing cultural gaps between those extra-regional operators (especially 
the newcomers) and the regional firms also acted as a kind of value accumulation on the 
part of the latter. This helped regional companies to build a level of dependence that 
outsiders had to recognize as a vulnerability they had to address to be able to expand into 
the region. The Corridor roundtable forums reinforced the regional players’ awareness of 
these two powerful variables that eventually played into their favor, as well as on the 
vision and minds of the outsiders who foresaw the need to include these variables into 
their plans.  
7. The globalization in itself and the Corridor members’ pro-active attitude did have an 
impact on those laggard firms in that it helped them comprehend and internalize the 
imperative necessity to update and restructure to face the future. This process suggests that 
the roundtables effectively influenced those who owing to their relative lesser economies 
of scale or market positioning had not taken any leadership position nor opened up toward 
a fruitful potential interaction.  
8. Cooperation and collaboration showed little inhibition or impediments among 
complementing companies. These saw in one another a potential business opportunity to 
adapt and reengineer to cope with uncertainty. Once more, the roundtables seemed to have 
helped these companies gain a winning awareness of their joint potential and of their need 
to reengineer to better utilize their assets and management.  
9. Lack of focus was an element that became apparent both in those state-owned companies, 
where goals and motivation were absent variables, and those corporations holding little or 
none internationalization. In both cases, the Corridor seems to have played a role of 
paramount importance not only in letting knowledge sharing and transfer taking place, but 
also in somehow redefining the leader-follower relationship. The creation of a knowledge 
market, where precise knowledge was an appreciated commodity, eventually helped 
triggering the appearance of other crucial variables such as: cooperation and collaboration; 
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leadership; and change and innovation. These resulted in a renewed business and benefits 
results focus. 
10. Regional cultural asymmetries tended to highlight some differences in styles and timing. 
However, and possibly because of the upcoming business context transformation, they 
were never a real barrier for the players to reengineer other than to perhaps slow down the 
interaction process. The Corridor seemed to have highlighted first the cultural asymmetries 
between the regional and the extra-regional players to later dissolve those intra-regional 
differences in favor of a rapid and innovative adaptation process.  
11. The active commitment and participation on the part of the outsiders did have a driving 
influence on many regional firms in that they saw themselves compelled to back the 
knowledge sharing and transfer mechanism. They not only attended Corridor roundtables 
to learn and capitalize from others, but also they came to realize they had also became part 
of the forums in that they were needed as someone else’s strategy to enter into a JV, 
agreement or partnership.  
12. Knowledge stickiness became apparent in those non logistic-oriented corporations holding 
non common objectives and those logistic complementing companies of relative lesser 
market share and influence. Some of them turned out to be just observers while others 
were regarded as laggard players. In all cases, Corridor-born synergies played a significant 
role in improving this situation. Corridor officers were active brokers and monitors of the 
process and these activities became a recurrent need to allow firms both to profit from and 
to contribute to the roundtables. This suggests that the argument of a threatening business 
context may not necessarily drive companies to take action to share and contribute 
knowledge but that it might also depend more on each company’s history and current 
competitive positioning.  
13. A face-to-face interaction seems to have been the preferred channel to let tacit knowledge 
flow and to bridge apparent cultural asymmetries among the leading primary stakeholders. 
This process was soon imitated by followers, both primary and secondary stakeholders, to 
later expand (though to a limit) to those classified as laggards or showing indifference to a 
system they just adhered to for political reasons. 
14. Indifference was a factor that despite having played a negative role during the initial stage 
of the Corridor life cycle, turned out to be partly offset by the roundtable attendants’ own 
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dynamics that turned on-going indifference into productive synergies leading to a deep 
involvement of some corporations. This suggests that even though some companies had 
shown indifference or lack of initiative, they ended up by setting up alliances or 
agreements beyond their own fields of activity and possibly their expectations too. 
 
There were some aspects that did not prove pivotal in hindering Corridor players’ knowledge 
transfer between and leadership from emerging and spreading more widely amongst Corridor 
players. However, these aspects do deserve further brokerage efforts through the Corridor for it to 
produce greater regional benefit. These aspects include participant indifference, laggards, 
potential cultural asymmetries, corporate cautiousness, and lack of focus. 
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7. BARGE TRANSPORTATION SUB-CASE STUDY 
 
7.1 – INTRODUCTION  
This chapter relates to the waterways supply market evolution and the way the project 
stakeholders had to deal with the particular business context it faced to overcome (either in a 
purely transactional management mode or transformational style) the many constraints that 
emerged. The response by the players to the business environment, particularly radical changes in 
focus on supply chain management towards value chain management (which exemplifies the 
Winter et al (2006) research direction 3) seemed to have played a more decisive role than the 
management styles deployed by the different actors. The specific project focused upon in this 
study comprised the construction and operation of fully dedicated barge convoys to carry iron ore 
supplies from Brazil to Argentina commencing in 2003 and phased over six-years. The first phase 
comprised development and acceptance of an innovative logistics design solution and its 
realisation through the construction of new barges and leasing of existing barges. The project had 
in-built replication possibilities to roll out a series of similar projects. 
 
As with the previous case studies, this chapter exposes a similar rationale governing issues of 
collaboration, cooperation, knowledge sharing and transfer, leadership, and culture. It also 
emphasizes the way the globalization process impacted the region and somehow facilitated the 
creation of the Corridor to allow different players to network and exchange knowledge. However, 
this case study differs from the previous chapter’s four case studies in that a different type of 
traditional tacit knowledge plays a specifically critical role in making this river transportation 
transformation project a reality. The way that this traditional knowledge resource was shared and 
used is shown to be a crucial element of the transformation. Also, the geographical setting where 
this project is put into practice, along with its operational complexity, turns it into a unique case 
study.  
  
Another important difference is given by the participation of a major multinational company that 
has no business or specific interest in any logistic segment. However, this firm happens to be a 
primary stakeholder in a supply chain that involves Corridor logistics firms. All the other 
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stakeholders are, to a greater or lesser extent, logistic-related firms doing business in the region – 
each of them possessing a highly valued quota of traditional knowledge..  
  
 
 
 
 
 
It continues with a description of the project stakeholders by highlighting the role played by those 
regarded as instrumental to the project, and addresses in a separate section the various negotiation 
steps it took for the project to kick off. It ends with the actual contribution of the Corridor to the 
project completion and the chapter’s final conclusions. Table 7.1 describes the following sources 
of information. 
 
Table 7.1: Sources of information. 
Company Source Content Notes 
Southmark Logistics S.A. Project Manager with 
an extensive project 
logistic experience 
acquired throughout 
30 years of regional 
experience.  
Business 
networking strategy 
and personal 
insights on 
knowledge sharing.    
Informal chats, gatherings and 
lunches in view of working 
together for the same company 
and based on a long-lasting 
knowledge of this person’s 
feelings, views, and 
professional opinions and 
understanding of the region. 
Mercosur Trade Center President; Director of 
Sao Paulo-based 
Sebrae; Director of 
Sao Paulo-based 
Fiesp; Director of 
Olam.  
Role played by 
traditional 
knowledge and 
leadership styles on 
the part of the 
project 
stakeholders. 
Occasional and formal 
meetings were held from 
02/2004 to 12/2005. Notes 
were taken and messages were 
exchanged on concepts, 
processes, and methodologies 
on   knowledge sharing and 
stakeholders collaboration 
process. Data was validated 
with the source by early 2007. 
Navisur Buenos Aires-based 
ship-agent for the 
Paraguayan barge 
operator holding an 
extensive operational 
experience of more 
than 20 years in South 
American fluvial 
operations. 
The Corridor as an 
adequate arena for 
complex project 
development  
Regular short, informal and 
frank conversations normally 
held during lunch time and 
while attending the roundtable 
forums during 2005. 
Occasional exchange of views 
and professional opinions were 
made when developing the 
logistic design. Content and 
conceptual aspects were 
This case study will demonstrate how a supply chain management (SCM) problem triggered a 
business transformation with a more complex and demanding scale than was the case with 
case studies 1-4. The manner in which this SCM transformation was carried out further 
illustrates and helps explain how the Corridor was pivotal in managing this radical change 
management project.  
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revised and checked with the 
source by late 2007. 
Wachovia Miami-based project 
director for the 
Americas with a solid 
experience of more 
than 30 years 
developing logistic 
projects in ports, 
shipping, and 
multimodal integration 
projects. 
Business strategy 
across the 
Americas. 
A single short business 
breakfast where an informal 
chat was held and a few short 
and project focused comments 
produced.    Concepts were 
checked with the source and 
validated during 2007.   
Southmark Logistics S.A. Managing Director. Business developer 
and task 
coordinator. 
A complete version of the 
contract in Spanish language 
can be obtained by contacting 
info@southlog.com   
 
7.2 – INTRODUCTION TO CASE STUDY 5 
Iron ore and magnesium reserves all over Bolivia’s Mutun region are estimated to reach 40 
billion tons according to recent prospects carried out in the region79, without even considering 
those located in Brazil’s Matto Grosso Do Sul area, which turns out to be another large source of 
supply of these key raw material utilized in the steel industry. Mutun’s iron ore deposits are 
considered to be the world’s largest80. 
 
While Brazil is a significant producer and exporter of this strategic mineral, Argentina lacks it 
and is therefore increasingly dependent on Brazil as a supply-source to manufacture steel tubes, 
rolls, and slabs to be exported all over the world. Traditionally, this role is been mostly 
dominated by a single industrial Argentine multinational group whose supply sources were 
spread all over the globe, as a way to avoid too much concentration that might negatively impact 
on the production cycle should anything go wrong on the supply chain. Thus, and beyond any 
quality assessment on the product itself, their supply sources were utilized as per needed and by 
making good use of the opportunity cost concept.  
 
About one quarter of the supply needs was consequently allocated to each of the following 
historical supply origins: 
? Matto Grosso Do Sul – Brazil: this source of supply was rated as supplying a good product 
quality vis-à-vis a poor logistic performance. Its main advantage – product quality – often 
                                                 
79 Will Evo stick?". Mines and Communities Website. Retrieved on 2008-03-29 
80 "Serrania Mutun, Chiquitos Province, Santa Cruz Department, Bolivia". mindat.org. Retrieved on 2006-10-20. 
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turned out to be of relatively good value as compared to alternative that involved barge 
convoys sailing 2,400 km along the Parana-Paraguay waterways across 4 countries in order to 
reach final destination, where on time and on budget performance often proved to be just an 
aspiration. Therefore, the steel plant’s critical stocks often had to increase to offset occasional 
shortages of iron ore which would ultimately make other sources gain a relative higher share 
of the required supply. 
? Newcastle and Fremantle – Australia: a lower relative quality iron ore was regularly supplied 
on ocean-going vessels in shipments of up to 40,000 tons on “Panamax” type ships of 60,000 
tons of deadweight. Even though these vessels held more capacity and were therefore 
underutilized owing to the on-going River Plate draft limitations (that are explained later in 
this chapter) – this resulted in higher ocean freight rates per ton. However this still turned out 
useful in offsetting any supply shortfalls arising out of the waterways’ recurrent logistic 
bottlenecks and service interruptions. A full shipment from Australia generally supplies 40 to 
45,000 tons with a 30 days sailing time, whereas a full convoy on the waterways often 
supplied a tonnage ranging from 18 to 30,000 tons (depending on seasonal draft) and a sailing 
time ranging from 15 to 60 days – depending on a number of operational variables. It was 
clear by then that the waterways’ variability in reliability of supply was high and this 
certainty resulted in both performance outcomes in terms of low loading volumes and poor 
sailing times - without even considering port congestions at the Brazilian river terminals as 
well as a modest loading speed. River draft variability was subject to a dynamic seasonality 
that made planning risky and tricky. Constraints related to the existing regulatory framework 
as regards convoy fractioning81, night navigation ban, and safety controls also played its role 
in tightening the operational window even further. 
? Mobile, USG – United States: although the product was of high quality and the sailing time 
and/or certainty of physical delivery resulted much better than the two options previously 
mentioned, the existing draft limitations on the River Plate limited the size of the vessels to 
the underutilized “Panamax” type and therefore logistics economies of scale were only partly 
accomplished. Consequently, this supply source was in being very similar to that of the 
                                                 
81 This means splitting or separating cargos into smaller loads to lower the barge draft (depth from the waterline to 
the underside of the barge) or to cope with narrow unobstructed channels. Fractioning is critical where the barge is 
travelling over rocky and shallow waters or through narrow navigable channels within the river. Fractioning cargoes 
produce inefficiencies in carrying capacities but are necessary to avoid grounding risks.   
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Australian option in terms of operations and productivity. However, Mobile turned out to be 
an efficient supply source capable of quickly offsetting a shortfall of any other sources owing 
to both its relative geographical proximity and ample ship tonnage availability (unlike far 
away located Australian ports and problematic river services). These variables were 
reinforced by an existing easy access to the commercial or negotiating channels to reach both 
shipping companies and qualified shipbrokers capable of giving the right response at short-
notice. However, this supply source also started allocating an increasing degree of preference 
to those purchasing orders coming from China and India – two markets that represented 
markets of much larger volumes and higher prices than the River Plate. Australian suppliers 
also showed the same tendency with respect to the Chinese market. 
? Sepetiba, Tubarao, Carajas – North Eastern Brazil, product quality here was not the best 
though both product delivery response by the producing mines and sailing times offered a 
result being close to optimal. However, continuous labor strikes, unannounced port lock-outs, 
and the ever-existing draft limit on the River Plate – affecting all ocean sources alike - 
restricted this source of supply to no more than one fourth, and often even less than the total 
required. 
  
It is interesting to point out that all the players at this stage, both on the raw material supplying 
side and the receiving party, were large, well-established, and powerful multinationals financed 
with an interesting array of capital from: Argentina / Australia / Italy / Brazil / UK / USA. 
Therefore, these corporations’ markets represented the world itself whereas the River Plate 
market was just a marginal destination of a much lesser relative weight when compared to 
potential buyers in the Asia-Pacific region. On the river logistic side, the waterways were 
dominated by a number of traditional barge operators displaying great variability as regards barge 
and tugboat technology, management, operational versatility, financial standing, and reputation, 
all which led the Argentine steel company to exploit those asymmetries by playing one river 
operator off against another as a way to negotiate lower freight rates and short-term contracts in 
their favor.  
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Therefore, the Argentine group historically supplied their needs of iron ore from four regular 
sources across the world by combining a number of variables which they always tried to optimize 
according to the on-going contextual circumstances:  
• Level of critical stock to avoid production shutdown; 
• Total transit times from supply source to destination’ 
• Mix of freight rate levels and type of services; 
• Mix of product quality to allow a competitive end product; 
• Draft limitations and its ratio to the critical stock level.; and 
• Operational constraints of any nature, such as strikes, lock-outs, stranding, collisions, etc. 
 
Ocean shipping operators supplied their vessels in a normal fashion within a context of relative 
stability and predictability. Time-charter rates varied within a range that was considered 
reasonable and ship-owners did not hesitate to engage into one-year contracts for carrying iron 
ore from Australia, the US gulf, or northeastern Brazil in view of the return trip being often 
backed-up by grain shipments from the River Plate up to the origins’ nearby locations. Both ships 
hiring rates and bunker prices – two critical interrelated cost factors for any shipping company – 
remained under control throughout most of the 1990s. 
 
All the above might be considered as the normal on-going circumstances that historically had 
governed the supply-chain of this organization with respect to a commodity or raw material. 
These were not seen as a strategic factor in a supply chain but rather a commonplace input. 
Consequently, the supply-chain management of this group could be regarded as sensible and 
reasonable within an international context of relative stability where suppliers did not fail to 
honor their delivery commitments; no supply source was a major or dominant player; the ever-
existing operational constraints were always, to a lesser or greater extent, under control; demand 
for steel products and its price levels were relatively stable; logistic suppliers were manifold; and 
logistic bottle necks of any kind were mostly manageable.  
 
However this business scenario, being of relative certainty with no drastic or major changes 
during the 1990s, suddenly started to experience a structural shift for the following reasons: 
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1. China’s economy started to demand an increasing volume of various commodities, among 
which two were to be critical for the steel making firm’s supply-chain (iron ore and soy). An 
increasing demand of iron ore made this firm’s historical suppliers in Australia shifting their 
preferences and supply to Chinese buyers on the basis of higher prices and long-term 
commitments based on price adjustments. China’s proximity and its shorter financial cycle 
also played its part. China’s growing demand for soy products – of which not only Argentina 
but also Brazil, Paraguay, and Bolivia were by then (and still are) large exporters – changed 
the commercial priorities of the barge operators in the waterways. The barge operators gave 
up carrying iron ore to load a much better profit-yielding product (soy and its byproducts) 
which despite being seasonal offered them the typical commercial advantages of a product 
mix that was heavily demanded on the other side of the world. Even though the barge 
operators did not disappear and kept carrying iron ore along the waterways’ 2,400 km of 
waterways, their commitment, compliance, and reliability left much to be desired. Service 
informality then loomed large and became a commonplace.   
2. Even though the Gulf War triggered oil prices soaring in the early 1990s and introduced a 
certain element of uncertainty on the river and shipping markets worldwide, this crisis alone 
neither impacted on the market structure of the shipping companies nor on that of the river 
barge operators. Bunker costs were duly adjusted according to their respective bunker 
adjustment clauses and suppliers kept carrying iron ore in a regular fashion. However, the 
situation in 2004 seemed different with different causes with respect to oil prices despite 
these having also soared in a significant way and within a context of growing global 
uncertainty. The difference can be explained by the pressure China’s economic expansion 
exerted a critical and drastic business scenario change through:     
1. China becoming the first priority as a long-term customer; 
2. Ship tonnage supply being mostly committed to China; 
3. River tonnage supply giving preference to supply China; and 
4. Ocean time-charter rates and river freight rates tending to increase sharply owing   
a. to supply shortage and excessively high bunker rates which made operators retreat 
and cancel new-buildings orders; and  
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b. Short-distance sailing being preferred to long-distance sailing by the shipping 
companies as a way to reduce their financial exposure to a global price of USD 50 
per barrel time-charter rates. 
 
From my own company and the steel-producing company’s business  intelligence sources, it is 
clear that steel prices also exhibited a growing trend throughout 2004, which if compared to the 
previous year’s average of USD 300/ton, resulted in an increase of more than 70%. This 
evolution made the steel-producing company increase their physical assets by investing in an 
entire new plant to cope with the growing global demand, while the fluctuations in the oil price 
made barge operators becoming cautious by not engaging in new buildings.  
 
7.3 – SUPPLY MARKET STRUCTURE  
The waterways market linking Brazil, Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay, and Uruguay were until the 
1990s, mostly dominated by both Argentine and Paraguayan barge companies with significant 
capital investment in barges, tugboats, river terminals, handling equipment, and specialized 
management. This was historically so when the currency parity of the Argentine Peso to the US 
Dollar became 1 to 1, at which time the country’s economy started to open to the world. 
 
Thus, Argentina received a significant flow of foreign direct investment in practically every 
infrastructure segment or economic activity of interest such as railways, ports, electricity, 
hydrocarbons, water, grains, foodstuff, mining, and power generation. Both private and public 
national firms saw a bright opportunity for capital investment thanks to the high valuation that 
their assets enjoyed, based on the existing 1:1 USD to Argentine Peso currency parity. Barging 
companies were no exception and a deep and rapid process of capital concentration took place, 
first from the USA and later from Chile – two aggressive investors in the country at that time.  
 
Traditional barge operators with interests all along the waterways started to retreat, sell out their 
assets, and either reengineer their businesses or disappear from the market. Most of the few 
existing Paraguayan operators sold off their companies and gave up the river business too. By the 
end of the 1990s the market was mainly operated by a strong and financially solid (though 
unskilled) foreign barge company whose only competitors were a bunch of small independent 
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persistent operators from both Argentina and Paraguay. Figure 7.1 illustrates the type of business 
with barges being positioned. 
 
 
 
Figure 7-1: Barge carrier positioning barges in the River Plate. 
 
The capital concentration phenomena brought about a deepening of the situation that had been 
taking place with respect to historic market informality during the soy export season. Unlike the 
1980s and early 1990s, the market structure changed with a single player emerging to take the 
lead with respect to whether or not to commit with long term contracts to carry iron ore from 
Corumba (Brazil) to San Nicolás (Argentina).  
 
Even though this barge operator engaged in one year contracts, it was normal practice to break 
down a convoy and split it to carry soy products at the expense of leaving the steel company 
without these badly needed supplies. While on the one hand the penalties for breach of contract 
were often substantially lower than the additional income soy freight rates generated; on the other 
hand the soy exports seasonality did not hinder the barging company from operating informally. 
This was because competition was not relevant given the large iron ore volumes required. 
 
Therefore, the steel firm’s critical stock was fed from Australia, USG, or northern Brazil, as a 
way to cope with the market informality and supply uncertainty that dominated the waterways in 
those days. Figure 7.2 illustrates barges being transported.  
 261
 
Figure 7.2 : Typical barge convoy represented by multi-purpose barges based on  informality and poor 
performance . 
 
It is useful to visualize some navigation distances, convoy formation structures, and draft 
limitations to allow the reader better understand the formidable operational constraints the 
waterways presented: 
1. Total river navigation distance: 2,450 km; 
2. Convoy formation structure:12 barges on 3 x 4 mode basis 200 meters in length, 45 meters in 
width; carrying capacity of up to 2500 tons each = total 30,000 tons; 
3. Tugboat pushing power of 4,000 HP equipped with bow-thruster and having an optimal 
operational draft: 10 foot 6 inches; 
4. Draft limitations: March through September 12 foot - September through December 9 to 8.5 
feet - January to February 8 to 6 feet. 
      
Further operational particulars: 
? Critical passages82 marking trends in the river are found at various spots all along the 
waterways. However, there are 500 kilometers on the Alto Paraguay river (km. 0 to 
500) that show certain particulars that are worth highlighting; 
? km. 485 rocky bottom: barge convoys could not dredge the river bottom by just 
pushing forward and making use of the tugboat power, or becoming fractioned to 
facilitate individual barge (rather than barge convoy) passage. 
                                                 
82 A critical passage is one that shows a lower draft than average or where a convoy needs to make special 
maneuvers to avoid a physical obstacle during it navigation.  
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? km. 415 rocky and sandy bottom: barge convoys could not dredge the river bottom 
though could be fractioned and facilitate passing carefully right on top of the sandy 
bottom by leaving rocks on either side. 
? km. 184 rocky and sandy bottom: idem km. 415, though facing strong currents that 
posed serious constraints to a safe maneuvering of both tugboat and barges.  
 
The above clearly shows that every single voyage had to be carefully planned in advance and get 
the convoys loaded with as much cargo as possible, though always considering what data nature 
provides to the experienced eye about hazards. Often highly skilled operators could ‘read’ 
warning signals displayed at a given moment with respect to a spot lying some 800 km away. 
Therefore, data readings at a given moment often led to a disastrous round trip operation for all 
those who participated in the sailing adventure because of inherent uncertainty of weather, river 
and other relevant factors that need to be expertly ‘read’. Even if data readings were correctly 
interpreted and expertly put into practice by the barge operator, much was left to the operator’s 
tacit knowledge on how to successfully navigate these turbulent waters for a safe arrival. This 
kind of operation suggests the importance of traditional knowledge that in view of its very 
particular characteristics is critically strategic.  
 
7.4 – DESCRIPTION OF STAKEHOLDERS 
The project comprised a highly customized design that was developed to suit a series of complex 
logistic constraints of a steel-manufacturing company belonging to a large transnational industrial 
conglomerate. Project participants were located in Argentina and Paraguay. Geography 
influenced the project logistical design, as it is an extremely complex process to transport 
steelmaking raw materials by river barge over 2,400 kilometers across national borders along one 
of the world’s largest river systems. River barge transport remains the most financially viable 
mode of transporting such materials. My reflection on this experience and feedback provided as 
evidence from participants interviewed both named in various tables and many others in less 
formal exchanges confirms that an important facet is that case study participants shared a past 
history of business interaction and collaborated through the Atlantic Corridor Project e-
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collaboration83 network (Arroyo and Walker, 2004). This collaboration cemented trust and the 
necessary relationship commitment and goodwill that provided the underpinning for attempting 
to transform the way the collaborating firms participated in a value/supply chain. This innovative 
approach represents an interesting example of a project (that could be seen as part of a program 
or portfolio of projects) that helps explain how a business transformation was delivered through a 
series of projects in a portfolio of change initiatives.  
 
The specific project focused upon in this study comprised the construction and operation of fully 
dedicated barge convoys to carry iron ore supplies from Brazil to Argentina commencing in 2003 
and phased over six-years. The first phase comprised development and acceptance of an 
innovative logistics design solution and its realisation through the construction of new barges and 
leasing of existing barges. The project had in-built replication possibilities to roll out a series of 
similar projects. The following proposal as illustrated in Table 7.2 was accepted to describe the 
broad scope of the six-year project (with the prospect of a larger follow-on project): 
 
Table 7.2: Project Proposal Scope 
One fully-dedicated barge convoy twelve 
months a year 
Building 12 barges of 2500 tons each = 
30.000 tons capacity 
One suitable tugboat of “pusher” type basis 
4500 horse power 
Port Loading at: Ladario, Corumba, Sobramil 
/ Brazil 
Speed 5 to 6 knots up-river and 8 to 9 knots 
down-river 
Port Discharge at: San Nicolás / Argentina 
12 days sailing up-river; 11 days sailing 
down-river; 2 days loading/unloading; 1 to 
2 days open 
Gross operational time: 25 to 27 days; 1 trip 
every month. 
Total annual volume 250,000 tons + or - 
10% basis 6 years contract 
24 hours loading / 24 hours unloading 
Barge dimensions basis 65 metres length by 
15 metres width 
Building of new barges basis USD490,000 
each 
 
The first barge unit required 90 days to be built with a maximum of 30 days for every subsequent 
built barge. A group of 12 leased barges was sourced, surveyed, approved and chartered from one 
                                                 
83 Participants from remote and central regions across the MERCOSUR agreed to meet on-line twice monthly in a 
virtual meeting place with the aim of finding ways to solve logistical problems within a 24-hour period. 
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of the smaller barge operators. Figure 7.2 illustrates a typical barge convoy. A reliable river 
operator was introduced into the project team and persuaded to operate the convoys under strict 
efficiency standards throughout the six-year contract duration. Three potential shipyards were 
approached in Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and invited to bid for the barge-building contract 
using steel sheets for the barges to be supplied by the steel-manufacturing company from one of 
its plants in Brazil.  
 
 
Figure 7-3: Joint Venture Showing Critical Primary Players and Instrumental Secondary Players 
 
Figure 7.3 illustrates the formation of the JV that was facilitated by the MERCOSUR Trade 
Centre (MCT). It principally involved three principal players who formed the JV with several 
other instrumental secondary players that influenced the final JV design. 
 
Although this project and therefore this case study addresses a number of players which made 
possible the implementation of the project itself, only those who played a key or critical role will 
be analyzed from a Corridor contribution perspective. Those having fulfilled a secondary role 
will only be mentioned to let the reader identify both the number of participants embodied in the 
project, as well as the different dimensions that made up the project, leading to a rather complex 
decision-making scenario.  
 
Critical and instrumental players are described as follows: 
a) Critical players or primary stakeholders: 
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o The steel manufacturing company is based in Buenos Aires with 4,000 employees and having 
an annual turnover well in excess of USD 1 billion. This firm belongs to a much larger 
industrial conglomerate with annual sales for USD 3.2 billions and 16,000 employees 
worldwide.   
o The logistic consulting company is a Buenos Aires-based firm specializing in the formulation 
and implementation of relatively high complexity logistic designs. It has offices throughout 
Latin America to provide industrial conglomerates with assistance in their logistic campaigns 
in landscapes characterized by difficult physical access. It specialized in oil, gas, power, and 
mining, infrastructure for customers represented by large transnational corporations with 
projects undertaken throughout the region. This company can be said to possess a great 
volume of tacit knowledge which provides them with a competitive advantage position as 
described by Porter (1985) of low inimitability along with an ever-increasing market focus 
positioning. 
o The barge operating company is based in Asunción, Paraguay. This is one of the various river 
transportation firms that went through a reengineering process during the 1990s by disposing 
of most of their floating assets and shore facilities. However, this operator kept running a very 
efficient and rather small operation based on deep knowledge, solid planning, and sound 
strategy. It can be said this operator was probably the only left on the waterways skilful 
enough that to undertake a project of this nature as well as being daring enough to challenge 
larger and more resourceful global operators.   
b) Instrumental players or indirect stakeholders: 
o The barge operator’s ship agent is based in Buenos Aires and could be considered the barge 
owner’s right hand in Argentina. A barge owner himself during the 1990s and ex-partner of 
the Paraguayan barging company, this ship agent has become a shrew and intimate translator 
of the various meanings and codes that are often hidden behind people’s facades, attitudes, 
phrases, and cultural behaviors. The ship agent acted mainly as a cultural bridge and 
managerial interpreter between the Argentine steel transnational and the Paraguayan barge 
operator, as both the current operational and regulatory framework on the waterways resulted 
being well known fields by the Paraguayan operator. This actor played more of a role as a 
cultural enhancer than as a technical advisor on operational topics one might assume were of 
tactical relevance. 
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o Main competing shipyards in Argentina, Paraguay, and Brazil played their respective cards 
by actively lobbying both critical and instrumental players alike. Technical skills, social 
contacts, governmental lobbing, and community impact were some of the variables cleverly 
utilized by the shipbuilders and the client, suggesting a fluid interaction of conversation and 
knowledge exchange at the corridor roundtable forums. 
o Main competitors were wary of capital concentration providing too much dominance over the 
waterways market. Competitors’ retaliation to impede the accomplishment of the project was 
not less significant than their seemingly short-sighted strategy of excessively relying on their 
prevailing market dominance. The Corridor also provided a dynamic scenario for interactions 
to occur between all competitors who were members. 
o Banks were purely instrumental in approving or rejecting the project from a financial 
standpoint, although their understanding of the waterways business may be regarded as 
important.  
o The media also became instrumental in supporting through editorials and articles lobbying in 
the press and TV the location where barge-building was going to take place as well the 
facilities wherefrom the steel was going to be supplied for the shipyard to build the barges.     
 
7.5 – INSIGHTS ON THE PROJECT LOGISTIC DESIGN 
The project’s logistic design was formulated by the Buenos Aires-based consulting company on 
the basis of carefully assessing the existing contextual conditions and the steel manufacturing 
firm’s strategic position at that given moment. Such an assessment entailed a deep review and 
study of the following aspects: 
1. Australia’s increasing commitment to supply China’s growing demand for iron ore; 
2. USG suppliers’ growing preference to meet China’s increasing demand for iron ore; 
3. Northeastern Brazilian suppliers’ preference to supply both China and India’s expanding 
markets for iron ore; 
4. Inauguration of a new plant in the River Plate to cope with a steady increase of demand for 
steel-made end products from all over the world – Asia-Pacific region inclusive; 
5. Existing relative indifference on the part of the steel producing firm with respect to becoming 
more actively involved in controlling their own waterways-based supply-chain;  
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6. High levels of capital concentration of river transportation companies operating on the 
waterways linking the Brazilian suppliers with the Argentine buyer, leading to both price 
increases and service informality; 
7. High levels of on-going variability and future uncertainty scenario for oil prices impacting 
negatively on ocean-going vessels’ time charter market;  
8. Steady increases in demand volumes for soy products arising out of China’s formidable 
growth leading to a river transportation imbalance and a general rate increase in barging 
services; and 
9. Slow reaction and limited innovation capacity on the part of the Argentine steel-producing 
company despite its global structure and well reputed international management.  
 
In view that the waterways market was to a great extent dominated by a major player and that no 
independent barge operator was at that time in condition to successfully compete on a sustainable 
basis, the logistic design illustrated in Table 7.2 was formulated and submitted to the steel 
company for their evaluation. It was intended to both bring an achievable solution to the 
multinational and to make their executives visualize the opportunities lying in the long run in 
terms of market dominance, ship-building, and supply the derivable outlined in Table 7.2. 
 
 The building project schedule was expected to be 90 days for the first unit and a maximum of 30 
days thereafter for every barge, bringing the total construction time up to a maximum of 12 
months. In the interim period a group of 12 barges was located, surveyed, approved, and 
chartered from one of the smaller river companies that were still making business on the 
waterways. Figure 7.3 illustrates a typical example of one of these second hand barges.  
 
The steel-manufacturing firm signed a contract for six years, this being a requisite for the 
financial institution to even start talks and carry on with the process. A reliable river operator was 
brought into the deal and convinced to operate the convoys under strict efficiency standards 
throughout the duration of the contract and despite the well-known operational constraints of the 
fluvial system itself. Three potential shipyards were approached in the three countries (Argentina 
; Brazil ; Paraguay) and were invited to bid for the building contract. The steel sheets for building 
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the barges was agreed to be supplied by the steel-manufacturing company from one of its plants 
in Brazil in view of it having the most adequate sheet cuttings and lowest cost. 
 
 
 
Figure 7-4 : Second Hand Barges Getting Ready to Start Loading Operations Alongside Berth in Corumba, 
Brazil, During the Interim Period . 
 
The moment this information appeared in the media, things started to change and the project ran 
into serious danger of running aground and therefore obstructing the realization of a second 
larger contract upon which negotiations were already being held. It is interesting, and aids 
making sense of the context of the emergence of this project, to break down and later analyze 
from a leadership standpoint – item by item - how the sequence of events was finally influencing 
the players’ decision-making and shaped their final agreement - it reflects a somewhat typical 
project multi-headed stakeholder quandary that needs to be resolved. It also illuminates the 
reality of those involved in PM that reflects the lived reality of being involved in PM activities in 
all its uncertainty, planned responses as well as coping mechanisms to achieve results. 
 
A Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on a six-year contract was made public on the media 
by March 2004. Details of the events that followed are summarized as follows: 
1. The dominant and largest river company lodged a formal claim on very old pending issues 
against the smaller river operator and proceeded to seize some of the barges that had been 
chartered to the steel-making firm for the transition period of 12 months – until the new-
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buildings were launched and ready to operate. Thus, the first shipment of 25 to 30,000 tons of 
iron ore resulted in a failure.  
2. The steel-making company’s shipping manager threatens the large river operator with no 
longer chartering their ocean-going vessels from Northeast Brazil – as they also provided 
shipping services from overseas – unless an amicable solution to this issue was found. 
3. No threat was made however, with respect to the on-going barging operations of this 
dominant player as despite being informal and therefore inefficient, the steel-producing firm 
needed to maintain raw material supplies in any way it could to avoid having to make use of 
critical stocks at San Nicolas port terminal at their plant in Argentina.  
4. The Paraguayan operators reinforced their distrust of the smaller river operator by sustaining 
belief that one never knows what legal or financial problem lies behind this firm’s floating 
equipment assets: maritime liens; embargoes; outstanding moneys; material deficiencies; 
unsettled casualties,  etc. In the meantime, the Asunción-based company had positioned a 
tugboat in San Nicolas while waiting to proceed with the voyage, thus incurring in heavy 
running costs. 
5. The Paraguayan operator offers to personally talk to the smaller river operator in order to 
convince him to pay out the pending moneys, lift the embargo, and carry on with the river 
adventure while getting capitalized with the still pending 12 months charter. Instead, the 
smaller operator proposed that the Paraguay-based company advance the said pending monies 
in order to immediately free the barges and to jointly exploit other extra-contract barges that 
were also trapped by the embargo to carry other party’s cargo with their tugboat. After some 
robust negotiations, the deal was accepted and the first convoy departs from San Nicolas 
towards Asunción – though a high degree of distrust is retained by the Paraguayan operator. 
6. While performing the 3rd day of navigation a new embargo emerged and resulted in 6 out of 
12 barges being seized and detained at an intermediate river port. This time the plaintiff was 
the Argentine Government that claimed reimbursement of some loans that were destined to 
construction but that were in fact utilized on running their daily operations. Lawyers had to be 
appointed and guarantees were submitted to let the convoy proceed. However, the efficiency 
degree with which the whole transition process of the river operation had been planned was 
already void, and deserved an urgent reengineering if economies of scale were to work on 
their side instead of becoming a over burdensome.  
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7. The dominant river operator let the market know they had allocated a huge building order for 
40 barges in each of the potential shipyards the steel-making firm was negotiating with. The 
most likely shipyard – located in Paraguay – acknowledged not only having read the news but 
also being in advanced negotiations to build 40 barges as informed by the media. Whether 
this was a distractive operation or a strategic move to keep control of the waterways market 
was by then unknown to the players. 
8. The financial party started to delay the final signature for releasing the funds in view of the 
recent events which brought about uncertainty and made public their concern on whether or 
not the appointed shipyard would have enough building facilities to carry out the job on time 
and within budget, these being two variables of paramount importance in a project 
characterized by efficient operations based on low margins.  
9. The steel-producing company instructed their lawyers to speed up the proceedings of some 
old claims for barge sinking and total loss they went through on several occasions against the 
dominant river player which they found to be responsible for. Clearly, this acted as 
retaliation. 
10. The media gave ample nationalistic coverage to the fact that an Argentine company was 
placing a construction order not in Argentina but in Paraguay, and to supply steel sheets from 
their Brazilian subsidiary and not from any of their various domestic facilities.  
11. The Paraguayan operator finally lost the support of their financial partner and had to call for 
the services of another bank, which demanded less attractive conditions causing margins to 
lower even further - though still feasible.  
12. The Paraguayan shipyard – though the best qualified – was eliminated by political motives 
and thus two Argentine shipyards became short-listed. One turned out to be very 
knowledgeable and counting on respectable facilities and availability to start works 
immediately while guaranteeing a strict construction schedule compliance; the other one was 
once a large yard specialized in building railway wagons and whose CEO happened to be an 
old school mate of the steel-making company’s owner and chairman. In spite of not counting 
on the right facilities and giving no certainties with respect to construction timing or delivery 
dates, they were invited to participate in the bidding process. 
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13. The new bank, despite knowing little about naval construction engineering, became the first 
party to oppose the appointment of this new shipyard by alleging their lack of expertise and 
commitment.  
14. The Paraguayan operator confidentially let the others know that should the bank pay a visit to 
this shipyard’s job-site the deal was going to be over again, as it was clear that their facilities 
did not match the basic needs of a safe construction process. 
15. The steel-making firm’s managers had no other option than considering this shipyard’s 
proposal in view it was somehow favored from the very top of the organization. 
16. Such a proposal delayed over and over and made the Paraguayan operator give a final notice 
to the steel-making firm by alleging they could no longer wait for a final decision if an 
operational scheme based on efficiency and productivity was to be accomplished. 
17. Finally, the inexperienced shipyard delayed too much in matching the necessary technical 
requirements and their offer was dismissed, despite of having assured to be by then, the most 
competitive. Despite the fact that they were previously disqualified, the bid was won by the 
Paraguay-based shipyard while the steel sheets supplies were agreed to be sent off from an 
Argentina-based facility as a way to cope with the media and pacify potential critics by 
referring to the fact that the whole project remained as a MERCOSUR deal, with no extra-
regional participants. However, at the very last minute the board of the steel-producing 
company decided to proceed and place an additional construction order with the most 
qualified Argentine shipyard and therefore commit to the fully dedicated operations 
philosophy to be applied on a 2nd convoy. 
18. By-products of these first two contracts resulted in a potential third identical contract being 
awarded to the same Paraguayan barge operator through the consulting company with 
shipyard works completion monitoring and the carriage of steel sheets being awarded to the 
consulting firm.   
19. Related business possibilities emerged for the consulting firm with respect to developing a 
fully-dedicated convoy for a large soy exporter further to a new river traffic for the same 
steel-manufacturing firm. 
  
These simplified vignettes of the complex and energetic interactions between stakeholders 
provide a glimpse of the complexity of the situation. Delivering a business transformation of this 
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nature is fraught with uncertainties, should-be obvious (but often ignored) risks and politics of 
stakeholder management that can only be summarized and alluded to. The lived experience is far 
too complex to describe in terms acceptable to academic studies because so many of the issues 
trigger emotional and therefore highly personal, contextual and tacit responses and reactions. The 
point of highlighting the above is to illustrate the complexity, richness and tentative nature of 
variables involved. Such studies are necessarily filtered by personal observations and experiences 
of those contributing evidence. However, despite these limitations, the lived experience advances 
our knowledge of repertoires of behavior and responses to such situations and so it is this value 
that constitutes the value of these business transformation project management studies. 
 
7.6 – THE CORRIDOR AS A FACILITATOR 
Two driving forces for this joint venture become clear from this case study; one is the global 
dimension of the primary stakeholder (steel manufacturing company) and the other one the 
complexity of the logistic operation in itself that made traditional knowledge of strategic 
relevance. One might assume that the steel company, holding a business presence in so many 
countries around the world and having access to countless data bases and logistic experiences to 
feed from and benchmark with, would not regard the Corridor as a potentially valuable 
development tool. 
 
However, not only did the primary stakeholders interact during the roundtable forums and 
exchanged knowledge until eventually giving birth to a knowledge-based logistic design, but also 
the secondary stakeholders took part in the process and became interested to form part of what 
was about to take place. Even though a number of functional aspects such as financial 
engineering, insurance, port operations and barging services were often contracted by the steel 
company on diverse geographical settings, the knowledge specificity and viscosity of the logistic 
design along with its very unique geographic and operational particulars embodied by the 
waterways, seem to have found a fertile ground for these various actors to get together and 
become interested in one another’s needs, potential, and proposals.    
 
Carlos Candia, Project Manager of the Buenos Aires-based logistic consultancy company, 
attended the roundtable forums long before this project became a reality and therefore had the 
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opportunity to keep face-to-face contacts and dialogue with various members who later brokered 
him to some of the senior executives that played decisive roles in this project. In one interview 
with me he said (translated from Spanish) “I always attended the roundtable forums as I 
considered them a unique opportunity toward exercising a realistic knowledge sharing and 
transfer, as well as a suitable arena for networking in search of future business opportunities. 
However, an aspect I immediately realized and caught my full attention on the river supply 
problems the steel company was going through, was its high complexity, a great number of 
variables to consider, the risks involved, and perhaps its very uniqueness given its inimitability or 
difficulty to replicate anywhere in the world”. 
 
When asked on the way the steel company’s executives reacted to the globalization impact he 
replied; “It was amazing to see the contrast between the apparent available resources of a 
globally established and well reputed international company (where one might assume there will 
always be an alternative strategy to follow), and the lack of vision or anticipation of their 
regional executives to come up with a solid plan to break their logistic dependence on a single 
barge operator”.  
 
According to Carlos Candia the Corridor proved fruitful for this large company in that their 
executives had the opportunity to witness the truly dynamic character the Corridor held during 
the peak of the globalization impact over the region, as well as the speed at which knowledge 
sharing and transfer took place in its different forms. In his opinion, the roundtable forums for the 
steel company seemed to have taken the leadership role of that of their company’s most 
experienced managers, who as well as holding a recognized leadership by peers and subordinates, 
also find themselves in a pyramidal structure where levels and ranks are respected and followed. 
“The multinational’s managers looked so structured and accustomed to be told what to do and 
how to carry on as if they did not have any initiative on their own, which was a weird supply -
chain situation as it was the Corridor the one that precisely adopted a leadership role and acted 
as a truly motivating tool for them and others”.  
 
MTC’s President Roberto Cristaldi also interacted with several of their executives as well as 
participated in numerous roundtables while integrating various CoPs. He observed that these 
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executives had taken the typical attitude of those more interested in assessing others’ ideas and 
concepts rather than developing their own formulas. “I have seen this attitude many times 
amongst executives of the larger companies who were convinced their firms’ potential volumes or 
purchasing power was large enough to adopt a come-to-see-me and shall assess your proposal 
attitude – instead of timely reacting and putting into practice their own plans to weather the 
storm”.  
 
Roberto Cristaldi has a coincident opinion with Carlos Candia in that the Corridor proved an 
efficient arena to open up these executives’ minds towards becoming more receptive, 
challenging, realistic, and perhaps inspirational to face an uncertain scenario. He also highlighted 
the very specific role traditional knowledge played not only with respect to the barging operation, 
but also from a financial standpoint. “I believe that the uniqueness of the waterways operations is 
very clear and out of discussion. However, there seems to have been also a financial scheme that 
was not readily available to be developed by just any bank or financial institution as it demanded 
to truly comprehend the operational risks involved and the very particularities of a 2,400 km of 
fluvial transportation. In this regard I believe the Corridor played a fundamental networking role 
for the members to profit from as well as it meant a tremendous innovation incubator in the sense 
that companies attended not just in search of new businesses, but that were just compelled to 
touch base with the right party to face the new scenario”.  
 
Mariano Gramajo was the operations representative of the Paraguayan river operator in Buenos 
Aires. His main observations are related to the framework within which the project developed as 
well as the various stages that were needed up to accomplishing the final logistic design. He 
argues that it is difficult for him to imagine this project having moved forward in a more 
traditional setting such as business or informational meetings held at the ship-owners association 
or chamber of commerce or some sort of internal follow-up management gatherings, or under a 
typical management by objectives scheme arising out of a particular company need.  
 
He said: “Firstly, there is a rapidly changing business environment that is undoubtedly impacting 
both on the region and upon all the players. Secondly, the business context uncertainty only 
rivals the almost countless variables a 2,400 km all-year-round river operation embodies. 
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Thirdly, the magnitude of the traditional knowledge along with its complexity is so large that an 
independent or outer development becomes simply unthinkable”. To this end, Mariano Gramajo 
believes the roundtable forums proved to be critical for a subsequent assembling of the different 
parts and pieces of a very complex logistic puzzle.  
 
Carlos Arizaga was the steel company’s Procurement Managing Director and head of the 
waterways project within his organization. He eventually submitted the project for the approval 
of the board (once the consultancy firm had rounded off the logistic design). He headed a division 
of more than 20 engineers in charged of the many logistic segments needed to keep various plants 
running across Argentina. He admitted that his team was more focused on setting new key 
performance indicators and improving or securing their supplies from the various origins, rather 
than on innovating on new supply channels or creating the conditions for new logistic suppliers to 
emerge and grow along them. When asked about this particular logistic design he was categorical 
in his response; “The parties to talk to were so many, their interests and points of view so 
diverse, and the traditional knowledge so deep and attached to every single player, that I find an 
alternative setting to develop a project this complex simply unrealistic”. 
 
I requested the river operator representative’s opinion on the above comments. He stated that had 
this individual and his team taken a more modest attitude or deployed a better receptivity with 
respect to those holding the specific operational knowledge, the project would not have been so 
time-consuming. “With this I confirm my own suspicions in that representing a large 
multinational may give oneself negotiating power and a high self-esteem I suppose. This person 
along with his team took a long time to evolve and understand that here the key to the project was 
accepting others’ views and experience coming from so many years of working on the waterways, 
and not that much engineering performance ratios and indicators that proved successful 
somewhere else. I am convinced this was always about who held knowledge and not so much 
about relative power or global dimension”.    
 
I had the opportunity to participate in the logistic design developed by the consultancy company 
(which brought together the primary and secondary stakeholders and shaped the logistic design in 
itself) while at the same time attending the roundtable forums as a Corridor member. In my 
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opinion not only the Corridor resulted key to let people interact and participate in different CoPs, 
but also was a suitable setting to replicate proposals and countless situations by third parties who 
were not part of the project but that possessed a specific piece of knowledge applicable to 
different stages of the project. Their own opinions and views (based on their past experiences) on 
a number of different functional aspects (e.g. loading speed at Brazilian river terminals / 
controlling procedures by the national coastguards / port congestion impact on freight rates / 
casualty probability / seasonality impact on round-trip performance) helped immensely to 
dissipate the doubts or fears of the steel company’s management before a scenario that they could 
not dominate, anticipate, or even entirely assimilate.    
 
Even though most of time this whole exercise was not an easy journey, such a process provided 
the various players with the possibility to double check with those who were not parties to the 
project on certain operational issues, which otherwise would have possibly meant the 
unfeasibility of the project owing to potential doubts with respect to operational or financial 
aspects, hidden agendas, or simply lack of trust. A complete breakdown and full exposure of the 
critical variables along with the input coming from both the stakeholders and collaborators helped 
the project to avoid running the risk of becoming inconclusive.     
 
Ruben Conde, shipping financial expert, was in charge of designing the financial engineering that 
made possible the different pieces coming together. Even though he did not regularly attend the 
roundtable forums, he had the opportunity to witness its functioning and corroborate that his 
comments on specific financial issues that were brought up from an operational perspective, 
helped to consolidate the players’ visions that otherwise would have probably led to nowhere. He 
said: “I found the Corridor’s dynamics very interesting and challenging. But perhaps most 
importantly was the participation of those who were not central to the project but that based on 
their experience contributed to dissipate doubts and increase transparency and trust amongst 
those who were critical to the project”.  
 
In my quality of direct participant and observer I agree with those who commented on the 
uniqueness of this project as well as the great number of variables that had to be considered on a 
12-month basis operation. In this regard I would like to add that a river operation holds a tight 
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connection with its geographical environment which is very unlikely to extrapolate in view of 
both the existing topography and the traditional knowledge that often comes attached to it.  
 
Even though I had to operate convoys on both the Amazon basin in Brazil and the Orinoco basin 
in Venezuela, I find them both unique and therefore different when compared to each other or 
with the Parana-Paraguay waterways. One can always find certain analogies though they often 
turn out to be the exception and not the rule. In those locations I also found traditional knowledge 
to be absolutely critical while both the operational variables (tug boats; barges; terminals; cranes; 
berths; buoys; people; culture; etc) and the geographical particulars (depths; tides; currents; 
sedimentation; seasonality; rains; fog; temperature; etc) which tended to be also unique.  
         
The next section will address the case study conclusions based on the axis of both the role played 
by traditional knowledge and the Corridor’s dynamics in allowing a project of this nature to be 
formulated and put into practice.         
 
7.7 – CHAPTER SUMMARY 
There are three aspects that clearly stand out in this case study that perhaps did not play such a 
dominant role in the previous examples. One is represented by the fact that once this project was 
designed, formulated, and eventually put into practice, the worst of the globalization impact on 
the region had already been experienced or absorbed. Therefore, the driving motive of this 
project does not find its sources on the first globalization wave over the region, but on a sort of 
globalization impact byproduct that brought about a specific supply-chain problem to a major 
regional player.  
 
The traumatic moments that hit each and every national and regional logistic player and 
compelled them to reengineer their business or give up, were over by the time the steel company 
had engaged in the roundtable forums. It can therefore be argued that the Corridor as a system, as 
well as its varied array of members, were pretty much conversant with its modus operandi and 
had witnessed or taken part of the many alliances and JVs that effectively took place. 
Consequently the Corridor counted on a certain level of maturity acquired during the 1990s by 
the time the steel company joined the system in the late 1990s.  
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The second element is given by the high level of traditional knowledge a project like this one 
needed to develop and become a reality. Had not the Corridor counted on those few critical 
regional players having a thorough understanding or deep knowledge of their business context, it 
is extremely unlikely this project would have progressed the way it did – regardless of the 
contextual or global circumstances. Bringing together potential independent actors with a 
common interest or rationale to collaborate, exchange views and impressions, and transfer 
knowledge to produce a remarkable business transformation on the primary stakeholders, would 
have been unthinkable without identifying the existence of a solid traditional knowledge platform 
to grow from.  
 
This project knowledge specificity and viscosity and its apparent dependence on traditional 
knowledge, also suggests that a certain degree of maturation amongst the Corridor members as 
well as the roundtable forums’ functioning, was needed to overcome the many managerial and 
operational barriers along the process. One may assume this project to have failed had it been 
undertaken by the early 1990s when the system was just initiating and little experience was 
available in terms of interactions, networking, knowledge sharing and transfer, cooperation, 
collaborations, etc. 
 
The way stakeholders (direct and indirect) and outsiders collaborated toward bringing data and 
information on their own functional experiences shows that further to traditional knowledge, 
face-to-face interaction along with a given accomplished maturity degree of the system in itself, 
have also held a triggering effect towards the project completion. It seems clear that trust, 
commitment, leadership, motivation, collaboration, and innovation have all played their part 
within a common setting.  
 
Even though it was not the globalization impact of the early1990s (the one event that triggered 
the reaction of the steel manufacturing firm), a comparable outer symptom was aroused by China 
and India’s economic expansion—which had a similar effect on the main stakeholder when 
compared to the logistic companies at the outset of the Corridor. A critical element for the steel 
manufacturing firm’s decision to join the Corridor was their being unable to rely upon in-house 
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resources (or perhaps lacking of vision, initiative, or leadership) so they needed to search for 
knowledge, innovation, and possibly leadership to deal with this deep rooted knowledge-based 
project.  
 
The third aspect that stands out in retrospective reflection of my role as participant and catalyst 
for change, was that rather than there being a highly formulated strategic plan painstakingly 
designed at the outset (that according to Mitzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampet (1998) can be classified 
as fitting the planning or positioning school of strategy where a more stable and predictable 
environment prevails) the project followed an emergent and learning school of strategic 
thought—with elements of the entrepreneurial, cognitive, cultural, power, and environmental 
schools. Indeed to follow their typology of strategic decision making that this case study best 
exhibits, the way the project unfolded is more in line with the configuration school which is best 
suited to dealing with turbulence, uncertainly, a need to be agile and responsive. The 
transformation in PM approaches that this case study illuminates is how different the approach 
adopted to deal with the many primary and secondary players and the economic environmental 
realities that this approach exhibits when compared to how this industry segment would 
traditionally be approached.  The Corridor and its facilitation not only influenced critical 
elements of knowledge exchange and co-generation, and its brokering activities as a business 
opportunity incubator but it also appears to have facilitated a more pragmatic and 
configurationally strategic approach that all parties adopted.     
 
In my privileged role of direct observer I can affirm that when the impact of the Asia-Pacific 
economies had taken place, the Corridor members had already to a great extent reengineered their 
businesses to cope with the new business context that gradually impacted the region during the 
1990s. This entailed a great deal of business transformation along with vision, knowledge sharing 
and transfer, and leadership on the part of the members with respect to both their own internal or 
regional reengineering, and their alliances and partnerships with foreign-based companies. Such a 
degree of evolution has apparently helped the steel company to soon realize they had to open up 
and push its executives to interact within the roundtable forums in search of knowledge to 
transform their business limitations in strategic opportunities.  
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To this end and given the project complexity, the maturity accomplished by the Corridor by the 
early 2000s seems to have helped the steel company transform a threatening supply-chain context 
into a more predictable operational context leading possibly to, a   dominant market position in 
the waterways. Further to securing their logistic supply sources, the Corridor proved efficient in 
finding ways to enlarge economies of scale to gain competitive advantage.  
 
The next chapter will develop a cross study analysis of all the case studies presented aiming at 
discussing the findings that seem to be common to all, highlighting the concepts where the 
Corridor seems to have been successful, and making reference to those aspects the Corridor needs 
further development or a different strategy to improve its overall performance.  
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 8. CROSS-CASE STUDY ANALYSIS 
      
Chapter 6 and 7 presents data, findings and insights from a variety of triangulated sources. These 
findings were then considered from reflection and analysis, both from a grounded data up theory 
and from a top down literature perspective, led to overarching themes to emerge. These help 
explain the role of the Corridor in this context and to address the research questions. 
 
8.1 - INTRODUCTION 
This chapter starts by addressing the end of a sort of linear dynamic growth model that the 
various logistic segments experienced right before the globalization reached the region. It 
describes Porter’s (1985) five competitive forces as a suitable vehicle for companies to expand 
and invest as well as his three main strategies to gain competitive advantage. A cross-case study 
analysis is made with respect to the way Porter’s (1985) three main strategies helped companies 
to face the upcoming business context along with the Corridor’s contribution along the process. 
The chapter further continues with a cross-case study analysis of Porter’s (2001) value chain 
model and the actual contribution of the Corridor to the different roles played by both the primary 
and support activities.  
 
Another cross-case study follows and embodies the different aspects that both transactional and 
transformational leadership types influenced each project as well as the way the Corridor turned 
out to be critical to help bringing up leadership to the benefit of the stakeholders. A final cross-
case study on knowledge management highlights the importance and influence of Nonaka’s 
(1991) SECI cycle as well as relates Dixon’s (2000) knowledge transfer types to each case study 
aiming to better comprehend the constructive role both the Corridor and the roundtable forums 
played at that time. The chapter ends with the conclusions where both the achievements and 
failures of the system are highlighted in order to open up a new avenue of discussion in the 
following chapter.     
 
8.2 - CROSS-CASE STUDY COMPETITIVE FORCES ANALYSIS 
The moment the globalization process hit the region and together with it the market opened up to 
new options, the growth dynamics changed and the need to adopt some sort of business 
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transformation strategy became apparent on the part of the stakeholders – either primary or 
secondary. 
 
Case Study 1 (shipping JV project) explained the drastic transformation a number of shipping 
companies had to go through to remain competitive. Case Study 2 (land-bridge project) involved 
two companies that had to face a significant organizational transformation to achieve a level of 
innovation capable of facing a new non-linear dynamic business scenario. Case Study 3 (regional 
railways project) details the ways for a solid national company to reengineer and become first 
regional and later international to plan how to keep control and respond to demand and achieve 
the necessary economies of scales to remain competitive. Case Study 4 (port terminal project) 
was perhaps the most relevant example of the way a linear dynamics business environment can 
drastically turn into a non-linear one that leads to uncertainty and ambiguity with respect to 
planning the future. Case Study 5 (river transportation project) clearly illustrates the way outer 
regional uncertainties can constructively trigger a profound organizational transformation even 
within a supposedly rigid and hierarchical multinational company.  
 
It is in this respect that all five of these case studies easily identify with Courtney, Kirkland, and 
Viguerie’s (1997) argument that in turbulent and rapidly changing circumstances, traditional 
strategic planning horizons are dangerously constricting and confining, leading to a true 
ambiguity situation (level 4 of their model). This situation provides no basis to forecast the future 
but rather, it requires drawing analogies, recognizing patterns, and putting into practice non-linear 
emergent and recursive models. So it becomes hard to imagine how long it would have taken for 
all these firms to effectively internalize, assess, discuss, and benchmark with others the various 
alternatives to better face a threatening scenario. Clearly a mechanism that provides a safe space 
or ba to explore situations, scenarios and options is both necessary and desirable. 
 
Figure 8.1 illustrates the struggle that was going on by the case study organizations as they tried 
to balance forces acting upon them with strategies and actions they could take and how they 
could shape the future by managing the delicate balancing act.  
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Figure 8-1: The Balancing Act  
 
 
The Corridor at this point seems at least to have shortened networking times and provided a 
unique setting for companies to benchmark with one another, capture others’ ideas or thoughts, 
imitate constructive attitudes, and erode potential rivalries to slowly shape the minds and spirits 
of the members to let cooperation, collaboration, knowledge, and leadership to emerge. Had not 
the Corridor project existed, one could well assume that the globalization impact would have 
hindered many firms from achieving larger economies of scale on time to remain or even gain a 
more competitive profile.   
 
Even though the Corridor gathered a wide array of companies together in these transformation 
projects with a variety of visions and interests (also represented in the five case studies), it is 
interesting to highlight its potential role to bridge the existing gaps with the two types of anxieties 
as described by Schein (1993) in Chapter 3. Anxiety 1 holders (fear associated with a company’s 
inability or unwillingness to learn something new in view of its difficulty degree) while anxiety 2 
holders (fear, shame, or guilt for not learning something new). Both anxiety types seem to have 
had their differences eroded owing to the existing cross-business learning dynamics along with 
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the concept of a growing uncertainty level that acted as a triggering effect for members to open 
up and show more receptive.   
 
Porter (1998, pp8-11) argues that even though industry profitability in the short run depends on 
the balance between supply and demand, it is industry structure what determines long-term 
profits projections. In his opinion, it is industry structure that makes competitors add supply as 
well as reducing it every time an excess of capacity brings down the price levels to make a sector 
unprofitable. This is precisely the primary impact the region experienced from the globalization 
wave and what acted as triggering effect to drive the formation of the Corridor.  
 
Porter’s (1985) five competitive forces, which he describes as determining the ability for a firm 
to invest in a certain activity are precisely the fundamental concepts that supported the Corridor’s 
essence which became commonplace in the five case studies. Entry of New Competitors and 
Threat of Substitutes are two concepts that are embodied in the case studies when facing the 
arrival of much larger-scaled and therefore lower cost-based global operators - with the exception 
of the river transportation project where the triggering concept was perhaps more identifiable 
with the already existing global market’s interdependence that suddenly and unexpectedly led 
this firm to undertake an aggressive business transformation. 
 
The Bargaining Power of Buyers and Suppliers as well as the Rivalry Amongst Existing 
Competitors also are variables that Porter defines as critical considerations to companies’ 
expansion and investment decisions. Coincidentally, the strength of these competitive forces 
reflect the fears and concerns of those firms that gradually joined the Corridor in search of 
alternative courses of action in a business environment that they could no longer control or even 
anticipate. These forces find similar expressions in all of the case studies with the exception of 
the last one, in terms of companies struggling to joint venture, rationalize, and reengineer to 
attain larger economies of scale while retaining their market positioning. Case Study 5 responds 
more to a structural economic transformation brought by the globalization process as well as an 
implicit desire to exercise leadership, and not so much to Porter’s (1985) competitive forces 
strengths. 
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The Corridor’s contribution at this point seems to have been to facilitate the conditions for 
companies to actively interact and share their corporate views and concerns by effectively 
brokering a rather ample array of interests. Clearly, knowledge sharing and transfer stand out as 
privileged components in all the case studies.  
 
Porter (1985) emphasizes that there are three main strategies for companies in order to gain 
competitive advantage: cost leadership / differentiation / focus. These three elements are present 
in the five case studies though adopting different forms, the Corridor being the facilitator for 
these strategies to spread and produce outcomes.  
1. Cost Leadership: This became a critical variable for the shipping companies to attain 
during the JV process in case study 1. It would have been very unlikely for them to 
individually face the larger firms deploying global economies of scale if they had not 
joined resources to rationalize their fleets and services in pursuit of greater efficiencies 
and broader geographical reach. The land-bridge case study would have never been able 
to successfully compete with the existing and well established full-container liners in 
the pacific if it was not for the shipping company’s ample geographical reach (Western 
and Eastern Europe / Middle East / North Africa) that provided the land-bridge scheme 
with the necessary cargo volume to lower its operational costs and gain competitive 
advantage. Enlarging economies of scale was also crucial for ALL in Case Study 3 to 
effectively compete with both regional and extra-regional ground and river 
transportation firms. Case Study 4 also needed to first achieve larger economies of scale 
to allow it to later lower its operational costs—though pretending to face a global 
contender located just 70 kilometers away. The barging Case Study 5 JV formation 
would not even be considered to become a JV prospective option for the steel 
manufacturing company unless lower, or at least comparable, unit costs would not have 
been attained to make the waterways operations and construction a viable project. The 
Corridor seems to have fulfilled the role of an impartial setting for members to explore 
alternative ways to face the globalization as well as a fertile ground for knowledge, 
leadership, and culture to bridge gaps and let business transformation to occur.  
2. Differentiation: Even though the modality of JV and VSA were well known in the 
northern hemisphere by the time the globalization wave hit the region, none of the 
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shipping companies described in Case Study 1 (as well as in general) was allied or 
operationally combined with other market players but that all remained independent and 
disconnected from world trends. In this regard Case Study 1 shows a remarkable degree 
of differentiation in view of the unique and pioneering structure of the JV which by the 
time it was initiated happened to be a leading case for other to follow. Case Study 2 
turned out to be not only unique, as it combined various modes of transport by bringing 
together two continents, but that  also it was regarded as a leading case by most of the 
regional and global operators who happened to first observe it and then to later put into 
operations their own versions of the model. Case studies 3 and 4 also show a high 
degree of differentiation in that both formulated and implemented strategies that were 
not often seen even in more developed markets: a railway company that became 
regionally operational and globally commercial, as well as a national port terminal 
operator that challenges a world class operator by taking advantage from its deep 
knowledge of the market and customers. Despite the apparent geographical 
disadvantages of the waterways in terms of supply distance and operational constraints, 
Case Study 5 is a truly tailor-made logistic design where a higher degree of 
differentiation becomes hard to imagine.  
3. Focus: Porter (1985) argues that focus means producing products and services that 
fulfill the needs of small group of consumers. As such, the 5 case studies focus on very 
well determined and specific market segments far from what a retail market strategy 
might look like. Focus was perhaps the most sought after strategy amongst the Corridor 
members when attending the roundtable forums, as a way to reengineer their businesses 
and survive while going through a transformation.  
 
It becomes apparent that the linear dynamic concept was no longer valid in terms of business 
continuity or contextual circumstances. Anxieties seem to have been at first ignored by most 
stakeholders while they did recognize the seriousness of the globalization process and its 
associated potential impact. Although Porter’s competitive forces find some similarities and 
differences in the case studies presented, they all seem to play a decisive role in shaping the 
firms’ strategies to face the future. To summarize by referring to Figure 8-1, a combination of 
Porters’ (1985) competitive advantage theory was balanced by consideration of the turbulent and 
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uncertain context (as described earlier from Courtney et al (1997) and any influence of Schein’s 
(1993) anxiety and awareness of uncertainty theory) explain the dynamics of the situation facing 
these case study firms. It is in this respect that the Corridor seems to have facilitated their cross-
learning and managerial networking for them to profit from. The next section will address 
Porter’s value chain model in relation to the case studies.    
 
8.3- CROSS-CASE STUDIES VALUE CHAIN ANALYSIS 
Porter’s (1985) value chain model recognizes both primary and support activities. The way these 
interacted within the Corridor does not find a homogeneous response since each case study shows 
its own characteristics and dynamics. Table 8.1 illustrates a summary of these element related to 
each case study and the explanation of this assessment follows. 
 
Table 8.1: Value Chain Analysis – Relevance of Porters’ Elements to Case Studies  
Value Chain Elements to Case Studies  1 2 3 4 5
Primary Activities:      
Inbound Logistics *** * ** * * 
Operations management *** *** *** *** ** 
Outbound Logistics ** ** ** * * 
Marketing and Sales – access to markets, supply chain *** *** *** *** * 
Support Activities:      
Firm’s Infrastructure  *** ** ** ** ** 
Human Resources – knowledge and skills ** ** *** ** *** 
Technology Development ** ** * ** ** 
Procurement transformation options  * ** * ** *** 
          Where * = low, ** = medium, *** = High 
  
Case Study 1 identifies itself with Inbound Logistics (bunkers / turn-around-time of containers); 
operations (towing / cargo handling / hiring of vessels / combined operations around the world); 
and Marketing and Sales (better transit-times / more accurate scheduling / broader scope of 
services / expanding intermodal transportation / greater sailing frequency).  
 
The firm’s infrastructure along with an upgrade of the overall technological profile of the JV, 
possibly are the two most relevant contributions of Porter’s value chain model (2001) to support 
activities to better understand the value of the Corridor. While the first embodies around-the-
world offices, trucking equipment, warehouses, transfer facilities, and container manufacturing 
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premises in distant geographies (which provides them with a tangible competitive advantage), the 
second focuses on more comprehensible and integrating information systems technology. Unlike 
Case Study 5, traditional knowledge was not here a dominant factor despite human resources 
played a role of importance in letting the global firms better interpret the regional market 
variables and have access to it through the regional executives.  
 
It becomes apparent that a combination of Porter’s primary and support activities held a vital 
influence in the organizational transformation of these companies to face the globalization. The 
Corridor seems to have facilitated some of the generic strategies and create the necessary 
conditions for knowledge to spread, leadership to emerge, to bridge gaps in mutual 
understanding, and business transformation to take place based on both achieving larger 
economies of scale and gaining competitive advantage. 
 
Inbound Logistics had a lower relative relevance in Case Study 2 as only part of the land-bridge 
design involved maritime transport and therefore a close tracking of the containers from the 
moment they were delivered to the customers (which only happened in Chile and for a limited 
period of time). However, the other two primary activities became as relevant as in Case Study 1 
as both Operations (coordination of ship-rail-truck mode / standardization of equipment / rolling 
stock / ground transportation contracting and equipment) and Marketing and Sales (enlarged 
sales point / faster transit-times / better frequency of sailings / faster round-trip) were critical 
parts of their business transformation process.  
 
A certain degree of traditional knowledge within the Human Resources area is one specific 
support activity that stood out on the part of the railway segment since this business 
transformation project found no parallel or form/type of imitation for a long period of time after it 
was launched. Traditional knowledge in this sense refers to individual tacit or uncodified 
knowledge that is transferred at the individual level through HR practices of mentoring, coaching 
and facilitation of knowledge exchange between people.  This might well indicate that traditional 
knowledge acted as a barrier for new entrants until such knowledge leaked and spread toward 
new players. Naturally, both the Firm’s Infrastructure and deployed Technology also were of 
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relevance in view of the project’s internationalization level (Europe / Middle East / North Africa / 
South America) and the successful interaction of their information systems technology.  
 
The Corridor facilitated not only the companies to interact and benefit from each other by sharing 
knowledge and promoting a strong leadership trend to prevail over those holding lesser 
knowledge or market positioning to become influential, but it also brokered the formation and 
development of a number of CoPs aiming at fostering innovation and business transformation. 
Such a process brought about in some cases a high degree of innovation, despite initial doubts or 
a given level of skepticism, this eventually led to an effective business transformation process.  
 
Case Study 3 shows a different profile with respect to Porter’s (2001) value chain. Inbound 
logistics represented a complete commercial responsibility over the containers turn-around-times 
in view of ALL’s international commercial structure, while it only held operational (cost-based 
impact) involvement and therefore responsibility over the regional market – leaving the ocean leg 
to the contracted ship-owners. Outbound logistics were also a factor since being a regional 
railway company they had to service many export-oriented customers only at domestic level. 
Therefore, this is a distinctive aspect if compared to all the other case studies. Operations as well 
as marketing and sales were as highly relevant as before, especially when considering both their 
extensive regional operations and broadened overseas sales points together with a conceptual 
understanding of the importance of exerting control on the cargo-routing decision making. These 
two activities provided ALL with an interesting degree of innovation which eventually led the 
company to a substantial business transformation by re-orienting their understanding of the 
surrounding business context.  
 
A rather high level of traditional knowledge on the part of both the executives and lower layer 
staff made the human resources field to stand out as the most relevant among the support 
activities. Once again, both the existing level of traditional knowledge and its retention by the 
railway company seem to have played a critical role in deterring overseas new entrants from 
taking control or limiting their scope of action. Contrary to the previous case studies, IT systems 
were not that relevant in view of the company’s pre-existing satellite systems that made new 
investment or upgrades unnecessary. Regional information systems proved to work well before 
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ALL joined the Corridor and developed this project – leaving ship-shore interface in the hands of 
the shipping companies who by then proved to be in a better position to do so more effectively 
than any other party. The firm’s infrastructure became of paramount importance in achieving 
larger economies of scale and gaining competitive advantage by moving toward attaining a 
tighter control over the cargo routing decision-making – an aspect no operator could have 
undertaken seriously without committing with an appropriate international network.      
 
The Corridor might at this point be attributed to have created the necessary awareness in the 
minds of ALL executives and operational staff because they had to engage in a profound 
reengineering process if they wanted to have a chance to face what the globalization wave might 
bring to the region. Uncertainty seems to have exerted a great deal of pressure on the company’s 
decision makers to interact and share knowledge at the roundtable forums – where the germ of 
innovation seems to have spread successfully.  
 
Case Study 4 differs from the previous case studies in that leadership was a more dominant issue 
than anything else since the main stakeholder neither lacked financial capital nor was unaware of 
the negative impacts the globalization wave might introduce to the region.  Strong leadership was 
always evident even before Murchison joined P&O Ports (a world-class operator) and loomed 
large from the moment they were compelled to retreat and start all over again just 70km away 
from where they had exerted an almost undisputed leadership for so many years.  
 
In this particular case, ATZ’s traditional knowledge (market / regional customers / culture / 
fidelity / uses and customs) was clearly not enough to deter P&O Ports from controlling 
Argentina’s main port stevedoring operations – which suggests there might be a link between 
traditional knowledge and a lower-relative standardization degree84. However, it seems to have 
played a decisive role in capturing and therefore exerting control over a significant share of 
cargoes that used to naturally fall within Buenos Aires’ port hinterland.  
 
                                                 
84 The higher the standardization of the operations (containers / customs / roads / bridges / controls / etc) the lesser 
relevance traditional knowledge has. The lesser standardization the higher importance traditional knowledge takes – 
especially in the far hinterland where improvisation along with uses and customs play a clear entry barrier for those 
global companies holding higher degrees of global standardization.   
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The concept of leadership is immersed into Porter’s (2001) value chain model in that Operations 
and Marketing and Sales turned out to be instrumental to first detain and later counterbalance an 
overwhelming superiority based on P&O’s brutal economies of scale, state-of-the art technology, 
almost unlimited financial resources, and globally-oriented human resources. It becomes apparent 
that P&O could have easily surpassed ATZ’s regional influence within its very same hinterland 
in view of their supremacy in both the primary and support activities. However, ATZ’s leadership 
and their regionally-focused traditional knowledge dynamics seem to have delivered value to 
their strategy and marked a clear line dividing the areas and segments each player could best 
manage.  
 
The Corridor was useful in bringing closer two parties that were active in different though 
complementing segments (port operations and foodstuff exporter) with apparently no common 
interests other than the typical shipper-port relationship. ATZ was not particularly interested in 
capturing anyone else’s ideas or in getting transferred a specific piece of knowledge for them to 
internalize and project to the future. This contracts with the previous case studies and to what 
most stakeholders have done while in the roundtable forums. ATZ already possessed traditional 
knowledge, vision, talent, experience, and a truly genuine wish to keep leading the way they did 
for so long in the recent past. Consequently it was in search of a strategic partner who could 
provide them with a substantial cargo volume throughout the year as well as financial support to 
back up a challenging project and make it sustainable toward the future.   
 
Case Study 5 embodied two distinctive particulars: a) a typical scenario where traditional 
knowledge became critical to the success of the barging project; and b) an astonishing lack of 
leadership and apparent passiveness on the part of the steel manufacturing company’s 
management. The Corridor can be attributed to have created the needed ambience for a number 
of players to interact and essay different possible alternatives aiming at producing a potential 
business transformation scenario. Clearly, knowledge sharing and transfer, leadership, 
cooperation, and collaboration, all played their part in modifying the on-going market conditions 
and develop a tailor-made solution in the form of a project. The support activities were also of 
vital importance in that Human Resources became essential in the transfer of knowledge amongst 
the stakeholders (mainly from those holding knowledge to those who at the outset showed 
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passive or indifferent), this being an aspect that was not present in the previous cases. The Firm’s 
Infrastructure also was critical to this project as its optimization and continuous betterment truly 
reflected the very need of the project in itself, this being an aspect that finds coincidences with 
the previous cases. 
 
It becomes apparent that the value chain model provides a useful framework to help interpret how 
things were changing in these cases. Both the primary and support activities described in the case 
studies, and the fact that the Corridor played a decisive role in not only allowing knowledge to 
spread and cross-business interaction to take place but also to foster and broker them through the 
roundtable forums as CoPs, played an important role. The value chain framework allows us to see 
what value elements each participant can recognize as a gap that they might fill or seek from 
other JV partners. This helps to explain the particular constellation of collaborating firms that 
emerge.   
 
8.4 - CROSS-CASE STUDY LEADERSHIP ANALYSIS 
The 5 case studies will now be analyzed here from a leadership perspective by assuming that 
management and leadership cannot occur in the same person (Bennis & Nanus 1985; Zaleznik 
1977; pp62-70) or as argued by Yukl (2002 pp5-6) and that the two styles value different 
functions and each has distinct concerns. It also considers as valid Bass & Stogdill’s (1990 
pp383-86) view that a transformational style does not replace a transactional style but that it may 
complement it.  
 
The impact of how trust was generated and developed, as noted in Chapter 3 section 3.8 relating 
to culture, also deserves some attention as it impacts and is impacted upon by leadership styles 
and resulting transactional or transformational leadership approaches taken by case study 
participants. This forms a backdrop to explaining how leadership styles developed and how trust 
impacted upon outcomes. Figure 8.2 illustrates a model adapted from (Walker, Bourne and 
Rowlinson, 2008, p80). Calculative trust moved towards relational trust allowing leadership 
styles as indicated. Trust was built from initially being based upon integrity of actions, then over 
time in each of these case study transformational projects benevolence towards parties was tested 
and when both integrity and benevolence was well tested and accepted at the mature stage of 
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these projects the main trust issue was ability of individuals involved and organizational ability to 
deliver promised results. 
 
While Figure 8.2 implies a uniformity of trust within entities, various parties held different 
perceptions of trust that also varied over time. However, Figure 8.2 does provide a useful 
background to understanding the degrees of transactional and transformational leadership 
exercised by JV parties. 
 
  
 
 Figure 8.2 – Trust and Leadership Form and Style Influences 
 
Case Study 1 involves a number of shipping companies that by the time they initiated 
negotiations showed a negligible degree of vertical integration – an aspect which later they 
changed in order to exert a tighter control on demand and consequently to achieve larger 
economies of scale. This case study entails the formation of a JV by a number of regional 
companies that foresaw at a given point in time that they needed to drastically reengineer their 
organizational structure to lower operational costs and gain overall efficiencies to face world-
class contenders. Both transformational and transactional leadership styles were present as every 
organization had something to profit from one another, which meant that all participants had 
something to give up as well. Contribution details for managerial resources, information 
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technology means, corporate internal communications, suppliers’ optimization, and 
standardization of operational procedures were just a few of a long list of functions that needed 
consensus amongst the members. Those who held the largest structure and market positioning 
(Zim) as well as the deepest regional knowledge on customers and systems (Maruba) can be 
regarded as putting into a practice a Transformational leadership style while the other two 
became Transactional followers.  
 
Case Study 2 also found its two main stakeholders (Zim & BAP) showing too little vertical 
integration at the outset of the project. However, this tended to change rapidly in view that this 
very project was based on a consistent vertical integration process by which each transport mode 
provider was going to coordinate and optimize its operations with the other two to make the land-
bridge project work (ship-truck-rail mode land-bridge). Further to a growing vertical integration 
strategy, this project entailed a market development strategy by expanding sales points all over 
Europe, part of the Middle East, and the entire North Africa for which a transformational 
leadership seems to have played a critical role. Once more such a role was taken by the company 
holding the larger structure and more solid market positioning (Zim) together with a more 
versatile attitude toward facing volatile or uncertain scenarios – suggesting this company may 
have taken advantage of its already existing international network wherefrom knowledge could 
have been absorbed and duly imported to the benefit of both stakeholders and project.  
 
The railway company adopted the role of a follower, though was also active in negotiating many 
operational aspects that demanded a certain level of good management – suggesting perhaps 
more a Transactional leadership type showing a certain degree of knowledge-based power 
distance. So the first 2 case studies look similar with respect to both the leadership style they put 
into practice and the variables they were based on. 
 
Contrary to the previous case studies, the 3rd one shows an aggressive horizontal integration 
strategy on the part of the Brazilian railway that became regional by acquiring other railway 
networks both within Brazil and Argentina – with the possibility to further expand into bordering 
countries as well. This case study entailed not only a profound business transformation example 
but that also suggests that such a process would not have been possible without counting on a 
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genuine leadership with Transformational particulars. A standard managerial or Transactional 
leadership style seems unlikely to have attained such a strategic shift—especially when also 
considering this firm’s international marketing strategy which led them to exert a tighter control 
on the demand to challenge global ship-owning companies.  
 
Case Study 4 also shows a clear Transformational leadership style in that ATZ was determined to 
lead even before breaking its JV with P&O Ports and initiate a brand new project up-river. 
However and contrary to the previous case studies, ATZ became active by engaging in an 
innovative horizontal integration strategy by joining Sadia as well as a growing vertical 
integration strategy (both forward and backward) by fixing agreements with suppliers to achieve 
larger economies of scale and gaining competitive advantage by better covering its vast 
hinterland – suggesting a strong presence of Transformational leadership style concept though 
most likely supplemented by the Transactional leadership style component. 
 
Case Study 5 seems at first sight to be similar to ATZ’s case in that it takes a typical 
Transformational leadership style to carry out a project that innovative in a rapidly changing 
business context. However, the number and variety of stakeholders that took part in the design 
and development of this project, as well as their diverse relative market positioning and structure, 
demanded more of the cold calculative mind of a strategist or sound manager–more likely to be 
reflected in a Transactional style – and not so much in a team or individual capable of 
performing beyond expectations. This case study seems to have required a greater leadership 
capability that adjusts or matches the present circumstances of the steel manufacturing firm to the 
potential solutions brought to the scene by a number of small knowledge-based companies – 
indicating that a cost-leadership strategy might demand first a Transactional leadership style 
profile to be perhaps supplemented by a Transformational attitude at a given point of the project. 
 
It becomes apparent that the Corridor was an entity that not only gathered different interests, 
views, opinions, and necessities from all over the region, but that it also can be argued to have 
served as a nurturing place for talent to spread, leadership to become contagious, and knowledge 
to foster companies to change and innovate. The uncertainty brought by the globalization 
triggered the establishment of the Corridor and facilitated the formation of regional roundtable 
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forums. Leadership became a byproduct of the roundtable forums. The Corridor along with its 
CoPs can be regarded as crucial in having facilitated companies to network with one another and 
for leadership to emerge. Either a Transactional or Transformational style – or a combination of 
both – seem to have a logical connection with the firm’s market positioning strategy and 
therefore with its infrastructure both across segments and locations.   
 
8.5- CROSS-CASE STUDY KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT ANALYSIS   
Knowledge forms a crucial basis for developing business strategy (Zack, 1999) and also has 
relevance to culture and behavior as an appropriate vehicle toward the creation and sharing of 
knowledge (Markus, 2001). Additionally and as argued by Nonaka (1991), knowledge has first a 
cycle or process to fulfill within an organization to be capable at a later stage to produce 
outcomes and help strategies to become real.  
 
The evidence suggests that, the Nonaka (1991) SECI cycle seems to have been adopted by all the 
stakeholders in the five case studies in a quite similar pattern: Socialization generally came first 
as a realistic step for companies to know one another as well as sound and compare their 
respective needs and willingness to open up and cooperate with data and information – an aspect 
which also helped in bridging cultural and behavior gaps. Externalization followed when 
companies found the need to benchmark with one another and also to develop sound potential 
alliances and partnerships to help them share their visions on their respective business segments. 
It also facilitated the stakeholders to bring up and contrast their views, opinions, and 
understanding on what the globalization process might cause to the region and their businesses. 
This last aspect became the Combination stage of the SECI cycle.  
 
Finally, Internalization resulted useful for companies to let change and innovation emerge (based 
on the final personalized interpretation of data and information within the organization) and 
consequently open new avenues for the companies to reengineer and transform their structures to 
better cope with the upcoming business context. 
 
The Corridor together with the roundtable forums proved to be fruitful settings for the SECI cycle 
to evolve and facilitate knowledge sharing as a first instance. However and even though each of 
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the case studies involved operating companies only within the logistics universe, both their 
receptiveness to knowledge and the complexity of the case studies individually considered posed 
significant barriers to a uniform or homogeneous knowledge transfer process. Although it seems 
to be clear at this point that the globalization process had a profound impact on the region and 
that uncertainty became a decisive motivational factor for the firms to gather and interact, their 
timing to elaborate a realistic diagnose on the situation and react accordingly showed significant 
differences amongst the stakeholders. 
 
This difference may be explained by the existing diverse degree of knowledge stickiness amongst 
the stakeholders as well as the barriers to an effective internal knowledge transfer within their 
respective firms (Szulanski. 1996). While the case studies did not show any sign of heterogeneity 
with respect to the sources of knowledge stickiness (mostly represented by lack of motivation), 
the situation became different as regards the existing barriers to internal knowledge transfer. 
These barriers were represented by both a diverse degree of absorptive capacity on the part of the 
stakeholders and the causal ambiguity held by some of the case studies’ participants.  
 
Stickiness of knowledge became a problem that deserved a continuous brokerage and follow up 
on the part of the Corridor with respect to the majority of the regional members that entered into 
any type of association with foreign companies, or held a significant international exposure 
(typically the JV, land-bridge, and railway examples). The waterways project also required a 
facilitation or brokerage assistance on the part of the Corridor in helping make the steel 
manufacturing company internalize the project’s traditional knowledge content that was in the 
hands of a few small players with no comparable market positioning. Contrary to this trend, ATZ 
(port terminal operator) did not face any knowledge stickiness issues with their Brazilian partner 
despite the fact one was a consumed port operator while the other a world-class exporter (which 
indicates that knowledge stickiness not always had a connection with the recipient’s absorptive 
capacity but that it may have other ingredients such as trust, vision, or just talent).      
 
Lack of absorptive capacity and causal ambiguity played different roles in the case studies. Case 
Study 1 showed no lack of absorptive capacity as all the members of the JV were already ship-
owners who despite holding different relative market positioning and influence—they all 
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comprehended well the main variables of the business and the point at which they could exert 
leadership. However, the regional companies tended to fall into a certain degree of causal 
ambiguity given perhaps by a natural resistance on the part of their management to really 
understand the inherent cause and effect loops. Case Study 2 also showed causal ambiguity on 
the part of the railway company as they probably felt they were loosing control over the demand 
made by a much larger, global and therefore resourceful company. Such a process might well be 
assumed as a natural resistance or indifference toward a new business model that proposed a new 
axis of leadership leading to change and innovation – aspects which often find resistance on the 
part of the weaker or follower party. 
 
Case Study 3 showed a considerable degree of knowledge stickiness leading to increasing 
difficulties to make their newly controlled rail network in Argentina to interpret and put into 
practice the main operational and managerial concepts embodied in its business regional 
transformation. Having kept their activities and resources in a domestic environment without 
major regional or international exposure for so long, seemed to have hindered the Argentine leg 
of the business from developing a rapid absorptive capacity and adjust to the new business 
context. 
 
Case Study 4 experienced neither absorptive capacity nor causal ambiguity despite the 
challenging and complex circumstances surrounding this project – which suggests a strong 
leadership on the part of ATZ and a high level of trust (knowledge transfer facilitator) amongst 
the partners’ management. Case Study 5 entailed both a high degree of knowledge stickiness and 
a significant degree of resistance to internalize knowledge on the part of the steel manufacturing 
company. Contrary to the previous case studies, causal ambiguity became apparent amongst the 
steel manufacturing firm’s front line employees and management who faced serious barriers 
toward conceptualizing the business transformation model embodied in the project.  
 
The types of knowledge transfer as explained by Dixon (2000) seem to find a perfect match for 
each of the case studies and therefore set interesting differences with respect to the way 
knowledge is passed from one team on to the other – suggesting a richness of the diversity of 
transformation projects the Corridor contributed to facilitate. 
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Case Study 1 was the typical Serial Transfer model where Zim’s global experience in setting up 
JVs in overseas markets was repeated and put into practice by following previously proven 
patterns. Case Study 2 was well represented by the Strategic Transfer type where both tacit and 
explicit knowledge were timely combined aiming at producing a significant business 
transformation. Case Study 3 falls into the Near Transfer category by which a source team 
transfers knowledge to a receiving team for a similar task and different location. Non-routine tacit 
knowledge transfer between two teams seems to have been the most appropriate to classify Case 
Study 4 as Far Transfer. Expert Transfer embodies the last case study in view of the infrequency 
and uniqueness of its tasks. Case Study 5 has some unusual knowledge transfer features. In some 
senses knowledge transfer was characterized by Expert Transfer in that there was a level of 
expertise transferred from both the Corridor experiences but also from companies involved, 
however, much of this was totally new to all players and so it may be more accurate to conclude 
that this was an example of emergence of knowledge through interaction and shared perceptions. 
 
Whatever the degree of knowledge stickiness, recipient’s absorptive capacity, and knowledge 
transfer type, the Corridor seemed to have played a critical role in making companies socialize 
first to later create the necessary conditions for knowledge to spread and transfer in different 
forms. The Corridor’s role to facilitate interaction of parties also affected the level of trust 
building of relationships as illustrated in Figure 8.2. Its role throughout the transformation 
provided an institutional setting to maintain institutional trust as all parties were part of the same 
Corridor entity. It had high perceived integrity at the initiation stage and its benevolence in 
maintaining its positive facilitating role allowed risk testing to demonstrate that it had the ability 
to positively influence partners. Each partner was able to similarly develop closer trust in each 
other through the same mechanisms.   
 
Even though it became apparent that business uncertainty exerted, to a lesser or greater extent, a 
triggering effect on the case studies’ stakeholders to gather and interact, it was the Corridor and 
its round table forums and CoPs the ones that fostered knowledge transfer across the many 
logistic segments.      
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8.6- CHAPTER SUMMARY    
The Corridor together with the roundtable forums, CoPs, and a permanent brokerage and follow-
up of the many diverse situations seem to have created an adequate setting for the named 
concepts to flow and thus generate outcomes for the companies to benefit from. Porter’s (1985) 
competitive forces and strategies was not only useful to help determining the existing similarities 
and differences in the case studies, but also to explain the real implications and the importance 
the Corridor held as a true facilitator for companies to network and produce significant business 
transformations.  
 
As the globalization wave drew closer to the region, a linear dynamic growth model tended to 
gradually dissipate bringing about the element of uncertainty – a concept here regarded as 
possibly the most important triggering variable for both the Corridor to get established as a valid 
forum and the companies to join in search of alternative channels that helped them reengineer and 
face the global trend. In terms of strategic choice under uncertainty, using the Courtney et al 
(1997) model of four approaches, each case chose to try to shape the future; there was some 
evidence of reserving a right to participate and to some extent to adapt to the future. Mostly, the 
Corridor allowed strategy to emerge and evolve through its knowledge facilitation and scenario 
exploration and testing by JV partners. Porter’s value chain model also became useful to better 
comprehend and explain the various ways companies undertook to enlarge economies of scale to 
become competitive and face a changing and unpredictable business scenario. Both the primary 
and support activities as per Porter’s model marked clear differences as well as similarities 
amongst the case studies depending more on both the firm’s market positioning and the firm’s 
infrastructure than any other variable. These two aspects set parameters with respect to the way 
leadership and knowledge flew and allowed transformations to take place by letting other aspects 
to come up and contribute with the setting up of a number of projects (collaboration / cooperation 
/ culture).         
 
Even though each case study showed different types of leadership or even a combination of the 
two most accepted or popular currents of thought, the Corridor seems to have played a crucial 
role in both letting companies interact in order to build trust first, and fostering project 
stakeholders and outsiders to expose and cross-assess their views, opinions, and practical 
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experiences at a later stage in a kind of contagious manner. Such a process turned out to be useful 
for companies to socialize, benchmark with one another, and become more aware of the 
globalization impact on the region - all done within a specialized and unrivalled corporate setting.  
 
Recipient’s absorptive capacity was improved, causal ambiguity reduced, and knowledge 
stickiness reduced in each case study through the Corridor’s facilitating KM role and aim to 
generate innovative outcomes. Even though each case study showed a different reaction with 
respect to their knowledge needs, they were all intertwined and consequently immersed within a 
growing knowledge market under the auspices of the Corridor. Each case study adopted its own 
characteristics and showed its own degree of innovation. Perhaps one of the main attributes of the 
Corridor that became clear from the analysis of data is its having facilitated not only the 
gathering and professional interaction of those firms belonging to the same field of activity 
seeking to become more competitive, but also it having provided the members with the 
possibility to interact and benchmark with those firms of other fields.  
 
Such a process helped the members to test, contrast, and consolidate their thoughts and opinions 
on a certain issue, as well as to dissipate a doubt or just discard a business transformation 
proposal that before interacting with others looked feasible or realistic. The case studies seem to 
have also shown that for companies to remain competitive within a region where its business 
structure is about to show great discrepancies in terms of economies of scale and resources 
amongst the players, some sort of vertical or horizontal integration becomes imperative to enlarge 
economies of scale and gain competitive advantage.  
 
Possibly the most significant pending deliverable the Corridor failed yet to develop is given by 
the rather modest participation and contribution of the public sector in the roundtable forums and 
general business interaction. This also becomes apparent by the lack of connectivity between the 
regional needs in terms of business and infrastructure, and the governmental planning both at 
national and regional levels. Rivalry and cultural differences manifested by hidden agendas 
between the national governments – and to a lesser degree between federal and state governments 
– became a challenge for the Corridor to work on. Private businesses seemed to have overcome 
and reached significant business transformations by regionally integrating with a global 
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projection. However, national administrations are yet to become full members to the Corridor to 
both contribute with and benefit from its knowledge market dynamics.   
 
This chapter indicates that the Corridor turned out to be useful perhaps in facilitating richness and 
variety in a number of situations where the transforming threads became represented; mainly by 
collaboration, cooperation, knowledge, and leadership. Innovation occurred once these were 
combined with other elements such as culture, trust, and uncertainty. While this chapter has 
focused upon a more general management analysis of the cases and how the Corridor could be 
viewed in this light, it has not focused upon PM implications. The next chapter will focus on the 
Project Management implications for the Corridor in the future as a way to improve what has 
been developed so far. 
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9. CORRIDOR’S PROJECT MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT NEEDS 
 
9.1 - INTRODUCTION 
This chapter briefly addresses, from a PM perspective, those aspects where the Corridor project 
needs improvement to better face business scenarios going through turbulent times. It starts by 
highlighting the way the absence of the public sector during the early stages of the Corridor has 
impacted on the potential deliverables as well as on the Corridor’s CoPs and brokers. It draws 
upon concepts of stakeholder engagement; refer to Bourne and Walker (2005) for more on this 
PM perspective in terms of the need to generate value and benefits to players in JV’s as well as 
their clients and customers. It also draws upon theory on trust and commitment not only for 
building collaborative relationships but also for high levels of input into enabling effective KM 
and situated learning (as discussed in Section 3.7).  
 
The bureaucracy is yet to join the Corridor and could add value through their government-to-
government and region-to-region influence. An important gap in the composition of Corridor 
players was the exclusion of public sector players at a national or regional level. It remains to be 
seen whether that could or would have been an asset or liability to the way that the Corridor 
operated and it represents a gap in our understanding how the case study’s project deliverables 
could have been improved or harmed if public sector players actively joined the Corridor and 
addressed concepts such as power distance, decision-making timing, and project coordination 
through integration management. This section further continues with a brief analysis of the 
impact that the public sector could have had on Porter’s (1985) competitive forces to end with 
some implications related to Nonaka’s (1998) SECI cycle as well as on performance monitoring 
aspects. The chapter ends with a chapter summary 
   
9.2 - PUBLIC SECTOR: POTENTIAL PROS AND CONS  
Both the roundtable forums and the various CoPs that were created to later evolve as a supporting 
mechanism towards an effective regional networking were based almost entirely on the 
participation of private stakeholders. The public sector played a minor and secondary role as it 
had never really become involved in the process despite the fact the very survival of an entire 
economic sector was pretty much at stake. There was no active participation of the public sector 
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in the form of official representatives, delegates, or even observers other than occasionally a port 
representative who as a secondary stakeholder limited himself to attend the forums and take notes 
to possibly draw up an internal report on the minutes. 
 
From a project management perspective it may be affirmed that having counted on the active 
presence and participation of the public sector’s various agencies at an early stage of the Corridor 
formation (road and rail transportation agencies / waterways and ports secretariats / air 
transportation agency / coast guard / frontier police / customs house / environmental department / 
strategic planning ministry / etc) both at federal and state levels, might have proved to be an 
additional challenge to overcome by the Corridor in terms of project interface coordination 
through integration management. As projects become more complex, drawing on knowledge and 
skills from more areas of expertise – and thus, more subunits of the parent organization as well as 
more outsiders – the problem of coordinating multidisciplinary teams becomes more troublesome 
(Meredith & Mantel 2009, p267). And together with it, uncertainty tends to increase in a business 
context where stakeholders desperately looked for responses that placed them beyond these 
uncertainties.  
 
If government players at national and regional levels would have actively contributed to the 
Corridor’s facilitation effort so that high levels of trust and commitment was generated, then 
some of the obstacles of dealing with uncertainty about government policy or its reaction to 
various initiatives may have been reduced. This could have moved strategy from having to deal 
with the most complex situations described by Courtney et al (1997) at the 4th level of ambiguity 
to one where more stable plans could have been made, for example at level 3 where a range of 
futures can be explored using scenarios or even level 2 where a limited number of potential 
futures can be identified. Further, greater knowledge exchange from this sector could have 
proved useful in reducing uncertainty. However, risk management involving government players 
can prove to be a two-edged sword as I later elaborate upon. 
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Both the federal and state agencies normally plan their infrastructure investments within a 5 to 10 
years horizon, which would have turned out to be possibly useless and even negative when 
compared to the stakeholders’ by then current needs and strategic urgencies in a context of gross 
turbulence and uncertainty. The concept of survival would have possibly held very different 
meanings for a private firm and a state or federal agency. As discussed earlier in Section 3.2, 
different uncertainty types require different strategic responses (Courtney et al., 1997). 
 
 Government instrumentalities, particularly long established ones such as that existing in Latin 
America at the time when the Corridor was being developed, tended to be bureaucratic and 
lacked the flexibility in outlook to focus on benefit realized rather than ordained processes that 
had been long prescribed. This is not unusual and as Hodgson (2004) argues, this rigid mindset is 
apt to transfer the ‘iron triangle’ norms in being considered ‘good or best PM practice’ when 
agility may be needed. Others have also drawn attention to this potential scenario (Styhre, 2006).  
The concern, or fear, that I observed was that while there could be distinct advantages for 
government inclusion in the Corridor, it may have come at a cost of required highly process-
driven mechanistic and processes that were favored at the time by government instrumentalities.    
 
Additionally, there is a considerable power distance in South America between the public and 
private sector as discussed in Section 3.8 of the literature review. This can be better visualized by 
the existing differences between those people who lay down the rules and the ones who obey 
them, with little intermediate steps – a scenario that in multidisciplinary teams within a project 
setting might well become counterproductive. Rivalry amongst the regional countries’ authorities 
to favor one region’s development plan against another one - although never experienced so far at 
this level - might well be expected to take place and consequently to lead to a slowdown process 
on the private sector as far as business transformation is concerned.  
 
Following Porter’s (1985) analysis with respect to the role the competitive forces play for 
companies to decide on expansion and investment, it becomes apparent that the concepts of Entry 
of New Competitors and Threat of Substitutes are aspects very much identified with a short term 
scenario and not so much with a longer term scope of action as it would be more appropriate if a 
federal or sate agency were to be involved.  
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However, a shorter term scope of action on the part of the public sector might well have had a 
direct impact on the Bargaining Power of Buyers and Suppliers as well as the Rivalry Amongst 
Existing Competitors—for example in expanding an existing port terminal, allowing a free zone85 
to operate, or opening border passages between two countries to promote regional trade. Thus, 
depending on the on-going circumstances, such an impact could have been a constructive element 
in that it would have helped stakeholders anticipate a given scenario and therefore formulate 
better focused strategies that ultimately would bring about a kind of transformation under a lower 
level of uncertainty. Conversely, a deeper knowledge of the private stakeholders’ plans, visions, 
and needs might well contribute to better planning in physical infrastructure projects by the 
federal agencies.    
 
The modest or limited participation of the public sector in the Corridor’s networking scheme has 
provided the Corridor stakeholders with practically no support on aspects pertaining to policy 
formulation which would have helped them foresee some upcoming developments as to let them 
adjust or coordinate their strategies within a pre-defined framework. It also becomes apparent 
that if a truly active participation of the public sector had taken place from the outset of the 
Corridor project, there would have been a significant gap between the private sector’s short run 
needs and the public sector’s long term focus—given their different priorities as well as exposure 
degrees to the globalization impact. One might infer here that various agencies might have felt 
tempted to regulate the incipient business transformation process with perhaps an excess of 
jealousy by laying down an endless set of rules and regulations as a way to intend controlling the 
market variables as they did in the recent past. Notwithstanding, a certain level of internal 
competition amongst the sate and federal agencies might have also led to a general betterment of 
the system.   
 
Despite the potential negative effects the public sector could have had on the early stages of the 
project, it is been a pending issue for the Corridor to effectively engage the various federal and 
state agencies to actively participate in the roundtable forums as well as to get them integrated in 
                                                 
85 A Free Zone is a designated area where storage of imported goods, physical transformation to goods, and tax 
deferment schemes are allowed to promote the development of a specific sector or logistic corridor.   
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the various CoPs. It seems to be highly desirable for the Corridor to also recruit public officials 
capable of bringing their long-term views as well as many relevant agencies as possible to help 
the companies set their strategies in a more predictable business environment in terms of 
infrastructure development and policy formulation. Policy formulation by federal agencies might 
well help private operators to raise entry barriers to their respective segments and make their 
businesses less vulnerable to future trends. It is conceivable that government players, once their 
interests would be aroused for fostering local or regional industry, that they may take on a role 
akin to that of project sponsor or champion as described in Section 3.9. 
 
It becomes apparent that the Corridor project was born as the globalization threatened many 
companies to interrupt the kind of linear growth they had somehow become used to enjoying 
thanks to some governmental protection embodied in an overall regional protectionist trend. 
Having counted on an active, regular, and decisive participation of the public sector from the very 
beginning of the Corridor project, would have likely become deeply counterproductive. As the 
Corridor can be regarded as a mother project that continuously nestles a rotating number of sub-
projects going through the four stages of a project’s life cycle (while the Corridor yet keeps away 
from its phase-out stage), it becomes highly advisable for the Corridor and their stakeholders to 
recruit more governmental officials and agencies that can ultimately bring value to every stage of 
a project’s life cycle from conception to termination or phase-out. Active public sector agency 
participation could also be useful for them to formulate shorter term plans as well as the private 
sector adjusting their decisions’ timing to what the public sector might deliver. Should the 
Corridor succeed in doing this, it is likely that the projects’ deliverables and sustainability might 
tend to substantially increase in the future.  
 
9.3 - CONSIDERATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE AND PERFORMANCE 
 Another aspect of relevance where the Corridor should do better in future is also related to public 
sector participation. However in this regard it involves the SECI cycle as a way of softening the 
public officials’ natural resistance to interact and contribute data and information that might be 
beneficial in shaping new alliances or setting new business trends. 
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 The Corridor has not only failed in recruiting public officials and institutions to join the 
roundtable forums but also has been unsuccessful in making their brokers truly understand the 
importance of gaining the public sector’s support and contribution during each stage of a 
project’s life cycle. There was an almost complete absence, as a by-product of this failure, of key 
micro or macro economic performance indicators (KPI) in particular being required of the 
Corridor’s brokers and the stakeholders as a consequence of possibly having no such entity or 
public organism to report to. Thus a potential focus for optimization may have been lost. 
 
Even though one may expect the Corridor to have set their own performance parameters, it is 
more likely that a Corridor-like organization had felt more compelled to report to the public 
sector in the form of KPIs. Projects were regarded as successful or unsuccessful as they move 
forward and overcome the various stages until accomplishing some sort of integration or alliance. 
Gaining the public sector’s participation from an earlier stage would have possibly compelled the 
Corridor to define a number of leading activities and processes to later set some basic standards 
that could have proved what the Corridor’s contribution to the economy was, and thus to gain the 
support of the government agencies. 
 
From a productivity standpoint the Corridor showed a certain lag in the decision-making process 
once the globalization wave had passed. This experience is similar to that of many large firms 
when intending to define which projects to approve and which ones to discard during stable 
times. This was partly attributable to the absence of uncertainty acting as a truly triggering 
feature – which was precisely what gave birth to the Corridor in the first place: many more 
projects than management expected; inconsistent determination of benefits; competing projects; 
interesting projects that did not contribute to the overall strategy; projects whose costs exceeded 
their benefits; and lack of tracking by the Corridor executives. This is similar to project program 
management strategic decision making where projects are more effectively chosen to be 
undertaken based on a more coherent strategy. This has been a subject of much discussion in 
emerging views of how program project management is developing (Archer and Ghasemzadeh, 
1999; Norrie, 2006; PMI, 2006a; 2006b).  
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Improvement seems to be needed in all those concepts related to the absence of KPIs as a way to 
monitor effective outcomes, an internal benchmark procedure within the Corridor as a project 
quality enhancer, and a more practical relationship between the various CoPs, and the public 
sector as a policy setting entity and certainty builder.   
     
9.4 – CORRIDOR PM AND PUBLIC SECTOR ASPECTS CONCLUSIONS 
The Corridor has moved forward as a master project that has produced, and keeps on generating, 
an increasing number of sub-projects that show different needs and potentialities. As such it 
becomes apparent that it has overcome an extremely threatening scenario from the impact of the 
globalization wave and all the implications that has for business sustainability that has been 
discussed in this thesis.  
 
This has been undertaken without the support of the public sector to help companies achieve a 
significant transformation process. Such a process has led companies to formulate and implement 
a wide array of strategies to gain competitive advantage while enlarging economies of scale that 
helped them face the globalization impact. Throughout this process the public sector remained as 
a passive witness, the Corridor, CoPs, and brokers being responsible for not having encouraged 
the effective incorporation of both federal and state agencies.  
 
Figure 9.1: The Government Participant Missing Link 
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Figure 9.1 illustrates the missing link of Government participation as an actor, along with the 
Corridor participants (that bring various assets and characteristics with them) and the external 
environmental influences (that have also been illustrated through the case study chapters context 
and literature review chapters). Government participation presents a missing link that could have 
on the one hand added strength to the facilitation of the Corridor and on the other hand created 
some tensions that would present challenges to the Corridor.  
 
The same immediateness and urgency that dominated the corporate world during the early 1990s, 
seems to have also taken its toll on the Corridor as the public authorities were practically 
overlooked, if not ignored, during this period. The public sector might have provided the various 
logistic segments with better tools to struggle against the uncertainty of the external environment 
and therefore achieve better outcomes in their respective projects. For example they could have 
offered developmental policy support, incentives or diplomatic intervention and support at global 
trade talks and negotiations. 
 
However, early participation might have also turned out to be highly detrimental for the Corridor 
project as a whole in view of the response speed the ongoing business context demanded vis-à-vis 
the often slow pace decision making by the governments. Although this is a territory where no 
experience has so far been registered, one can only speculate on the outcomes and various 
situations. Notwithstanding that speculation, which is not suitable to be elaborated upon without 
presenting supporting evidence, it becomes apparent that the conditions for the public sector to 
actively join the Corridor project seem to be nowadays far more suitable for a proper adjustment 
and interaction of both the public and private industry sectors. 
 
Without too much uncertainty on the horizon86, as compared to the early turbulence of the 
globalization wave discussed earlier, and having left the globalization impact well behind, it is 
likely that the Corridor can only benefit from the public sector participation in that it might bring 
about new knowledge dimensions, help setting standards, and give stakeholders a sense of 
                                                 
86 The unfolding global economic recession that is unfolding however at the time of writing this thesis could and 
does present a new and different kind of turbulence and uncertainty should be acknowledged as potential modifying 
this assertion, particularly if government financial guarantees or facilitating financing of projects becomes an 
essential enabler.. 
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support and planning that so far was never experienced. Projects growing under the Corridor’s 
umbrella are currently more likely to find regional governmental agencies offering helpful 
responses to enquiries and requests for knowledge and to create more certainty in solving issues. 
 
9.5 - CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter focused upon an important issue relating to those aspects, from a project 
management perspective, where the Corridor could perhaps improve its structure and actions to 
more fully engage with the government sector.  
 
It started with discussions of the advantages and disadvantages of a more intense public sector 
involvement given the Corridor’s history. The added support and knowledge that governments 
could have contributed was identified and a model was presented in Figure 9.3 to illustrate the 
perceived potential gap. This now naturally leads to the final chapter of this thesis.   
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10. FINAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
10.1 - INTRODUCTION 
This final chapter commences by describing the most important structural aspects arising out of 
the case studies and presented theory, that leads the reader to better conceptualize how the 
Corridor project became a viable undertaking in facilitating positive transformational change in 
partner businesses. It continues with a summary of the principal general conclusions by 
addressing each research question posed in Section 1.4 and Chapter 5 thus summarizing and 
bringing a number of concrete responses that find common ground in all the 5 of the case studies 
and presented theory. This is followed by acknowledgement of this thesis’ limitations with 
respect to aspects that were not included in this thesis for scoping reasons as well as limitations 
relating to the author’s own views and experience. It also highlights some areas deserving further 
study as well as the potential for other Corridor-like type of organizations to develop in the 
future.  
 
10.2 – BUSINESS TRANSFORMATION CONCLUSIONS 
Artto and Kujala (2008) identify management of a business network and its interface between 
managing a project network as an emerging and valid field of PM study. This thesis is based on 
just such an aspect of ‘project work’. It therefore validly falls within the scope of a research study 
in the PM discipline. Additionally, as highlighted in Chapter 3 Section 3.8, the Corridor could be 
seen as a form of Project Management Office (PMO) in the way that it facilitated joint ventures 
and other forms of collaboration and business transformation. Chapter 4 focused upon the 
Corridor as a knowledge management agency that presents it as a facilitator of knowledge work 
in a PM knowledge chain setting. As noted in Section 1.8, Winter et al (2006, p642) discuss 
emerging trends in PM research and highlight three directions of research for practice that is 
needed that relates specifically to business transformation type projects and to the approach 
undertaken in this thesis. These are: Direction 2 (projects as social processes); Direction 3 (value 
creation as the prime focus); and Direction 4 (needing broader conceptualizations of projects 
having multiple purposes). They also stress in their Direction 5 a need for PM theory in practice 
through practitioners being reflective learners. This research work meets these criteria because it 
investigated the Corridor as a social process. It is also conceptualized not only as a transport 
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logistics enhancer (which is one lens through which it may be viewed) but as a program of 
projects that facilitated business transformations. It also draws upon the disciplines of economics, 
knowledge management, business process re-engineering through business transformation in 
addition to supply and value chain analysis all within a trans-national context. Thus it addresses 
Research Direction 3 and 4. Finally, in undertaking this research as a series of selected illustrative 
case studies in which the researcher was a participant observer, as recommended by Coghlan 
(2001), it undertakes deeply contextual research work in an emerging PM area addressing the 
Winter et al. (2006, p642) Research Direction 5 of the author of the research being a reflective 
practitioner. The basis of this research as being appropriate as a topic for a DPM thesis is 
therefore established. This was discussed in Section 5.1 in the research aims, propositions and 
questions. Finally, as Hodgson and Cicmil (2006b; 2006a) argue, the ‘lived experience’ of project 
managers and those engaged in project work is an under-researched and much needed are for PM 
research. By being a participant observer and reflective practitioner, I have been able to draw 
upon deep and rich insights from my experience and thus add a valuable contribution to PM 
research. 
 
This thesis has been developed by considering a number of variables, identified as constituting 
principal elements of the five case studies as well as being the main pillars upon which the 
Corridor project evolved to produce (in different combinations) similar outcomes across each of 
the case study transformation projects. These pillars (collaboration, cooperation, knowledge 
sharing and transfer, leadership, and culture) all play different roles and exert a specific influence 
on case studies presented.  
 
It becomes apparent from discussion of the thesis’ project context presented in Chapter 2 that the 
globalization phenomenon has found a fertile ground in South America. This phenomenon 
strongly impacted its business structures in view of the region’s unawareness of the global trends 
as well as the belief by its business community that a kind of linear growth business context 
could be sustainable without having to engage in business transformation, reengineering, or 
integration strategies of any kind. Chapter 2 provided the background context to understand how 
during all this process the above mentioned variables became critical for the Corridor to evolve as 
a mother project and let a growing number of sub-projects to also evolve and produce innovative 
 314
project deliverables within the logistic discipline. It can be affirmed that a profound business 
transformation process has taken place across the region, uncertainty being the greatest motivator 
and the potential threat brought by globalization the real triggering element. These two concepts 
have undoubtedly contributed to the Corridor to become established and allow companies to join 
it in a defensive action. There were a number of structural aspects that transpire from both the 
case studies results and theory presented in Chapter 3 and 4 that brought about a greater number 
of variables to interact and facilitate this large business transformation to take place. 
 
Table 10.1 summarizes ten main business transformation drivers/inhibitors through the Corridor’s 
facilitation role together with brief comments drawn from the analysis of the case studies. 
 
Table 10.1:  Corridor: Transformation Facilitation Role Drivers and Inhibitors 
Driver/Inhibitor Comments 
1. Lack of strategic 
vision by companies in 
this region 
 
INHIBITOR 
This tended to make them favor a short-term or tactical financial 
transaction scenario instead of projecting themselves toward a longer term 
integration business context 
Corporate decisions showed no concern for the long run but and 
focused on very specific short run yielding business niches with little or no 
strategic value. 
2. Slowness to react to 
the emerging global 
trends 
 
INHIBITOR 
This related to the need for regional firms to achieve larger economies 
of scale and to gain competitive advantage to better face the arrival of 
much larger and more resourceful foreign-based operators. 
A clear example of what globalization was going to bring concerned 
those global shipping operators that held a much larger carrying capacity 
along with a much lower slot cost than their global competitors who also 
had  a much more advanced technological and managerial profile that 
tended to establish an unbridgeable operational gap.  
3. False expectations 
about the region’s 
economic growth 
sustainability 
INITIALLY AN 
INHIBITOR THEN A 
DRIVER 
There was an erroneous perception on the speed and aggressiveness 
with which the globalization phenomena hit and expanded across the 
region.  
This process had a dual impact. It was first manifested by complacency 
followed by a realization that a strategy for survival needed to be 
developed. The later made cooperation and collaboration an urgent 
necessity to spread across the regional corporate world. This realization 
contributed to gradually erasing counterproductive corporate attitudes and 
personal feelings such as rivalry, secrecy, distrust, pride, jealousy, 
complacency, and hidden agendas. 
4. Excess of confidence 
in the regional market 
protective laws. 
 
INHIBITOR 
This resulted in failure to realize the global operators’ structural 
advantage, strategic focus, and political power to create their own legal 
framework to operate in. The regional operators failed to visualize how 
low in fact their businesses’ entry barriers turned out to be, as well as how 
overwhelming the difference in operational scales were between them and 
the global operators. 
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5. Lack of stakeholders’ 
inhibition to cooperate 
when necessary 
 
A DRIVER 
This seemed to have played in favor of transforming the Corridor 
project into a win-win project generator entity by means of cooperation 
and collaboration, suggesting that information complexity and its attached 
potential knowledge viscosity did not present barriers that were too high to 
be overcome.  
6. Reluctance of to ex-
state-owned 
companies to embrace 
modern management 
practices.  
 
INHIBITOR 
Lack of motivation, distrust, little or no collaboration, lack of 
leadership, and political agendas on the part of transitional ex-state own 
organizations were all variables that might have encouraged or accelerated 
the arrival of foreign-based operators in some particular segments. 
7. Active and strategic 
participation of both 
CoPs and brokers 
 
DRIVER 
This eased knowledge flow for the benefit of both outsiders and those 
holding direct interests in a particular business segment. Not only was a 
technical or professional role needed for these two players to facilitate 
networking but also, and perhaps most importantly, their abilities to find 
alternative ways to make knowledge stickiness, lack of absorptive 
capacity, cultural barriers, indifference, envy, and further inhibitors to 
dissipate and were eventually removed. 
8. Extremely low degree 
of either vertical or 
horizontal integration 
 
INHIBITOR 
There was an amazing initial unawareness of how to conceptualize 
these strategies as effective tools to face the global threat by achieving 
larger economies of scale and gaining competitive advantage. 
9. A transactional 
leadership style  
 
INHIBITOR 
This turned out to be dominant throughout the years of regional linear 
economic growth against a modest presence of a transformational 
leadership on the part of a few companies that by then showed a certain 
level of internationalization and therefore contact with other realities.  
Despite this process brought about a drastic aggiornamento87 on the part 
of the regional players toward achieving innovative ideas and proposals. 
The lack of transformational leadership might have been identified as a 
regional weakness (low management entry barriers) and accelerated both 
the Corridor formation and the coming of the global operators. 
10. The outstanding role 
played by traditional 
knowledge in 
helping some 
regional players 
build defensive 
strategies 
 
DRIVER 
This factor set higher entry barriers for deterring global operators from 
becoming entirely dominant in a number of segments and market places 
within a complex and strange context for the global players as described in 
Chapter 2 – Context. 
 
The way that the above influenced the general conclusion of the thesis follows as a response to 
each of the research questions first posed in Chapter 1 section 1.4.  
                                                 
87 literally meaning "bringing up to date” but according to the Wikkipedia it has a meaning of “an attempt to learn 
from the world and read the 'signs of the times'..see URL http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ressourcement accessed on 
Feburary 28th 2009.  
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10.3 – GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
Based on the research idea, aims, and objectives as detailed in Chapter 1 and Chapter 5, the 
research proposition is that the MERCOSUR Atlantic Corridor Project can be seen as:  
 
… an instrumental entity where regional stakeholders can find a useful system and adequate tools 
to formulate and implement a business reengineering strategy to achieve larger economies of 
scale. Two principal tools that has been demonstrably used are those used by a Project 
Management Office (PMO) and a CoP 
 
As such, the system entails stakeholders to engage in a deep business transformation journey 
aiming at reducing existing structural asymmetries and gaining regional competitive advantage. 
To this end six research questions were raised and have been responded to individually and 
according to the findings from the case studies. 
 
Table 10.2: Response to Research Question 1 
Question 1 What are the variables granting the Corridor project the ability to generate 
trust first and facilitate knowledge transfer among stakeholders? 
Main Themes Trust facilitators and inhibitors – fear, responsiveness, collective action, 
shared vision, CoPs  
Comments The Corridor became a safe haven in which knowledge could be created, 
exchanged and used in the sense that it was a ‘ba’ or special knowledge 
management space (Nonaka and Konno, 1998; Nonaka, Toyama and 
Konno, 2001). Knowledge work as a shared enterprise helped develop trust 
and commitment to the business transformation.  
 
The model presented in Figure 3.4 in Section 3.8 provides a useful theoretical background to 
view the how trust was gained and maintained by using the GLOBE cultural dimensions to 
visualize and measure the cultural climate. Also a model of how the Corridor developed trust was 
presented in Figure 8.2 in Section 8.4. Trust is considered to be a critical element for companies 
to interact and exchange not only data and information on a given project but also to exchange 
views, impressions, feelings, and visions on a given situation. Aspects such as attitudes, 
behaviors, codes, and most importantly cultural signals are sent out during this process for others 
to capture, interpret, and duly codify. Trust, as discussed in Section 3.7, is possibly the most 
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important variable for a company to start seriously assessing the possibility of undertaking a 
strategic alliance.  
 
However, and as it became apparent in the case studies, the main themes of trust facilitators and 
inhibitors turned out to be the same though the speed at which they developed and the structural 
circumstances became unique in essence. The globalization process had provoked most of the 
firms to reappraise their relationships with other firms they interacted with. While some of these 
were earlier considered as rivals they came together and become united in the Corridor’s 
roundtable forums across the region. The real magnitude of the global threat became 
overwhelming for these companies and therefore brought about an adequate space where all these 
firms could actively interact, exchange visions and opinions; let cultural codes spread and work, 
all leading to an active and unprecedented trust generation process. This peculiar space was 
similar in nature to the concept of ba Nonaka and Konno (1998) as a learning space where 
players interact and create exchange and use knowledge. It may be affirmed that the global threat 
brought about by globalization and its associated corporate fear have accelerated the process by 
which all the constituting variables of trust worked better and faster toward accomplishing trust 
first and consolidating an innovative business transformation later. 
 
Even though the global threat can also be attributed to having facilitated knowledge to become 
shared and transferred amongst the stakeholders, it was rather the way the corporate interaction 
was carried out which allowed knowledge to flow that in turn generated trust and commitment. 
Face-to-face tacit knowledge sharing was promoted at the roundtable forums from the very outset 
of the Corridor project aiming at enhancing trust to emerge and flatten cultural barriers. Both the 
CoPs and their brokers (the Corridor facilitators who brought various players together) turned out 
to be critical in working out whatever asymmetry they came across in order to facilitate 
knowledge to flow and trust to gradually consolidate. The Corridor’s aim was that the sooner this 
process had shown some results the more it encouraged others to feel inclined to imitate 
behaviors that generated those results.  
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Table 10.3: Response to Research Question 2 
Question 2 How do Corridor stakeholders share vital internal information and join 
forces to face extra-regional threats? 
Main Themes Shared tacit knowledge and collaboration through CoPs, JV’s Partnerships 
and Alliances – collective action, shared vision, CoPs, understanding and 
empathy, value chain integration, sticky knowledge, Knowledge Brokers. 
Comments The Corridor facilitated a space where trust generated through empathy and 
closer understanding of how players could add value to collectively gain 
competitive advantage.  
 
Section 3.8 and Chapter 4 of the literature review is particularly relevant to this question. Once 
the globalization was duly internalized and conceptualized as a potential threat by the 
stakeholders, and the interaction proved useful in allowing trust to emerge and expand, the 
stakeholders tended to assess what was best for their businesses in terms of alliances, 
partnerships, JVs, or any other type of resources combinations. This occurred either vertically or 
horizontally. Porter’s supply chain model and competitive forces helps to conceptualize the 
various pros and cons stakeholders held by the time they attended the roundtable forums by 
addressing these potential combinations from a functional perspective as discussed in Chapter 3 
and in Chapter 8 
 
Both the Corridor as a master entity and the CoPs as knowledge enhancers and facilitators were 
crucial in setting up the framework within which strategic information was made available. Both 
entities were committed to making stakeholders aware of the importance for stakeholders to 
transform their structures towards gaining competitive advantage as well as introducing one 
another as a way to facilitate potential business synergies that could lead them to achieve larger 
economies of scale. However, it was up to the CoP’s brokers to actively promote both the 
exchange of tacit and explicit knowledge amongst not only the representatives of a similar 
segment but also complementing or even competing segments. Such a process was of paramount 
importance for stakeholders to combine their assets and different types of knowledge that later 
brought about a number of sub-projects. The brokers also played a decisive role in dismantling 
project inhibitors such as those problems associated with knowledge stickiness, low absorptive 
capacity, anxiety, and causal ambiguity, which otherwise would have hindered a significant 
number of projects from being realized. This reduced the stickiness of knowledge through 
helping create both the motivation to learn and exchange knowledge as well prepare a fertile 
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rather than barren environment in which knowledge work can take place (Szulanski and Jensen, 
2004).  
 
Table 10.4:  Response to Research Question 3 
Question 3 Why do Corridor stakeholders show their current attitudes and 
motivations towards committing themselves with partnerships, alliances 
and joint-ventures? 
Main Themes Commitment to collaboration – Fear responses, competitive advantage, 
business cooperation theory  
Comments The Corridor facilitated an environment where change in the prevailing 
business paradigm was essential this also links into the concept of 
managing business networks as a valid PM research (Artto and Kujala, 
2008) topic. See Chapter 2 Corridor context and Chapter 3 Sections 3.2, 
3.3 3.4 and 3.6  
 
Chapter 3 Sections 3.2 discussed introduced concepts and theories of competitive advantage with 
Figure 3.1 providing an illustration of the Corridor’s role. Section 3.3 focused upon value chain 
theory with Section 3.4 providing a discussion of the role of the Corridor in terms of the 
resourced based view of the firm. The case studies clearly demonstrated that the main motivation 
for the stakeholders to join forces and commit to new ventures is given by the overwhelming 
threat posed by much larger and resourceful corporations. It may well be affirmed, considering 
theory presented and discussed, that it was more a matter of survival than anything else. 
However, it should be highlighted that even though most companies have undertaken some kind 
of business transformation during a relatively short period of time, it seems to have been 
reinforced by the Corridor as an adequate setting for the logistic companies to join and interact. 
Had not the Corridor existed, it is hard to imagine the way the regional logistic sector would have 
reacted before the arrival of global operators. One may infer at this point that a number of 
companies would not have had the opportunity to understand and conceptualize the magnitude of 
the threat and therefore sell out, becoming subcontracted, downsized, or just disappeared. Artto 
and Kujala (2008) have argued that managing a complex of coordinated organizations within a 
value chains is a legitimate and little-researched field of PM study, so this aspect is particularly 
salient to PM research. 
 
The Corridor was not only useful as a master project coordinator and enhancer of alternatives, but 
was also a fundamental motivator or compass for firms who needed some sort of guidance and 
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follow up to truly visualize how the region was going to experience the globalization impact as 
well as what the potential defensive options were feasible. Motivation proved to be a concept as 
contagious as the fear provoked by the globalization threat. The creation of the Corridor and its 
evolvement into a sustainable entity provided a tipping point (Gladwell, 2000; Kim and 
Mauborgne, 2003) which influenced the participants to use the Corridor’s framework as a way to 
activate business process re-engineering, business transformation and other forms of change 
management within their organizations that enhanced productivity. 
   
Table 10.5: Response to Research Question 4 
Question 4 How does culture play a role in easing or impeding the development of 
the Corridor vision throughout the region?  
Main Themes The impact of organizational and trans-national culture on commitment 
and knowledge work– Culture theory, trust and commitment. 
Comments The Corridor facilitated trust and knowledge transferred as discussed 
earlier above. Section 3.5 on Leadership and strategy indicated how the 
response to the threat faced by Corridor participants required a change 
in leadership style. Section 3.6 then discussed business cooperation 
theory which is relevant to this research question. And this led into 
Section 3.7 where under the KM discussion relating to knowledge 
‘stickiness’ theory (Szulanski, 1996) and how culture impacts upon that 
to provide a fertile ground to facilitate knowledge work between parties. 
 
 The Corridor consists of a number of companies from countries that share not only common 
historical roots and geographical nearness, but also values, codes, aspirations, as well as only two 
languages through which people can understand one another across an entire region. The relative 
cultural homogeneity of the region certainly helped in avoiding major constraints in the formation 
of new projects. Culture is not revealed here as an impediment to new undertakings but, on the 
contrary, it has generally proved to be an enhancer for new projects. However, certain differences 
related to power distance become apparent in the way projects are run in Brazil and Argentina 
though without serious implications in terms of knowledge sharing and transfer or project 
completion. Power distance could have possibly become a factor if the public sector would have 
taken an active role from the early stages of the Corridor with respect to not only the private 
sector stakeholders but also with intra-regional authorities. Aspects of superiority, dominance, 
rivalry, and possibly distrust amongst the regional agencies – although not yet experienced – 
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might well be factors to consider upon a more active interaction between the private and public 
sectors at regional level within the roundtable forums. 
 
Table 10.6: Response to Research Question 5 
Question 5 What factors hold a more relative influence on stakeholders to allow vertical 
or horizontal integration to occur? 
Main Themes Change management, value chain, reappraisal, changed world view from 
myopic to global through exposure to global players’ practices. Leadership 
style and influence. 
Comments The Corridor facilitated a change in leadership style due to the need for 
parties to exchange knowledge and form alliances or joint ventures. The 
industry structure and leadership style influenced impediments to changing 
organizational structures to form joint ventures but the external shock 
provided the necessary impetus (discussed in Chapter 2) to radically change 
the value chain.  
 
Section 3.2 discusses the industry structure and factors influencing organizational structure 
changes. Section 3.6 discussed business cooperation theory which is relevant to this research 
question along with the discussion of the region’s context in Chapter 2.  
 
The trust building process started as a natural consequence of participants having already 
identified the potential impact that globalization was going to have on the region and decided to 
find a way to reconfigure their businesses in some way or other but they had only a vague idea of 
how to do this. It becomes apparent from the representative case study examples of the many 
projects spawned by the Corridor that the main factors were given by the stakeholders’ 
determination to reengineer their businesses to better face the new context. Such a process 
entailed an active process of knowledge sharing and transfer, cooperation, collaboration, and 
most importantly leadership. The latter turned out to be of paramount importance not only with 
respect to the leading attitude some companies adopted toward an integration strategy but also as 
a model to follow by many others holding a lesser market position and influence on other 
stakeholders. There was a strong relationship between a relatively small number of leading 
companies that took the initiative to reengineer and engage to various degrees of integration, and 
a greater number of followers. They were seduced both by the leaders’ firm attitude and access to 
an open knowledge market that tended to undertake proactive behaviors in becoming integrated. 
Many lone runners became integrated to defend their market position or even expand their scope 
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of services based on combined larger economies of scale, wider geographical scope of services, 
higher productivity, and enhanced knowledge, all within an innovative spirit that only the global 
threat seems to have put in place.  
 
The case studies illustrate how the Corridor provided the ba discussed earlier that allowed 
participants to explore how they could contribute to an integrated joint venture through their 
specialized input into a re-engineered value chain. This led to unexpected opportunities and 
forms of vertical and horizontal business integration.   
 
Table 10.7:  Response to Research Question 6 
 
Question 6 What is the actual awareness degree among stakeholders with respect to 
sustainable development and its future relevance over the region? 
Main 
Themes 
Change management, value chain, reappraisal, changed world view.  
Comments Initially before the Corridor facilitated a change in participants forming 
alliances or joint ventures, the industry appeared complacent, parochial and 
ignorant of technical advances in a range of logistics and business 
technologies that posed the external shock that provided the necessary 
impetus (discussed in detail in Chapter 2) to radically change the value chain. 
What is remarkable about the evidence from the case studies presented is that 
Corridor evolved as a peculiar and unique response by businesses operating in 
a vast region of the world where local knowledge turned out to be a highly 
valuable strategic asset. The resulting experience of reconfiguring business 
may prove to be a valuable lesson learned with respect to the recent global 
financial crisis. 
 
Chapter 2 provides a detailed context to the region as well as its players. There was a remarkable 
degree of myopia in anticipating the impact of globalization upon this far flung region of the 
world economy, notwithstanding the fact that many of the participants in the case studies were 
highly business-literate individuals with high level qualifications that would have prepared them 
for understanding theories related to the nature of the firm, competitive advantage and the context 
of their region. 
 
The case studies demonstrated: (1) how unprepared the region was to face the globalization 
impact; and (2) uncovered a false sense of security granted by protective laws and political 
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regimes. These misconceptions were regarded by the companies as sustainable at that time. 
However, the Corridor project not only contributed to accomplish a major business 
transformation process but also to install in the minds and spirits of the regional logistics players 
that their only way towards sustainable business or to be globally competitive was to undertake a 
permanent business transformation. This entailed a constant change and innovation process 
facilitated through corporate networking, sharing and transferring knowledge, cooperation, 
collaboration, and leadership. The Corridor is regarded as a fundamental tool for the general 
betterment of the regional logistic sector as well as the most adequate entity to anticipate trends 
that help companies make their businesses sustainable. The situation is summarised using a PM 
perspective and illustrated in Figure 10.1. 
 
 
Figure 10.1: View of the Corridor’s Role in JV Development 
 
Figure 10.1 illustrates the formation of a JV through using a PM perspective based on the 
research findings. The Corridor project business transformation process passed through an 
awareness gestation phase then through to initiation and briefing where various forms, 
combinations of roles and ways of collaborating were discussed and decided upon. This was 
followed by the actual design of the JV and that passed into the reality of the JV. The thesis 
focuses upon the end of the awareness phase as it recursively slipped into the initiation and 
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briefing phase and then into the start of the design of JVs and how they may be formed. Figure 
10.1 also summarizes how the external environment impacted upon this process, how competitive 
advantage helped shape the drivers for change and how the Corridor facilitated the shaping of 
JVs and alliances. 
 
At the initial stage, the separate parties joined together under the facilitation and auspices of the 
Corridor. This entity was sanctioned by advancing the MERCOSUR ideals and it was established 
as a safe (trustworthy) place in which representatives of member firms could meet and exchange 
knowledge and to solve problems. This helped the engaged firms to form a CoP and later more 
intimate groups coalesced into JV type arrangements and so the Corridor also had a role as a 
business incubator and change agent.  
 
The role of the Corridor fulfils an important stakeholder engagement role. Stakeholders included 
the MERCOSUR member states and their constituencies, the firms that joined the Corridor as 
well as customers and clients of these firms. The Corridor, therefore, helped to draw together 
stakeholder representatives through the roundtable discussions. Stakeholder engagement is an 
important element of designing value into any project procurement arrangement (Walker, Bourne 
and Rowlinson, 2008).  The project phases during which all this intense interaction took place 
was the awareness, initiation and recursive design and development of the JV.     
 
10.4– LIMITATIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND FUTURE POTENTIAL 
This thesis research methodology was based on a qualitative approach where personal interviews 
and both my direct observation and participation in most of the cases were crucial to determine 
what the findings of the study turned out to be. A quantitative approach might have accurately 
identified some useful economic data relating to business failures, trends in changed company 
formation and changes in profits or losses sustained over the studied period. However, these can 
never explain what was actually happening on the ground, what was motivating and influencing 
such changes and how it all transpired the way it did. The research questions are framed around 
gaining an understanding about issues that could not effectively be studied using quantitative 
data. I had the opportunity as an active participant and reflective practitioner with strong 
connections to the players and a deep understanding of the ‘soft’ variables at play such as culture, 
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geography, and business practice, to be able to gather qualitative data to help explain subtle 
issues at the micro level as well as my understanding of the Corridor’s role at the macro level. 
 
A quantitative approach might have been perhaps more accurate in establishing certain 
parameters or identifying some trends which otherwise may be influenced by my past 
professional experience, cultural origin, and personal views on certain topics. Even though this 
may pose a limitation on the depth of this thesis’ findings, I have paid special attention to these 
aspects in order to avoid misinterpreting the findings.  
 
The justification for using a qualitative rather than quantitative research design was the need to 
access deep and rich data and insights provided by participants and my own role as a reflective 
practitioner. This kind of research design makes replication impossible (as much of the data and 
insights are highly idiosyncratic) even though the approach could be mimicked for other similar 
research projects by others in a similar fortunate position to have similar access. In this sense it 
contributes and adds to insights about how a practitioner can develop reflective skills. 
 
This thesis does not delve into the role or influence that the public sector might have played or 
exerted on the Corridor as an entity and all of the case studies, but that limitation does refer to 
this aspect as a pending issue subject to further study. The absence of this analysis raises a 
question mark as regards the interaction of the public and private sectors from a project 
management perspective as well as its potential impact on the business transformation trend the 
Corridor has so vigorously commenced. 
 
This study did not address the IT component by which the many roundtable forums were 
integrated and their insights and results (tacit and explicit knowledge) circulated amongst the 
stakeholders. Doing this was beyond the scope of the DPM thesis that would have led to 
developing an entirely new thesis. Consequently this project opens up the possibility to deepen 
insights further from a communications technology perspective.   
 
A clear limitation and therefore a potential recommendation for future study is the geopolitical 
perspective the Corridor holds with respect to its clearly dynamic dimension in terms of 
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innovation and expansion. Innovation leads to cope with new ideas and concepts that can be 
added to the betterment of the various sectors and the region as a whole, and expansion entails 
adhering new countries and segments needing business transformation.  
 
Further study is recommended on the comparative analysis of different regions of the world 
where structural asymmetries can be found in various regions where production and consuming 
poles can be brought together in far more efficient ways (e.g. Australia/New Zealand and south 
east Asia; southern Europe and North Africa; USA/Canada and central America & the Caribbean; 
eastern Europe and the Middle East). Maritime affairs in the ground of fisheries, off-shore oil and 
gas, wind energy, sea-bed mining, marine environment, tourism and even Antarctic interests 
might find it useful to be integrated within a Corridor-like organization and to simultaneously 
tackle a number of supranational aspects of economic and geopolitical dimensions. 
 
The Corridor’s future potential is therefore defined by its capacity to generate not only defensive 
strategies to overcome a volatile and uncertain business context, but also to transform realities by 
means of cooperation, collaboration, culture, knowledge, and leadership put all together to work. 
The Corridor model may turn out to be useful anywhere structural asymmetries are found and 
trading practices need substantial improvement.   
 
Finally, the recent global financial crisis has not been considered at all because the data gathering 
and validation phase of this thesis preceded that crisis. In many ways it bears similarities, as a 
massive shock, to the economic system in the way that the globalization wave triggered changes 
facilitated by the Corridor. It would be interesting for future research to be undertaken to track 
and better understand the way that the Corridor partners may be a) better prepared to cope with 
the consequences of this crisis and b) what form that coping and adjustment mechanism may 
take, particularly as government agencies may be a significant player in that process as appears to 
be the emerging case as governments move towards direct interventions.  
 
10-5 INSIGHTS AND SUGGESTED CORRIDOR IMPROVEMENTS 
The Corridor has been shown to be an unusual, even a unique, entity. This thesis has not 
proposed to assign a particular term that can describe beyond being a form of Strategic CoP as 
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the title conveys. The Corridor is a commercial entity that was initially formed to facilitate 
business transformations, improvements in business processes and knowledge exchange to 
overcome common (to participants) challenges posed by the globalization wave and the 
implications of the MERCOSUR. However, its role grew more significant as a market for 
knowledge exchange and its role as brokering firm collaboration, supply chain integration, 
formation of radical business transformation through JVs and forms of alliance. It became a 
unique business incubator and model for managing complex programs of business change 
projects. While this may imply a role akin to a strategic PMO, the Corridor never had the 
authority to impose strategy and indeed there was not an intention to do so. While it was able to 
draw out from participants involved in its transformation projects in particular, sound practices 
that could be shared and adapted by other participants it was not an authority that could demand 
anything. It resembled a kind of midwife that delivers babies but it also (to use that analogy) was 
a matchmaker that brought firms together to conceive new possibilities. Knowledge and skill was 
the currency used in facilitating these transformations. Trust and commitment in members was 
inspired by the form of leadership adopted that fitted the culture.  
 
In this regard, the Corridor is best viewed as a form of CoP but it takes a unique place in the 
continuum of CoPs from wholly anarchic ones based on disparate individuals with a common 
passion to a calculative corporative CoP that has been established by some form of recognized 
powerful authority that retains influence over its members. 
 
The Corridor’s strength is its tacit and collegial support that it has managed to gain so that 
commitment is generally affective rather than normative or continuance (Meyer and Allen, 1991). 
Two major improvements have been suggested in this thesis that the Corridor could consider. 
First, is that the possibility of government participation should be explored and enacted so long as 
the special authority of the Corridor through its trust is not compromised. Second, the IT 
supporting infrastructure that was for scope reasons excluded from the thesis could be reviewed 
as advances in this area have been radical over the past decade.     
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10.6- CHAPTER SUMMARY 
This chapter concludes the thesis. It has presented structural conclusions relevant to the thesis and 
also restated the research proposition and summarized the main factors that underpin it. 
Responses to the six research questions posed was also summarized and explained using Figure 
10.1 to presented a model of the formation of JVs through the Corridor’s facilitation taken from a 
PM perspective. The research limitations were explained and further research gaps were 
identified for future researchers to address. The final section ended with a speculative comment 
relating to the emerging global financial crisis that gripped the world during the end of 2009 
while this thesis was being written up and so is beyond the scope of further research. 
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GLOSSARY 
 
ALADI: Latin American Association of Economic Integration  
ALL: America Latina Logistica 
ATZ: Auto Terminal Zarate 
BAP: Buenos Aires al Pacifico 
CAFTA: Central America Free Trade Agreement 
CARICOM: Caribbean Community 
CET: Common External Tariff 
CDS: Construction Differential Subsidy 
COE: Centre of Excellence  
COP: Communities of Practice 
DPM: Doctor of Project Management 
ECLAC: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean 
ELMA: Empresa de Lineas Maritimas Argentinas 
FO: Fuel Oil 
GATT: General Agreement on trade and Tariffs 
GPS: Global Positioning System 
HCO: Health Care Organization 
KM: Knowledge Management 
KPI: Key Performance Indicator 
MERCOSUR: Southern Common Market 
MTC: Mercosur Trade Centre 
NAFTA: North America Free Trade Agreement 
NMC: Northern Maritime Corridor 
NVOCC: Non-Vessel Operating Common Carrier 
ODS: Operating Differential Subsidy 
PMBOK: Project Management Body of Knowledge 
PMO: Project Management Office 
PNW: Pacific North West 
RBV: Resource Based View 
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RO/RO: Roll-on / Roll-ff 
SAMEC or SAEC: South America East Coast 
SAMWC or SAWC: South America West Coast 
SECI: Socialization, Externalization, Combination, Internalization 
3PL: Third Party Logistics 
TCE: Transaction Cost Economics 
TMM: Transportadora Maritima Mexicana 
TAT: Turn-Around-Time 
TEU: Twenty Equivalent Units 
USEC+G: United States East Coast and Gulf 
USEWC: United States West Coast 
VSA: Vessel Sharing Agreement 
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APPENDICES 
 
APPENDIX A: EXTRACT FROM THE TREATY OF ASUNCION 
 
Treaty of Asunción 
30 I.L.M. 1041 (March 26, 1991) 
Appendix I: Treaty of Asunción. 
SOUTHERN COMMON MARKET (MERCOSUR) AGREEMENT (Original: Spanish) 
Treaty Establishing a Common Market between the Argentine Republic, the Federal Republic of 
Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the Eastern Republic of Uruguay. 
The Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Republic of Paraguay and the 
Eastern Republic of Uruguay, hereinafter referred to as the “States Parties’ 
CONSIDERING that the expansion of their domestic markets, through integration, is a vital 
prerequisite for accelerating their processes of economic development with social justice, 
BELIEVING that this objective must be achieved by making optimum use of available resources, 
preserving the environment, improving physical links, coordinating macroeconomic policies and 
ensuring complementarity between the different sectors of the economy, based on the principles of 
gradualism, flexibility and balance, 
BEARING IN MIND international trends, particularly the integration of large economic areas and 
the importance of securing their countries a proper place in the international economy. 
BELIEVING that this integration process is an appropriate response to such trends, 
AWARE that this Treaty must be viewed as a further step in efforts gradually to bring about Latin 
American integration, in keeping with the objectives of the Montevideo Treaty in 1980, 
CONVINCED of the need to promote the scientific and technological development of the States 
Parties and to modernize their economies in order to expand the supply and improve the quality of 
available goods and services, with a view to enhancing the living conditions of their populations, 
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REAFFIRMING their political will to lay the bases for increasingly close ties between their peoples, 
with a view to achieving the above-mentioned objectives, HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS: 
 
CHAPTER I: PURPOSES, PRINCIPLES AND INSTRUMENTS 
Article I 
The States Parties hereby decide to establish a common market, which shall be in place by 31 
December 1994 and shall be called the “common market of the southern cone” (MERCOSUR). 
This common market shall involve: 
The free movement of goods, services and factors of production between countries through, inter 
alia, the elimination of customs duties and non-tariff restrictions on the movement of goods, and any 
other equivalent measures; 
The establishment of a common external tariff and the adoption of a common trade policy in relation 
to third States or groups of States, and the co-ordination of positions in regional and international 
economic and commercial forums; 
The co-ordination of macroeconomic and sectoral policies between the States Parties in the areas of 
foreign trade, agriculture, industry, fiscal and monetary matters, foreign exchange and capital, 
services, customs, transport and communications and any other areas that may be agreed upon, in 
order to ensure proper competition between the States Parties; 
The commitment by States Parties to harmonize their legislation in the relevant areas in order to 
strengthen the integration process. 
Article 2 
The common market shall be based on reciprocity of rights and obligations between the States 
Parties. 
Article 3 
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During the transition period, which shall last from the entry into force of this Treaty until 31 
December 1994, and in order to facilitate the formation of the common market, the States Parties 
shall adopt general rules of origin, a system for the settlement of disputes and safeguard clauses, as 
contained in Annexes 11. III and IV respectively to this Treaty. 
Article 4 
The States Parties shall ensure equitable trade terms in their relations with third countries. To that 
end, they shall apply their domestic legislation to restrict imports whose prices are influenced by 
subsidies, dumping or any other unfair practice. At the same time, States Parties shall co-ordinate 
their respective domestic policies with a view to drafting common rules for trade competition. 
Article 5 
During the transition period, the main instruments for putting in place the common market shall be: 
(a) A trade liberalization programme, which shall consist of progressive linear and automatic tariff 
reductions accompanied by the elimination of non-tariff restrictions or equivalent measures, as well 
as any other restrictions on trade between the States Parties, with a view to arriving at a zero tariff 
and no non-tariff restrictions for the entire tariff area by 31 December 1994 (Annex I); 
(b) The co-ordination of macroeconomic policies which shall be carried out gradually and in parallel 
with the programmes for the reduction of tariffs and the elimination of non-tariff restrictions referred 
to in the preceding paragraph; 
(c) A common external tariff which encourages the foreign competitiveness of the States Parties; 
(d) The adoption of sectoral agreements in order to optimize the use and mobility of factors of 
production and to achieve efficient scales of operation. 
Article 6 
The States parties recognize certain differentials in the rate at which the Republic of Paraguay and 
the Eastern Republic of Uruguay will make the transition. These differentials are indicated in the 
trade liberalization programme (Annex 1). Article 7 
In the area of taxes, charges and other internal duties, products originating in the territory of one 
State Party shall enjoy, in the other States Parties, the same treatment as domestically produced 
products. 
Article 8 
The States Parties undertake to abide by commitments made prior to the date of signing of this 
Treaty, including agreements signed in the framework of the Latin American Integration Association 
(ALADI), and to co-ordinate their positions in any external trade negotiations they may undertake 
during the transitional period. To that end: 
(a) They shall avoid affecting the interests of the States Parties in any trade negotiations they may 
conduct among themselves up to 31 December 1994; (b) They shall avoid affecting the interests of 
the other States Parties or the aims of the common market in any agreements they may conclude 
with other countries members of the Latin American Integration Association during the transition 
period; 
(c) They shall consult among themselves whenever negotiating comprehensive tariff reduction 
schemes for the formation of free trade areas with other countries members of the Latin American 
Integration Association; 
(d) They shall extend automatically to the other States Parties any advantage, favour, exemption, 
immunity or privilege granted to a product originating in or destined for third countries which are 
not members of the Latin American Integration Association. 
 
 
 348
APPENDIX B : EXTRACT OF THE PROTOCOL OF OURO PRETO 
 
Appendix II Protocol of Ouro Preto 
Regarding the Institutional Structure of 
MERCOSUR 
(December 17, 1994) 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY PROTOCOL TO THE ASUNCION AGREEMENT ON THE 
INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE MERCOSUR 
—OURO PRETO PROTOCOL— The Argentine Republic, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the 
Republic of Paraguay and the Oriental Republic of Uruguay, hereinafter referred to as the “Party 
States:” In compliance with Article 18 of the Treaty of Asunción of March 26, 1991; Considering 
the importance of the advances already achieved and the implementation of a joint customs union as 
a stage in the creation of a common market; 
Reaffirming the principles and objectives of the Treaty of Asunción and mindful of the need for 
special considerations towards the lesser developed countries and regions within the Mercosur; 
Mindful of the dynamics implicit in the entire integration process and the consequent need to adapt 
the institutional structure of the Mercosur to changes that have taken place; 
Recognizing the outstanding job performed by the existing administrative bodies during the 
transition period; 
Agree: 
Chapter I 
Mercosur Structure 
Article I 
The institutional structure of Mercosur shall comprise the following administrative bodies: 
I—The Common Market Council (“CMC”); 
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Il—The Common Market Group (“CMG”); 
111—The Mercosur Commerce Commission (“MCC”); 
IV—The Joint Parliamentary Commission (“JPC”); 
V—The Socio-Economic Consultative Forum (“SECF”) 
VI—The Administrative Secretariat of Mercosur (“ASM”) 
Sole paragraph—Any auxiliary organs deemed necessary to attain the objectives of the integration 
process may be created under the terms of this Protocol. 
Article 2 
The Common Market Council, the Common Market Group and the Mercosur 
Commerce Commission are intergovernmental organizations with decisionmaking 
powers. 
Section 1 
The Common Market Council 
Article 3 
The Common Market Council is the highest administrative body of the Mercosur. 
It is charged with political leadership of the integration process, and with making 
348 
those decisions necessary to ensure that the objectives established by the Asunción 
Agreement are met and that the common market becomes fully established. 
Article 4 
The Common Market Council shall consist of the Ministers of Foreign Relations and Economics, or 
their equivalents, from each Party State. 
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Article 5 
The Common Market Council’s Chairmanship shall rotate among the Party 
States, in alphabetical order, for six-month terms. 
Article 6 
The Common Market Council shall meet as often as it deems necessary, but no 
less than once every six months, with participation by the Presidents of each 
Party State. 
Article 7 
The Ministers of Foreign Relations shall coordinate the meetings of the Common Market Council, 
and other Ministers or authorities at the cabinet level may be invited to participate. 
Article 8 
The following are functions and powers of the Common Market Council: 
I—To ensure the implementation of the Treaty of Asunción, its Protocols and the agreements signed 
within its framework; 
Il—To formulate policies and promote necessary actions that will constitute the common market; 
Ill—lb assume the legal personality of Mercosur; 
tV—To negotiate and sign agreements on behalf of Mercosur, with third countries, groups of 
countries and international bodies. Said functions may be delegated by express mandate to the 
Common Market Group under the conditions set by Article XIV, paragraph VII; 
V—To rule on proposals submitted to it by the Common Market Group; VT—To organize the 
Ministers’ meetings and rule on agreements submitted to it from those meetings; 
Vu—To create, modify or eliminate whatever administrative bodies it deems appropriate; 
VIII —To clarify the contents and scope of its Decisions, when deemed appropriate; 
lX—To nominate the Director of the Mercosur Administrative Secretariat; X—To issue financial 
and budgetary Decisions; 
XI—To approve the internal operating procedures of the Common Market 
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APPENDIX D: EXTRACT OF THE CORRIDOR’S PROTOCOL OF 
INTENTIONS 
 
Protocol of Intentions 
Atlantic Corridor for Mercosur 
ANEX I 
1 - South America is unequally occupied in demographic and economic terms, an enormous inland space almost empty. involved 
by a coastal belt of demographic density much superior. 
Particularly, the Atlantic coast of the continent harbors most part of M l RCOSUL’S economy and population. 
In this coastal belt three sub regions are identified: 
The north-northeast region of Brazil. with a population of about 50 millions, and a GNP (Gross National Product) close to 60 
billion dollars. 
The South-Southea.st brazilian coastal region, with a population of about 90 millions of inhabitants, and GNP close to400 
million dollars. 
The region of River Plate, (Great Buenos Aires), and Uruguay, with population close 1020 millions of inhabitants, and GNP 
close to 70 billion dollars. 
2 - These regions, are distributed alongside the Atlantic coast of South America. through considerable distances. For example, 
the state of MaranhAo. north of Brazil, and Estuário do Prata, (River Plate), measure nearto 5000 Km. 
Despite this fact, the transportation is made basically by truck. As a consequence. the costs are very high, turning diflicult the 
interchange among the several sub-regions, nearly obstructing, for instance, an effective integration of the north-northeast 
region with the economic block of 
MERCOSUL 
Obviously, the ports and the coastal navigation should constitute the main element of role among these regions. And also, 
each port should perform the active linkage of development pole in its own region of influence. 
3 - Considering these facts as of crucial importance for the balanced development of the MERCOSUL, the group of entities 
who sign this document, decided to form an organization aiming at addressing these questions in an integrated torm, 
In this respect, they propose to undertake the following activities: 
a- Promote the creation of a real “ MERCOSUL Atlantic Corridor” integrated by ports and terminals connected among 
themselves with a regular shipping lines system. 
b - Attract the private investment for ports, navigation, and for installations of support to the system. 
c- The efficient integration of these ports, with their own regions of influence, through efficient railroads, highways and river 
networks. 
d - Gradual reduction of the transportation costs, based on the concept “door to door”, through the transference from the intra 
coastal highway network to the coastal navigation of huge volumes of cargo. 
e- Optimization of economic exchanges among the different regions involved, in special between the extreme points northnortheast 
and River Plate. 
f- The transformation of ports, into poles of regional economic development and promoting centers of commerce and 
investment for their regions ofinfluence 
g - The creation of port-industrial zones in the coast of South America, through the attraction of industrial projects which 
benefit from the presence of ports. 
h - The planning of ecological urban and social development, of the port zones, aiming the protection and recuperation of the 
environmental property, the balanced development of the local infra-structure and the planned incorporation of the population 
of the port cities to the process. 
4- Aiming the opcrationalization of theses goals, the constitution of the following institutional mechanisms are intended: 
a - A consortium formed by the mentioned entities, associated to private companies and business federations, in special to 
those belonging to the zone of influence ofthe various ports. 
b - A South American center of port development, formed by universities and research centers of the regions involved. 
c- The consortium will be organized in the terms of a non profit private society. Its activity will be, mainly carried out through 
partnerships and associations with investors and companies willing to participate, taking as example the “ modus operandi” of 
the operational consortium of the CENTER- EAST corridor. 
d - The South American Center of Port Development will have as objective the formation of personnel, training, technological 
development and rendering services in the different fields involved in the project. 
5- Based on this fact, the undersigned entities, undertake through this document, the commitment to develop jointly, their best 
efforts with a view to implement these intentions. 
Rio de Janeiro, 05 September. 1996 
 
 
 
 
